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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the impact of the New World Order on the Arab-Israeli peace process. 
It argues that, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the old 
bipolar World Order has disappeared and a new unipolar one has emerged. The United 
States of America, as the only remaining single superpower, has enjoyed a great degree of 
influence and a kind of hegemony in international affairs. Its military superiority and 
economic, technological and diplomatic strength, in the absence of any competing power, 
have given it the upper hand to pursue its own policies and its own interests. 
This American unipolarity and hegemony are clearly demonstrated in the Middle 
East peace process. The United States' unipolarity on the international level and its 
hegemony on the regional level have allowed it to pursue policies to resolve the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Regional states, released from the constraints or protection of the patron-
client relationships fostered under the bi-polar Old World Order, have adjusted their own 
policies to take into account this New World Order. A neo-realist understanding of this has 
been developed which assesses this process in terms of international and regional balance 
of power and "rules of the game". 
This method had been used to understand the reasons for and nature of the Arab-
Israeli peace negotiations that started at Madrid in 1991 and developed in Oslo in 1993. 
The thesis argues that these negotiations were in fact a single process which was the direct 
result of this American-led New World Order. Whether through direct or indirect American 
involvement or through the indirect or direct acknowledgement by regional actors of the 
nature of the New World Order, American interests and preferences have been strongly 
reflected in the peace process. 
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INTRODUCTION 1 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Introducing this thesis I would start by saying that the impact of changes in the 
international level on the Middle East peace process is a subject of great importance that 
justifies its study. This importance stems not only from the importance of the region itself 
but also from the importance of its stability for world peace and security and thus for the 
World Order. The topic however has its own sensitivities. National and religious aspects, 
together with historical grievances, create a huge emotional burden on the shoulders of 
Arab and Israeli researchers who study the Arab-Israeli issues. Courage, objectivity and a 
considerable degree of independence are essentially needed. 
Although a lot has been written and published on the New World Order on one hand 
and the Arab-Israeli peace process on the other, linking the two variables in an academic 
study that follows the developments of the peace process up to 1999 has not yet been fully 
achieved. The contribution of this thesis is that it tries to present a new understanding or at 
least a different look at the subject. The impact of the New World Order on the Arab-Israeli 
peace process as this study wil l argue is huge, important and evident. 
The hypothesis of this study is that "the Arab-Israeli peace process has been not 
only influenced but determined and shaped by the new distribution of power, rules and 
conditions of the New World Order in which America has played the role of a single 
hegemonic superpower". This American unipolarity and hegemony, especially in the 
Middle East, made the peace process an American-led policy in the first place, both in 
planning and implementation. The nature of the American-Israeli special relation, and its 
strategic characteristic that stems from the impact of domestic policies, made this policy in 
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one way or another a reflection of this important factor. The American sponsored peace 
process was on the other hand evidence of the USA's international unipolarity and regional 
hegemony. 
This thesis wil l use a theoretical analysis rather than empirical experiment. The 
methodology in this research is based on an attempt to apply a theoretical framework on a 
specific political process. It is based partly on content analysis of documents and 
agreements of the Arab-Israeli peace process. The theoretical framework wil l be built on 
understanding the major theories of international relations and comparing the two 
international systems (the old bipolar system and the new unipolar system of American 
hegemony). 
Although other school of thoughts wil l be looked at, a neo-realist approach will be 
used as the suitable tool for understanding the World Order and thus its impact on regional 
sub-systems. Neo-realists view the World Order as a product of a stable distribution of 
power among the major states and regulation of world stability through the balance of 
power mechanism. A neo-realist understanding also encompasses acknowledgement of 
"rules" by which states play in the international system. These may be formal or informal 
rules but are collectively recognised and inform states on how best to pursue their national 
interests. 
As it is important to understand the Old World Order in order to understand the 
New World Order, it is clear that the Old World Order was, as Barrie Axford pointed out, 
"constituted by the stable condition of bipolarity known as the Cold War."1 The Cold War 
is a term describing the nature of international relations during the period 1945-1989 and 
'Axford, B., The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture, (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1996). 
INTRODUCTION 3 
was the main feature of the international system during that period, characterized by 
ideological struggle. 
During the Cold War the international relations of the Middle East were determined 
largely by the superpowers' struggle for power and domination. The international system's 
impact on the region was intense in the Middle East because the superpowers have 
penetrated and shaped it far more than other regions. The states of the region aligned 
themselves with one or other of the superpowers to serve their own interests. The 
superpowers on their part sought to use regional conflicts to advance their own interests as 
well. These alignments came to resemble patron-client relationships. This relation inter-
linked the superpower conflict with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The hostile relations and lack 
of cooperation between the two superpowers affected the Middle East more than any other 
region. This effect will be examined through looking at the Arab-Israeli peace process, 
arguing that the Cold war stalemate has been imposed on the Arab-Israeli conflict and that 
the Arab-Israeli peace process was frozen because of the Old "Cold War" World Order. 
The New World Order can be contrasted with the Old World Order. The New 
World Order is a term that describes the new pattern of international relations following the 
end of the Cold War. The task wil l be not only to define the term but also to look at the 
different alternative possible characteristics and prove that the neo-realist notion of 
unipolarity with USA playing the role of hegemon is the right interpretation of recent 
international and regional events. 
My argument in this study is that the collapse of the Soviet Union gave the USA a 
role that has no description other than hegemony. This hegemony, even i f it does not mean 
an absolute hegemony in the extreme meaning of the word, does mean a clear ability to 
impose its political views, especially concerning the resolution of international conflicts. 
This has been pursued either by using its political, economic and military power or its 
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influence on international organizations. It has also been the result of the diminishment of 
patron-client relationships and the recognition by regional states that new "rules" are in 
operation i f they wish to successfully pursue their national interests. 
This hegemony cannot be seen more clearly than in the Middle East. The 
importance of the region for American interests made it the focus of the USA's policy to 
protect the American interests, most important of which are oil and Israel. To this end, the 
USA instigated the Madrid Peace process. When this process failed to produce the desired 
results, it endorsed and in the end directly engaged in the Oslo peace process which was not 
a totally separate thing from the Madrid peace process but a continuation of it. Both 
processes emerged from the dynamics of the New World Order and the understandings of 
regional states of those dynamics. To understand American hegemony and its impact on the 
peace process, a detailed study of both the Madrid and Oslo peace process is essential. 
Analyzing developments of the peace process starting from Baker's trips following 
the Gulf War and Madrid Conference and later on, Oslo I agreement, the Jordanian-Israeli 
peace agreement and the Palestinian-Israeli agreements of Cairo, Taba (Oslo II), Hebron, 
Wye River and up to Sharm al-Sheikh's memorandum wil l be the main focus in this study. 
This study argues that the Madrid Conference was possible only because of the radical 
transformation in the international and regional balances of power. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union on the international level and the defeat of Iraq on the regional level (as well 
as a number of other related factors), which were symptomatic of the New World Order, 
enabled or forced the sides to set down at the negotiation table and reach agreements after 
decades of conflict. 
Because of practical reasons this thesis did not carry out any interviews or 
questionnaires. From the author's point of view they were not essential. For the same 
practical reasons, the author was not able to make any field study or visit the region during 
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his conduct of this research, although he originally comes from the Middle East. Instead, 
extensive reading compounded with close examination of documents, political statements, 
memoirs and events were the main tools of research. The theoretical structure and content 
analysis as a base for this study were based on extensive reading of the literature, including 
a huge flow of information and analysis. Already published interviews with leaders 
concerned were however used. Those leaders' words were important, but not sufficient in 
themselves. Reading between the lines and understanding what is happening behind the 
scene was much more important, because leaders use their political statements as part of 
their strategies and tactics in the ongoing peace process. Because there is always suspicion 
that some deals were not made public there was a need for making some speculation. 
The contradictory accounts of events by the different parties created an obligation 
on the author for deeper and careful examination of what has been written and said. 
Although the author used the English and Arabic languages for reading and examining the 
material used in this study, materials written in Hebrew were not consulted. Because of 
Israeli wide use of English for presenting and explaining their views this was not a big 
problem and did not represent an important gap. It is important to mention here that the 
continuing and fast developments in the World Order and the peace process created 
difficulties but at the same time challenges to the hypothesis of this study. 
This research has been organized into two parts and five chapters. Part one is a 
theoretical framework divided into two chapters. Chapter one studies the old Cold War 
order, while chapter two analyses the New World Order. Part two is about the implications 
of the New World Order on the Arab-Israeli peace process and divided into three chapters. 
Chapter three is about the history of the peace process from 1948 to 1991. Chapter four 
discusses Madrid peace process 1991-1993, while chapter five discusses the Oslo peace 
process 1993-1999. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
T H E OLD WORLD ORDER 
Though the Cold War has preserved the world conflicts it has also ensured that the 
superpowers have been very anxious to retain some degree of control over their 
'clients' and to ensure that conflicts in the Middle East did not lead to direct 
conflict between the superpowers. The clients have been kept on a reasonably 
tight rein, though not without risks. So the superpower competition in the region 
has had the effect of keeping conflicts running whilst seeing that they do not 
1 
escalate out of control. 
(Joshua Goldstein) 
Introduction 
The Old World Order is a term which I am using here to describe the old pattern of 
international relations that dominated following the end of World War I I . There can be 
no doubt that such a pattern of international relations did in fact exist in the international 
arena and, more specifically, in relations between the two superpowers of the globe. The 
most significant features of that Old World Order were its bipolarity and the Cold War. 
In order to build up a theoretical and conceptual framework for this study on the 
relations between the international system and the Middle East sub-system, and 
consequently the impact of the successive World Orders (Old and New) on Middle 
Eastern international relations in general, and the Arab-Israeli peace process in 
particular, I wil l devote the whole of this chapter to studying the Old World Order. That 
is the Cold War, which began following the end of the Second World War and 
continued until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. 
1 Goldstein, J., International Relations, (New York: Longman, 1999), p .20. 
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In the attempt to arrive at a better understanding of this pattern of international 
relations, which historically had a strong effect on the Middle East region -as a highly 
penetrated sub-system of the international system- I wi l l first review the two principal 
schools of thought in International Relations and define some indispensable concepts 
and terms such as world order, power and balance of power. I wi l l be choosing to utilise 
a neo-realist understanding of World Order which assumes the following: that the state 
is the primary but not the sole actor; that the nature of the international system at any 
given point in time needs to be considered; that this international system can be viewed 
as a distribution of power as well as a system of rules that affect the behaviour of states; 
and that power should not be confined to just military definitions but also economic, 
diplomatic and other forms of influence. 
I wil l proceed to identify the distinguishing characteristics of the Old World 
Order. I will conclude that there existed a bipolar balance of power, which resulted from 
the so-called Cold War between the USA and USSR; that the international system 
demanded that regional states aligned themselves with one or other superpower - or that 
they sought to play the superpowers o f f against one another with policies of non-
alignment; and that in doing so they were acting as rational actors advancing their own 
interests. 
I wil l then clarify, and explain how the Old World Order influenced and shaped 
Middle East politics. Specifically, I wil l argue that, with respect to the international 
system as a whole, the Middle East should be viewed as a highly penetrated regional 
sub-system, and secondly, as a consequence of this, that it should be understood that 
during the Cold War the international relations of the Middle East were determined 
largely, though not exclusively, by the superpowers struggle for domination. Regional 
states, and in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the PLO, sought alliances with one or 
other of the superpowers in order to advance their own interests within that conflict, 
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dividing the region. Equally, however, the regional conflict affected the relationship 
between the superpowers. 
Schools of Thought 
Among the many schools of thought and paradigms of international relations, I wil l 
examine here the two recognised by Joseph Nye as the most influential; the realist and 
liberal schools. 
Realists see international politics occurring among sovereign states balancing 
each other's power. For them World Order is the product of a stable distribution of 
power among the major states. World Order, according to this logic is the regulation of 
world stability through the balance of power mechanism. Distribution of power between 
states represents the essential form for maintaining every World Order. World Order is 
not governed by international law and supra-national government, but by competition 
between the internationally dominant powers. Thus, a stable World Order can only be 
achieved by dominant actors or by balance of power between states. This distribution of 
power and maintaining that balance provides the source of World Order for realists. 
Change in this distribution of power can lead to change in World Order. 
Realism is a theory that maintains that insecurity, aggression, and wars are 
2 
permanent possibilities in the international state system. 
Both realism (and its offshoot, neo-realism, which is discussed below) sees international 
relations as a timeless present. 
The classical realists see conflict between states as a manifestation of a flawed and 
unchanging human nature. The neo-realists see an endless interplay of states 
2 Fukuyama, F., The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: Penguin Books Ltd, 
1992), p. 254. 
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wanting to survive, within different distributions of powers, in a condition of 
anarchy. 
The realist case, it is acknowledged, is "not a homogeneous one as such. Instead, two 
major variants on the realist theme are accorded significance. The first (the official 
USA/Western approach) suggests that the Cold War was an inevitable outcome of the 
post-World War I I power structure, in which the victorious democratic powers were 
confronted by the Soviet Union -an erstwhile ally- now ideologically committed to the 
destruction of liberal-capitalist principles and, ultimately, to world domination. The 
4 
second realist variant also blames the Soviet Union for the Cold War." 
The tradition of classical realism focused on the nation-state as the principal 
actor in world politics. Realism emphasises the role of the state. The state is a unitary, 
rational actor, a principal actor in international relations and is pre-occupied with 
national security. "Its central proposition is that since the purpose of statecraft is 
national survival in a hostile environment, the acquisition of power is the proper, 
rational and inevitable goal of foreign policy - 'the struggle for power' ". 
Neo-realism, however, puts its emphasis on the structure of the international 
system. It sees the structure of the international system as determining the behaviour of 
3 The main exponents of both viewpoints are Niebuhr and Waltz. See Booth, K., "Dare 
not to Know: International Relations Theory versus the Future," in K. Booth., 
International Relations Theory Today, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 12. 
4 George, J., Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re) introduction to International 
Relations, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), p. 83. 
5 Stone, L., Notes Towards a Definition of Politics, (Ankara: ATS Publication, 1998), p. 
34. 
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states. The behaviour of states is governed by a set of rational principles based on 
national interests.6 
According to Leonard A. Stone, neo-realism has accommodated international 
economics to the realist line of thought, and also lays greater emphasis on the 
explanatory power of the character of the international system (especially in terms of 
the major powers). Neo-realist or structural realist theories of international politics 
focus on the effects of anarchy and the global distribution of capabilities on state 
behaviour and international outcomes. As long as anarchy (in the sense of the absence 
of an international government) persists, the key variable for understanding 
international politics is the distribution of world power as measured by the number of 
8 
the great powers. In summarising realism and neo-realism, Leonard A. Stone wrote: 
For realists and their works, such as Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations: 
The Struggle for power and Peace (1948), and Kenneth Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics (1979), the key actors are states, who, within certain 
processes always seek for security (usually defined in military terms). Neo-
realism has added a further dimension by offering a wide-ranging analysis of 
international political economy. For realists, international relations is essentially 
about states and their interests in maximising their power in a world characterised 
by struggle for dominance. War is never far away, and peace is held together 
9 
through balance of power, international law (gradually) and adept diplomacy. 
6 Keohane, R., Newrealism and its Critics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986), p. 7. 
7 Stone, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 35. 
8 See Keohane, R., "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond" in R. 
Keohane., (1986), Op. Cit., pp. 158-203. 
9 Stone, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 33. 
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For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to note that for both realism and neo-
realism, foreign policies are determined in the first place by the international political 
system. 
The second view of World Order according to Joseph Nye is that made by 
Liberals. Liberals, look at relations among peoples as well as states. They see order 
arising from broad values like democracy and human rights as well as from 
10 
international law and institutions such as the United Nations. Liberalism is therefore a 
tradition of political thought composed of a set of practical goals and ideals. For 
classical liberal theorists, the individual is the most important unit of analysis and the 
n 
claimant of rights. 
Neoliberalism, sometimes called "neoliberal institutionalism" or "neoidealism", 
seeks to build theories of international relations by giving the basic tenets of classical 
12 
liberalism and post-World I idealism a fresh examination. For the purposes of this 
thesis, it seems inappropriate to use a liberal school methodology since negotiations in 
the Arab-Israeli peace process have historically been between states which have 
themselves shaped their foreign policies with reference to other states and their 
interpretation of the international system. This thesis wi l l therefore utilise a neo-realist 
approach, which recognises both the roles of the state and the international system. 
However, it is my intention to be flexible enough to include the actions and decisions of 
non-state actors such as the PLO or the United Nations where relevant. In this study, the 
1 0 Nye, J., "What New World Order?" Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2, 1992, p. 83. 
1 1 Viotti, P and Kauppi, M. , International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, 
Globalism, (Massachusetts: Viancom Company, 1993), p. 230. 
1 2 Kegley, C and Wittkopf, E., World Politics: Trend and Transformation, (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 31. 
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neo-realists' definition of World Order as a product of a stable distribution of power 
among the major states seems appropriate as a starting point for understanding 
international politics. However, introducing a set of definitions for "World Order" is 
also essential to understand what is meant by the term. Understanding World Order is 
important in understanding its effects -at different stages- on the various regional sub-
systems and on conflicts that occur at that level. Also one must consider the possibility 
of the existence of any counter effect of these sub-systems on the World Order. 
Defining the World Order 
The World Order, or the "Global System" as Al i Hillal Dessouki called it, is defined as 
the "Pattern of interactions among international actors, which take place according to an 
identifiable set of rules." 3 
In order to clarify the term further, it seems to me of benefit to review some 
definitions by different writers to be able to make some comparison and reach a better 
understanding of how the term has been defined and dealt with. According to Yair 
Evron, "World Order" is: 
A neutral term, it does not mean that the world is orderly or tidy. In each period, 
he asserted, there was a world order, and world order is simply the 
characterisation, our conceptualisation of the character of the world: how do the 
14 
political entities that compose the world behave? 
1 3 Korany, B., The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, (Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1991), p. 70. 
1 4 Evron, Y., "The US and the Middle East in the Post Cold War Era," in B. Rubin., 
From War to Peace: Arab-Israeli Relations, 1973-1993, (Brighton: Sussex Academic 
Press, 1994). 
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Writers such as Evan Luard and Joshua Goldstein have emphasised the role of states as 
such political entities. Luard for example emphasised that states interact within rules. 
On this he wrote that: 
States interact within a set of well-defined and long-established 'rules of the 
game' governing what is considered a state and how states treat each other. 
Together these rules shape the international system, as we know it. 
With regard to these rules, in their book entitled Global Problems and World Order R. 
Mckinlay and R. Little wrote that: "Order in its most general sense can be equated with 
a pattern; and any attempt to discover a pattern, therefore, can be identified as a search 
for order."'6 
Again, World Order as David Carlton defines it, is "the patterns of relations among the 
principal actors of world politics -or what has been called the international system-
which have varied considerably over time. Actors include states, private groups, and 
17 
international organisations." Thus, the World Order is the pattern of relations between 
the world's countries and organisations in a specific period governed by the existing 
balance of power. 
World Order further means or implies the regulation of world stability through 
the mechanism of balance of power. The distribution of power between states 
constitutes the main form of control in the World Order. Hence World Order may be 
viewed as a stable distribution of power between major states as well as a pattern of 
behaviour or rules governing the behaviour of states. 
1 5 Luard, E., Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System: A Study of the 
Principles of International Order, (London: Macmillan, 1988). 
1 6 Mckinlay, R and Little, R., Global Problems and World Order, (Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), p. 263. 
1 7 Carlton, D., The Cold War Debated, (New York: McGrow-Hill, 1988), p. 105. 
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The International System 
The other term, which is used sometimes in conjunction with the term World Order, is 
the International System. The International System for Stanley Hoffmann, is "a pattern 
18 
of relations among the basic units of world politics." For Goldstein, however, the 
international system is: "The set of relationships among the world's states, structured 
according to certain rules and patterns of interaction. Some such rules are explicit, some 
19 
implicit." Again we see the concept of a pattern or rules of behaviour as being 
important to our understanding of how international relations work. 
Power 
In order to understand how states -which are the main elements and actors in the 
international system- behave, and to understand the mechanism of the balance of power, 
it is very important to highlight some important points about power. The analysis of the 
international system, as Fred Halliday observed, rests upon, and has recently 
20 
occasioned, a discussion of the nature of power, and specifically of military power. 
For neo-realists power is the main element. It is found in all levels of analysis: the 
21 
individual, the state, and the system. Politics among nations, as Hans Morgenthau has 
1 8 Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 43. 
1 9 Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 11. 
2 0 Halliday, F., "The End of the Cold War and International Relations: Some Analytic 
and Theoretical Conclusions," in K. Booth(ed.) International Relations Theory Today, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p .54. 
Waltz, K., "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power," in R. Keohane., (1986), Op. 
Cit., p. 99-130. 
THE OLD WORLD ORDER 16 
22 
said is a struggle for power, and Bertrand Russell defined power as "the production of 
23 
intended effects." 
For Robert Dahl, power amounts to the control of behaviour. "A has power over 
24 
B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do." 
Thus it can be understood as the ability to make others do what they do not want to do. 
Max Weber's view of power, like Russell's, stressed the element of intention or wi l l but 
unlike him stressed the capacity to realise it and in suggesting that resistance, actual or 
potential, is relevant to attributions of power. Weber defined power as: 
The probability that an actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry 
out his own wil l despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this 
probability rests.25 
Talcott Parsons on the other hand understands by power the general capacity of a social 
26 
system 'to get things done in the interest of collective goal. 
In this case, power can be identified as the ability to control outcomes e.g. state A is 
able to get state B to act in a way which maximises the interests of A. 
According to Joshua Goldstein "World Order has always been grounded in 
power, but order mediates raw power by establishing norms and habits that govern 
, , 2 7 
interactions among states. 
22 
See Morgenthau, H., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 
(New York: Knopt, 1968), p. 336. 
2 3 Lukes, S., Power, (Oxford: Basil Blakwell, 1987), p. 1. 
2 4 Ibid., p. 2. 
2 5 Ibid., p. 3. 
2 6 Ibid., p .3. 
2 7 Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 333. 
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The nature of power -or the mechanisms by which control can be exerted- is 
also subject to debate. Power, from the point of view of pluralists, is multidimensional 
and resides in a multitude of forms, and at varying locations within the international 
28 
system. It has both sources (inputs) which include geographic location, population and 
natural resources, and outputs, which include economic strength, military strength and 
29 
technology. 
Power in my view is this combination of various elements. Military strength can 
not be maintained without economic strength. Economic strength in itself and without 
military might to protect it can not allow a state to be considered as powerful. 
Diplomatic abilities, technological advancements and many other factors are very 
important as bases for state's power. In this study power is the ability of a state to 
implement its policies through using its elements of strength. 
Balance of Power 
The term "balance of power" has come to be associated mainly with the distribution of 
30 
power among states. Many writers, political thinkers and international relations 
analysts have seen the term as the single most important element in the international 
2 8 Nye, (1992), Op. Cit.,p. 83. 
2 9 Halliday, F., "The End of the Cold War and International Relations: Some Analytic 
and Theoretical Conclusions," in K. Booth., (1995), Op. Cit., pp. 38-61. 
3 0 Wagner, R., "What Was Bipolarity?" International Organisation, vol. 47, no. 1, 
Winter 1993, p. 89. 
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system. As Ehteshami has argued; "World Order is governed by the competition 
between hegemonic world powers through the balance of power".3' 
Neo-realism is the school of thought that most emphasised the balance of power 
as a central concept in international relations. According to neo-realism, a balance of 
power may be defined as "the distribution of power in the international political 
32 . . . 
system." We may view the balance of power as an equilibrium between states but the 
question is then raised as to how this equilibrium is achieved; historical realists regard it 
as the product of diplomacy (contrived balance) whereas structural realists regard the 
33 
system as having a tendency towards a natural equilibrium (fortuitous balance). 
Either way, theories of balance of power are based on the assumption that the 
World Order is anarchic. States compete with each other within the international order, 
driven by their own respective national interests. How then, does the balance of power 
provide the mechanism for producing World Order? 
The World Order as a pattern of the relations between international actors, wil l 
depend for its nature on the kind of distribution of power between those actors. There 
are three or more forms of that distribution. First, i f three or more of those actors are 
relatively equal in their power, the World Order wi l l be described as multipolar; 
Second, i f only twbT>f the actors are relatively equal, the World Order wil l be described 
as bipolar; Third, i f there is only one powerful state, which has no equal in the real term 
3 1 See, Ehteshami, A., The Changing Balance of Power in Asia, (Abu Dhabi: Emirates 
Centre for Strategic Studies and research, 1998). 
3 2 Waltz, K., "Anarchic Order and Balance of Power" in R. Keohane., (1986), Op. Cit., 
p. 117. 
Bayhs, J and Smith, S., The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to 
International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 122. 
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of power, the World Order will be described as unipolar. 
Alternatively and more traditionally, the concept of a balance of power was associated 
with the idea that weak states find it in their interest to join together to prevent the 
34 
hegemony of powerful states. 
The Old World Order that I am going to discuss in the coming pages falls within 
the second form of distribution of power. It was clearly a bipolar World Order where 
two superpowers were competing to dominate the world and impose their respective 
ideologies and ways of life on the rest of the world. While, as the last traditional concept 
mentioned above suggests, Middle Eastern regional states attempted in the early post 
World War I I years to maintain some kind of non-alignment so as to appear to be 
independent of the superpowers. As the Cold War progressed they were increasingly 
drawn into alliances with the superpowers as client states in order to protect their 
interests. Throughout the period, domestic and regional political considerations (such as 
commitments to Arab nationalism) had to be balanced with the reality of the balance of 
power in the international system. 
To summarise the methodology selected for this study from the preceding 
discussion, I have concluded that a neo-realist approach to the study of World Order is 
most appropriate. This approach considers the state to be the primary but not the sole 
actor, within the international system. States act within this international system as 
rational actors pursuing their national interests. To understand the international system, 
one must view it as a set of relationships determined by distribution of power and 
guided by explicit and implicit rules. Other non-state actors also play a role in the 
international system (as we will see with, for example, the PLO and the United 
Nations). However, order within the international system is achieved by a distribution of 
power among the states themselves. A stable order requires a balanced distribution of 
Wagner, (1993), Op. Cit., p. 90. 
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power, where power is defined as a combination of military, economic, diplomatic, 
technological and other capacities. 
Rules of the Game 
As I am taking a neo-realist approach in this thesis, it is important to note here with 
Joshua Goldstein that neo-realists acknowledge that the rules of international relations 
often create a security dilemma.35 It is important also to note that a detailed study of the 
36 
rules of the game is beyond the scope of this study. However, a brief idea of the nature 
of these rules and their content is necessary, as these rules, together with the distribution 
of power are -as I said earlier- the two components of any World Order. 
In every World Order -old or new- there are unwritten "rules" or implicitly 
acknowledged limitations to and determinants of behaviour, that the states not only 
understand but also respect and which alter their behaviour according to how they 
understand them. These rules are determined according to the nature of the World Order 
and the nature of the distribution of power within it. The concept of "rules" has 
associated with it the concepts of "game" and "players". The rules of the game, as 
37 
Morton Kaplan said, determine the moves a player may make. 
"Rules" may take a variety of forms. There is within the international system a 
set of well-defined and long-established "rules of the game" governing what is 
considered a state and how states treat each other. These rules shape the international 
" Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 79. 
3 6 Dam, K., The Rules of the Game, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982). 
3 7 Kaplan, M. , System and Process in International Politics, (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1957). 
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system, as we know it. They may include formalised institutional rules, such as 
international laws and subordination to the United Nations, as well as commonly 
acknowledged limitations to behaviour (such as not initiating a war of aggression). 
However, since deferment to these types of rules requires acceptance of the prevailing 
balance of power, and since some states chose to contest the moral or actual basis of the 
prevailing balance of power, some such states are more likely to confine themselves to 
more pragmatic "rules" based on national interest and uncodified by any institution or 
treaty. 
Such rules normally, besides being unwritten, carry no obligation. Primarily 
taking into account the distribution of power among those states, they depend on the 
understanding by the international actors of the nature of the power distribution and 
how to deal with it accordingly. 
For Joshua Goldstein, the rules of the game are connected to the norms of 
behaviour. The great majority of state interactions "closely adhere to norms of 
behaviour-shared expectations about what behaviour is considered proper. Norms 
change over time, slowly, but the most basic norms of the international system have 
39 
changed little in recent centuries." It is important to understand that besides being a 
distribution of power, a World Order is a "set of rules, norms, and procedures around 
which the expectations of actors converge in a certain issue area." Every actor or player 
expects to play by the same rules. 
States work together by following rules they develop to govern their 
interactions. States usually do follow the rules. Over time, the rules become more firmly 
established and institutions grow up around them. States then develop the habit of 
3 8 Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 76. 
3 9 Ibid., p. 77. 
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working through those institutions and within the rules. It is also important to 
understand some facts about the rules that together with the distribution of power 
determine the behaviour of states. First, the international institutions and rules that 
operate today took shape especially during periods of hegemony. Second, rules of 
international behaviour have become established over time as norms and are often 
codified as international law. Third, the rules that govern most interactions in 
international relations are rooted in moral norms; international norms are the 
expectations held by national leaders about normal international relations. Fourth; when 
rules are broken in international relations, actors can rely only on the power of 
individual states to restore order. 
In practical terms we notice that during the multipolar World Order, for 
example, the colonial powers divided the Third World between themselves according to 
unwritten rules. Every colonial power respected these rules and did not go beyond it. 
Also throughout the Cold War, the two superpowers dealt with each other in the 
international arena according to a kind of understanding to unwritten rules and red lines. 
Each side recognised certain areas in the world as within the other party' sphere of 
influence. Intervention in those areas was limited according the unwritten rules. 
Throughout the long period of the Cold War, the rules of the game were adhered to. 
According to Haim Bresheeth: 
- Each player controls its sphere of influence, that is the immediate geographic 
and political continuum. 
- Areas outside the immediate sphere of influence of either side are considered a 
free-for-all. 
- Once a significant number of countries in a region are taken by one of the sides, 
the other side is defeated, and is required to retreat partially. 
- In areas immediately adjacent to one of the superpowers the opposite side is 
barred from intervention, as those areas are considered the backyard of its rival. 
Action in those areas, against the wishes of the controlling superpower, is deterred 
40 
by nuclear threat. 
Bresheeth, H., The Gulf War and the New World Order, (London: Zed Press, 1991). 
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In this thesis, since we use a neo-realist understanding of events, the most 
important "rules" for consideration of developments in the Arab-Israeli peace process 
are those informal and unwritten rules which determine state behaviour on the basis of 
national interest. This perspective emerges for two reasons. Firstly, neo-realists are 
concerned primarily with the balance of power among states. Secondly, the Arab parties 
to the peace process contest the moral and legal basis of any institutional rules which 
Israel or the West might seek to apply. (For example, in the belief that the United 
Nations Security Council is a "tool" of American interests and support for Israel). In 
some instances, for example the UNSCR 242 and 338, the parties have never agreed on 
what the "ruling" actually meant anyway). Since there is no consensus on a moral or 
legal/institutional order, there is no common acceptance of any "rules" within these 
realms by which the players might "play". Therefore states' behaviour must be driven 
principally by their national interests, as a neo-realist would predict. 
The Old World Order: Defining the Cold War 
We describe the international system in the period from 1945 to the end of 1980s as the 
Old World Order in order to distinguish it from what is to be known as the New World 
Order, which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the eastern communist 
camp. Thus, the Old World Order is that pattern of relations or system that dominated 
international relations in the aftermath of World War I I and the Yalta conference in 
1945. In that period, as Fred Halliday pointed out, this "international conflict known as 
the Cold War was the dominant issue in world politics from the late 1940s until the late 
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1980s". Barry Axford has further described the Old World Order as follows, again 
referring to it as the Cold War: 
The 'old' order was constituted by the stable condition of bipolarity known as the 
Cold War, when antagonism between the superpowers and their cohorts consisted 
of an 'imaginary war' along the main frontiers which divided the hegemons in 
Europe and turned bloody only at the margins, in Asia and Africa. During this 
period of global order, colonialism virtually came to an end, partly as a 
consequence of the growth of nationalist movements nourished by superpower 
ambitions. Some Third World states even achieved a sort of power vis-a-vis the 
superpowers, by playing one o f f against the other in multilateral institutions like 
42 
the UN, which were otherwise impotent as a result of superpower rivalry. 
These two writers have identified the Old World Order as both a period of time (the 
post-World War I I era) and a particular relationship between the Soviet Union and the 
United States that dominated international relations. Clearly, it was only after the end of 
World War I I , that the United States and the Soviet Union found themselves on a 
collision course, having previously being allies during the war against a common 
enemy, Nazi Germany. Herbert Ellison observed on that matter that: "The end of World 
War I I marked one of the most dramatic and significant transformations of the global 
43 
power structure in modern history." The main feature of this post-war period was the 
emergence of these two states as the dominant powers of the new international system -
such that the conditions for a bipolar international system were fulfilled. As a transition 
from the pre-war multipolarity (dominated by European Great Powers) to bipolarity, the 
Cold War was described by Lewis Namer as "the point at which world power passed 
Sayigh, Y and Shlaim, A., The Cold War and the Middle East, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997), p. 6. 
4 2 Axford, B., The Global System, Economics, Politics and Culture, (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1996), p. 182. 
4 3 Carlton, (1988), Op. Cit., p. 105. 
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from the major European states to two essentially extra-European powers, the United 
44 
States and the Soviet Union." 
This competition, or rivalry, has been given the title "Cold War", implying 
certain specific characteristics or a basic structure to their relations, which remained 
45 
more or less constant. Relations during the period in question could be largely 
described as something between peace and war, first called a Cold War by the American 
journalist Walter Lippman in an article entitled, "The Cold War: A Study in U.S. 
46 
Foreign Policy," published in 1947. The Cold War drew its name from the fact that it 
did not involve any direct fighting between Soviet and American troops, or the use of 
nuclear weapons but did involve war between the Soviet Union and the United States by 
all other means except direct armed conflict. It witnessed proxy war, with American 
troops fighting against the Soviet Union's allies (Korea, and Vietnam); countries 
supported by the USA fighting countries supported by the USSR, as in the Middle East; 
the Soviets using armed forces to install communist regimes in neighbouring countries, 
(Poland, North Korea etc.) American attempts to overthrow pro-Soviet regimes in Iran 
and Latin America (Guatemala, Cuba, Nicaragua and Chile), Soviet invasion of 
countries attempting to get rid of pro-Soviet regimes (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
Afghanistan) and civil wars in which the USA and USSR supported opposing camps (El 
Salvador, Ethiopia, Congo and Angola). It was a war on all fronts except a direct 
47 
military clash. 
4 4 Ibid., p. 165. 
4 5 Baylis and Smith, (1997), Op. Ci t , p. 91. 
4 6 Carlton, (1988), Op. Cit., p. 100. 
4 7 See, Hammond, T., Witnessess to the Origins of the Cold War, (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1982), p. 3. 
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The Cold War, like many other controversial things, was subject to different 
interpretations, motivated in many cases by subjective political rather than objective 
academic reasons. As Joseph M . Seracusa pointed out: "The Cold War has come to 
mean many things to many people. To some, the Cold War was the brave and essential 
response of free men to communist aggression. To others it was a clash of inevitable 
48 
national interests." 
In reviewing the different interpretations, one must acknowledge that the key 
structural elements of the Cold War are the political and military (and above all nuclear) 
rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union; ideological conflict between 
capitalism and communism; the division of Europe, and the extension of superpower 
49 
conflict to the Third World. 
Herbert M. Levine and David Carlton define the phenomenon of the Cold War 
50 
as, "The adversarial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union". 
Picking up on the structural element of outright superpower rivalry, Thomas Hammond 
thinks that the term "Cold War" is usually taken to mean the intense conflict between 
the communist world and the non-communist world that started after the World War 
I I . He has chosen to identify the ideological conflict as the key feature of the 
bipolarity. On the other hand Lynn Boyd Hinds sees the Cold War as being grounded in 
a sort of rhetoric. He wrote that the Cold War was a "rhetorical state of mind rather than 
a description of Soviet-American relations, a rhetorically constructed ideological reality 
Siracusa, J and Barclay, G., The Impact of the Cold War, Reconsiderations, (London: 
Kennikat Press, 1977), p. vii . 
4 9 Baylis and Smith, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 91. 
5 0 Carlton, (1988), Op. Cit., p. 1. 
5 1 Hammond, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 3. 
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that was first accepted within the ruling circles of government, then publicly conveyed 
through major speeches and writings to Americans who generally accepted it as the 
reality of both foreign and domestic politics."5 2 According to him political rhetoric 
creates political reality, and in the case of the Cold War, the universal rhetoric created in 
53 
the aftermath of World War I I created a universal reality. 
Fred Halliday, the author of The Second Cold War, like Levine and Carlton, 
defines the Cold War as the dominance of international politics by the Soviet-US 
54 
competition However, unlike other writers who apply the term Cold War to the whole 
period from the end of World War I I until the unification of Germany. Halliday divided 
it into two periods. The first he dates from 1947 to 1953, and the second from 1979 to 
1989, with a period of detente in between.55 Although, it is important not to ignore the 
detente period, detente did not in my opinion constitute any big change, as the relations 
between the two superpowers continued -especially in the Middle East- as a Cold War 
56 
until the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s. As William Quandt 
pointed out, "Each [Superpower] was too deeply committed to allow its friends to be 
57 
sacrificed for the spirit of detente." 
5 2 Hinds, L., The Cold War as Rhetoric: The Beginning, 1945-50, (London: Praeger, 
1991), p. 5. 
5 3 Ibid., p. 6. 
5 4 Sayigh and Shlaim, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 20. 
5 5 See, Halliday, F., The Making of the Second Cold War, (London: Verso, 1983). 
5 6 For more about Detent basic principles and Middle East situation, see Meany, G., 
"The Case Against Detent," in Carlton and Levine, (1988), Op. Cit., p. 76. 
5 7 Quandt, (1977), Op. Cit., p. 201. 
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Some writers see the Cold War from the zero-sum game point of view. Michael 
W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry believe that the Cold War was an intense competition 
distinguished by extreme hostility between the Soviet Union and the United States. It 
differed from normal interstate relations in its win-or-lose (zero-sum) competition -the 
58 
extreme competition that characterises "hot" wars. 
Mentioning the role of the nuclear weapons in shaping the Cold War, Richard 
Hass wrote that: 
The Cold War was a relatively structured era of international relations dominated 
by two great powers and disciplined by nuclear weapons. Rules of the road 
developed governing competition that reduced the chance the two superpowers 
would find themselves in direct confrontation involving military forces of any 
sort. Most other states had their freedom of action circumscribed by their 
59 
respective superpower patron. 
For the purposes of this thesis, an eclectic approach to these definitions is useful since 
there is some truth in all these definitions. The Cold War, in short, is a term describing 
the nature of international relations during the period 1945-1989, between the members 
of the capitalist bloc under the leadership of the United States on the one hand, and the 
countries or members of the communist bloc under the leadership of the Soviet Union, 
on the other hand. The meaning of the term is that the relations were relations of war, 
but without direct military conflict. Instead it was an economic and ideological war, 
with extensive use of propaganda and the media, and of the secret services organisations 
such as the CIA and KGB. It was also reflected in the form of conflicts and limited wars 
or proxy wars between other countries such as the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Angola and 
the Middle East. 
5 8 Doyle, M and Ikenberry, J., New Thinking in International Relations Theory, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 2. 
5 9 Hass, R., The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the Cold War, (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), p. 1. 
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It is clear that international relations throughout the period were very polarised; 
with the first pole representing the first world, which comprised the Western European 
countries, Japan and the USA, and the second pole representing the second world, 
comprising the Eastern European countries, the Soviet Union and China. The Third 
World was composed of the rest of the world countries, which included, most 
significantly, many of the under-developed African, Asian and Latin American 
countries, most of which were members of the non-aligned movement. The Warsaw 
Pact was the military instrument of the communist block, while NATO was the military 
instrument of the capitalist block. 
The international system during the Cold War reflected the great degree of 
competition between the two conflicting international blocs. This competition was both 
an ideological contradiction, and aimed at achieving contradicting economic and 
strategic goals. Both superpowers considered the third world, which did not fall under 
the direct control of either of them as a sphere of influence to fight in, to control its 
wealth and to prevent the other competing bloc from doing so. Cuba in the Americas, 
Vietnam and Korea in South East Asia, Congo in Africa and the Middle East are 
examples of how that international conflict was embodied in different regions of the 
world. They are examples of how the struggle between the two international blocs found 
outlets in preventing direct military clashes, and preserving the "cold" nature of the war 
between the two blocs on all other levels such as ideology, economic, political, media 
and secret agencies levels. 
Thus, the various definitions of the Cold War phenomenon, either as a 
relationship of competition between the Soviet Union and the United States or as 
intense conflict between the communist world and the non-communist world following 
the second world war, agree on some points: First; the relations between the two blocs 
were tense, hostile and competitive. Second; the degree of intensity in the relations, 
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reached the point of some kind of war; but did not reach the direct use of arms between 
the two blocs. Third; this phenomenon called the Cold War was reflected in 
international relations and world politics from its start by the end of World War I I to the 
collapse of one of these poles and disintegration of one of these blocs by the end of the 
1980s and the beginning of 1990s. 
In sum, my neo-realist understanding of the Old World Order therefore 
interprets the 1945-1989 period as one of a bipolar balance of power. The United States 
and the Soviet Union exercised their power against one another through intermediary 
spheres of influence. They did not use their own direct military power as the primary 
tool. Instead they used a range of economic, diplomatic, ideological and quasi-military 
tactics to compete, relying on an international system in which the rules of the game 
were those of alliance and spheres of influence. The world lined up in two opposing 
camps, loosely focused on ideological support for either superpower. Those states, 
which remained un-aligned sought to take advantage of super-power rivalries to 
advance their own interests. Therefore, they too recognised a bipolar distribution and 
balance of power. 
Origins of the Gold War 
There are many views on the actual start of the Cold War. Writers, political 
commentators and statesmen have differed on who was to blame. In other words the 
responsibility for the Cold War was directed by supporters of each side to the other. The 
debate on the Cold War has been characterised primarily by the question of blame; who 
was responsible for the hostility and tension in the relations between the USA and the 
Soviet Union? 
Some believe that it was the communist ambition to transfer the whole world to 
communism that led to an American response, in the form of the USA policy of 
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containment, and thus the Cold War began. Others saw USA imperial policy and 
President Truman's attempt to force the Soviet Union to allow the Eastern European 
countries to institute the open door policy as responsible for the Soviet Union's policy 
of establishing a defensive system surrounding East Europe. De Senarclens observed 
that many American historians in particular have ascribed the origins of the Cold War to 
the United States' imperialist ambitions and the internal contradictions of its capitalist 
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regime. 
As Lynn Etheridge Davis has pointed out "The origins of the Cold War were 
numerous and continue to be a matter of controversy, but most writers consider the 
development of Soviet-American conflict over the political future of Eastern Europe to 
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have been a major cause." Alternatively, the Cold War began, according to Pierre De 
Senarclens, when Chiang Kai Shek's forces were defeated and the People's Republic of 
China was established on 1 October 1949. According to him, the outburst of the Cold 
War is generally associated with the "Truman Doctrine," introduced in March 1947 
when the President of the United States declared his country's will to defend the "Free 
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World" against the advance of Soviet totalitarian designs. 
The Truman Doctrine was a response by USA President Harry Truman on 6 
April 1946, to the Azerbaijan Crisis when the Soviet Union refused to withdraw from 
Iranian Azerbaijan. With the presentation of the Truman Doctrine, American strategic 
De Senarclens, P., From Yalta to the Iron Curtain: The Great Powers and the Origins 
of the Cold War, (Oxford: Berg, 1995), p. 264. 
6 1 Davis, L., The Cold War Begins, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947). 
6 2 De Senarclens, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 120. 
THE OLD WORLD ORDER 32 
thinking towards the region contributed towards the conception of the Cold War and its 
,• • , 6 3 political concepts. 
Explaining the origins of the Cold War is a subject that has taken up a lot of 
energy and discussion. Many writers, politicians, statesmen and philosophers have 
participated in this discussion. Many theories and school of thoughts have been 
developed from realist, orthodox, revisionist and classical perspectives among others. 
Although this dissertation takes an essentially neo-realist view, in the following sections 
I wi l l briefly shed some light on the orthodox, classical and revisionist theories 
concerning the origins of the Cold War which have dominated the literature on the 
subject. (The issue has not been of such great concern to realist scholars). 
Classical Theory 
An early interpretation placed the chief blame for the Cold War upon the Soviet Union. 
According to this point of view (traditional or classical theory) Soviet leaders were 
determined to make the entire world communist, by force i f necessary. For this they 
used the alliance of the wartime with the West to destroy Nazism, and when they 
achieved that -according to this theory- they renounced the Grand Alliance to achieve 
the universal revolution. They renounced their promises in Yalta by establishing 
communist regimes in East Europe and they waited for their chance to do the same in 
Western Europe especially in France and Italy. Finally according to this theory, the 
Paterson, T., "American Crisis of the Cold War and their Alternatives," in T. 
Paterson., Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman 
Years, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), p. 14. 
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United States acted in defence of the basic democracy ideals to oppose the communist 
64 
expansion with the containment policy and thus the Cold War started. 
Revisionist Theory 
The revisionist theory on the other hand came from New Left historians who blamed the 
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United States for the Cold War. These historians emphasised the American economic 
objectives and saw American foreign policy after 1945 as imperialist and anti-
revolutionary. They asserted that the Cold War started when the American President 
Harry Truman decided to force the Soviet Union to allow the Eastern European 
countries to enter the open door policy, an American expansionist capitalism and that, 
according to them, led the Soviet Union to pursue a defensive system over Eastern 
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Europe. 
In the aftermath of World War I I , in which the USA and the Soviet Union were 
allied against the Axis powers (Germany, Italy and Japan), an ideological competition 
started to appear between the two main powers. The difference between their views of 
the post war world was huge. Capitalism and liberal democracy viewed communism as 
a danger to all free societies, while communism saw western capitalist imperialism as 
the great evil. European countries allied themselves with one of the main players, the 
USA and the Soviet Union, creating two competing blocs. 
This competition turned to a real war in all fields except a military direct 
confrontation. The Cold War between the two superpowers took the form of hot war 
6 4 Carlton, (1988), Op. Cit., pp. 91-104. 
6 5 Maddox, R., "The Rise and Fall of Cold War Revisionism," in Carlton, (1986), Op. 
Cit., p. 96. 
6 6 For more details see Siracusa, (1977), Op. Cit., p. vi i . 
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only in the peripheral areas such as in Korea, Vietnam, Africa and the Middle East. The 
conflicts in the Middle East, and in South Africa reflected the struggle between the two 
camps. The Soviet Union supported the Palestinians and the Arab countries in their fight 
against the Israeli occupation of West Bank and Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, South 
Lebanon and Sinai. It also supported the African National Congress in its struggle 
against the Apartheid regime in South Africa and other liberation movements such as 
SWAPO and ZANO to liberate Namibia and Zimbabwe. 
The Cold War witnessed ups and downs, moments of greater or lesser tension 
between the superpowers. Examples of the high points were the Cuban missiles crisis in 
1963, the Suez crisis, and the 1956, 1967 and 1973 wars in the Middle East. The low 
points included a period of detente and some time short-lived co-operation between the 
two superpowers. 
Orthodox Theory 
The orthodox school sees the Cold War as an ideological war. "The Cold War is in fact 
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a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake." It portrayed the Soviet 
Union as a major threat to the ideology, institution, norms, and values of the free 
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world. According to this school of thought, the Cold War had evolved into a limitless 
contest between freedom and tyranny, a totally revolutionary propelling history down its 
dangerous course. 
Chomsky, N. , Deterring Democracy, (London: Vintage, 1992), p. 10. 
6 8 See, Maddox, (1986), Op. Cit , p. 96. 
6 9 Graebner, N . , The Cold War: A Conflict of Ideology and Power, (Lexington: Heath, 
1967), p. v i i . 
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Charles W. Kegley pointed out that determining the origins of the twentieth 
century's third hegemonic fight for domination is difficult because the historical 
evidence is amenable to different interpretations. However, he defined three main 
causes for the Cold War. First, a conflict of interests; second, ideological 
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incompatibilities; and third, misperceptions. 
Characteristics of the Cold War: The Importance of Bipolarity 
I have already asserted that the Cold War Order was characterised by bipolarity as a 
form of power distribution and by an international system based on ideological, 
economic and political struggle and competition between two camps notionally oriented 
round communism and capitalism. Charles Kegley has identified six primary principles 
or characteristics of the Cold War: ? 1 
• High level of superpower conflict. 
• Periods of intense conflict alternated rhythmically with periods of relative co-
operation. 
• Reciprocal, action-reaction exchanges were evident. 
• Throughout the Cold War contest, both rivals consistently avoided all-out war as 
their highest priority. 
• Both actors displayed a willingness to act in violation of their respective professed 
ideologies whenever their perceived national interests rationalised such 
inconsistencies. 
• Through a gradual learning process involving push and shove, restraint and reward, 
tough bargaining and calm negotiation, the superpowers created rules for the 
peaceful management of their disputes and trust in their mutual willingness to abide 
by the norms of this security regime. 
72 
The heart of Kegley's analysis is the concept of bipolarity. I shall now examine this 
form of power distribution, which dominated the Old World Order. The word 
/ u Kegley, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 88. 
7 1 Ibid., p. 120. 
7 2 Gaddis, J., The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, 
Reconsiderations, Provocations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 172. 
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"bipolarity" has been used in two very different ways: (1) as a shorthand for the 
"bipolarity" of the world into two hostile camps as a result of the Cold War and (2) as a 
description of the distribution of power among individual states. Kenneth Waltz has 
73 
argued that the two definitions need to be distinguished from one another. 
Nonetheless, both definitions are relevant. 
The post-1945 international system can be described as bipolar because of the 
enormous disparity in power between the two new superpowers, the USA and the Soviet 
74 
Union on the one hand, and the rest of the community of states on the other. 
Alternatively, the power that lay with the superpowers was itself divided between them. 
This meant that the world was effectively divided between the two superpowers in 
terms of influence. Although the Third World countries tried through the non-aligned 
movement to play a major role in the World Order and international affairs, they lacked 
the power to do so. This kind of distribution of power between the two superpowers 
during the Cold War period produced, according to many analysts, much more stability 
than other forms of World Orders such as unipolarity or multipolarity. In one of its 
editorials, Middle East International wrote that: "The bipolar world of the Cold War, for 
all the chilling talk of mutual annihilation, was in comparison a stable and predictable 
place - at least for the citizens of the two main power blocs." 
The United Nations and the Cold War 
There are two principal types of international organisations, intergovernmental and non-
governmental. Intergovernmental organisations share in common the fact that they are 
7 3 Wagner, H., (1993), Op. Cit., p. 81. 
7 4 Sayigh and Shlaim, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 1. 
7 5 Editorial., "The New Cold War," Middle East International, 22 May 1998, p. 3. 
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composed of states. The United Nations is an intergovernmental organisation that has 
universal membership. Throughout the four decades from 1945 to 1985 the main feature 
in the international relations was the United Nations, with its Security Council as the 
main organ responsible of international security. During the Cold War period neither of 
the two superpowers was able to act freely regarding the international security matters. 
In the Security Council, the permanent members used the veto extensively to block any 
resolution that contradicted their interests, preventing the other power(s) from using the 
Security Council to legitimatise its action against other countries. 
During the Cold War, the United Nations in general and the Security Council in 
particular was paralysed by the superpower competition and conflict. The extensive use 
by the permanent members and the superpowers in particular of the veto restricted the 
United Nations ability to act effectively according to its charter. According to Kegley 
and Wittkopf: 
The Security Council rapidly fell victim to the Cold War. Between 1945 and 
1955, the Soviet Union, unable to mobilise a majority on its side, exercised its 
veto power 77 times to prevent action on matters with which it disagreed. From 
1970 until 1992, the United States exercised its veto power 72 times, twice as 
often since 1966 as all other permanent council members combined. The Security 
Council was often paralysed as a result, as vetoes severely restricted the ability of 
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the United Nations to undertake collective action. 
This restriction on UN was due to the Cold War relations between the two superpowers. 
The Middle East in the Old World Order 
Concept of the Middle East 
The concept of the Middle East or Near East is a western concept, developed from the 
viewpoint of the British Foreign Office. According to Ken Matthews: 
Kegley, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 155. 
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The Middle East is a construction of the European mind. The Middle East is a 
product of the European imperial and bourgeois imagination. The Middle East is a 
77 
geographical term. It is also defined politically in European terms. 
The Middle East -according to the British definition- contains the Arab Orient, 
Egypt, Sudan, Turkey, Afghanistan and the Arab peninsula. North Africa is not included 
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in this concept. However, the Middle East as a concept can be regarded as a political 
concept in the first place. It does not constitute a homogeneous geographical unit. This 
name did not stem from the nature of the area itself and its cultural character, but from 
its relations with the others. That reflects the Western conception of the area as a mosaic 
or mix of peoples and national, ethnic and cultural groups, which means not dealing 
with the Arab world as a one unit. For the West the Middle East includes Turkey, Iran, 
Cyprus, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Israel while excluding the North African countries. 
Importance of the Middle East to the Superpowers 
The Middle East is an important region. Its location, resources and its historical 
importance have for centuries drawn the attention of foreign powers, and thus the 
interaction between the Middle East and these powers has increased over time. Indeed, 
the Middle East is arguably the most important region of the international system today, 
especially for western great powers tied to the region by oil and bilateral 
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commitments. The global system's regional impact was exceptionally intense in the 
7 7 Matthews, K., The Gulf Conflict and International Relations, (New York: Routledge, 
1993), pp. 12-13. 
7 8 Musallam, S., Diplomatic History of the Middle East, (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997). 
7 9 Goldstein, J., "Dynamics of Middle East Conflict and US Influence, 1979-1997," 
(http:\\ www.american.edu/academic.depts/sis/goldtext/me98.papr.htm). 
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Middle East because the great powers, attracted by its strategic location, immense oil 
reserves and the presence of Israel, have historically penetrated and shaped it far more 
than other regions. 
It can be argued that the relative importance of the Middle East to outside 
powers increased during the period of the Cold War. As Harold Saunders has observed: 
Interaction between the peoples of the Middle East and the world powers was not 
new in the years after World War I I . What became apparent increasingly in those 
years was that the nations of the region and the world powers on the global stage 
began to experience profound change as that interaction continued. Politics in the 
region became more complex; politics in the larger world became more complex; 
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and the interaction between the two arenas became more intertwined. 
Joshua Goldstein wrote that in the historical context, today's Middle East can not be 
totally separated from its past. 
The great Arab Empire of about AD 600 to 1200 plays a special role in the 
international relations of the Middle East. Almost the whole of the region was 
once united in this empire, which arose and spread with the religion of Islam. 
European invasion -the Crusades- were driven out. This history continues to 
influence the region in the twentieth century. For example, Pan-Arabism (or Arab 
nationalism), especially strong in the 1950s and 1960s, saw the region as 
potentially one nation again, with a single religion, language, and identity. Iraq's 
Saddam Hussein in 1991 likened himself to the Arab ruler who drove away 
Crusaders a thousand years ago. The strength of Islamic fundamentalism 
throughout the region today, as well as the emotions attached to the Arab-Israeli 
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conflict, reflect the continuing importance of the historic Arab Empire. 
Ehteshami, A and Hinnebusch, R., Syria and Iran, Middle Powers in a Penetrated 
Regional System, (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 9. 
8 1 Saunders, H., "A Broader Peace Process for the Middle East," in Kipper and 
Saunders., The Middle East in Global Perspective, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 
311. 
8 2 Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 26. 
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As Yezid Sayigh observed: "The emergence of the Middle East as a distinct 
international relations subsystem in the post independence period added new dimension 
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and arenas of interaction" to the bipolar system. 
After 1945, as the Cold War and the containment of the Soviet Union became 
the dominant concern of the Western allies, the strategic importance of the Middle East 
reached new heights. Henceforth it was argued that Soviet penetration of the region 
would outflank the Atlantic alliance, causing a decisive rupture in the world balance. A 
second perception was that Soviet control over Middle East oil resources would 
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dislocate the economy of the Western world. Furthermore, the west, and particularly 
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the USA became more concerned with protecting Israel's security. "In the 1945-91 
period, the Middle East region experienced five Arab-Israeli wars, two Gulf wars and a 
86 
handful of other (largely) inter-Arab conflicts." 
No regional conflict in history has been so intertwined with world politics as the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Robert Freedman in his edited book World Politics and the Arab-
Israeli Conflict pointed out how the superpowers exploited the regional conflict to 
advance their interests in the Middle East. 
Sayigh, Y., Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National 
Movement, 1949-1993, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
8 4 Buheiry, M. , "The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East in the Early 1950's and 
Today." in R. Khalidi and C. Mansour., Palestine and the Gulf, (Beirut: Institute for 
Palestine Studies, 1982), pp. 120-160. 
8 5 Quandt, W., Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
1967-1976, (Berkley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 1. 
86Ehteshami, A., "Security Structures in the Middle East: An Overview," in H. Jawad., 
The Middle East in the New World Order, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 70. 
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In the early stages of Arab Nationalism and Zionism, both nationalist movements 
sought the aid of the great powers to aid them in realising their nationalist 
aspirations. Then, as conflict between the two movements arose, virtually all the 
great powers sought to exploit the opportunities created by the Arab-Israeli 
87 
conflict to increase their influence in the Middle East. 
The superpowers planned their international policies according to how they view the 
overall picture of their struggle for international power. As Joshua Goldstein pointed 
out, "One flaw of USA policy in the Cold War period was to see such regional conflicts 
through East-West lenses. Its preoccupation with communism led the United States to 
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support unpopular pro-Western governments in a number of poor countries." 
During the 1950s, 60s, 70s and early 80s, the relations between the states of the 
Middle East came to mirror the relations between the superpowers. Some countries 
were governed by conservative western oriented regimes, while others witnessed 
military coups and were ruled by revolutionary or radically oriented regimes. During 
that time, the Middle East, as with many parts of the world, was a theatre for 
superpower competition; its location, natural resources, historical background, and 
many other reasons, made it a focus of attention. This was compounded by the fact that 
it was for a long time one of the most volatile areas in the globe. Wars, military coups, 
inter-Arab disputes, regional conflicts and constant interventions from the superpowers 
wracked the region. 
In terms of alignments with the superpowers, Israel, the Gulf states, Egypt (after 
Nasser), Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and North Yemen made up the pro-West 
group; Algeria, Libya, Sudan (since 1969) Iraq, South Yemen, the PLO and Syria made 
up the pro-Soviet group. The states and peoples of the region saw Israel as a Western 
8 7 Freedman, R., World Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, (New York: Pergamon 
Press, 1979), p. 1. 
8 8 Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 29. 
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base and spearhead in the region and a foreign entity. Turkey and Iran (until the 1979 
Islamic revolution) were also Western allies and western oriented regimes. 
Alliances 
Before discussing in detail the issues of regional alignment and patron-client state 
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relationships, it is important to distinguish these from the concept of alliances. 
Although there has been some evidence of alliance building in the Middle East, I hope 
to show that alignments have been based on patron-client relations rather than alliances. 
It follows then that, i f the Old World Order was characterised by patron-client relations 
between the super-powers and regional states, the decline of one superpower in the New 
World Order wil l witness a different pattern of international relations, an altered balance 
of power and new behavioural "rules". 
Throughout the history, states have occasionally formed alliances to pool their 
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military capabilities in the face of a potential threat. As George Liska pointed out, it is 
impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances. "The two 
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often merge in all but name." Great powers -according to Joshua Goldstein- often 
93 
form alliances with smaller states, sometimes called client states. 
8 9 Quandt, (1977), Op. Cit., p. 7. 
9 0 Camilleri, J., "Alliances and the Emerging post-Cold War Security System," in R. 
Leaver., Charting the post-Cold War Order, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). 
9 1 Sorokin, G., "Patron-Clients, and allies in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in M . Maoz, 
Regional Security in the Middle East, (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 46. 
9 2 Liska, G., Nations in Alliance, (Baltimor: The John Hopkins Press, 1968). 
9 3 Goldstein, (Op. Cit., p. 91. 
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It is clear that alliance is "as original event in politics as is conflict. It associates 
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like-minded actors in the hope of overcoming their rivals." It is clear also that alliance 
play a key role in the balance of power and in how the states can alter the distribution of 
power. 
What an alliance means therefore is a coalition of states that coordinate their 
actions to accomplish some end. Most alliances form in response to a perceived threat. 
States in general try to balance threats. They look at both the capabilities and the 
intentions of potential rivals to determine whether alliances are necessary. Writers such 
as Gerard Sorokin distinguish between alliance and patron-client state relationships. The 
difference between an alliance and a patron-client state relationship is that an alliance is 
a formal promise of military support while a patron-client relationship is an informal 
relationship entailing economic, political and military assistance. 
Sorokin thinks that any formal or informal military political agreement among 
states qualifies as an alliance. In other words, alliances are formal agreements between 
sovereign states for the putative purpose of coordinating their behaviour in the event of 
specified contingencies of a military nature. Patron-client relationships "are based on 
informal understandings, trust, loyalty, solidarity and shared interests" but "are not fully 
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legal or contractual". 
Sorokin tells us that "alliances have been rare in the Middle East conflict, 
because states in the region typically prefer to pursue independent security policies 
96 
using the assistance of outside patrons. However, examples of alliance formation 
among states in the Middle East can be found. Some of these are the Baghdad Pact, 
9 4 Ibid. 
9 5 Sorokin, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 49. 
9 6 Ibid., p. 47. 
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Syria-Egypt unity, the Israeli-U.S. alliance, and the international alliance or coalition 
against Iraq in 1991. The Arab League is also considered by some to be an alliance 
between the Arab states to coordinate their economic, political and military efforts. The 
League -especially its summits- played an important role in coordinating Arab 
confrontation with Israel and in supporting the front line states and the PLO. Indeed 
according to George Liska, the only overtly offensive alliance since the Axis has been 
the Arab League. 
A mixture of the alliance and the patron-client relationship overshadowed the 
relations between Egypt and Syria with the Soviet Union on the one hand, and Israel 
with the United States on the other. The relationship between Israel and the United 
States is not an official alliance according to a formal agreement but it is an alliance in 
practical terms, because of the USA's strong commitment to protect Israel and 
guarantee its security. As Goldstein pointed out, "Two countries may create the 
practical equivalent of an alliance without a formal treaty, as did the United States and 
Israel in the 1970s".97 
In the Middle East, alliances between regional states have generally been 
undesirable for two reasons: First, access to non-regional patrons that provide low-cost 
military and economic assistance enables the regional powers to pursue their preferred 
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security policies; Secondly, political isolation makes potential regional allies rare. 
The Baghdad Pact is an example of a regional alliance that was formed by 
outside intervention. In 1955 Britain, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan created the Pact 
for the purpose of regional defence. Before 1955 had finished Syria had signed a 
Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 88. 
Sorokin, (1997)., Op. Cit., p. 66. 
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military alliance with Egypt and purchased arms from the Soviets. After the break with 
Egypt that followed the dissolution of the United Arab Republic in 1961, Syria began 
once again to pursue its own security policy. The patron-client relationship between 
Syria and the Soviet Union was tightening. The Friendship treaty between them in 1980 
was an affirmation of the patron-client relationship, rather than of an alliance in that the 
Soviets made no formal commitments to the Syrians. 
There was no need for Syria or Israel to form formal alliances with the 
superpowers because the terms of their patron-client relationships were favourable. 
Both countries understand that formal alliances would restrict their ability to pursue 
their policies and limit their freedom of action. For Syria, formal alliance with the 
Soviet Union would not have been popular domestically and would have damaged its 
relations with the Gulf States, its main financial donors. 
In many ways the Soviet-Egyptian relationship between 1967 and 1974 is 
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archetypal of a patron-client state relationship. Egypt preferred informal alliance with 
the Soviet Union for the same reasons mentioned in the Syrian case. Obtaining military 
support without being involved in a much serious formal relationship that might 
undermine its relations with other countries and affect its domestic politics was much 
more acceptable to the regimes of both Nasser and Sadat. 
Israel also preferred not to be involved in formal alliances, although as has been 
mentioned its relationship with the United States was strong to such a degree that many 
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describe it as alliance. The American-Israeli strategic cooperation understanding 
9 9 Kerr, M. , The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967: A Study of Ideology in Politics, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 5. 
1 0 0 Shoemaker, C., Patron-client State Relationships, (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 82. 
1 0 1 Mansour, C , Beyond Alliance: Israel in U.S. Foreign Policy, ( New York: Columbia 
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memorandum is evidence of this. However, Israel has also developed patron-client ties 
when useful. Until the Six-Day War, France, rather the United States supplied Israel 
with weapons, playing part of the role of a patron. During President Johnson's 
administration, however, Israel clearly became a client of the United States, with 
economic, diplomatic and military aid being forthcoming. 
I f alliances were not the principal means by which the superpowers engaged 
with regional Middle Eastern states, patron-client relationships were a more common 
feature. 
Regional Alignments and Patron-Client Relationships 
Long-term patron-client relationships as we wil l see later are not only 
alternatives to alliances, but often supersede them in terms of effectiveness and 
desirability. This kind of relationship may be distinguished from other forms of bilateral 
interaction by the dominance of several key elements. First, there must be a sizeable 
difference between the military capabilities of the states involved. Second, the client 
plays a prominent role in patron competition. Third, there is a critical perceptual 
dimension to patron-client state relationships. This derived from consistent association 
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between the two states for a recognisable period of time. 
At their foundation, patron-client state relationships rest upon two elements that 
shape their nature and dictate their impact on the international system as a whole. First, 
patron-client state relationships are inherently unstable. The second fundamental feature 
University Press, 1994). 
1 0 2 Shoemaker, (1984), Op. Cit. 
THE OLD WORLD ORDER 47 
of patron-client state relationships is that they are, at their most basic level, mechanisms 
103 
by which patrons compete with each other in a theoretically low-risk environment. 
Having established that the superpowers developed an interest in the Middle 
East region during the Cold War, we now need to determine the impact of superpower 
penetration on the states themselves and to see whether it conforms to the conditions of 
patron-client relations listed above. The main argument here is that the Middle East 
became characterised by efforts of regional states to align themselves with one or other 
superpower, and that these alignments came to resemble patron-client relationships. In 
other words, the region was affected by bipolarity in the international system, both in 
terms of their own relative lack of power compared to the superpowers, and in their 
reaction to the balance of power between the superpowers. 
The particular nature of the struggle between the superpowers prevented them 
from co-operating even while the balance of terror prevented them from engaging in a 
hot war. This kind of 'special relation' between the two superpowers, characterised by 
hostility and a lack of direct war, had a great effect on the rest of the world, where the 
two superpowers exercised their competition. The impact of that kind of relations on the 
Middle East was much clearer than on any other region. 
The extent of that effect can be measured through looking at the events that took 
place in the region and how the two superpowers reacted to them. For instance the 
reaction towards establishing new states in the Middle East, (Israel as an example); the 
reaction towards changes in the regimes in some Middle Eastern countries (Egypt, 
Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Yemen as examples); the reaction towards the Palestine 
problem; the several Arab-Israeli wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982); the bombing 
of Libya and the first Gulf war (1980-88) 
Ibid., p. 184. 
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Although the superpowers generally disagreed on recognising new states, 
according to their interests, the two superpowers both agreed to the establishment of a 
Jewish state in Palestine, and that reflected the early stages of the Cold War, when the 
superpowers could still agree on some issues. In this instance, the USA agreed with 
Great Britain and France on a Tripartite Agreement not to send arms to the parties 
engaged in the conflict in order not to inflame it. The issue did not immediately become 
one for superpower competition therefore. 
However, the crisis in Iran in 1947 and the overthrow of Mosadaq's leftist 
government in 1951 witnessed the beginning of real superpower competition in the 
Middle East, especially after the United States had become directly involved. After 
World War I I , the United States seemed to have inherited the British role in the Middle 
and Far East. Paul-Marie De la Gorce pointed out in an article published in the Journal 
of Palestine Studies that after Britain conceded to the USA to play the role it had played 
in the first half of this century, 
The Western states on both sides of the Atlantic were identical: to maintain the 
exclusive preponderance of the Western powers in the whole of the Middle East 
and, more particularly, to prevent the penetration of Soviet influence. Thus, at 
that stage the United States was not seeking to reduce Britain's military and 
political positions in the Gulf region or even in Jordan or Egypt, because these 
seemed to contribute to the control of the region by the Western Camp as a 
whole. 
As the administration of President Truman established the main lines of America's 
Middle East policy, to some extent these were inherited from imperial Britain or 
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developed in response to domestic pressures, particularly in the case of Palestine. In 
1 0 4 De La Gorce, P., "Europe and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, A Survey," Journal of 
Palestine Studies, vol. 26, no. 3, Spring, 1997, p. 7. 
1 0 5 Buheiry, M. , "The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East in the Early 1950's and 
Today," in Khalidi and Mansour, (1982), Op. Cit, p. 122. 
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that case, American involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and before that USA policy 
towards Israel and the Palestine problem can be ascribed to the deep Protestant belief. 
"Affinity for Zionism can be traced to American Protestant rootedness in the Old 
Testament and an evangelical belief that Zion will rise again' in the Holy Land under 
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Jewish hegemony." 
The USA subsequently pursued a policy of containment, imposing or installing 
regimes hostile to communism in the areas surrounding the communist block, especially 
in Greece, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The aim was to prevent the Soviet 
Union from extending its influence to the warm seas. In that context the USA, 
considered the Middle East sufficiently important that it should not be allowed to fall 
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under the Soviet influence. That was also true of the Indian sub-continent and South 
East Asia, and was one of the reasons behind the wars of Vietnam, Korea, as well as 
Middle East conflicts, reflecting the struggle between the two blocs in wars by proxy. 
When the differences between the two superpowers were reflected in different world 
areas in the form of local wars, we find that the countries themselves in their struggle 
against each other found in the struggle between the two blocs an opportunity to rely on 
the side hostile to his enemy's supporter. Walter Laqueur wrote that: 
Despite the fact that during the first stage of the reorientation of Arab politics, the 
stress was still on 'positive neutralism'. With the erosion of the "Third World" 
. , • . 1 0 8 
bloc, neutralism gave way to anti-western commitment. 
Peretz, D., "Origins of American Support for Israel," Palestine-Israel Journal, vol. 
iv,no. 3, 1997, p. 40. 
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In other words, although the Middle Eastern states, especially the newly independent 
Arab states, wanted to preserve their independence from superpower influences, this 
was decreasingly possible, as the superpowers became more interested themselves in 
Middle Eastern affairs. 
The Baghdad pact was the first real example of this. This was the outgrowth of 
an Anglo-American search for allies in Middle East defence system. Together, they 
aimed to thereby limit Soviet advances south and eastwards. The Baghdad Pact is 
nowadays usually seen as the direct result of an initiative taken by the United States 
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, after the latter's historic trip across eleven 
Middle Eastern capitals in May 1953. 
This famous tour -the first-ever to the area by an American head of diplomacy- is 
now generally considered as a watershed in Middle East politics, burying plans 
for the long-cherished Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO), designated to 
create a regional bulwark against any possible Soviet penetration, and replacing it 
with plans to set up the so-called 'Northern Tier' collective defence project, based 
on the voluntary participation of Dro-Western Middle Eastern countries lying on 
the southern border of the USSR. 
Another major incident of early superpower intervention in the region was the Suez 
Crisis of 1956. As previously stated, after World War I I the joint policy in the Middle 
East of both the USA and Europe was initially to ban any export of arms to the region. 
This was evident in the tripartite declaration of 1950. The Cold War period was 
simultaneous, however, with the struggle for Arab independence, the Egyptian 
revolution of 1952 and the rise of Arab nationalism, which were important factors to be 
taken into account by American policy. The USA wished to establish a political, 
1 0 9 Sanjian, A., "The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact," Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 
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military and strategic system for checking Soviet infiltration, and for establishing the 
n o 
basis for closer relations with the new independent Arab countries. 
In an effort to develop relations with Egypt, the USA offered assistance in 
financing the construction of the Aswan High Dam. When it discovered, however, that 
Egypt had agreed an arms deal with Czechoslovakia (in response to Israel being able to 
purchase weapons after all from France and Great Britain), America withdrew the offer. 
Gamal Abdel-Nasser subsequently decided to nationalise the Suez Canal to generate 
revenues, and accepted a Soviet counter-offer to help construct the dam. In the 
aftermath of the American refusal to finance the Dam, which the Egyptians regarded as 
an important strategic project, the USSR, had found an opportunity to approach Egypt. 
Its decision to support Egypt in building the Dam, and supply her with modern Soviet 
arms to confront the Israeli offensive ambitions succeeded in this. 
With the eruption of the subsequent British, French, and Israeli military 
offensive against Egypt in 1956, the Soviet Union found another opportunity to 
approach the Arab countries and Egypt in particular. Soviet support for the Arab 
position and its threats to use its nuclear weapons, which forced the American President 
Eisenhower to issue his famous ultimatum to the three countries to withdraw, 
consolidated the Soviet position as a friend to Nasser, a situation which Nasser himself 
had never actively sought. The Suez crisis was the real end to the British role as a major 
power in the area. As Charles Smith pointed out in his book Palestine and the Arab-
Israeli Conflict "The Suez invasion and its failure signalled the end of Britain's tenure as 
1 1 0 De La Gorce, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 7. 
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the dominant imperial nation in the Middle East."'' As importantly, it also signalled the 
entrance of real direct superpower competition in the Arab-Israeli conflict arena. 
The Suez crisis was a starting point for a Soviet infiltration policy in the region, 
also creating a change in the American policy, as the American warning to end the 
aggression had its effect through the following decade. In the words of Paul-Marie De la 
Gorce: "The hallmarks of the ten years following Suez could all be said to be 
consequences of the shock of 1956. The continuing weakening of European influence in 
the region; the growth of Arab nationalism; the steady advance of Soviet diplomacy; 
. . 112 
and the systematic and ever increasing alignment of American and Israeli policies." 
In a later war, in June 1967, Israel occupied large areas of Arab lands, composed 
of all Sinai, the Golan Heights, and parts of Lebanon and Jordan, with the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. This was regarded as a defeat for the Soviet arms against the 
Americans, but for the Arabs there was no alternative than to turn to the communist 
block in trying to rebuild their armed forces to face the by-now directly American -
supported Israel. The war of 1967, was a turning point similar to the 1956 crisis, as after 
the Israeli military victory, the American-Israeli concern was to maintain the Israeli 
military edge. In one way or another this was to be the instrument that was used by the 
USA to impose its role in the region. Also to make it clear to the other states in the 
region that they had to take the balance of power into account in formulating their own 
policies and to behave on that basis. The USSR presented the only alternative for the 
regional states, which were not willing to surrender to the American interests and 
1 1 1 Smith, C , Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
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exertion of power. Thus Syria, Iraq and Egypt went to the USSR to rebuild their 
military power in an effort to regain the strategic balance destroyed by the Six-Day war. 
By now, in its efforts to weaken and ultimately eliminate Western influence 
from the Middle East and particularly from the Arab world, while promoting Soviet 
influence, the Soviet leadership has employed a number of tactics. The supply of 
military aid, the Aswan Dam in Egypt and the Euphrates Dam in Syria are prominent 
examples of Soviet economic assistance. Moscow also sought to solidify its influence 
through the conclusion of long-term friendship and assistance treaties, such as the ones 
113 
concluded with Egypt in 1971, Iraq in 1972 and Syria in 1980. Egypt and Syria for 
example tended to rely on the communist bloc, not through sympathy with its ideology, 
which is very different from the basic moral and cultural principles of Middle East 
societies, but because they believed they had no alternatives given the full and unlimited 
support from the Americans to their enemy Israel. 
The Arab-Israeli conflict was clearly becoming an arena for proxy war between 
the superpowers. Moreover, regional states were being pushed into aligning themselves 
with one or other superpower in order to defend their own interests. 
All three wars, 1948-1949, 1956 and 1967, resulted from balance of power 
calculations. In 1948-1949, a coalition of five Arab states assumed that the newly 
established Jewish State would not pose a serious threat to their combined military 
power. In 1956, Israel attacked Egypt's military capabilities. Finally, the 1967 war 
114 
was related to a strategic threat that was taking place on Israel's borders. 
In the first war, superpower support for Israel was a diplomatic factor rather than an 
economic or military consideration. In 1956, Israeli concerns over Egyptian arms 
purchases from the USSR that might tip the regional balance of power prompted attack. 
1 1 3 Freedman, (1979), Op. Cit., p. 54. 
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In 1967, superpower engagement was clearly evident in the calculations of both parties. 
The regional balance of power was increasing reflecting the international balance of 
power. 
By the time the next Arab-Israeli war broke out in 1973, the pattern of 
superpower intervention and regional state responses was set. Carol Saivetz has pointed 
out that: 
During the October 1973 Middle East war, Washington and Moscow backed their 
respective clients, and, even as they co-operated to manage the crisis their 
competition had exacerbated, they risked direct confrontation to preserve their 
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own initiatives. 
In this case, after Anwar Al-Sadat assumed power in Egypt following the sudden 
death of Gamal Abdel-Nasser, he started talking about economic and political 
liberalisation, and excluding the leftist elements from the power centres, followed by the 
deportation of the Soviet technicians from Egypt. This was sending signals to the West 
about his new tendencies. When he launched the October War, in co-ordination with 
Syria, he was aiming to bring the world's attention to the conflict, and to push forward 
the diplomatic process to regain the Arab occupied territories within a peaceful solution. 
That is why he followed the war with his famous initiative of visiting Jerusalem which 
opened the way to the Camp David agreements, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace accord 
of 1979. The apparent contradiction -that Al-Sadat was sending warm messages to the 
West but during the war found himself still to be the subject of superpower 
competition- can be explained by the fact that the USA policy still prioritised protection 
of Israel when that country seemed under threat. Equally, the Soviet Union still 
responded to this by taking the "other" (in this case the Arab) side. However, when the 
1 1 5 Saivetz, C , "Superpower Competition in the Middle East and the Collapse of 
Detente," in O. Westad., The Fall of Detente: Soviet-American Relations During the 
Carter Years, (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997) pp. 72-94. 
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war with Israel was over, and the threat to Israel reduced, America was able to respond 
to Al-Sadat's overtures and engage in warmer relations and ultimately mediate the 
peace process.116 
The year 1979, was -as many political analysts believed- a beginning of new 
phase of the Cold War between the two superpowers (the "Second Cold War", as Fred 
Halliday calls it) that lasted through the presidency of Ronald Reagan 1980-1988. 
Although with the signing of the Camp David Agreements, Egypt had been removed 
from the front line with Israel, the conflict now simply moved to Lebanon, in particular 
with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon 1982, which ended in the evacuation of the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) from Lebanon and the transfer of its 
headquarters to Tunis. During this process, the USA was clearly supportive of the 
Israeli position, while the PLO and the Lebanese leftists (as well as Syria) were seen as 
Soviet clients. The end result, therefore, represented a change in balance of power 
within the Middle East region and within the Arab-Israeli conflict itself. This was 
further evidence, i f it were needed, of what Al-Sadat had already concluded; that the 
competition between the superpowers in the Middle East was swaying in the 
Americans' favour. 1 1 7 
That was not to say that America did not suffer setbacks. The United States 
withdrew its forces from Lebanon after suffering huge humanitarian losses, and that 
enabled Syria to play a major role in Lebanese politics, especially after the killing of the 
new elected Lebanese president Bashir Gemayel, following his signing of a peace 
agreement with Israel. 1 1 8 
1 1 6 Dawisha, A., "Egypt," in Sayigh and Shlaim, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 40. 
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It is important to note that in that period, and largely as a result of the American 
president, Ronald Reagan's own vision of the evils of communism, the United States 
was determined to increase the pressure on the Soviet Union. By the Strategic Defence 
Initiative the American administration aimed at pushing the Soviet Union into an 
expensive arms race, to disrupt its economic plans, and weakening it economically. It 
also increased its support to the Mojahedin of Afghanistan in their war against the 
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Soviet Union. 
Having summarised briefly the development of superpower engagement in the 
Middle East, and more specifically the Arab-Israeli conflict, we can now assess how 
this led to patron-client relations as a feature of the Old World Order in the Middle East. 
The first point to note is that the relationship between a patron and client is necessarily 
constrained. Great powers face a real danger of being dragged into wars with each other 
over relatively unimportant regional issues i f their respective clients go to war. I f the 
great powers do not come to their clients' protection, they may lose credibility with 
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other clients, but i f they do, they may end up fighting a costly war. Bipolarity and the 
search by super-powers for allies and clients can increase the bargaining power of the 
smaller power, leading to a "tail wags the dog" scenario. 
According to Yaacov Bar- Siman-Tov, "The Middle East is an ideal laboratory 
for examining this patron-client relationship in the international system." As both the 
United States and the Soviet Union had vital geo-strategic and economic interests in the 
area, both endeavoured to gain access to these resources by trying to assemble as many 
1 1 9 Oberdorfer, D., From the Cold War to a New Era, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1991), p. 274. 
1 2 0 Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., pp. 91-92. 
THE OLD WORLD ORDER 57 
clients as possible in the region.1 2 1 Equally, states in the region were receptive to 
superpower initiatives. 
Intense regional conflicts, the area's high instability, and the difficulty of 
resolving conflicts -especially the Arab-Israeli conflict- politically caused local 
states to seek advantages in superpower patronage. Additionally, since the Middle 
East is a "grey area" (that is, one lacking definitive spheres of influence between 
the superpowers), competitions for clients is increased and allows high client 
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manoeuvre-ability between patrons. 
During the period of the Cold War, the two superpowers increased their strength 
economically and militarily; each of them presenting a major political and ideological 
line, which attracted other countries. Despite the rise of the non-aligned movement after 
the Bandung conference of 1955, which attracted most of newly independent countries 
in Asia, Africa and Latin America, in reality most of these countries tended to rely on 
one of the two blocs. They did so either for political, ideological or strategic reasons or 
because of the need for military support to guarantee their security and also because 
these countries needed economic aid to reconstruct their economies after a very long 
period of colonialisation and wars. Thus, both of superpowers worked hard to attract 
other countries to enter economic or military co-operative relations to extend their own 
influence. This race between the two poles to expand their influence through the 
spreading of their ideologies, support for political movements, or through economic and 
military aid as a means to impose their influence, was more successfully pursued by the 
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capitalist bloc, due to its economic capability and technological advancement. 
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Even states who were not members of any of the two bloc's political 
organisations and/or military alliances, found themselves, for political, economic and 
ideological reasons obliged to search for security umbrellas. One of the most important 
reasons, for such countries to approach one of the two blocs, was the existence of local 
or regional conflicts, where the parties needed to obtain political, economic and military 
support. Thus when one party received support from one bloc, the other party went to 
the other bloc for support. The two blocs suspected each other's motives in involvement 
in these third world conflicts and considered them as attempts to expand their influence. 
The evolution of a pattern of patron-client relations within a region on the basis of a 
bipolar division of power therefore has a snowballing effect, becoming a self-fulfilling 
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prophecy. 
The establishment of patron-client relationships between the superpowers and 
the sides to the Arab-Israeli conflict inter-linked the superpower conflict with the Arab-
Israeli conflict. This inter-linkage meant that there was some interdependence between 
the two conflicts in that each one affected the other via the patron-client relationship. In 
other words, developments and changes in the superpower conflict influenced the Arab-
Israeli conflict via the patron-client relationship and vice versa. The degree of influence 
of each conflict level on the other varied according to the nature of developments and 
changes in each conflict and to the nature of the main characteristics of each patron-
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client relationship (Soviet Union-Egypt-Syria- PLO; United States-Israel). 
What is clear is that, as mentioned earlier, despite superpower desires to prevent 
the effects of the Arab-Israeli conflict from leading themselves into direct conflict, they 
have been unable to look beyond their own competition at methods of achieving or 
124Bar-Siman-Tov, (1987), Op. Cit. 
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advancing peace between Arabs and Israelis. The patron-client relationships have 
prevented this. Joshua Goldstein has summarised this ably: 
The Cold War competition in the Middle East has had two effects. First the Cold 
War stalemate has effectively been imposed on the Middle East. As in many other 
parts of the world, conflicts and disputes arising out of local relationships have 
been frozen by the determination of the respective superpowers to take one side or 
another. For the superpowers Middle Eastern policy has constituted merely part of 
their respective Cold War policies. The dispute between Israel and the Arab states 
on the one hand and the Palestinians on the other has got caught up in the 
antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union which effectively has 
prevented a solution. But the other dimension is that though the Cold War has 
preserved these conflicts it has also ensured that the superpowers have been very 
anxious to retain some degree of control over their 'clients' and to ensure that 
conflicts in the Middle East did not lead to direct conflict between the 
superpowers. The clients have been kept on a reasonably tight rein, though not 
without risks. So the superpower competition in the region has had the effect of 
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keeping conflicts running whilst seeing that they do not escalate out of control. 
It should be repeated, however, that the nature of the linkages between patrons and 
clients were not simple. Just as the superpowers chose their clients according to a 
variety of criteria -ideology, strategic value and political structure- so the regional 
states chose their superpower patrons for a similarly large number of reasons. Arab 
states like Egypt or Syria turned to the USSR, not out of love of communism but out of 
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a need to find a pro-liberation alternative to Israel's strength. Thus, it appears that the 
struggle between the two superpowers ideologically, militarily and politically was 
reflected clearly in the Middle East region. This happened through the deepness of 
differences between the countries of the area. Overall, the division was between radical 
countries rejecting the existence of Israel and the western intervention, especially the 
USA, on one hand, and moderate countries tending to co-operate with the West in 
containing the Soviet expansion and willing to resolve the Palestinian problem on the 
U b Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 52. 
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other. The efforts made by King Hassan I I of Morocco to mediate secretly between 
Egypt and Israel which culminated in the Dayan-Tuhami meeting, and the Fahd plan 
presented by the Saudi king to resolve the Arab Israeli Conflict, which I will discuss 
later in chapter Three, were such examples. 
In summary, the history of superpower involvement in the region outlined above 
demonstrates that the criteria for identifying patron-client relations were met during the 
Cold War era. Regional states developed relations with superpower patrons whose 
military capabilities were far superior to their own and which could be used to defend 
the interests of the regional states in their own local conflicts. In return, the clients came 
to play a prominent role in the superpowers' own competition with one another. The 
lengthy duration of these relationships led to an embedded perception of a region 
divided according to superpower alignments. Consequently, the balance of power 
between regional states was mutli-dimensional, depending as much on the actual or 
potential input of superpower patrons as on the capabilities of regional states 
themselves. Equally, in their relations with one another, regional states were forced to 
take account of a wider understanding of international relations and the dynamics and 
imperatives of superpower competition. In effect, unwritten "rules" were established 
that constrained the actions of regional states. 
Europe and the Arab-Israeli Conflict during the Cold War 
A word may briefly be said regarding the role of Europe during the Cold War. Prior to 
the Cold War, European powers had been dominant in the Middle East, and we need to 
explain why they were unable or unwilling to continue to play such a role after World 
128 
War I I . 
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Britain, which had held the Palestine Mandate, effectively abrogated 
responsibility for the Arab-Israeli dispute when it handed the problem over to the 
United Nations. With the temporary exception of the Suez crisis, its influence declined 
thereafter for lack of economic or military means to sustain the empire. France, in the 
early post-war period was concerned to contain Arab nationalist movements that 
challenged its own empire. These two factors effectively made Israel their natural ally in 
the Middle East as both found themselves rejected by the former Arab colonies. This 
relationship became clear with the collaboration in the Suez war and in French supplies 
of weapons and nuclear capabilities to Israel. This convergence of interests declined 
soon after Suez. While Britain, as has already been pointed out, began to tie its Middle 
East policy to an increasing American role in the region, France under De Gaulle 
attempted to take a more independent line. Although he was not specifically pro-Arab, 
the Arabs were able to take advantage of his distancing himself from an American-led 
alliance. De Gaulle halted the French involvement in the Israeli nuclear programme for 
example while the French criticism of Israel enhanced its position in the Arab world. 
The French policy of encouraging those countries that wished not to be part of any of 
the two-principle bloc gave France a position in the Third World, which continued for 
many years. France's approach towards the Middle East was by now contradicting that 
of many of its European partners. The French point of view was that the unconditional 
support of Israel would lead to increasing the violence, widening the conflict and a 
Soviet entrenchment, and introducing into the region the most fearsome aspects of the 
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Cold War. 
The 1967 war shed light on the behaviour of those European states, which had 
chosen to align themselves with the American policy. They did not present any 
proposals to settle the conflict. It is true that Britain, supported by France, proposed 
De La Gorce, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 10. 
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Israeli withdrawal in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, but the 
American conditions remained without any major changes.130 In sum, the European 
countries allowed the establishment of a regional strategic and political balance, in 
which they had no role to play. The reason behind the general European acceptance at 
being excluded or exempted from the scene, not only in that moment, but in the years to 
come was partly due to the mentalities resulting from World War I I . That mentalities 
pushed them to believe that every thing depended on the American protection, and their 
acceptance of the USA as their common leader. In the case of the Middle East, the 
unwillingness to criticise Israel (especially from Germany) and the sensitivity towards 
the influence of the pro-Israeli circles played undoubtedly an important role. At the 
same time, Europe itself no longer had any real great powers who could compete with 
the USA or USSR for influence - indeed Western Europe depended on the USA to 
defend it from the East. The European states had no collective mechanism for making a 
foreign policy together, and were more concerned with preserving their own security 
through the Cold War than managing that of others. It has been said that the discrepancy 
between the USA and European positions on the conflict was the result of the different 
degrees to which the two sides of the alliance depended on Arab oil. Equally likely, is 
the fact that European governments did not face the same domestic pressures from a 
pro-Zionist lobby as the USA who argued loudly that Israel was a vital American 
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strategic asset during the Cold War period? 
As Philip Gordon pointed out: 
Two main features have characterised US and European roles in the Arab-Israeli 
dispute. The first is the pre-eminence of the US in regional diplomacy; the second 
1 3 0 See, Whitbeck, J., "Could Europe Produce Middle East Peace?" Palestine-Israel 
Journal, vol. iv, no. 3, 1997, p. 72. 
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has been the US alignment with Israel, while the Europeans took a position closer 
132 
to that of the Arab states. 
Because of the weight of the Jewish community in the USA, the influence of the 
Zionist lobby was unprecedented. The domination over the media, and the political, 
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financial and economic institutions was evident. This fact stood behind the nature of 
the relationship between the USA and Israel and America's policies in the Middle East. 
Steven Rosen believed that: "in the 1980s, the existence of a clear and definable threat 
made it easier for Americans to think in strategic terms. Israel was then more a strategic 
asset than today when Americans don't have an agreed-on national purpose or 
strategy. 
Those who believe that Israel was and still is a strategic asset to the USA present 
the case of the 1970 events in Jordan as an example. Charles Krauthammer pointed out 
in an article entitled "the US-Israel Relationship" published in Middle East Quarterly 
that: "the United States used Israel in 1970 as a very concrete strategic asset to prevent a 
Syrian invasion of Jordan."'35 For Europe, there were no such strategic concerns, which 
Israel could act as an asset to protect. 
Therefore, for whatever reason, the West European countries were involved in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict to a far lesser degree than the United States. Unlike the USA, they 
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lacked the power base from which to conduct an influential Middle East diplomacy, and 
their interest in the region was based mainly on economic factors. 
Summary 
The purpose of this chapter on the Old World Order was to build a theoretical 
framework for this study. Together with chapter two (the New World Order) these two 
chapters wi l l provide the tools of analysis that I want to apply on the Arab-Israeli peace 
process in its stages throughout these two World Orders. 
I have discussed various interpretations for the Old World Order (the Cold War) 
presented by two schools of thoughts, realism/neo-realism and Liberalism/new-
Liberalism. From these I have chosen to utilise a neo-realist methodology which 
examines international relations through the concepts of balance and distribution of 
power and "rules of the game". 
The Old World Order was defined as "the pattern of international relations that 
dominated following the end of World War I I . " The Cold War according to my eclectic 
approach is a term describing the nature of international relations during the period 
1945-89 between the capitalist and communist blocs. The relations were relations of 
War but without direct military conflict. 
In this chapter I also described the characters of the Cold War as bipolarity and 
competition between two camps. The bipolarity can be understood as a distribution of 
power between the two superpowers. 
The Middle East was highly affected by the Cold War. The superpowers 
penetrated the region to the extent that it became the main field for struggle between 
them. The relations between the two states and regional actors of the Middle East came 
to mirror the relations between the superpowers, with regional states aligning 
themselves with one or other of the superpowers as client states, and engaging with one 
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another on that basis. The regional balance of power therefore increasingly reflected the 
international balance of power. 
The evolution of patron-client relation's pattern within a region on the basis of a 
bipolar division of power therefore has a snowballing effect, becoming a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. The superpower conflict (the Cold War) was inter-linked with the Arab-
Israeli conflict by the establishment of patron-client relationships between the 
superpowers and the sides to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The two conflicts on both 
international and regional levels influenced each other. 
The Cold War competition in the Middle East had profound effects on its issues. 
Chapter Three wi l l demonstrate how the Cold War stalemate was effectively imposed 
on the Middle East. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process were frozen because 
of superpowers conflict. As April Carter pointed out rightly "The Cold War between the 
USA and USSR, which structured world politics for forty years, restricted the 
136 . 
possibilities for peace action," and thus a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was 
prevented by the antagonism between two superpowers. Before embarking on that, 
however, let us turn to an examination of the New World Order; its definition and its 
implications for the Middle East. 
Carter, A., Peace Movements: International Protest and World Politics Since 1945, 
(London: Longman, 1992), p. 27. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
T H E NEW WORLD ORDER 
Today, a New World Order is struggling to be born, a world quite different from 
the one we have known, a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the 
jungle a world in which nations recognise the shared responsibility of freedom 
and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the weak. 
(George Bush, 11 September 1990) 
Introduction 
The New World Order is a term used to describe the new pattern of international 
relations, which emerged following the end of the Cold War. There can be no doubt that 
such a new pattern of international relations did in fact emerge in the international arena 
and, more specifically, in relations between the major powers of the globe. The most 
significant features of this New World Order are the decline of the Soviet Union and the 
fact that the USA remains as a superpower. 
For writers such as Molly Cochran, who argues that the New World Order 
represents, "... a unique situation, describing an altered state of international relations 
2 
from what has gone before," the existence of this New World Order has been signalled 
by a number of events. These events include the collapse of communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, the collapse 
of the Warsaw pact, the START I and I I treaties, the war in Yugoslavia and the military 
operations authorised by the UN to oust Iraq from Kuwait and to provide humanitarian 
1 Cochran, M. , "The World Order and International Political Theory," Paradigms, vol. 
8, no. 1, Summer 1994, p. 108. See also Appendices, p. 368. 
2 Ibid., p. 106. 
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aid to Somalia. For her, as for others, it is clear that talk of bipolar international 
relations is nonsensical in this new political landscape. Indeed, there is a general 
agreement between writers and politicians that there has been a fundamental change in 
the status and politics of the international system, that the ideological struggle, military 
competition, arms race, media war and other Cold War features which dominated the 
last forty years ended with the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and, thus, the world is now 
witnessing new and different form of international relations. It is surely new because it 
is different from the old, although it is not clear yet what it is or what form the new 
order will ultimately take. 
This chapter seeks to define the term New World Order and to determine 
whether the criteria which justify its usage have actually been present in the post-Cold 
War era; to identify the causes of such changes and their specific impact upon the 
international system; to identify the signposts and symptoms which indicate that 
fundamental changes have occurred in the world order; and, finally, to examine the 
symptoms of, and impact on the Middle East, of this New World Order. The chapter 
asserts that a New World Order has indeed emerged since the late 1980s. The principal 
causal factor in its establishment was the decline and eventual collapse of the Soviet 
Union which removed one superpower from a previously bipolar system, allowed the 
other an unprecedented opportunity at hegemonic self-assertion, and required all of the 
other states in the international system to re-evaluate their respective positions within it. 
The chapter continues to identify a number of "symptoms" which provide evidence of 
this New World Order. These include the bombing of Libya in 1986, the fall of 
Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the nature of the UN's military operations 
in Iraq in 1991. I wi l l then proceed to examine the characteristics or features of this 
New World Order and its impact on the Middle East. 
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A survey of the literature reveals that international relations theories have not 
been able to keep up with the accelerated changes in the international system in the last 
decade and that there is no consensus on the direction or future shape of the 
international order. Analysts have, however, provided a number of ideas and 
interpretations of the pattern of international relations in the New World Order, 
including ideas of unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity. In truth, the ideas of writers 
such as Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, Joseph Nye, Charles Krauthammer, 
Walden Bello, Michael Hogan, John Lewis Gaddis, Martin Walker, Fred Halliday, 
3 
Stanley Hoffman and many others, appear, frequently, to raise more questions than they 
answer. From Paul Kennedy's book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, to Samuel 
Huntington's Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, to Fukuyama's 
End of History and the articles of Stanley Hoffman's " A New World and its Troubles" 
and Joseph Nye's "What New World Order?" writers seem unable to establish a clear 
and comprehensive theory of the international relations of the post Cold War world, and 
their use of the term "The New World Order" leads to more questions rather than 
establishing a complete projection of what that order is or will be. 
3 See Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World 
Order, Charles Krauthammer's "The Unipolar Moment", Walden Bello's Dark Victory: 
the United States, Structural Adjustment and Global Poverty, Michael Hogan's The End 
of the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis's Toward the post-Cold War World, Martin 
Walker's The Cold War: A History, Stanley Hoffman's "A New World and its 
Troubles", Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great powers and Fred Halliday's 
The Making of the Second Cold War. 
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4 
Most of those writers do agree on some points: 1- that the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989 was a turning point from one era to another. 2- the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 brought an end to ideological hegemony of communism as an 
alternative to western "capitalism". 3- the end of the Cold War led to a reduction of the 
possibility of nuclear confrontation and East-West military confrontation. 4- the United 
States became the only superpower in a unipolar world. They could not agree however 
on whether the USA would continue to be the only superpower or whether a multipolar 
system would eventually emerge.5 
Focusing on the elements upon which most writers are able to agree, in this 
chapter I wi l l conclude that the neo-realist notion of unipolarity with America playing 
the role of global hegemon is the most convincing interpretation given the evidence of 
recent events. However, this may be only a temporary situation since the balance of 
power is still fluctuating and factors other than military projection capability do play a 
role in determining relations in the international system today. 
Definition of New World Order 
As was explained in Chapter One, a World Order is a pattern of relations between the 
international actors in a specific period, and, when this pattern of relations changes, we 
find ourselves confronted by a New World Order. According to William Olson, who 
takes a realist view of international relations, "a New World Order occurs whenever the 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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fundamental power ratio changes."6 In other words, a New World Order occurs when 
7 
there is a fundamental redistribution of power in the international system. 
However, Stanley Hoffman presents a strongly contrasting view of world order. 
According to Hoffman a world order has usually been understood as the practices that 
allow for the restraint of parties in international disputes that threaten relative security 
and stability. Thus a New World Order, in his view, would mean the existence of new 
8 
practices and rules of play in the international system. 
From these two positions, we might assume that a New World Order exists 
when a fundamental redistribution of power takes place, which in turn creates objective 
conditions within which new unwritten rules of engagement become relevant for all 
states within the international community. Although the term 'New World Order' was 
first coined by the then USA President George Bush as late as 1991, such a fundamental 
shift in the distribution of power had clearly taken place some years earlier as the Soviet 
Union began to alter its policies and lose its ability to project its own power within the 
international system in the mid-1980s. The final collapse of the USSR in 1991 led to the 
end of the bipolar order, which had dominated the international system since 1945 and 
demanded that the other players in the international system should respond quickly to 
the absence of a counter-balancing power to the USA. 
6 Olson, W., International Relations, Then and Now: Origins and Trends in 
Interpretation, (New York: Routledge, 1992). 
7 See, Hoffman, S., "A New World and its Troubles," Foreign Affairs, vol. 69, no. 4, 
1990, p. 115-122. 
8 See, Hoffman, S., Contemporary Theory in International Relations, (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1960). 
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With the collapse of an international balance based on the existence of two 
superpowers following the effective collapse of one of these superpowers, questions 
arose such as; wi l l the new balance be based on multiple poles? Or wi l l the USA remain 
as the sole pole in a unipolar system? And i f so until when? Is the unipolarity a 
transitional stage towards multipolarity similar to the multipolarity of the last century? 
Or is it the "end of history?" Responses to these questions have varied. There are 
supporters of the notion that the fall of communism and the collapse of the Soviet pole 
presented the ultimate prevalence of Western capitalism, the latter having proved its 
ability to survive, and that history had given its final judgement that capitalism and 
Western liberal thought won this battle that continued for about half a century. Francis 
Fukuyama's argument that we have reached the end of history wi l l be discussed as an 
example later in this chapter. On the other hand, there are those who feel that the 
unipolarity is merely a transitional stage that wil l not continue for long, and that the 
world wil l head towards either a new bipolarity or a multipolarity similar to that at the 
end of the last century. Such arguments are based on the notion that world order 
requires a balance of power. Until such a balance is achieved, the world order is 
necessarily fluctuating and in a transition stage. This transformation may be attributed 
to the diverse nature of global power. 
As well as a new balance and distribution of power, a New World Order would 
require new "rules". According to neo-realist assumptions, states will inevitably 
continue to pursue their own national interests. However, a New World Order implies 
that the environment within which they do so has changed, with resulting changes in the 
limitations and constraints upon their behaviour. It is my argument that in effect the 
norms emerging from the domination of superpower rivalry over international relations 
have been replaced with new norms determined by American hegemony over the 
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international system. In a unipolar New World Order in which the United States has no 
rival, the rules are being set by the only remaining superpower. 
The speech by USA President George Bush to the USA Congress in 1991, 
which is seen by many as having been the real declaration of the New World Order, 
outlined what are, arguably, the guiding principles. In his speech, President Bush 
declared a New World Order in which "the principles of justice and fair play . . . protect 
the weak against the strong." In the absence of superpower competition, the United 
Nations would play a revived and revitalised role in ensuring that states abided by a 
code of conduct which broadly corresponded to Western ideas of moral right and 
wrong. Rogue states would be excluded from international activity, while incentives of 
inclusion would attract many states to play the game. He argued that the major 
international changes, which had occurred at the end of the 1980s and in the early 
1990s, culminating in the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War, provided more opportunities 
. 9 
for co-operation and consistency in international affairs. Thus, according to Joshua 
Goldstein, the "New World Order" is a set of norms, proposed by President Bush, for 
international behaviour in the post-Cold War era. 
The "New World Order" envisioned by U.S. President Bush during the Iraq-
Kuwait crisis included four principles: peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity 
against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all 
peoples. Some of the principles are based more on practical considerations 
(reduced arsenals) and others on more explicitly moral standards (just treatment of 
all peoples). These principles represent the interest that the United States and 
other great powers have in a stable world order. This new order found little solid 
ground to stand on in the post-Cold War era, however. One problem with rapid 
change is that nobody knows what to expect; norms break down because leaders 
do not have common expectations. Through a long process of coping with a 
sequence of cases, international leaders build up new understandings of the rules 
of the game. In the 1990s the rules have clearly changed. For example, President 
Bush's last secretary of state, who helped keep the United States aloof from the 
Bosnia crisis in 1992, said later that i f the Cold War had still been going on he 
9 See President Bush's Speech, appendices, p. 368. 
1 0 Goldstein, J., International Relations, (New York: Longman, 1999), p. 333. 
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would have advised U.S. leaders to "jump in with both feet." Thus, the end of the 
Cold War put basic expectations, such as when U.S. military intervention is 
warranted, up for grabs. These new norms remained unsettled in the late 1990s. 
New expectations were emerging in such areas as human rights, U.N. 
peacekeeping, Russia's and China's role as great powers, and the role of the U.S. 
11 
superpower. 
There are thus two dimensions to the new "rules" of international relations. 
Firstly, the international environment is one which is governed by moral and legal 
norms dictated by the United States rather than by the real-politik of norms negotiated 
by superpower rivalries. These new norms are to be enforced by international 
institutions like the United Nations, making such institutions the tools of an 
international order shaped around US interests and moral judgements. Inevitably these 
moral judgements and interests are not necessarily shared by all states but for those who 
reject them in principle, there is no alternative "umbrella" under which to hide. Rather 
than being on one side or another, states must now be either " in" or "out", with 
sanctions being levied against those who choose to be "out". On the other hands, states 
must necessarily continue to seek to advance their own national interests, as they did 
under the Old World Order. Therefore the dynamic for engagement is the same but the 
constraints upon that engagement have changed. 
According to the new rules other players are not allowed great movement in 
areas where they used to play an important role. Russia and Europe for example, are not 
allowed to play important roles in the Middle East peace process. The United States is 
intervening militarily in areas, which were considered red line areas during the Cold 
War such as Iraq, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. Chechnya is a clear example of 
how the rules of the game are respected by the international powers. The United States 
can not intervene militarily in an area in which Russia is ready to use nuclear weapons 
in the case of any foreign military intervention. Throughout this thesis, I wi l l show how 
1 1 Ibid., p. 290. 
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both the distribution of power and the rules of the game affected the behaviour of states 
and other regional actors. 
Having discussed the question of the existence of a New World Order, having 
found a quite general agreement on its existence as an alternative to the Old World 
Order (the Cold War and ideological struggle), and having defined that New World 
Order in terms of new power arrangements and new consequential "rules" governing the 
international behaviour of states, two questions need now to be discussed. Firstly, it is 
necessary to determine at what point in time this New World Order can be said to have 
emerged. To understand this emergence, we also need to identify the indications of its 
arrival. Secondly, we can attempt to identify the features of this unprecedented order 
and the new pattern of relations between states, especially between the major powers. 
Identifying the Starting Point of the New World Order 
The New World Order became a commonplace term by the start of the 1990s. Yet the 
point of origin for this New World Order has been viewed differently by different 
analysts, who have, in turn, viewed its emergence from different angles. Although it 
was not until after the second Gulf War, and, more precisely, the 6th of March 1991, 
that President George Bush declared a New World Order, the events indicating the 
beginning of such a New World Order can be traced back to well before that. One clear 
sign of change was the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev to power in the Soviet Union in 
12 
1985 and his subsequent pursuit of policies based on "new thinking". While some 
have identified policies such as reconstruction (Perestroika) and openness (Glasnost) as 
the starting point for changes towards a different system of international relations, 
1 2 See, Thomas, F., Glasnost, Gorbachev and Lenin: Behind the New Thinking, 
(London: Polity Research, 1988). 
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others'3 believe that it is the effective collapse of the Soviet empire, the independence of 
some of its former republics and the assumption of power in Russia by Boris Yeltsin 
that marked the era of change. The Soviet defeat in Afghanistan compounded by a 
severe economic crisis only served to further destroy Soviet prestige in world politics. 
One might also argue that it was the fall of the Berlin Wall, the declaration of the 
unification of Germany and the collapse of the other Eastern European regimes, which 
provided the starting point. 
Alternatively, can the Second Gulf War, and the creation of the international 
coalition against Iraq under the leadership of the USA compounded by Russian 
cooperation -as presented by its agreement on all UN resolutions concerned- be 
considered as the starting point for the New World Order? In this context, one might 
question whether it was the war, the coalition or President Bush's speech to the 
Congress on 6 March 1991 itself, in which he spoke clearly and publicly about New 
World Order, that acted as the real starting point for that order. 
I would also argue that two other events signified major changes in the 
international system resulting from, or providing evidence of, a changing balance of 
power. Both the USA bombing of Libya in 1986 and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 
demonstrated that the relative power of the United States and the Soviet Union was 
fluctuating and that a straight forward bipolar division was transformed, with 
consequences for the way in which other players in the international system had to 
define their own positions. 
1 3 Bluth, C , The Collapse of Soviet Military Power, (Brookfield: Dartmouth, 1995). 
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New Thinking in Soviet Politics 
The new thinking or policies of Mikhail Gorbachev known as Perestroika and Glasnost 
(reconstruction and openness), undoubtedly marked a turning point, at least in the 
history of the USSR. It is clear that Gorbachev's reform policies in the middle of the 
1980s stemmed from his awareness of the extent of the crisis suffered by the communist 
bloc in general and the USSR in particular, both at the economic level - presented in the 
economic crisis which resulted from the ineffectiveness of the planned economy system, 
and the political crisis which resulted from public dissatisfaction with the political 
14 
domination of one political party in an age of information revolution. Additionally the 
military defeat -especially in Afghanistan- provided an early and basic cause of political 
changes, not only in the Soviet Union but also in the communist countries in Eastern 
Europe and the Third World in general. The Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan in 
1979 but, as with the USA war in Vietnam, the Soviet Union for all its military strength 
could not defeat rebels supported by the opposing superpower. The Soviets ultimately 
15 
withdrew after almost a decade of war that considerably weakened the Soviet Union. 
Not only did the war drain the Soviet economy, but the inability of the Soviet military to 
assert its control over a territory on which it had set its heart both divided political 
forces within the union and indicated its weaknesses to internal and external opposition 
forces. 
The centrepiece of Gorbachev's reforms was the launching within the Soviet 
Union of a process of economic and political liberalisation intended to relieve the 
16 
crisis. These internal reforms were paralleled by the Soviet desire to liberate itself 
1 4 See Galeotti, M. , Gorbachev and His Revolution, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997). 
, 5 Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 43. 
1 6 See, Brown, A., The Gorbachev Factor, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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from its costly commitments to its Eastern European satellites, which had been a buffer 
zone against the West since the beginning of the 1940s.'7 Combined with pressures for 
democratic change from within those countries, this led in some cases, such as Poland 
and Czechoslovakia, to the establishment of democratic governments in the former 
Soviet periphery. The culmination of this process was Soviet support for the unification 
of Germany in December 1990, although such support was to some extent "purchased" 
18 
by tens of billions of dollars in German aid. Such events opened the way for many 
more demands for independence, notably from the Baltic republics, and other southern 
19 
republics such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine. 
Gorbachev's new thinking in domestic or internal Soviet Union policy had 
profound implications for Soviet foreign policy, which witnessed a major 
transformation based on the abandonment of communist ideology and all that it 
entailed, for enemies and allies alike. The new foreign policy was based on practical 
considerations, one of which was the economic cost of strategic competition with the 
West and the consequent need to end international tensions in such a way as to facilitate 
20 
the resolution of domestic problems, especially those in the economic sphere. To some 
extent the objectives were similar to those of the Detente Policy, pursued by Brezhnev, 
1 7 Sakwa, R., Gorbachev and His Reforms, 1985-1990, (New York: Allan, 1990), p. 
316. 
1 8 Cooper, L., Russia and the World: New State-of-Play on the International Stage, 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1999). 
1 9 See, Lane, D., Soviet Society Under Prestroika, (London: Routledge, 1990). 
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in which he aimed at achieving a secure and comfortable international environment in 
21 
order to be able to promote the Soviet economy. 
Gorbachev's new thinking thus required a Soviet foreign policy in line with a 
new understanding of the place of, and the role to be played by the Soviet Union in 
today's world. In general terms, the new thinking posited the idea of global 
interdependence generated by the existence of a global economy and the global nature 
22 
of problems like the environment and nuclear weapons. This interdependence in the 
modern era demanded, according to the new thinking, a de-ideologisation of foreign 
policy and a search for a balance of interests between states instead of the pursuit of a 
23 
zero-sum-game competition. (It is worth noting, however, that some have argued that, 
in reality, the new foreign policy was simply a new practical and tactical approach for 
achieving the objectives of expansionism and international hegemony to which the 
24 
Soviet Union had long adhered.) A l l these factors contributed to producing a new view 
towards regional conflicts and, as we shall see later in the chapter, were bound to have 
25 
an impact on the frozen Middle East situation. 
Collapse and Disintegration of the Soviet Union 
The combination of weaknesses in Gorbachev's new thinking, the economic crisis and 
the defeat in Afghanistan was crucial to a series of events which are much more clearly 
2 1 See, Brown, A., New Thinking in Soviet Politics, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992). 
2 2 Ibid. 
2 3 See, Sakwa, (1990), Op. C i t , p. 316. 
2 4 Brown, A., The Gorbachev Factor, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
2 5 Aruri, N . , The Obstruction of Peace, (London: Common Courage Press, 1995), p. 120. 
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representative of real change in the structure of the world order, notably the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the achievement of independence by some of its 
former republics.26 
The speedy collapse of the Soviet Union and the successive failures of a number 
of communist regimes in Eastern Europe were a shock to many and posed real 
challenges to political analysts, thinkers and politicians. The disintegration of the Soviet 
empire not only unbalanced world politics, but also released previously suppressed 
energies in the form of national identities which have subsequently proved remarkably 
27 
unaccommodating to the idea of any newly ordered world. Of course, the major result 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union from the perspective of international politics, was 
28 
the end of the old bipolar order that had persisted for nearly half a century. It is no 
surprise then that realists date the New World Order from this collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. The international security landscape was irrevocably changed. As 
Douglas Hurd, then British Foreign Minister was to remark, empires have declined and 
fallen before, "but this one went with unprecedented speed and totality. Consequences 
of that collapse wil l be with us for decades to come. No longer do we have the 
simplicity, albeit an expensive simplicity, of deciding our security policy in the light of 
29 
a single massive threat from the East". 
Z b Goldstein, J., (1999), Op. Cit., p. 44. 
2 7 Axford, B., The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture, (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1996), p. 183. 
2 8 Nye, J., "What New World Order?" Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2, 1992, pp. 83-96. 
2 9 Hurd, D., "Foreign Policy and International Security," IBRU, July 1993, p. 50. 
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Fall of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe 
The collapse of the Eastern European regimes coincided with a swift decline in Soviet 
power, which culminated ultimately with the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. The 
loss of their patron state compounded with encouragement from the West for 
movements demanding democratic change brought about the respective ends of the 
totalitarian regimes in Poland, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and East 
Germany. This, in turn, was to have a profound effect on the Soviet Union itself, and 
inspired calls for independence by ethnic and national grounds from within, adding 
impetus to the processes which led to the final collapse of the Soviet Union itself in 
1991. In terms of the New World Order, the fall of the dictatorial communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe was both a result of a changing international balance of power (in the 
West's favour) and indicated the response of Eastern European states to the new 
30 
international conditions created by this change. 
In sum, events within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the 1980s 
culminated in the relegation of the Soviet Union, and later The Russian Federation from 
the superpower league, leaving that realm to the sole remaining super power, the United 
States of America. Consequently, all the Soviet Union's patron-client relations 
inevitably came in for reassessment: the Soviet Union was no longer either willing or 
able to fu l f i l the responsibilities of a patron, forcing its clients to look elsewhere for 
economic, diplomatic and military assistance. Moreover, regional actors around the 
world were forced to reassess their own place in the international order and in 
relationship to the US in particular. 
Brown, (1992), Op. Cit. 
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Bombing of Libya in 1986 
The evidence of change in the international order was not only seen in and around the 
Soviet Union itself. The decline of Soviet power left the USA with more room to 
manoeuvre and pursue its own interests in the international environment. Two clear 
examples of this, both of which took place within the Middle East region, were the 
bombing of Libya in 1986 and the military operations against Iraq in 1991. 
The USA's bombing of Libya in April 1986 was an early indication of the 
USA's desire and capacity to act as a lone superpower. It felt able to act without 
permission from the United Nations Security Council and without fear of any Soviet 
reaction. Several days after a bomb exploded in the La'belle discotheque in West 
Berlin, resulting in some injuries to American soldiers, the USA, with help from Britain, 
bombed the Libyan capital Tripoli, in the west of the country, and Benghazi, the second 
city, in the east, and many civilians were killed. Although the USA utilised the logistic 
support of the United Kingdom in this adventure, it did not feel any need to seek a 
mandate from the United Nations or to consult with the Soviet Union before taking 
action in an unstable region in which both superpowers had previously been extremely 
conscious of the ramifications, within the Cold War conflict, of their actions towards 
regional states. Critics of this act have sometimes attributed the American decision to 
the personal characteristics of the American president at the time, Ronald Reagan, but 
irrespective of the attack's causation, the fact that America "got away with i t" in this 
instance, without any meaningful form of international censure, indicates how greatly 
the international system had already changed since the days of the Cuban missile crisis 
or the Six Day War. This argument is supported by Dr Majdi Omar, who has pointed 
out that the period from 1986 onwards also saw the USA tending to intervene directly in 
other international conflicts, launching an economic offensive on the oil-producing 
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countries to reduce their prices, and intervening in the policies of the Soviet Union, all 
31 
indicating, for him, significant early changes in the international arena. 
The Second Gulf War 
The problem with the Gulf War of 1991 from the perspective of this study, is knowing 
whether it represented a turning point in the creation of the New World Order, or 
whether it was simply the first test of such an order, or indeed whether it may be viewed 
as both. Joshua Goldstein in arguing that the Gulf War, like Bosnia, has been one of the 
32 
two key defining conflicts of the post-Cold War era would seem to be taking the last 
of those positions. (In his opinion, the New World Order passed its first major test "the 
Gulf War" but proved much shakier on the second test "Bosnia"). By contrast, Don 
Oberdorfer saw the Gulf War more positively as demonstrating "unprecedented 
cooperation between Washington and Moscow [which] gave rise to hopes for a New 
World Order in which the two nuclear superpowers would stand together against 
international troublemakers".33 This belief was based on the argument that "by the 
dawning of the 1990s, a web of political and personal connections had been created 
between the leaders, governments, and peoples of the USA and the Soviet Union". 
Given that we have here an analyst who sees the New World Order not in terms of the 
3 1 Omar, M. , Altaghiurat Ji Al-nidam Al-dawli wa atharuha ala alsharq alawsat, The 
Changes in the World Order and its Impact on the Middle East, (Amman: Dar A l -
Bashir, 1995), p. 29. 
3 2 Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. xii . 
3 3 Oberdorfer, D., From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet 
Union, 1983-1991, (London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 9. 
THE NEW WORLD ORDER 83 
collapse of the Soviet Union but in terms of superpower cooperation, it is small wonder 
that there is a lack of clarity as to the role of the Gulf War in the New World Order. The 
theme of co-operation is also found in Lawrence Freedman's understanding of the New 
World Order. According to Freedman "the slogan of the USA's vision of the next stage 
of international relations after the end of the Cold War is the "New World Order" 
proclaimed by President Bush during the early stages of the Gulf crisis. He emphasised 
that a set of opportunities for more harmonious and co-operative international affairs 
had been put at risk by Iraq's act of blatant illegality." This vision of cooperation 
having replaced super-power-led confrontation/conflict in the international system 
provides an indication that, with the altering balance of power (due to the decline of the 
Soviet Union) new patterns of engagement in the international system were emerging 
which included Soviet acknowledgement that, in their state of diminished power and, 
with crisis on their own doorstep, cooperation with the United States (through the U.N. 
or otherwise) was a more effective strategy. This suggests that the New World Order 
was in existence before the Gulf War and that the war tested that New World Order. 
However, the Gulf War itself served to shape the nature of the emerging New World 
Order. 
From the beginning of the Kuwait crisis, the United States monitored and 
controlled, in one way or another, the diplomatic process to find a peaceful solution to 
the problem.35 It seemed to many, especially in the Arab world, that the USA had its 
36 
own agenda and conspired to drive the crisis in a certain direction. The Arab 
3 4 Freedman, L., "Order and Disorder in the New World," Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 
1, 1992, p. 22. 
3 5 Haikal, M. , Harb Alkhleej, The Gulf War, (Cairo: 1994). 
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governments were not allowed to exhaust all possible efforts to find an Arab solution. 
Instead of trying to pursue more diplomatic routes, the USA started, on the 7th of 
August 1990 five days after Iraq entered Kuwait, to deploy its forces in Saudi Arabia 
and the Gulf. It maintained control on all diplomatic channels and influenced all parties 
37 
to stick to its position of no compromise or concession. Consequently, the USA acted 
to block any proposals that could have made it possible for Iraq to withdraw without 
losing face. The UN Secretary General was given only the role of a messenger who 
38 
could not negotiate or take decisions himself to solve the problem. In his meeting with 
Tareq Aziz, James Baker issued ultimatums rather than attempting to use persuasion or 
39 
find an alternative to the war. It can be argued, then, that the USA's hidden agenda 
was to attack Saddam and to destroy his military machine in order to realise a bigger 
regional design that served America's interests in the post-Cold War era. 
Despite the different opinions as to the starting point of the New World Order, 
most analysts agree that the speech by the American president, George Bush to the 
American Congress in March 1991, was the real acknowledgement of such a New 
World Order. In his speech, which followed the cessation of military operations against 
Iraq, he declared a new order, in which "the principles of justice and fair play ... protect 
40 
the weak against the strong." 
Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided - a world of barbed 
wire and concrete block, conflict and cold war. 
3 7 Ibid. 
3 8 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 0998, A/1 , 16/1/1991. 
3 9Haikal,(1994), Op. Cit. 
4 0 Murphy, E., "The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Responding to the Economics of 
Globalisation," Critique, Fall 1996, no 9, p. 67. 
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Now, we can see a New World coming into view. A world in which there is the 
very real prospect of a New World Order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a 
"world order" in which "the principles of justice and fair play ... protect the weak 
against the strong..." A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war 
stalemate, is poised to fu l f i l the historic vision of its founders. A world in which 
freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations. 
The Gulf war put this New World to its first test and my fellow Americans, we 
passed that test. For the sake of our principles, for the sake of the Kuwaiti people, 
we stood our ground. Because the world would not look the other way, 
Ambassador [Saud Nasir] al-Sabah, tonight, Kuwait is free. 
Tonight as our troops begin to come home, let us recognise that the hard work of 
freedom still calls us forward. We've learned the hard lessons of history. The 
victory over Iraq was not waged as "a war to end all wars." Even the New World 
Order cannot guarantee an era of perpetual peace. But enduring peace must be our 
41 
mission. 
The principles on which the New World Order was therefore to be based were: peaceful 
settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, 
and just treatment of all peoples. 
In sum, as we have seen, there were many indications of profound change in the 
international system and the World Order dating back to the mid-1980s. Gorbachev's 
new thinking and policies following his assumption of responsibility as Secretary 
General of the Communist party in 1985 and the bombing by the USA of Libya in 1986, 
which at that time had close relations with the Soviet Union, were the earliest 
indications of a changing balance of power. Evidence of the international community 
accommodating itself to the new balance of power (and the diminished power of the 
Soviet Union) came later when the Eastern European states broke free of Soviet 
domination and indeed when the republics of the Soviet Union itself began to seek, and 
eventually to achieve, independence. The Gulf War in 1991 demonstrated clearly that 
this wave of adaptation had spread to regional conflicts beyond the Soviet Union's 
immediate realms and that the international community, led by the USA was adopting 
new formulae for international behaviour in a post bipolar era, the terms of which were 
4 1 President George Bush Address to Joint Session of Congress on the Middle East, See, 
Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. xx, no. 4, Summer, 1991, Issue 80, p. 181. 
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spelled out in President Bush's speech on 6 t h of March. 
86 
Characteristics of New World Order 
Having argued that a New World Order was in evidence by the end of the Gulf 
War (1991), it now becomes necessary to determine the characteristics or "shape" of 
that New World Order. In other words, it is crucial to determine the nature of the new 
global balance of power and the criteria by which states in the international community 
identify themselves with, or accommodate themselves to, that balance of power. 
The World Order and the pattern of international relations which persisted 
during the period from the end of World War I I in 1945 to the end of the Cold War 
1990 were characterised by struggle, competition and rivalry between the Soviet-led 
Eastern communist bloc and the US-led Western capitalist bloc. This struggle had 
ideological dimensions but was also an economic, geo-political, and strategic struggle 
between two confrontational camps that competed in all fields. Bipolarisation became 
the main feature of the international order, with the military race and, in particular, the 
nuclear balance of terror, acting as determinants for international order. 
I f that was the character of the World Order during that period which we called 
"Old", should we now proceed to differentiate it from what has followed. What then, 
are the characteristics of the New World Order? 
The end of the bipolarity opened the door to many possibilities. Unipolarity, 
multipolarity, bipolarity of a new kind, and a clash of civilisations has all been 
suggested as the possible outcomes for the New World. Writers, thinkers and political 
analysts have discussed all these possibilities. I wi l l now discuss each of them for better 
understand of their distinctive characteristics, and to establish which of them is more 
credible and nearer to reality. This is essential because of the crucial effect such 
characteristics wi l l have for determining the pattern of relations with respect to the 
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regional systems, especially the Middle East. Obviously, the shape of the New World 
Order may have a very great significance for the central regional issues such as the 
Arab-Israeli peace process. 
No New Order 
Some writers believe that there is no New World Order, and that "the world 
42 
order created in the 1940s is still with us and in many way stronger than ever." 
In an article entitled "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos" G. John Ikenberry wrote that: 
What ended with the Cold War were bipolarity, the nuclear stalemate, and 
decades of containment of the Soviet Union. But the world order created in the 
middle to late 1940s endures, more extensive and in some respects more robust 
43 
than during its Cold War years. 
According to him, attempts in recent years describing various versions of the post-Cold 
War order failed, because there is no such creature. "The task is not to discover a new 
44 
order but to reclaim the old". 
Ikenberry might be right that some aspects of the Old Order are still with us, but 
we can surely see that the bottom line of that order, namely the bipolar order, which was 
based on the balance of power and the ideological and political competition has been 
changed completely. 
4 2 Ikenberry, J., "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos," Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 3, 
pp. 79-91. 
4 3 Ibid., p. 79. 
4 4 Ibid., p. 81. 
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Chaos 
There are those who predict that the post-Cold War era will not see new order 
but a kind of disorder. The world does not need to be reminded that it exists in a formal 
state of anarchy as Richard Rosecrance for example has written: 
There is no international government. Nor is there sufficient interdependence or 
division of labour among states to transform international relations into a social 
system akin to domestic affairs. Under prevailing circumstances there are only 
three methods by which that anarchic system can be regulated or prevented from 
lapsing into chaos: the traditional balance of power; nuclear deterrence; and rule 
by a central coalition. Each system has been employed at different times during 
45 
the last two hundred years. 
The New World Order has been seen and described by some Third World governments 
as a New World Disorder.46 The misuse of the United Nations to serve the interests of 
certain states -in particular the American and Western powers- force many in the Third 
World to see the proclaimed New World Order negatively. 
Bipolarity 
Many writers believes that human history has always demonstrated the existence 
of two worlds, and there has always been a division of people between "us" and "them", 
our "civilisation" and those "Barbarians", etc. Some scholars have analysed the world 
on the basis of "Orient" and "Occident", "North" and "South", "centre" and 
"periphery", "peace camp" and "war camp", "Darul-Harb" and "Darul-Islam". 
"Bipolarity" is a form of balance of power that polarises the world into two camps. 
Bipolarity is based on a distribution of power between two main antagonists. Also, it is 
4 5 Rosecrance, R., "A New Concert of Powers," Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2, 1992, p. 
64. 
4 6 Media in Iraq and Libya for example described it as such. 
THE NEW WORLD ORDER 89 
a system where power is distributed between the two countries in a form in which the 
two countries are too powerful and able to defend themselves against any combination 
of states. 
According to Goldstein a "bipolar system has two predominant states or two 
great rival alliance blocs. This was the structure of world politics during the Cold War. 
Tight bipolar systems, such as the East-West stand-off in the 1950s, may be 
distinguished from looser ones such as the one that developed when China and (to a 
lesser extent) France split off from their respective alliance blocs. The USA-Soviet 
,47 
stand-off seemed to provide stability and peace to superpower relations.' 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, some thought that a new form of bipolarity 
might emerge in world politics. Joseph Nye wrote that "Before the failure of the August 
coup and the final collapse of the Soviet Union, some argued that a newly repressive 
Soviet or Russian regime would create a harsh international climate and a return to the 
48 
Cold War." However, in addition to bipolarity based on ideological diversity 
(Capitalism/Communism) or two superpowers, there are other forms of theoretically 
possible bipolarity such as West versus East, industrial countries versus non-industrial 
and North versus South, for which there is some evidence today. 
For example, the increase in wealth, development, unify, Cupertino and 
coordination of industrial Western countries on the one hand, and backwardness and 
fragmentation of Third World countries on the other, has created a kind of bipolarity 
and a hostile relationship in this economic division which embodies a contradiction in 
interests. This perspective has been interpreted as a North-South axis, to the extent that 
Alain Lipetz predicted that the twenty first century wil l start with war between the 
4 7 Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 85. 
4 8 Nye, (1992), Op. Cit., pp. 83-96. 
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North and South. As Joshua Goldstein pointed out "The most important global 
50 
division is now the North-South gap between the world's rich and poor regions . 
Others have argued that the end of the capitalist-communist bipolarity of the 
Cold War has led to the enhancement of a new bipolarity between the industrial liberal 
west and the rest of the world, made up of the underdeveloped, non-industrial countries 
in Africa, Latin America and Asia. The dualism of "west and east", or "west and rest" 
does not always have an economic base. Indeed, for some, it is primarily to be seen as a 
cultural bipolarity. For Samuel Huntington, the dichotomy is still more profound. 
Clash of Civilisations 
In the Westphalian era, wars were conflicts between kings and emperors to 
expand their territories and economies. With the French revolution, the wars became 
conflicts between nation states. This pattern of the nineteenth century continued until 
World War I . Following the Russian revolution and the reactions against it, the conflict 
between nations evolved into a conflict between ideologies; first a three-way conflict 
between communism, fascism and liberal democracy, and then, subsequently, between 
communism and liberal democracy.51 
During the Cold War this ideological conflict was embodied in struggle between 
the two superpowers. With the end of the Cold War, however, international politics 
Quoted in Bello, W and Cunningham, S, (ed.) Dark Victory: The United States, 
Structural Adjustment and Global Poverty, (London: Pluto Press, 1994), p. 111. 
5 0 Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit , p. xi . 
51 
Ibid. 
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moved out of this stage and, according to Huntington, its basis became the interaction 
52 
between western civilisations and non-western civilisations. 
In another perspective on what the world order might look like following the end 
of the ideological struggle between capitalism and communism and the collapse of the 
bipolar system with the demise of the Soviet Union, Samuel Huntington has presented 
his hypothesis that the principal conflicts wil l occur between nations and groups of 
different civilisations, and that the source of the conflicts wi l l be cultural. This 
prospect or view might be similar to the bipolarity, which imagines a division between 
North and South, and may even agree with the multipolarity prospect, as cultures and 
civilisations are numerous. Thus, every civilisation of the more than six civilisations 
discussed by Huntington (Western Christianity, Islam, Confucianism, Buddhism, 
Hinduism and Eastern Christianity) may constitute an independent pole. 
In an article entitled "The Clash of Civilisations?" published in Foreign Affairs 
in summer 1993, Samuel Huntington predicted that "The clash of civilisations wil l 
dominate global politics, and the fault lines between civilisations wil l be the battle lines 
of the future." 5 4 
During the Cold War, the world was divided into the First, Second and Third 
Worlds. Those divisions are no longer relevant.55 For Huntington, it is far more 
5 2 Huntington, S., " I f Not Civilisations, What? Paradigms of the Cold War World," 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 5, Nov-Dec 1993, pp. 186-194. 
5 3 Huntington, S., "The Clash of Civilisations?", Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, 
Summer 1993, p. 22. See also, S. Huntington., The Clash of Civilisations and Remaking 
of World Order, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 
5 4 Ibid. 
55 Rashid, S., "The Clash of Civilisations?", Asian Responses, (Oxford: Oxford 
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meaningful now to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems, 
or in terms of their level of economic development, but rather in terms of their culture 
and civilisation. As Amit Gupta pointed out, "the argument that the New World Order 
would be marked not by a clash of ideologies but by a clash of civilisations seems to be 
a compelling way to understand the unfolding crisis in the emerging international 
56 
system.' 
As Hahm Chaibong observed, "By presenting a new and provocative way of 
reading and interpreting the world the article on the clash of civilisations has succeeded 
in raising a sharply focused debate among the students of international relations for 
57 
whom the 'order' of the 'new world' has been anything but clear." 
Nation states wil l remain the principal actors in international affairs but the main 
conflicts in the world politics will occur between nations and groups of different 
civilisations. According to Huntington, this clash of civilisations wi l l dominate global 
• 5 8 politics. 
In my opinion there can be no doubt that the existence of a number of different 
cultures and civilisations is a matter of history and not a recent phenomenon. The 
existence of major political theories, ideologies and religions such as Christianity, 
Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism and others have, in their variety, 
University Press, 1997), p. 2. 
5 6 Gupta, A., "Are we Really Seeing the Clash of Civilisations?" in Rashid, (1997), Op. 
Cit, p. 65. 
57 
Hahm, C , "The Clash of Civilisations Resisted: A Confucian Perspective," in S, 
Rashid, (1997), Op. Cit, p. 109. 
58 
For response to Huntington's thesis see, Ajami, F., "The Summoning," Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 72, no. 4, September 1993, pp. 2-9. 
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helped to shape the development of mankind. However, although their coexistence has, 
in some cases, led to the occurrence of religious wars in the past, it is also an undeniable 
fact that there have been instances of understanding through dialogue between cultures 
and religions in a way which has been taken by many and which has led to positive 
results. Examples of religious coexistence which have lasted for hundreds of years can 
be seen in relations between Jews, Muslims, Christians and Hindus at different times 
and in different places. 
Any increases in cultural and religious differentiation which become causes for 
conflicts and wars are in many cases due to attempts by some forces which have an 
59 
interest m promoting these differences in order to achieve their own interests. It can be 
said without hesitation, for example, that the colonial powers exploited ethnic, religious, 
cultural and tribal differences to ignite the fire of wars between communities, to weaken 
60 
them and make them easier target for colonisation. 
Samuel Huntington's analysis presented in both his article and his subsequent 
book about the clash of civilisations, although having a compelling logic and more than 
an element of truth which can not be denied, cannot be totally distinguished from 
attempts, which have increased in the last three decades, to identify and exaggerate an 
Islamic threat to the Christian-Judaic civilisation.6' His thesis may be seen as either 
falling victim to, or actively promoting such interests who feel that the demonisation of 
the Islamic culture is of benefit to the West. Suspicion is raised by the location of Islam 
5 9 Netanyahu is good example for this. See, Netanyahu, B., Fighting Terrorism: How 
democracies can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorism, (London: Allison & 
Busby, 1995). 
6 0 Divide and rule is a very known colonial principle. 
6 1 Huntington, (1993), Op. Cit. 
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in the same camp as Buddhism, Confucianism and Hinduism, as form of religion and 
civilisation hostile to Western civilisation. Yet ironically, in my opinion, what links 
Islam with Judaism and Christianity is as much as what differentiates it from Buddhism 
and Hinduism. 
It is possible to trace some political aims behind the advancement of the theory 
of a clash of civilisations, especially when we observe the attempt to put Judaism and 
62 
Christianity on the same side, confronting all other civilisations and particularly Islam. 
This conception has found its way in the last few years into policies adopted by the 
United States and other Western nations, the political institutions and governments of 
which have been convinced to adopt this analysis as a guide in dealing with Islam as a 
hostile civilisation and incompatible culture.63 For example, the Arab-Israeli conflict is 
between Israeli Jews on one side and Palestinian Muslims and Christians on the other. 
For American policy-makers and influential figures, however, it has been portrayed as 
being between Jews and Christians (including American Christian interests) on one side 
64 
and Muslims on the other. One can even argue that, in order to assert their own 
cultural and ideological hegemony, the United States and its allies find it useful to 
propagate the idea of another, threatening, 'civilisation' or culture, one which includes 
air that is unfamiliar to the West, regardless of whether there is true collective purpose 
in the civilisations of Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism. Thus, an acknowledgement of 
both the truths and the weaknesses of the clash of civilisations thesis is not incompatible 
with notions of American hegemony, but may actually support them. 
6 2 See, Said, E., Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We 
See the Rest of the World, (London: Routledge, 1981). 
"Netanyahu, (1993), Op. Cit. 
6 4 Malachy, Y., American Fundamentalism and Israel, (Jerusalem: Graph Press, 1978). 
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Globalisation 
65 
The post-Cold War era has also been termed one of globalisation and it is appropriate 
to briefly consider the relevance of this assertion to our discussions. As Robert Holton 
pointed out: 
Globalisation has, over the past decade, become a major feature of commentaries 
on contemporary social life. This global focus extends almost everywhere in 
business, sport, politics, fashion, the environment, music, law, and cultural 
identity. Globe-talk also extends to the world of politics. Predictions of the demise 
of the nation-state in the face of globalisation occur, alongside an awareness of the 
growth of trans-national political institutions such as the U.N. and transnational 
political norms such as human rights. New images of world order speak of the 
66 
emergence of the global citizen and a global civil society. 
We may ask how this process of globalisation reflects on, or contributes to, the global 
distribution of power and the ways in which states relate to one another in the 
international system. Globalisation is viewed by many in the Third World as a new 
name for a new imperialism.67 Through expanding capitalism and the spread of 
multinational enterprises, globalisation serves to strengthen the western capitalist 
system and undermine the aspirations of other parts of the world for satisfactory 
68 
development and advancement. The USA as a leader of the western capitalist system 
and civilisation is seen to be benefiting from this new-old phenomenon called 
globalisation. In a globalised world, states will be tied up with economic and financial 
b i Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 48. 
6 6 Holton, R., Globalization and the Nation-State, (London: Macmillan Press, 1998). 
6 7 Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi, no. 247, 9/1999. 
68 
See, Hutchings, R, At the End of the American Century: America 's Role in the Post-
Cold War World, ( Washington: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). 
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interests. The USA again as a leader within the international economic and financial 
69 
institutions is therefore seen as a hegemon and presumably wil l behave as such. 
One aspect of globalisation is that global telecommunications, multinational 
business networks, and transnational ethnic communities are undermining state 
sovereignty from within, while the nascent supranational authority of the United 
Nations and the European Union are doing the same from without. The dissolution of 
borders weakens developing states and makes them more vulnerable to hegemonic 
assertions by the global organisations like the United Nations may become more 
70 
authoritative, but they too are the servants of their paymasters, notably the USA. Thus, 
we can say that globalisation does not necessarily limit the powers of a global hegemon 
and, at least for the time being, can increase its capacity to enforce its wil l . 
Multipolar! ty 
For some, the end of the Cold War marks the shift from a world of geo-strategy to a 
71 
new international arrangement based on geo-economics. Power is seen as being 
distributed between a number of major powers, each of which draws its own power 
from a number of different sources. Global balance is achieved through the creation of 
72 
coalitions and alliances, curbing any ambition for domination by expanding states. 
Nevertheless, as a regulator for global security, multipolarity is less effective than 
6 9 Baylis, J and Smith, S., The Globalisation of World Politics: an introduction to 
international Relations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
7 0 Ibid. 
7 1 Walker, M. , The Cold War: A History, (New York: Henry Holt, 1994). 
7 2 Ibid. 
THE NEW WORLD ORDER 97 
bipolarity in providing mechanisms for security. When a country develops its capability 
at the expense of its neighbouring countries, and therefore constitutes a threat, a 
realignment will ultimately rise to contain the power of the aggressor country. Thus, 
equilibrium governs the potential chaos of international relations. 
The notion of multipolarity is drawn from a number of conceptions of power. As 
Doyle and Ikenbury wrote, "The new multipolarity of the international system mirrors a 
73 
similar multipolarity of theory." 
For some, such as Rosecrance, multipolarity reflects the distribution of power. 
He has observed: "the break-up of the Soviet Union, the liberation of Eastern Europe, 
the Gulf War and the rapprochement between the United States and Russia have lent the 
world a new concert of powers. Five great bases of power again control the organisation 
of the world order: the USA, Russia, the EC, Japan and China. The U.N. Security 
74 
Council is one manifestation of this new central coalition." However, it can be noted 
that there should be no confusion between the multipolarity of the end of last century 
and any multipolarity of the beginning of the coming century. Such comparisons are 
invalid because the major powers of that time were balanced while the major powers of 
75 
these days are far from equally balanced. 
Most writers see the economic factor as being crucial to the change towards 
76 
multipolarity. They argue that because there are many competing economic blocs, 
which need each other because of the increasing economic interdependence engendered 
73 
Doyle, M and Ikenbery, J., New Thinking in International Relations Theory, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 278. 
7 4 Rosecrance, (1992), Op. Cit, p. 65. 
7 5 Nye, J., "What New World Order," Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2, 1992, p. 86. 
76Hutchings, (1998), Op. Cit. 
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by the globalisation process, and because this economic importance is more crucial than 
the military factor, the world will witness multipolarity presented in a number of 
77 
economic blocs such as the USA, Europe, Japan, China and South East Asia. In 
arguing for the primary importance of economic as opposed to military factors, Michael 
Hogan asserted that: "A multipolar world is emerging in which economic power wil l be 
more important than military might ... the economic dependency of the United States, 
especially its need for foreign financing of the national debt, will deprive the country of 
78 
its freedom to manoeuvre and render its military power increasingly meaningless" For 
him the end of the Cold War is the beginning of a new stage of global economic 
competition between the USA, Japan and the European Community. 
As Joshua Goldstein observed "Power still matters, but economic forms of 
79 
power now rival military ones. He observed that the USA position in the international 
economy has shifted considerably. USA hegemony has declined, USA strengths have 
eroded, and competitors have gained relative ground (especially in Western Europe and 
80 
Asia) Similarly Joseph Nye points out that those who do not give military might the 
greatest importance argue that there wi l l be three economic blocs: Asian bloc centred 
around the Yen, a Western hemisphere centred around the Dollar and a European bloc 
81 
centred around the Euro. 
7 7 Rosecrance, (1992), Op. Cit. 
Hogan, M. , The End of the Cold War: its Meaning and Implications, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 7-9. 
7 9 Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. xi . 
8 0 Ibid., p. 401. 
8 1 Nye, (1992), Op. Cit., p. 87. 
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I f economics can be considered to be one factor, which makes multipolarity 
inevitable, so too can nuclear capability. As we know, any country, which owns nuclear 
arms is able to threaten the whole world and put it in danger, and that gives it a weight 
in international affairs. Thus, for example, the first five declared nuclear states have 
permanent membership of the UN Security Council and enjoy the veto. 
82 
For many writers multipolarity is the ultimate destination of the world order, 
even i f today's world is one of American hegemony, because of the growth of regional 
economic blocs, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and because if , and 
when, American hegemonic power declines, there is no single, obvious successor likely 
to emerge as a global superpower. 
It has been said that states are individuals, albeit on a larger scale. They are born, 
grow up, become strong, get older and then weaker, and then finally die. The reading of 
history tells us that no power has lasted forever. The Roman Empire, the Byzantine 
Empire, the Islamic Empire and others lasted for extended periods but not forever. 
Civilisations in different part of the world dominated then disappeared during the last 
ten thousand years, examples being the Egyptian and Mesopotamian civilisations. 
Without contradicting ourselves, we can say that even i f the United States is a sole pole 
and today's world superpower, whose hegemony is clear and evident at least in some 
regions, its far and even relatively near future is uncertain. As some writers have 
pointed out, the USA has its own growing weaknesses and social contradictions. Indeed, 
the theme that the USA is in crisis and that its hegemony is in decline is widespread. In 
his book, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, Paul Kennedy depicts the decline of 
American power as part of a cyclical pattern of growth and decline which is largely due 
Lake, D and Morgan, P., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, 
(Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977). 
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to economic and technological factors. So, while, for now the USA seems set to 
remain a superpower and the dominant force, especially in specific areas and regions, 
there is much in favour of arguments of inevitable multipolarity. 
However, while it is possible to determine the poles around which a multipolar 
order wi l l develop, there are, as yet, no alternative poles capable of competing with the 
USA in military as well as in economic or other ways. The USA, is the biggest power in 
the world, and its role in the multipolar order wil l be crucial in forming alliances. 
Europe, Japan, China and Russia seem to be centres of gravity around which a future 
multipolar balance of power might be built. Currently Japan and Europe cannot form 
alternative poles to the USA to whom they are still subordinate economically and 
militarily. The European countries have not yet reached full political unity in spite of 
the advance of their economic integration. National interests are generally still dominant 
over European interests. During the Gulf War, for example, European divisions 
prevented the formulation and implementation of a united foreign policy. 
For Japan and Germany to play a full role in a multipolar world, they need to 
modify their constitutions and rebuild their military capabilities. An alliance between 
Russia and China is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Russia is recovering from the 
loss of its republics and is engaged in reconstructing its regional role. Since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, Russia has become dependent on economic aid from the USA and 
its allies, and thus, its global ambitions have been constrained. However, its entry into 
the exclusive G-8 club indicates its potential as an economic power of the future. 
Whatever the present weaknesses of potential competitors for global power, there are 
clearly multiple emerging poles. 
Kennedy, P., The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military 
Conflict from 1500-2000, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), see also, Axford, (1996), Op. 
Cit., p. 183. 
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Continuing with the discussion of the characteristics or "shape" of the New 
World Order and in order to determine the nature of the new global balance of power 
and the criteria by which states in the international community identify themselves with, 
or accommodate themselves to, that balance of power, and having already discussed 
bipolarity, clash of civilisation, globalisation and multipolarity I will now discuss 
unipolarity and unipolarity as American hegemony. 
Unipolarity 
Some writers, political analysts and statesmen believe that changes in the international 
arena following the end of the bipolar system left the United States as the only 
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superpower. Without any balancing power, they conclude that the main feature of 
international relations, at least for the present and the foreseeable future, is unipolarity. 
A unipolar system as Goldstein pointed out, has a single centre of power around which 
all others revolve. According to him, this is called hegemony, because the 
predominance of a single state tends to reduce the incidence of war; the hegemonic state 
performs some of the functions of a government, somewhat reducing anarchy in the 
See for example, T. Ismael., The Gulf War and the New World Order: International 
Relations of the Middle East, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994). Also 
Murphy, E., "The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Responding to the Economics of 
Globalisation," Critique, Fall 1996, no 9, pp. 67-91. 
8 5 Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 85. 
international system. 
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For Goldstein, as for Murphy, unipolarity includes both a new balance of power 
86 
and a new "code of conduct" determined by the remaining superpower. For Francis 
87 . . 
Fukuyama, by contrast, unipolarity may be seen less in terms of American military 
and economic dominance and more in terms of the ultimate victory of capitalism, 
liberalism, individualism and the ideological components represented by the USA over 
their communist antitheses. In any case, there can be little doubt that the United States 
plays a unique role in the New World Order as the sole surviving superpower. 
Among the most supportive of the idea of unipolarity as the distinguishing feature of the 
post-Cold War world is Charles Krauthammer. In an article published in Foreign 
Affairs, entitled "The Unipolar Moment" he argued that "the immediate post-cold war 
world is not multipolar, it is unipolar. The centre of world power is the unchallenged 
superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies . . . the most striking 
feature of post-cold war is its unipolarity." However, he argues that the current 
unipolarity may be a temporary phenomenon. Thus in his words, "now is the unipolar 
88 
moment". His understanding of a "pole" is based on his contention that the notion that 
economic power inevitably translates into geopolitical influence is a materialist illusion. 
He thinks that economic power is a necessary condition for great power status, but it 
certainly is not sufficient. The USA in his opinion is "the only country with the military, 
diplomatic, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in 
8 0 Murphy, (1996) Op. Cit., pp. 67-91. 
8 7 Fukuyama, F., "End of History," International Interests, Summer, 1989. 
8 8 Krauthammer, C , "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 1, 1991, p. 
23. 
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whatever part of the world it choose to involve itself." On this basis he can claim at 
least current unipolarity but also the potential for future multipolarity. 
Unipolarity as American Hegemony 
The role of the United States in this New World Order has been described by many 
writers as one of a global hegemon. Hegemony was viewed by Gramsci as the most 
90 
important face of power. Hegemony, for our purpose, is the holding by one state of a 
preponderance of power in the international system, so that it can single-handedly 
dominate the rules and arrangements by which international political and economic 
91 
relations are conducted. Such a state is called a hegemon, and when applying the 
concept to the New World Order, we can see that such a hegemon not only derives from 
a new balance of power but also determines the new "rules of the game." (Usually 
hegemony means domination of the world, but sometimes it refers to regional 
92 
domination.) 
93 
The theory of hegemonic stability holds that hegemony provides some order in 
the international system, by serving some functions similar to those of a central 
8 9 Ibid., p. 25. 
9 0 Femia, J., Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the 
Revolutionary Process (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 31. 
9 1 Rupert, M. , Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American 
Global Power, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
9 2 Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 86. 
9 3 See, Gaddis, J., The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, 
Reconsiderations, Provocations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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government; deterring aggression, promoting free trade, and providing a hard currency 
that can be used as a world standard. Hegemons can help to resolve, or at least keep in 
94 . . . 
check, conflicts among middle powers or small states. From the perspective of less 
powerful states, of course, such hegemony may seem an infringement of state 
sovereignty, and the order it creates may seem unjust or illegitimate. In contrast to the 
idea of hegemonic stability, Joshua Goldstein has argued that peace is best preserved by 
a relatively equal power distribution (multipolarity) because then no country has an 
opportunity to win easily. 
Lawrence Freedman holds to the view that the United States may be viewed as 
having the potential to be hegemonic. "The United States has attained an international 
pre-eminence beyond challenge. As leader of the West during the years of confrontation 
with the Soviet bloc and, most recently, of the international coalition ranged against 
Saddam Hussein's Iraq, it is now well placed to define both the character of this new 
96 
stage in international history and the West's role within i t ." Freedman's America is 
potentially hegemonic by virtue of its capacity for military projection. For Joshua 
Goldstein, however, the USA's extraordinary strength lies in a wider range of 
capabilities: 
The United States is an extraordinary wealthy and powerful state. Its most unique 
strength may be in the area of international security -as the world's only 
superpower- but its economic strengths are also striking. It is not only the world's 
largest economy but also the most technologically advanced one in such growth 
sectors as computers, telecommunications, aviation and aerospace, and 
9 4 Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 88. 
9 5 Ibid., p. 90. 
96Freedman, (1992),Op. Cit., p. 20. 
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biotechnology. The US position in scientific research and higher education is 
unparalleled in the world. 
For those who believe in the existence and continuity of American hegemony, and who 
take into consideration economic strength as much as military might, the USA remains 
the most influential participant in the world's economy despite the relative decline of 
USA economic power, for three reasons. The first is the role of the dollar as the main 
reserve currency and unit of transactions. The second is the very size of the USA 
economy, which continues, despite Japan's challenge, to exert domination on the 
financial markets and trade flows of smaller economies. The third is that only the 
United States, unlike Japan or the European Union, can integrate with its foreign policy 
98 
a vast array of economic and strategic-diplomatic instruments. For Barry Axford too, 
American hegemony is based on the combination of military predominance and 
economic strength. 
The commonly accepted New World Order consists, or more accurately was said 
to consist, of a number related elements. First, the voluntary withdrawal of the 
Soviet Union from its 'historical' world role was intended to leave it still intact 
and militarily capable, but benign as a player with global pretensions. As a result, 
the United States would be the only real superpower. Second, the prospects for 
lasting peace and prosperity in the New World Order would be enhanced by 
revitalised bodies like the United Nations (UN). Freed from the constraints of 
superpower rivalry the UN would play a more interventionist role in local 
conflicts, or in eradicating brutish conduct by individual" regimes, with American-
led coalitions of states acting to enforce the writ of the world community. Third, 
this globally sanctioned pax-Americana would have an geo-economic dimension, 
carrying market liberalism to former state-socialist economies through multilateral 
99 
institutions. 
v / Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 401. 
9 8 Hoffman, S., "Notes on the US Role in the Middle East," in Kipper and Saunders 
(ed.) The Middle East in Global Perspective, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 260. 
9 9 Axford, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 182. 
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Some writers differentiate between unipolarity and domination. In their view, the USA 
being the remaining superpower does not mean its domination over world affairs. 
Joseph Nye, for example, does not believe that the USA constitutes a hegemon. He 
argues that: "the premise is correct that the collapse of the Soviet Union left the world 
100 
with only one superpower, but the hegemonic conclusion does not follow." In his 
opinion "the United States is better placed with a more diversified portfolio of power 
resources than any other country, but the New World order wi l l not be an era of 
101 
American hegemony." Hegemony, according to Nye, is unlikely because of the 
diffusion of power through transitional interdependence, and because the world 
102 
economy is bipolar (USA, Europe and Japan) and has been since the 1970s. For Nye, 
challenges to American hegemony come not in the form of one superpower as in the 
past but in the form of a collection of fragmented ideological alternatives. 
Rather than the end of history, the post-Cold War world is witnessing a return of 
history in the diversity of sources of international conflict. Liberal capitalism has 
many competitors, albeit fragmented ones. Examples include the indigenous neo-
Maoism of Peru's Shining Path guerrilla movement, the many variant of Islamic 
103 
fundamentalism and the rise of ethnic nationalism. 
In this, Nye is, in fact, responding directly to Charles Krauthammer, who had argued 
that "the Gulf War marked the beginning of a pax Americana in which the world wil l 
acquiesce in a benign American hegemony". Nye believes that nationalism and trans-
104 
nationalism wil l be "contending forces in the New World politics". The same can be 
, 0 0Nye,(1992),Op. Cit., p. 87. 
101 Ibid., p .83. 
1 0 2 Ibid., p. 87. 
103 Ibid., p. 84. 
1 0 4 Ibid., p. 85. 
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said for the trans-national technological changes in communications and transportation. 
Instead of one global village there wi l l be villages around the globe, more aware of each 
other than in the past, but still distinct. In sum, Joseph Nye believes in multilevel 
interdependence. For him: 
No single hierarchy describes adequately a world politics with multiple structure. 
The distribution of power in world politics has become like a layer cake. The top 
military layer is largely unipolar, for there is no other military power comparable 
to the United States. The economic middle layer is tripolar and has been for two 
decades. The bottom layer of transnational interdependence shows a diffusion of 
105 
power. 
Finally, Nye believes that the realist view of world order, resting on a balance of 
military power, is necessary but not sufficient; equally the liberal conception of a world 
society of peoples as well as states, and of order resting on values and institutions as 
well as military power is more relevant. 
Some, albeit a few, contradict the idea of unipolarity itself by emphasising that 
the image of the USA as the sole remaining superpower is an illusion. Enid Hi l l for 
example has examined Henry Kissinger's argument that "The widespread perception 
that the Gulf War certified America as the last remaining superpower is erroneous... The 
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belief that the USA is the only remaining superpower is an illusion." According to an 
article by Kissinger, "power will be the nexus of political, military and economic 
assets"; thus the United States will be one power among others that are emerging in 
Asia and Europe. According to him "The new order will be more like the European 
State system of the eighteen and nineteenth centuries than the rigid patterns of the cold 
1 0 5 Ibid., p. 88. 
1 0 6 Hil l , E., "The New World Order and the Gulf War: Rhetoric, Policy, and Politics in 
the United States," in T. Ismael (ed.) The Gulf War and the New World Order: 
International Relations of the Middle East, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
1994), pp. 195-196. 
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war." There will be six major states: the United States, Europe, China, Japan, "whatever 
107 
emerges m the Soviet Union, and probably India." Enid Hill takes exception to 
Kissinger's list of future world powers for its neglect of the Middle East. After all, the 
Gulf remains the heartland of oil production and thus of American security concerns. 
According to Noam Chomsky, the world is now tripolar: "Germany-led Europe, 
Japan and its periphery, and the United States." The USA is undoubtedly the leading 
military force. "The USA is completely free to use force arbitrarily, anywhere it likes ... 
in the New World Order there is one very powerful military force" (the United States) 
and a "lieutenant" (Great Britain) with a "reasonably powerful military force." Neither 
108 
of them is dominant economically" and both are "very weak politically." Because 
they are politically weak, diplomacy is not a useful option for them and they therefore 
prefer to engage at the military level such that "force is the way you rule the world. 
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That's the New World Order". However, at the economic level a German-led Europe 
and Japan can, and do, weigh in with the United States. 
Joseph Nye's argument against USA hegemony can be easily countered by his 
own words. As he demonstrated that he believes that it is the "unipolar moment", this in 
itself means that the USA, the sole pole and the only superpower, is a hegemon at least 
in some areas and regions. The USA does not need to impose itself and show its 
hegemony everywhere in the world and on every issue it faces. It usually tries to 
cooperate with its western allies and continues to claim its willingness to create an ideal 
world of fairness, justice and equality, but in more problematic situations it reveals its 
1 0 7 Kissinger, H., "What kind of New World Order?," The Washington Post, 3 
December 1991. 
1 0 8 Hi l l , (1994), Op. Cit., p. 196. 
109 Ibid., p. 198. 
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ability and its desire to ensure its hegemony and use its economic and military power to 
force cooperation with its policies in areas that it considers most important for its 
national interests. The Middle East is the region where it has most clearly shown a 
preference for exerting its hegemony and enforcing its policy, not only because it is a 
strategically important region or only because it has the largest oil reserves, both of 
which are admittedly, very important elements, but also (for domestic reasons 'the 
Zionist domination over America's centre of power') to protect Israel and reorder the 
region in a way that can ensure the integration of Israel into it and eliminate any 
potential threat to its existence and security. 
It seems appropriate to conclude from the above arguments that ideas of USA 
hegemony stem from its combined economic, military, technological and diplomatic 
strength. They stem also from the fact that no other country is able or willing to 
challenge her. The acceptance of most countries -with a few exceptions such as Iraq, 
Cuba and Libya- of that fact is, in itself, a licence for the USA to behave accordingly. In 
the Middle East and in the Gulf in particular, the USA was invited in and crowned as a 
hegemon even before it had proved itself to be so. 
Regional states acknowledge that, whether or not the United States is hegemonic 
in world politics, for the past three decades it has been the dominant outside power in 
the Middle East, using its position sometimes to try to elicit cooperation among regional 
actors (as between Israel and the Arab states), and at other times to prevent cooperation 
n o 
(for example, with respect to Iraq and Iran) 
After the USSR retreated to attend to its domestic situation, it became clear that 
the USA administration began to act as the only superpower that could exercise 
influence on the world and that it was no longer an administration for the USA alone, 
1 1 0 Goldstein, J., "Dynamics of Middle East Conflict and US Influence, 1979-97," 
http://www .american.edu/academic.depts/sis/goldtext/me98.papr.htm. p. 5. 
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but an administration for the whole world community. However, despite American 
claims to the contrary, the USA has been accused of being a dictator who acts single-
handedly in international and regional crises, seeking to force its viewpoint and 
i n 
solutions on those crises. 
The concept of the New World Order, which the Bush administration raised and 
whose praises it began to sing and to market on every occasion was a cover to give 
legitimacy and collectivism to the USA administration's dictatorship and absolute 
control of the resources of the peoples.'12 They think that the USA has begun to practice 
its hegemony on the UN Security Council and to interfere in their affairs in accordance 
with its own standards and interests. For example, an Iraqi official statement stated that 
"Bush's New World Order is one which enables America to impose its complete 
hegemony on the world and to liquidate all the issues of national liberation and 
humanitarian struggle. Not only that, but the New World Order the USA wants is that 
113 
which also gives it the opportunity to control its allies". 
Tareq Ismael made it clear that the New World Order suggests at least two 
dimensions in its meaning: the end of an international order determined by the struggle 
for hegemony between the United States and the Soviet Union; and the initiation of a 
l f 4 
USA, foreign policy doctrine based on USA hegemony in the international order. 
1 1 1 Haykal, (1994), Op. Cit. 
1 1 2 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/1015, A/1 , 8 March 1991. 
1 , 3 Ibid. 
1 1 4 Ismael, T., The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the 
Middle East, (Gainesville: University of Florida, 1994), p. 1. 
THE NEW WORLD ORDER 111 
Summary of New World Order 
The New World Order as a pattern of international relations that emerged following the 
end of the Cold War is a matter of fact. The bipolarity of two great rival alliance blocs is 
a thing of the past, the rules of the Cold War no longer apply and the fundamental 
redistribution of power created new rules of engagement. Given that the United 
Kingdom and France are close allies of the United States, that Russia is going through 
economic crisis and social turmoil, that Japan is suffering from an economic malaise 
and has no military projection capability, and that China is very far from becoming a 
real superpower, it is hard to see any current power existing which can challenge 
America and the pursuit of American interests in the New World Order. Indeed, the 
United States is recognised in practice by almost every nation as the only remaining 
superpower. Its economic and militarily superiority is beyond any doubt. 
The signals for the existence of this New World Order are many. Among them 
were the bombing of Libya, the second Gulf War, the American military intervention in 
Somalia and later its intervention in Bosnia and bombing of Serbia. 
The New World Order as a pattern of relations between the international actors in 
a specific period became a reality because of the fundamental redistribution of power 
that took place following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The rules of the game of the 
Old Cold War Order were replaced by new rules that take account of the new 
distribution of power. The four principles envisioned by president of United States 
George Bush were as follow: Peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against 
aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals and just treatment of all peoples. 
I have argued in the previous discussion that, although a multipolar world order 
wil l most likely come to exist in the future, today's World Order is unipolar. The forces 
of globalisation may in the long term over-ride the dominance of the international 
system by any single state or group of states which have superior military and political 
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power (as well as economic strength). In today's World Order, however, the United 
States of America clearly has superiority in these other realms, allowing it to exercise its 
hegemonic tendencies. The New World Order is therefore a unipolar one in which the 
United States exercises something close to complete hegemony in today's world 
politics. The USA has got the power that amounts to the control of behaviour and has 
the ability to implement its policies through its unique combination of economic, 
diplomatic and military strength. The "clash of civilisations thesis" is misleading in so 
far as it assumes that the USA (and its civilisational allies) on the one hand, and the 
Islamic (and allied) world on the other, are engaged in international relations on the 
basis of something other than the very real struggle for, and exercise of, power. 
However, the form which American efforts to assert its hegemony has taken, and the 
Islamic World's resistance to the moral and institutional environment that the USA has 
sought to create, have combined to support the impression of such a "clash". 
This chapter wi l l continue to show that this is particularly true in the Middle East 
where no other power is able to challenge the United States. I shall now proceed to 
examine how the sea changes in the international balance of power, and the responses of 
regional states to that balance, have affected the Middle East region. The main body of 
the thesis can then examine in more detail the particular impact of the New World Order 
(American hegemonic unipolarity) on the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The New World Order in the Middle East 
Having determined that the New World Order displays a unipolar balance of 
power with the United States playing a hegemonic role, it is now necessary to show how 
this has manifested itself in the Middle East. 
The Middle East can be described as a highly penetrated regional sub-system of 
the international system. As it was highly affected by the Cold War, so it has been by its 
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end. The demise of the Soviet Union -felt as early as the 1970s-"5 and its ultimate 
collapse in 1991 left their marks on the Middle East and its politics. As every reaction 
has its equal counter reaction, so Middle Eastern countries that were highly affected by 
Soviet policies, and strongly supported by its strength and international position, were 
equally affected by its demise, collapse and subsequent withdrawal from the area. 
It seems to me useful at this point to take some examples in order to explain how 
both the demise and the retreat of the Soviet Union from the region on one hand and the 
increase of the United States' hegemonic role on the other, has been demonstrated 
through the actions and policies not only of the USA and Soviet Union, but also of those 
Middle East actors, during the last two decades. In other words, we shall demonstrate 
through examples how the alteration in the balance of power (with the USA becoming 
sole superpower) has enabled the USA to act as a regional hegemon in the Middle East 
and has forced other regional actors to respond to it as such. 
First of all, and in order to assess the Soviet demise and withdrawal from the 
region, we need to go back a little bit. As early as 1971, during the height of the Cold 
War, President Anwar Al-Sadat of Egypt declared that the United States held 99% of 
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the cards in a solution of the Middle East conflict. This was a very early public 
recognition by the leader of one of the major Middle East countries that the United 
States was able to exercise what amounted to hegemonic influence, even though it was 
not yet the sole superpower. The influence of the Soviet Union, or at least its 
willingness to exert that influence in the Middle East, had already begun to diminish. 
1 1 5 Al-Sadat dealt with the U.S. as the only credible hegemonic superpower as early. 
" 6Quandt, W., Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, (Washington: The Brookings 
Institution, 1986), p. 50. 
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Al-Sadat conducted his policies accordingly. Although he was intending to launch a war 
-in coordination with Syria- against Israel, he knew that the USA would not permit an 
Israeli defeat. His understanding of the USA's real power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union 
combined with his own ideological thinking and experience (of the 1967 defeat) led him 
to reach the conclusion that he could not rely on the Soviet Union for the economic, the 
military or even the diplomatic support which would enable him to achieve his 
objectives. His decision to expel the 20,000 Soviet military experts from Egypt prior to 
the 1973 war surprised many but was understood by the West in general, and by the 
USA in particular, as an acknowledgement of that fact. Consequently, they responded to 
Al-Sadat's initiatives much as he desired they would. 
The loss of Egypt by the Soviet Union was a big blow. Its centrality to the Arab 
world and Arab and Middle Eastern order was bound to have great effect on the rest of 
the region. Ironically, Egypt's new Western orientation contributed to the decline of the 
Soviet influence in the region. Every step of withdrawal, defeat or retreat by the Soviet 
Union increased the advantage to the USA. In other words, Al-Sadat's decision to 
distance himself from the Soviets indicated a desire for much closer relations with the 
West, and the United States, particularly. American rapprochement and encouragement 
met this. Henry Kissinger characterised detente in the Middle East (detente took place 
from 1953 to 1979) as: "A tactic 'to maximise Soviet dilemmas and reduce Soviet 
influence in the Middle East. . . partly a tranquilliser for Moscow as we sought to draw 
the Middle East into closer relations with us at the Soviets' expense.""7 
The United States influence correspondingly increased in the region with its 
success in bringing Israel and Egypt together to sign a peace treaty in 1979. The 
1 1 7 Saivetz, C , "Superpower Competition in the Middle East and the Collapse of the 
Detente," in O. Westad., The Fall of Detente: Soviet-American Relations during the 
Carter Years, (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), p. 76. 
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importance and strength of these two countries compensated the United States for its 
almost simultaneous loss of Iran as an ally. Although the Soviet Union tried to mobilise 
a rejection front against the Israel-Egypt peace treaty and its architect, the USA, it failed 
to destroy it. 
The case of Egypt gives us an early and clear example of the USA scoring points 
at the expense of the Soviet Union, as mentioned earlier by Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger. By winning Egypt to its side, the United States secured a very important 
achievement, which was to bear fruits later during the Kuwait crisis and the 1991 Gulf 
War. Raymond Hinnebusch summarised this pro-American role played by Egypt as 
follows: 
Al-Sadat forged a strategic alliance with the U.S., which constitutes Egypt's main 
bridge to the international system. In so far as it remains the hub of the Arab 
system, Egypt opens the Arab world to U.S. interests. It is now a force for 
stability against anti-western radicalism and has played a key role in persuading 
the Arabs to accept Israel. In return, Egypt expects major US economic 
subsidisation, military aid and security co-ordination, US help in resolving the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, and acceptance of E|yptian partnership in the workings of 
the New World Order in the Middle East. 
Carol R. Saivetz gives us another example of how the two rival superpowers see any 
one's success as a failure of the other or the opposite. She noted that: 
In late 1978 and into 1979, superpower competition focused on Iran, where the 
collapse of the Shah's regime seriously weakened the USA strategic position in 
the Gulf and seemingly presented the Soviet Union with new opportunities to 
j • r. 1 1 9 
extend its presence and influence. 
In actual fact, and contrary to expectations, the Iranian revolution although 
removing a pro-western regime did not prove to be directly to the Soviets' advantage 
1 1 8 Hinnebusch, R., "Egypt, Syria and the Arab State System in the New World Order," 
in H. Jawad (ed.) The Middle East in the New World Order, (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1994), pp. 123-24. 
1 1 9 Saivetz, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 72. 
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and Iran did not fall into the Soviet orbit. The Islamic revolution rejected communism 
and its patron, the Soviet Union, on profound ideological bases, while its course 
collided with the United States' due mainly to political differences such as past United 
States support for the Shah regime, its protection of the Shah and his supporters and its 
support for Israel. Two important conclusions can be drawn from this. First, while a 
Soviet loss represented a net American gain in the balance of power, an American loss 
did not automatically equate with a Soviet gain. Thus, the overall advantage remained 
with the USA. Secondly, hostility to America was essentially surmountable, requiring 
only changes in USA policy. By contrast, hostility to the Soviet Union was based on the 
more immutable problems of ideological incompatibility. 
The other regional conflict involving the American-Soviet rivalry was in 
Afghanistan, which developed into a military stalemate. Although President Reagan 
signed a resolution setting the objective for the USA of driving the Soviet forces out of 
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Afghanistan "by all means available," ultimately, it was not the USA, which defeated 
the Soviet Union. It was the internal problems of the Soviet Union itself that contributed 
to its most humiliating defeat. Economic difficulties contributed to that military defeat, 
which in turn resulted in more economic difficulties. Both forced the new Soviet 
leadership to review the inherited political and economic policies and alter foreign 
121 
policy accordingly. Thus, the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan marked the corner 
stone in the political earthquake of the international order. Its importance was not that 
the strategic gain for the opposing superpower so much as the fact that it provided 
evidence of the demise of the Soviet superpower itself. 
1 2 0 See, Garthoff, R., The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of 
the Cold War, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 712. 
1 2 1 Brown, A., New Thinking in Soviet Politics, (Basingtoke: Macmillan, 1992). 
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The Lebanese civil war (1975-1982) and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (June 
1982) followed by the American military intervention demonstrated the extent to which 
122 
the Soviet role in the Middle East had already been reduced. The defeat of the 
Lebanese nationalist, progressive and socialist forces and the expulsion of the PLO from 
Lebanon took place without any significant opposition from the Soviet Union. Its failure 
to assist its natural allies, indeed its relative lack of interest in doing so, indicated the 
weakness of the Soviet Union compared to the United States, in terms of their regional 
policies and profiles. As Raymond Garthoff pointed out, "While the Soviet Union lost 
standing by not assisting the PLO in any way, it avoided any direct involvement even 
after the United States intervened. It did, however, reportedly use the Hot Line in 1982 
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to warn about the consequences of United States' intervention in Lebanon. 
The consequences for regional states, which had grown accustomed to Soviet 
support, were immense. The defeat of the Syrian anti-air defence system, by the Israeli 
Air Force indicated further that Soviet military equipment was no match for Israel's 
equipment, which had mostly been supplied by the United States. More importantly, the 
Soviet Union declared itself unwilling to help Syria in achieving its goal of strategic 
124 
parity with Israel. Thus, the policies of the new thinking undertaken by Mikhail 
1 2 2 See, Gerges, F., "Lebanon," in Sayigh, Y and Shlaim, A., The Cold War and the 
Middle East, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), Op. Ci t , p. 98. 
1 2 3 Ibid., p. 691. 
1 2 4 See Joffe, G., "The Implications of the New World Order for the Middle East and 
North Africa," in The Middle East and North Africa (London, Europa, 1992), When 
President Hafez al-Assad of Syria went on a visit to Moscow in 1987 to promote closer 
cooperation with the USSR in the context of Assad's "strategic balance" policy, 
Gorbachev suggested that he abandon that idea and try to resolve the conflict politically. 
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Gorbachev after the deaths of both Brezhnev and Chemenko, which placed more 
priority on domestic Soviet problems, and less on supporting ideological allies in far 
regions, inevitably weakened the Soviet position in the Middle East. When Assad was 
125 
told by Gorbachev, during one of his visits to Moscow in 1987, that the Soviet Union 
would not meet Syria's ambition for strategic parity with Israel, and that he needed to 
explore a diplomatic solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict, Assad understood that the 
war option would no longer be credible and that a new relationship with the United 
States would be essential for any diplomatic settlement. The end of the Soviet Empire 
and thus the end of the Cold War therefore played an important role in Syria's 
realignment. "Without a superpower patron, Syria recognised the need to cooperate 
126 
more with the United States or face international isolation." Syria, as Raymond 
Hinnebusch commented, felt besieged in an USA-dominated world order. Syria's Vice 
President Khaddam preferred to explain this reality in slightly different, more Middle 
Eastern, way: 
The Cold War is over. We should work toward the creation of a New World 
Order, based on justice, equality, self-determination of peoples, and non-
interference in any country. Syria has a sincere desire to strengthen ties of 
friendship and co-operation with the USA, government and people. We seek all 
This was the first sign of the end of the Cold War in the Middle East. See Rabin, Y., 
The Rabin Memoir, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996) p. 392. 
1 2 5 According to Emma Murphy "From 1989 Gorbachev made it clear to President 
Hafez al-Assad that the USSR would no longer support the goal of strategic parity with 
Israel - promising only strategic defence capability. See Jawad, (1994), Op. Cit., pp. 83-
84. 
1 2 6 Sarkees, M. , "Disenchantment with the 'New World Order': Syria's Relations with 
the United States," IntemationalJournal, vol. 19, no. 2, Spring 1994, p. 357. 
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means to open the channels of cooperation. We want to improve the climate, and 
127 
we hope this can be achieved. 
While that was how Assad's deputy explained the situation, a more realistic reading of 
events shows that Syria's foreign policy was being shaped by the breakdown of the 
bipolar system. "By the 1990s the withdrawal of the USSR as a reliable patron-protector 
and arms supplier deprived Syria of a war option and made anti-Israeli brinkmanship 
too dangerous." As Hinnebusch observed, "Syria aimed to be accepted by the USA as 
the key to peace in the Middle East, whose interests had to be recognised in the peace 
process . . . and saw the New World Order shaping up and wanted to influence it rather 
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than be its victim." This was the bottom line of the last Syrian change of heart. 
Libya is another Middle Eastern country, which bears many similarities to Syria, 
not only by being an Arab country, but also in terms of hard-line policies, closer 
relations with the former Soviet Union, Arab national commitment and hostility towards 
Israel and the United States, presented another example, albeit in a different form, of the 
demise of the Soviet Union playing into the hands of the United States. When Ronald 
Reagan's administration decided to bomb Libya on 15 April 1986, it must have taken 
that decision secure in the belief that there would be no hostile Soviet reaction. Taking 
into account the close relations Libya had enjoyed with the Soviet Union, the USA 
would not have attacked Libya unless it understood beforehand that the Soviet Union 
would not react in an active or threatening way to the action. This was, in part, due to 
improvements in the relations between the two superpowers following Gorbachev's 
coming to power. As Leo Cooper pointed out: "The improvement in Soviet-US relations 
began in 1985 with the first Reagan-Gorbachev summit. During Gorbachev's first few 
1 2 7 Ibid., p. 361. 
1 2 8 Hinnebusch, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 129. 
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months as General Secretary of the Soviet communist party, there were clear indications 
, 129 
of the Soviet leader's determination to improve relations with the United States." 
Knowing the new Soviet leader's desire to improve relations, and thereby get economic 
aid, the United States judged correctly that Gorbachev would not jeopardise these 
objectives by taking a strong stand on behalf of a small Third World country. After the 
attack, "the Soviet Union strongly criticised the American move, but did nothing 
130 
more.' 
As we mentioned earlier in this chapter, the bombing of Libya in 1986 presented 
an early indication that, on one hand, the United States felt its own superiority and, on 
the other, that the Soviet Union was unable to react as the superpower that it used to be 
and that, increasingly, it was not taken seriously by its rival. Odd Arne Westad has 
argued that history: 
Had taken a U-turn. The United States under Ronald Reagan was reasserting its 
international hegemony, supported by European leaders as diverse as Francois 
Mitterrand, Helmut Kohl, and Margaret Thatcher. The Soviet Union was mired in 
a deeply unpopular war in Afghanistan, with international consequences for itself 
as bad, i f not worse, than those of the Vietnam War were for Washington. 
Or, as Leo Cooper has observed, "The change in the Kremlin leadership in 1985, 
132 
signalled a change in the direction of Soviet foreign policy" and "The change in 
Cooper, L. , Russia and the World: New State-of-Play on the International Stage, 
(London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999), p. 31. 
, 3 0Garthoff, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 712. 
1 3 1 Westad, (1997), Op. Cit, p. 3. 
1 3 2 Cooper, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 130. 
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Soviet foreign policy has been ascribed to the preoccupation of the leadership with 
133 
domestic economic problems." 
This historic U-turn can be seen in action also in Yemen. Although the Soviet 
Union's regional interests led it to oppose any merger of its client state, South Yemen, 
134 
with the North in 1990, it was unable to prevent the eventual unification of the two 
states. According to Gerd Nonneman, the developments towards unification were 
actually made possible and pushed along by the new Soviet policy under Gorbachev. 
His international accommodationist line (new thinking) which accompanied his 
domestic policies of Perestroika and Glasnost had its impact in South Yemen as well. 
The Soviet Union was unable to provide the economic assistance South Yemen needed 
in order to either resolve its domestic economic problems or take advantage of the 
discovery of commercial quantities of oil. There was no chance of Soviet investment in 
that area and other foreign investors were deterred by the Marxist nature of the regime 
and its affiliations with the Soviet Union. Thus, the end of the Marxist regime in South 
Yemen and its effective absorption by the Northern Republic of Yemen can be seen as 
another retreat of Soviet influence and a consequent increase of Western and American 
influence in the region. It also shows, again, that regional states were responding to this 
new fact of life and readjusting their own policies and alignments accordingly. 
Israel also was a beneficiary of the new reform policy in the Soviet Union, and of that 
superpower's demise and ultimate collapse. Israel benefited in two ways. First, Soviet 
political liberalisation enabled Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel, thus helping Israel in 
1 3 3 Ibid., p. 38. 
1 3 4 Nonneman, G., "Yemeni Unification: The End of Marxism in Arabia," in H. Jawad 
(ed.) The Middle East in the New World Order, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 
pp. 53-56. 
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increasing its population and human resource base and in settling the Occupied 
Territories. Second, as the Soviet Union was the main ally and patron of its enemies, the 
Arab states, Israel was relieved by its collapse. Having said that, Israel was to face some 
difficult days in the 1990s, which contributed to its strategic decisions with regards to 
its relations with its neighbours and to the peace process. The Gulf War illustrated that 
the removal of the Soviet patron did not guarantee Israel's safety against attacks from 
Arab enemies. On the contrary, the alliance of major Arab states, like Egypt and Syria, 
with the United States left Israel oddly isolated and, in its view, neglected by its own 
patron. 
The 39 missiles fired at Israel brought with them a sense of trauma compounded 
by humiliation over the fact that the country would have to absorb these strikes in 
its heartland without hitting back. This was the first time since the 1948 war of 
independence that Arabs had succeeded in striking at Israel's civilian home 
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front. 
Or as Levran put it: 
The impact of the SSM threat to Israel was more severe and far-reaching than its 
manifestation in terms of loss of life, material damage and disruption of normal 
life. The attacks on Israel by Iraqi al-Hussein missiles should be viewed through a 
broader strategic prism in which psychological and strategic aspects carry great • , 1 3 6 weight. 
Israel, moreover, understood that it was in its own best interest not to do anything that 
might prompt a premature cease-fire when the United States was, after all, demolishing 
137 
the war machine of one of its most powerful enemies." Shimon Peres made it clear 
that following the Gulf War he was convinced that, in the age of ballistic missiles and 
1 3 5 Schiff, Z., "Israel after the War," Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 2,1991, p. 19. 
1 3 6 Levran, A., Israeli Strategy after Desert Storm, Lessons of the Second Gulf War, 
(London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 3. 
1 3 7 See Schiff, (1991), Op. Cit., p. 27. 
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weapons of mass destruction, security could not be maintained by controlling a portion 
138 
of land. Peres also identified the economic and ideological process of globalisation as 
redefining international and regional relations. In fact he acknowledged that the rules 
had been changed. 
The world has moved beyond having ideological confrontation, and has thus lost 
one of the principal motivations for military struggle. The world has come to 
realise that economic opportunity is available for all of mankind, black and white, 
Southerner and Northerner. Economic rivalries have begun to take the place of 
military confrontation. The military confrontations required trained armies, 
fortified borders, constant vigilance and suspicion. Economic advancement 
requires a very different set of circumstances: open borders, markets that straddle 
139 
political demarcations, goodwill, good products and constant competition. 
For Israel, the problem was clarifying in what ways its strategic relationship with the 
USA was changing in the New World Order. In his book Beyond Alliance, Camille 
Mansour pointed out that new changes call into question Israel's place in the New 
World Order. 
The Bush presidency coincided with a radically new situation on the international 
level (with upheaval in the Eastern bloc) and in the Middle East region (with the 
Palestinian uprising and the second Gulf War), a new era had begun which could 
140 
only call into question the place of Israel in US strategic doctrine. 
This takes us to the question of whether or not Israel continues to be a strategic asset to 
the United States in the New World Order. 
See, Savir, U., The Process: 1,100 days that changed the Middle East, (New York: 
Random House, 1998), also see Peres, S., The New Middle East, (Shaftesbury: Element, 
1993), and also Peres, S., Battling for Peace, (London: Orion Books Ltd, 1995). 
1 3 9 Peres, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 374. 
1 4 0 Mansour, C., Beyond Alliance, Israel in US Foreign Policy, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), p. 144. 
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Jonathan Jacoby, executive vice president of the Israel Policy Forum, argues that 
United States-Israeli relations have changed more than once since 1948. With Israel 
entering its second fifty years, the relationship is changing again - this time largely due 
to the impact of globalisation and the advent of non-conventional weaponry. Strategies 
141 
to maintain the special USA-Israel friendship will also change. 
Charles Krauthammer agrees and believes that the notion of Israel being a 
strategic asset, in the old sense, has passed. Indeed, he argues that in some ways, that 
notion was never really operational. But i f the notion of a "strategic asset" was a bit 
artificial in the 1980's vis-a-vis the Soviets, Krauthammer feels that it is not at all 
artificial in the 1990s, when Israel and the United States share threats in common from 
weapons of mass destruction and missiles at one end of the spectrum to terrorism at the 
1 1 4 2 other. 
Steven Rosen, director of foreign policy issues at the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee, thinks that Israel is the number one country in the world working 
with the United States on missile issues; it is probably also the number one country in 
143 
the world working with the United States on terrorism issues. 
However, with the major changes in Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union, 
and subsequently with the emergence and then the disappearance of Iraq as a strategic 
144 
factor, the idea of Israel as an asset faced a serious challenge. Some think that Israel is 
1 4 1 Rosen, S., "Debate about the US-Israel Relationship: Still Special?" Middle East 
Quarterly, December 1998, pp. 53-65. 
1 4 2 Krauthammer, C , "Debate about the US-Israel Relationship. Still Special?" Middle 
East Quarterly, December 1998, pp. 53-65. 
1 4 3 Rosen, S., (1998), Op. Cit, pp. 53-65. 
1 4 4 Mansour, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 193. 
THE NEW WORLD ORDER 125 
not always an asset but can be a liability. Louis Cantori for example thinks that "During 
the Cold War Israel was viewed as not only a responsibility but a strategic asset. After 
145 
the Cold War, this was no longer the case, as illustrated in the Gulf war." Emma 
Murphy also pointed out that: "Israel had become, for the period of the war, a liability 
146 
for the United States." Israel of course does all that it can to prove itself as an asset 
which, the United States cannot do without. From being a base against the communist 
danger, Israel wants to convince the United States, and the West in general, that the 
147 
coming confrontation will be with Islamic terrorism and that it wi l l , once again, be 
148 
the advance base in this confrontation. 
For the Palestinians, the events of 1985-1991 did not in any way work in their 
favour. While the Intifada raised the profile of their plight on the international stage, 
other developments both internationally and regionally did not help at all. The Soviet 
new thinking policies allowed thousands of Jews to come to Israel and ultimately settle 
in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. The PLO, which for a long time had enjoyed 
positive relations with the Soviet Union, had lost a great supporter and ally. The other 
remaining superpower continued to refuse to recognise the PLO and dealt with it as a 
1 4 5 Cantori, L., "The Middle East in the New World Order," in T. Ismael (ed.) The Gulf 
War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East, 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), p. 453. 
1 4 6 Murphy, E., "The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the New World Order," in H. Jawad (ed.) 
The Middle East in the New World Order, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 82. 
1 4 7Mansour, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 292. 
1 4 8 Ibid., p. 193, and see also, Netanyahu, B., Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies 
Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorism, (London: Allison & Busby, 1995). 
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terrorist organisation. Later on, however, circumstances changed. Charles Smith pointed 
out: 
Arafat's effort to gain international recognition of his peace proposals met finally 
with success in December 1988 when Washington agreed he had met their 
conditions of renouncing terrorism and accepting 242. This came after the State 
Department under George Shultz denied Arafat a visa to address the United 
Nations in New York, forcing the transfer of the meeting to Geneva where the 
PLO head again appealed for peace. With American acceptance of Arafat's 
overtures, a dialogue was established with the PLO through the American 
149 
ambassador in Tunis where PLO headquarters remained. 
The PLO and the Palestinian National Council decided as early as 1974, for the first 
time and again in 1988 to explore a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
However, in 1991, recognising the new international realities, and in order to overcome 
its financial difficulties and its political isolation following the Kuwait crisis, the PLO 
decided to review its position in a more fundamental way. The PLCs acceptance of the 
invitation to participate -under the Israeli-American conditions- in the Madrid peace 
process demonstrated its lack of the sort of alternative that it used to have during the 
Cold War period. Israel was able to dictate its conditions for Palestinian participation, 
and both the United States and the Soviet Union were unable to force Israel to greater 
moderation. The PLO had no alternative to accepting the USA role in and dominance 
over, the peace process. Ultimately, it needed USA economic aid, American pressure on 
Israel to implement Oslo agreements and later the Wye agreement, and assistance in 
concluding the final status negotiations. However, the USA's dominant role in the 
process wil l always play into Israel's hands. 
As I have given some examples of how the New World Order manifested itself in the 
region, it is appropriate now to discuss in greater detail how the New World Order 
affected the Middle East. 
Smith, C , Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 
301. 
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Has the New World Order Impacted Upon the Middle East? 
The fact that dramatic developments and upheavals take place in different regions more 
or less at the same time following a major international change -the end of the Cold 
150 
war- shows the important effects of international factors on regional conflicts. As 
Tim Niblock has argued: 
There are significant changes occurring in the political landscape of the Middle 
East. At the level of intra-regional relations, these stem primarily from the 
151 
transformation which, has occurred in the global system. 
Bernard Lewis has further argued that: 
It is becoming increasingly clear that there are indeed many changes in the Middle 
East, and that while these vary considerably in their scope, scale and range, few 
things and few participants remain as they were before. 
These changes are related to two sequences of events: one short-term and 
regional, namely the war in Kuwait and Iraq; the other long-term and global, 
namely the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Some 
changes may perhaps be ascribed directly to these events; others -probably most-
had been in progress for some time and were revealed, and perhaps also 
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accelerated, by the cataclysmic events in the region and in the world. 
It is clear to any observer that the "recent dramatic global changes in the international 
system profoundly impacted on the Middle Eastern regional system and significantly 
affected its politics." 1 5 3 
In my judgement, there can be no doubt that the Soviet demise and its ultimate 
collapse affected the Middle East more than any other region, almost certainly with the 
1 5 0 See Miller, B., "Hot Wars, Cold Peace: An International-Regional Synthesis," in Z. 
Maoz (ed.) Regional Security in the Middle East: Past, Present and Future, (London: 
Frank Cass, 1997). 
1 5 1 Niblock, T., "A Framework for Renewal in the Middle East?" in Jawad, (1994), Op. 
Cit., p. 12. 
1 5 2 Lewis, B., "Rethinking the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 4,1992, p. 99. 
1 5 3 Cantori, (1994, Op. Cit., p. 451. 
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exception of Eastern Europe. Most of the region's countries were affected by Soviet 
policies in either positive or negative ways, and thus were affected by its absence in one 
or another way as well. 
There can also be no doubt that the Soviet Union's weakness, demise and retreat 
from the region benefited its main rival, the United States. As Raymond Garthoff 
pointed out "In the 1980s, the Soviet presence in the Third World markedly diminished 
154 
while the USA role increased". 
The discovery by some of the region's states that their patron was no longer a 
superpower forced them to look for alternative ways to protect their interests. Countries 
with strong relations with the United States and Western powers considered themselves 
to be on the victorious side of the Cold War, and acted accordingly. States such as 
Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan and the GCC states took comfort in the fact that their ally 
had become the only superpower. However, some states such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria 
and organisations like PLO felt displeased with the speedy changes in the international 
arena, and tried to act with the same speed to face these changes with appropriate 
policies. 
The New World Order in the Middle East was, perhaps, best summarised by 
Tim Niblock, who wrote that: 
With the transformation in the global system which occurred with the break-up of 
the Soviet Union, Middle Eastern states found themselves in a world where the 
superpower which was most overtly supportive of Arab regional ambitions (albeit 
suspected by many Arab governments of harbouring subversive intentions) had 
effectively disappeared from the scene. The transformation in the global system 
has forced regional states to review and restructure their relationship to the outside 
world responding to a new balance of strategic power. 
1 3 4 Grathoff, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 678. 
1 5 5 Niblock, T., "A Framework for Renewal in the Middle East," in Jawad, (1994), Op. 
Cit., p. 1. 
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As it is a matter of fact that there is a New World Order, following the sea changes in 
the international system in terms of the balance of power and rules of the game, and as it 
is also an undeniable fact that the United States is the only remaining superpower, it is 
also a reality that the Middle East is one of the regions most affected by these 
conditions, so it is of great importance to look at how the United States demonstrated its 
unipolarity and hegemony in this strategically important region. 
American Unipolarity and Hegemony in the Middle East 
The new American unipolarity on the international level and its hegemony on 
the Middle Eastern regional level can be attributed to two facts. On the international 
level, the collapse of the Soviet Union left it as the only remaining superpower. In the 
Middle East, the inability and/or unwillingness of other international powers (China, 
France, U.K. or Russia) to challenge United States in the region allowed it to exert its 
hegemony. This unwillingness can be seen either as an exchange of mutual interests or a 
common interest among the United States and the other powers. For example, the USA 
might be seen as buying its hegemony in the Middle East in exchange for giving a free 
hand to Russia in places where the latter's interests are more at stake. The same can be 
said to be the case for China. For the United Kingdom, however, the unwillingness to 
challenge the United States' hegemony and in fact its support of it might be due to the 
common interest or what can be termed a strategic partnership and alliance. I wi l l try in 
the coming discussion to give examples of both the United States' unipolarity and its 
hegemony in the Middle East. 
As I have tried to demonstrate throughout this chapter, unipolarity includes both 
a new balance of power and a new "code of conduct" determined by the remaining 
superpower. The United States became the sole pole in a unipolar world in the aftermath 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent end of the Cold War. 
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In the words of Louis Canton, "The end of the Cold War in 1989 prepared the 
156 
way for a USA-dominant unipolar international system in the 1990s." While For 
Emma Murphy, "The New World Order was essentially the extension of unipolar USA 
influence over the region - and, in turn, the subjugation of the region to USA national 
157 
interests.' 
United States' Interests in the Middle East after 1990 
The United States has a number of interests in the Middle East. As the 
superpower of the unipolar system and as a regional hegemon, the United States wil l 
perceive any development in the region as affecting its interests. Its dominance and 
superiority wi l l push it to assume the role of the world policeman or the world governor. 
In order to be able to examine its unipolarity and hegemony in pursuing its interests, we 
need first to know what these interests are. Although they are numerous and subject to 
considerable disagreement among scholars and analysts, there are three main interests 
which most authors agree on. These three interests, in my own judgement, can be 
ordered as follows: Israel, oil and other interests. Describing USA interests following 
the end of the Cold War, Louis Cantori wrote that: 
It can be speculated that the end of the Cold War has meant the destruction of the 
U.S. Cold War policy prism. As a result it is now possible for the United States to 
pursue the goals of secure oil, a secure Israel, and secure air and sea routes with 
primary attention to the amelioration of regional disputes. The cessation of the 
bipolar rivalry of the United States and the former Soviet Union has not resulted 
in an abrupt decline in their interests in the Middle East. Instead U.S. diplomacy 
Cantori, (1994), Op. Cit.,p. 451. 
Murphy, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 82. 
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has been focused on access to oil and oil pricing and the value of regional stability 
158 
in maintaining the free flow of oil. 
Fighting Islamic fundamentalism, stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, protecting the traditional ties with friendly Arab states, containing Iraq and 
Iran and confronting terrorism, can be seen as other American interests or tactics to 
protect interests. Anthony Lake, the American assistant secretary for the Middle East, 
former USA ambassador to Israel and National Security Advisor to Bill Clinton, 
commenting on the same point of USA interests, pointed out that: 
In the middle of this era of turmoil and hope, the United States cannot afford to be 
a bystander. Despite the end of the superpower rivalry, the region remains of vital 
interest to our nation. The free flow of oil at reasonable prices from the Gulf; the 
security and well-being of Israel; a secure and lasting Arab-Israeli peace; the 
stability of friendly Arab countries; our need to contain Iraq, Iran, Libya, and 
Sudan - the reactionary "backlash states" of the region; and efforts to curb the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction; all these reasons give our nation a very 
159 
real stake in ensuring a more peaceful, prosperous, and democratic future. 
In my view those mentioned interests are no more than tools to protect the main 
interests, Israel in the first place and then oil. Support for the idea that Israel and oil are 
the main American interests in the Middle East can be found quite easily. Louis Cantori, 
for example, observed that: 
USA foreign policy in the Middle East previously centred on denying the region 
to the USSR, guaranteeing access to its oil, preserving the security of Israel, and 
160 
accessing the crossroads of sea and air lanes that intersect the area. 
Cantori, L. , "Unipolarity and Egyptian Hegemony in the Middle East," in R. 
Freedman (ed.) The Middle East after Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, (Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 1993), p. 339. 
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More support can be gained from the comments of American Senator, Brand Gordon, 
who said clearly that there are several policy goals, which Congress shares with the 
Administration vis-a-vis the Middle East. 
First and foremost is the security and well being of the state of Israel. Secondly, 
promoting peace and security in the Middle East, protecting American national 
interests in the Middle East - which include, protecting Israel- but also securing 
oil in the Persian Gulf, fighting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
in the region, fighting international terrorism and radical elements that are anti-
161 
Western. 
Israel's was -due mainly to domestic politics rather than international considerations-
one of two principal USA interests. The Jewish community in the United States is very 
important, indeed, arguably the most influential of all ethnic communities. Its 
attachment to the State of Israel is very strong. The role of this community in general, 
and its active lobby in particular, in influencing the United States' policy towards the 
Middle East can not be denied by any expert on USA domestic or foreign politics. 
Israel and its lobby are doing everything possible to prevent any close Arab-
American relations, and to ensure Israel's role as the sole important USA strategic ally 
in the region. Thus, the American interest in Israel as an important factor in its dual 
containment policy was doubled by the crucial Israeli role in American domestic 
politics through ATP AC. Also Israel knows that its strong alliance with the United 
States is the best security guarantee for its existence. The USA is also Israel's chief 
defender in the United Nations and supplier of vital economic and technological 
assistance. AIPAC, the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, is one of the most 
powerful political organisations in Washington. Their power is so overbearing that 
nobody dares refuse them. Daniel Bloch wrote in the Jerusalem Post that: "There is a 
"American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Interview with Brad Gordon," Middle 
East Insight, vol. x i i i , no. 2, 1998, p. 50. 
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tendency on Capitol Hi l l to sign any letter originating from AIPAC's offices 
162 
automatically, even i f it says that the sun revolves around the earth." 
Charles Brook pointed out that "the fact that almost two-thirds of Congress has 
been elected since 1990, the pro-Israel political power base is as strong as ever. A case 
in point is the recent House vote affirming Israel's claim to Jerusalem. Only 19 
members out of 435 dissented on the vote, making it one of the most lopsided on any 
foreign policy issue brought to the floor. 6 3 
Edward Said is one of those who has a different view. He noted that "The 
reasons for such a view of things cannot be ascribed to a Zionist conspiracy, or even to 
Jewish pressures on USA policy. Those pressures play a role but only to the extent that 
164 
they coincide with the overall USA interests." 
Regarding oil, since 1948, and even now, the importance of oil as an American 
regional interest has come second only to Israel. Since oil is one of the resources 
considered to be of vital importance to the economic and military security of nations, it 
seems natural that a shortage of oil would pose a great potential threat to national and 
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international security. For the United States, the Gulfs significance increased greatly 
during the Cold War due to the prevalence of oil in the region. As Louis Cantouri 
observed, "It is the oil of the Gulf and the security of friendly states that have been the 
1 6 2 Bloch, D., "AIPAC on the Right," Jerusalem Post, 19/4/1998, p. 8. 
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1 6 4 Said, E., The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-
determination 1996-1994, (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 211. 
1 6 5 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute., Oil and Security, (New York: 
Humanities Press, 1974), p. 11. 
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focal point of USA policy." For a long time, the oil supplies from the Persian Gulf, 
were an American strategic priority for two reasons; the dependence of America's allies 
on these supplies, and the desire to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating the oil 
reserves. These two reasons, obviously, were understood in the context of the Cold War. 
The American administration under the presidency of Jimmy Carter followed its 
predecessor and making it clear that the Gulf oil reserves are of great strategic 
importance, and a national interest for the United States. Carter Doctrine declared that 
an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Gulf region would be considered 
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an attack on vital interests of the USA. The Doctrine restated USA awareness of the 
importance of the region's oil supply. Consequently, the USA started to build up its 
military forces and supply arms to the region in order to face any threat to this interest. 
In an interview with Middle East Insight, the American Senator, Joseph L. Liberman 
said that the United States has had a number of reasons why it is interested in stability in 
the Middle East. One clearly is economic, which is the flow of oil from the Gulf 
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countries to the USA and to the West generally. 
As we have demonstrated earlier, hegemony is the holding by one state of a 
preponderance of power in the international system to the extent that it can single-
handedly dominate the rules and arrangements by which international political and 
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economic relations are conducted. According to Tim Niblock, "the collapse of the 
1 6 6 Cantori, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 453. 
Gordon, P., The Transatlantic Allies and the Changing Middle East, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 46. 
1 6 8 "Building Bridges: Listening and Outreach," Interview with Senator Joseph I . 
Lieberman, Middle East Insight, vol. xi i i , no. 2, 1998, p. 41. 
1 6 9 Rupert, M., Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American 
THE NEW WORLD ORDER 135 
Communist bloc left the United States free to pursue its own preferred strategy on 
Middle East matters, uninhibited by fears that a superpower rival would exploit any 
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opportunity to undermine the United States' influence." 
Similarly Ziva Flamhaft, in her book entitled Israel on the Road to Peace: 
Accepting the Unacceptable pointed out that: 
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet state, the maintenance 
of world order was left in the hands of the only remaining superpower -the United 
States- even i f that required the cooperation of friends and allies and the help of a 
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more potent United Nations. 
Emphasising the same point, Meredith Sarkees mentioned in her article entitled 
"Disenchantment with the New World Order" that: 
The New World Order presented new conditions, and a new framework to 
international relations in general, and in the Middle East in particular. This 
framework of the American transitional hegemony wi l l affect the policies of the 
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Middle East countries and lead to a new Middle East. 
During the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf War, the 
United States continued to implement its hegemonic role and policies in the region. It 
was driven by its own economic and geo-political interests, mainly its interest in 
protecting the state of Israel and controlling the oil reserve areas. Both the Zionist lobby 
and lobbies of the respective oil companies are very strong and active in the American 
domestic politics. Their influence in the Congress is an undeniable fact. In order to 
satisfy the Congress, successive USA administrations designed their own doctrines 
Global Power, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
1 7 0 See, Niblock, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 4. 
1 7 1 Flamhaft, Z., Israel on the Road to Peace: Accepting the Unacceptable, (Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1996), p. 76. 
1 7 2 Sarkees, (1994), Op. Cit., pp. 355-376. 
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towards the region. From the Truman Doctrine, through the Nixon and Carter Doctrines, 
to Bush's New World Order, almost all of the administrations worked hard to set their 
own distinctive policies towards the Middle East in general, and the Gulf in particular. 
To protect Israel and maintain control and domination on the world oil reserve 
areas, the United States designed a dual containment policy to contain both Iraq and 
173 
Iran. In other words dual containment policy was designed to advance the two 
principal aims. 
President Clinton's advisors conceived the policy in 1993 as a reaction to the 
failure of the previous administration to maintain the balance in the Gulf by playing off 
Iraq and Iran against each other. The central idea was based on the assumption that 
"with the defeat of Iraq and the Iranian economic crisis they thought that all the USA 
needs is to contain both countries, and as for the Soviet Union, they wil l drop their 
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rejection of the new American dominated order in the Middle East." 
With these two major regional powers contained, Egypt at peace with Israel and 
Turkey in alliance with it, no other country in the region can pose any real danger to 
Israel. By dividing Iraq through enforcing the "no-fly zones" policy, the United States 
aspires to diminish, once and for all, any possibility for Iraq to be a great regional power 
again, and, thus, to eliminate any threat it might pose to its oil-rich neighbouring Gulf 
states and to Israel. With such policies in the Gulf, the United States has effectively 
established itself as the main protector of the area. Additionally it maintains a military 
presence which, helps among other things to create a buffer zone between Iran and 
Israel. 
m Quandt, (1977), Op. Cit. 
1 7 4 Rathmell, A., "The Demise of Dual Containment," Middle East International, 
21/11/1997, p. 18. 
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The United States' hegemonic policy in the Middle East is aimed at reordering 
the region in a way that can serve its interests as mentioned earlier. I f reordering the 
regional system and redrawing the map wil l be achieved by dividing Iraq and 
partitioning Sudan, for example, it should also be noted that the United States uses other 
tactics to achieve its other aims. Imposing economic sanctions and air embargo against 
Arab and Islamic countries like Libya, Sudan, Iraq and Iran will serve to contain these 
countries and prevent them from opposing the United States' plan for the region, 
especially with respect to the Arab-Israeli peace process. The blacklist of states 
sponsoring terrorism contains mainly the names of Arab and Islamic countries who 
oppose the American policy of integrating Israel into the region while it still occupies 
internationally recognised Arab territories. The blacklist is used as pressure tool to 
isolate these countries until they accede to the American policy. 
Fighting Islamic terrorism is a policy that has been shaped at a high speed during 
the last few years. Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Jonathan 
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Institute have played a major role both in defining the danger of Islamic terrorism, 
and in presenting Israel's role as being an advanced base and a front line for confronting 
this new danger.'76 Incidentally, this allows Israel to regain or reclaim the sort of 
strategic importance it enjoyed during the Cold War as an advanced base against 
communism. The cruise missile attacks against Sudan and Afghanistan followed by the 
coordinated international campaign against Islamic movements were an example of the 
direction that this United States' policy can be expected to take. 
In all its recent violent actions in the Middle East, the United States has faced no 
real challenge and this is due mainly to the changes in the World Order and its 
1 7 5 See, Netanyahu, (1995), Op. Cit. 
1 7 6 Ibid. 
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unchallenged regional hegemony. For many observers, America's leadership in the Gulf 
War "presaged a new period of multilateral engagement with the world's problems 
177 
under a benign hegemony." According to Charles Krauthammer, "the Gulf War 
marked the beginning of a pax-Americana in which the world will acquiesce to a benign 
American hegemony." Louis Cantouri thinks that: 
The end of the Cold War in 1989 paved the way for a World Order dominated by 
the United States as a sole pole in the nineties, and that the dissolution of the 
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Soviet Union confirmed this outcome period. 
On the impact of new international changes on the region, Emma Murphy observed that: 
The retreat of Soviet sponsorship had another profound implication for its Middle 
East client states, which was to draw them closer to the United States. . . In 1991 
the United States was in a position to develop new and existing ties in the Arab 
world, unhindered by prior considerations of superpower competition. Equally, 
the Arab states no longer had a choice of patrons and were forced to come to 
terms with a new global balance of power in which confrontation with the United 
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States would be a lonely venture. 
Clearly, the Middle East ranks high in USA foreign policy. Two reasons account 
for this. Firstly, Middle East oil is important for both the United States and the 
developed world. Second, United States policy towards the region is also determined by 
its relationship with Israel, primarily Israeli security. Supplying Israel with all of the 
elements of strength and power, successive American administrations were told of 
Israel's strategic importance, first as an advanced base against hostile Arab nationalism 
and the spread of communism and, later, as an advanced base against Islamic 
fundamentalism. 
Axford, (1996), Op. Ci t , p. 183. 
Cantouri, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 451. 
Murphy, (1994), Op. Cit. 
Mansour, (1994), p. 193. 
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Currently, as Joshua Goldstein observed, the United States has military forces and 
equipment in six Middle East states, including the wealthiest (Saudi Arabia) and the 
most populous (Egypt), and is the primary ally of the strongest regional military power 
(Israel). Clarifying the extent of its involvement he wrote: 
The United States is the main mediator of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the leader 
behind international sanctions on Iraq Iran and Libya. Forty percent of all USA 
foreign aid goes to the region, mostly to Israel and Egypt. No other state comes 
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close to these levels of regional involvement. 
USA's Use of the UN to Serve its Interests 
The role of the United Nations following the end of the Cold War changed 
dramatically. As Charles Kegley observed: 
The three barriers to the UN's performance posed by great-power rivalry, 
insufficient funds, and disunity generally have been somewhat alleviated by the 
Cold War's collapse. The great powers on the Security Council then began to 
behave in a manner consistent with what the framers of the United Nations 
Charter contemplated when they adopted the unanimity principle. Like the end of 
World War I and World War I I , the end of the Cold War has witnessed renewed 
efforts to empower the United Nations to preserve world order and promote global 
prosperity. The end of the Cold War holds out the promise that continued major-
power co-operation would remove the single most important obstacle to an 
enhanced UN role in world affairs. The Security Council in particular "has shown 
that it has the capacity to initiate collective measures essential for the maintenance 
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of peace m a New World Order. 
As Susan Strange pointed out in her book entitled, The Retreat of the State: The 
Diffusion of Power in the World Economy all that changed with the end of the Cold 
War was that there was nothing to stop the United States from making more use of the 
1 8 1 Goldstein, J., Dynamics of Middle East Conflict and US Influence, 1979-97. httpW: 
www.american.edu/academic.depts/sis/goldtext/me98.papr.htm. pp. 5-6. 
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approval of the Security Council, and of the UN's limited peacekeeping resources, to 
pursue its own unilaterally-determined strategic objectives. To some observers, this 
seemed to give the appearance of an enhanced role for the UN But it is a sham. Or as 
Maurice Bernard, professor at the prestigious Graduate Institute for International 
Studies at Geneva has observed: "the situation in which the US meets no effective 
opposition has permitted the United States to transform the UN according to its own 
, ,183 
views. 
There is always clear evidence of the American use of the UN's agencies to 
serve its policies. In order to facilitate implementing its policies, the USA used the UN 
as a cover to acquire the international legitimacy it needed. The United States used the 
United Nations agencies in general, and the Security Council in particular, to achieve its 
own political objectives. The Security Council resolutions against Iraq and Libya are 
examples of how the United States exploited its domination in the world's affairs 
against countries considered by the United States as threats against its interests. Security 
Council resolutions imposing air embargo and other measures on Libya, concerning the 
Pan Am bombing and its resolutions against Iraq over the Kuwait crisis have been used 
to implement USA strategy in the region. 
Another example of this misuse of the UN's agencies is the USA's spying on 
Iraq through the UN's UNSCOM, which facilitated its bombing campaign in December 
1998. American-British-Israeli close coordination is always evident too. As the 
Washington Post reported on 8 January 1999: 
The United States for nearly three years intermittently monitored the coded radio 
communications of President Saddam Hussein's innermost security forces using 
equipment secretly installed in Iraq by UN weapons inspectors, according to U.S. 
and U N officials. 
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In 1996 and 1997, the Iraqi communications were captured by off-the-shelf 
commercial equipment carried by inspectors from the organisation known as 
UNSCOM, then hand-delivered to analysis centres in Britain, Israel and the 
184 
United States for interpretation, officials said. 
Emphasising the United States use of the United Nations Barrie Axford wrote that: 
The sort of global order mooted by president Bush relied heavily upon a particular 
vision of the post-communist world. At its root it traded on the idea of co-
operation with the Soviet Union and upon the ability of the United States to build 
a coalition against any aggressor by using the United Nations as a rallying point, 
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or as a symbol of unity to legitimate direct action, as happened in the Gulf War. 
Aharon Levran in his book Israeli Strategy after Desert Storm: Lessons of the Second 
Gulf War explained how the Arab states fall under the mercy of the United States. 
The Second Gulf War brought home to the states of the Middle East that it is 
difficult, i f not impossible, to fight a war of any consequence without the 
patronage of a superpower, especially when this patron has no opposing 
superpower. The Arabs and pro-Soviet countries were undoubtedly aware that 
their traditional patron, the USSR, had, for all intents and purposes, abandoned its 
active role in the political arena, including the Middle East, leaving them at the 
mercy of the only remaining superpower, who happened to be the friend of their 
186 
foe. 
Conclusion 
It has been argued throughout this chapter that a new pattern of international 
relations, a "New World Order," is in fact existing. It emerged out of the collapse of the 
old pattern of international relations, the "Old World Order" that existed before 1989. 
The basic cause of the transformation of World Order was the decline of the 
USSR and removal of one superpower from a bipolar balance of power. The fact that 
the United States was the only sole remaining superpower led to a unipolar World Order 
184 The Washington Post, 8/1/1999. 
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at least in the immediate term. Even i f multipolarity will be the ultimate future 
characteristic of the World Order, the immediate characteristics is unipolarity and 
hegemony. 
The USA was able as a result of these international and regional changes to exert 
its own hegemony on the world and on the Middle East region in particular. For the 
Middle East this process was already evident in the 1980s. In fact it was clear since 
President Al-Sadat declared that the United States held most of the cards towards war 
and peace in the Middle East. The second Gulf war signalled the real acknowledgement 
by regional states of a New World Order. They have since been adjusting their 
behaviour to the new distribution of power and the new "rules of the game" of the new 
international system. 
The USA now pursues its two basic goals. The first is protecting the state of 
Israel while the second is protecting the oil supplies to the Western Hemisphere. To 
achieve its main goals for its own interests, the USA uses series of tactics. The most 
important of which is the dual containment policy towards Iraq and Iran. The second is 
the containment and fighting of what it calls Islamic terrorism. Isolation of other 'rogue 
states' such as Libya, Sudan and Yemen were the other tactics. The other tactic was the 
manipulation of UN. 
The New World Order presented a new situation for the Middle East in general, 
and the Arab world in particular. The unipolarity, domination and hegemony of the 
United States in the international system and in the region posed fundamental 
challenges. 
As next chapters wil l show, the USA also protects its interests by advancing the 
Arab-Israeli peace process in a way that suits its own and Israel's interests - even at the 
expense of the other actors in the conflict. 
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In the Middle East, as Dr Anoushiravan Ehteshami pointed out: "the issues at 
stake in the post-Cold War environment are not simply to reshape the past to fit a new 
187 
reality, but rather to shape the future in view of the new realities." Indeed the future 
of the Middle East is being shaped according to the new reality of the New World Order 
in which American unipolarity is recognised by almost every single country and its 
hegemony is felt especially within the Middle East. The implications of this New World 
Order on the Arab-Israeli peace process and wider Middle East relations wil l be 
discussed in the coming chapters. Particular attention wil l be given to the Madrid peace 
conference and the Oslo agreements, to see how the American international unipolarity 
and regional hegemony affected them. 
Ehteshami, A., "Security Structures in the Middle East: An Overview," in H. Jawad., 
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T H E COLD WAR AND THE PEACE PROCESS 
The Cold War competition in the Middle East has had two effects. First the Cold 
War stalemate has effectively been imposed on the Middle East. As in many other 
parts of the world, conflicts and disputes arising out of local relationships have 
been frozen by the determination of the respective superpowers to take one side or 
another. For the superpowers Middle Eastern policy has constituted merely part of 
their respective Cold War policies. The dispute between Israel and the Arab states 
on the one hand and the Palestinians on the other has got caught up in the 
antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union which effectively has 
prevented a solution. 1 
(Joshua Goldstein) 
Introduction 
This chapter is about the background of the Arab-Israeli peace efforts during the Cold 
War period. In this period attempts to reach peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, like the events of the conflict itself, were well connected with the events of 
world politics and the development of the international system and the Old World 
Order. 
Superpower interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict began as early as their support 
for the establishment of the state of Israel itself. Even prior to this, Britain had 
supported the creation of the Jewish national home in Palestine, and a ZionistTobby was 
operating to support the Zionist cause in the USA. 
With the development of the Cold War, the two superpowers were increasingly 
drawn into the developing Arab-Israeli conflict. As the USA and the USSR fought for 
influence in the region, the emergence of two competing regional poles (Arabs and 
Israelis) provided opportunity for the superpowers to use economic, political and 
military support to advance their own interests. 
1 Goldstein, J., International Relations, (New York: Longman, 1999). 
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In their efforts to realize their aspirations, the Zionist and Arab national 
movements sought the assistance of foreign powers to strengthen their military efforts 
against the other side. This created a kind of polarization, as each side to the conflict 
came to depend on one of the world's two poles in confronting the other pole supporting 
its rival. In the context of the struggle between the two poles for influence in this 
important region, the Arab-Israeli conflict was a great opportunity and a suitable place 
for intervention, through the provision of economic, political and military aid to the two 
sides of the conflict. This international competition that continued from the forties to the 
eighties reflected itself on the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its stages, on its events, wars, 
crises and attempts to achieve peace for its peoples. 
During the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and the various crises in 
between, this international involvement was obvious through the supply of arms, 
economic and technical aid and political support in international forums. Every side in 
the international conflict supported one of the sides in the regional conflict, with the 
exception of limited periods where the international powers co-operated in imposing 
embargo on arm sales to the region or trying to resolve the conflict during the Detente 
period. 
The superpowers used various peace processes to try to advance their own 
interests, not just wars or crises. But while peace processes were intended to prevent 
direct conflict (or the superpowers getting directly military drawn in) they had two 
counter effects. First, they encouraged regional parties to take advantage of superpower 
interest, preventing resolution. Second, the superpowers were actually able to take 
advantage of the continuation of the conflict. 
I f the peace efforts reflected in many cases the desire to prevent international 
confrontation that might result from Arab-Israeli war, the failure of such efforts was due 
to two factors. First, the conflicting parties were encouraged by the support of one of the 
THE COLD WAR AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS 147 
superpowers and aspired to realize their goals through force. Second, the two 
superpowers, despite their public support for a just and comprehensive peaceful 
settlement, felt that the continuation of the conflict provided them with the opportunity 
to intervene in the region, thus serving their strategic interests. As Ziva Flamhaft 
pointed out, "The vehicle that enabled the superpowers to intervene in the Middle East 
as part of their global balancing act during the Cold War was the Arab-Israeli conflict."2 
It is important to point out that peace initiatives in the Middle East reflected 
clearly different stages and periods of ups and downs, tensions and detente in the 
superpowers relation. During the tense periods, which accounted for most of the Cold 
War period, the cooperation between the two superpowers was nil, peace efforts failed, 
wars almost or actually happened. Examples of failed efforts were the Jarring mission, 
the William Rogers' initiative, the African Presidents' mission and the peace plans of 
Shamir, Mubarak, Reagan, Fahd, and others. 
When peace did happen, it was a limited peace or separate agreement, such as 
Kissinger's disengagement agreements and the Camp David agreements between Egypt 
and Israel, which did not lead to the end of the conflict but to its continuation, and 
resulted in "cold peace" between the two countries. 
During the detente periods, some kind of cooperation between the two 
superpowers enabled them to issue joint calls for a peaceful settlement, or the convening 
of an international conference to discuss the problem and open the door to negotiate 
possible solutions. Examples of that were the Joint American-Soviet statement, and the 
Geneva Conference. But the limits to cooperation, and the continued superpower rivalry 
prevented more substantial peace agreements. 
2 Flamhaft, Z., Israel on the Road to Peace: Accepting the Unacceptable, (Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1996), p. 9. 
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Since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict in Palestine, there were efforts to 
resolve the problem and bring about a peaceful settlement. With any escalation of the 
conflict, there were intensified efforts to find a solution. With every war between the 
newly established state of Israel on one side and the Palestinians and Arab neighbouring 
countries on the other, there were major efforts to reach a peaceful settlement, whether 
it was called peace plan, peace initiative or mediation effort. 
It is important to recognize that peace efforts were highly affected by the 
features of the international system. Not just by superpower bipolar competition but also 
by the existence of the United Nations and its Security Council. Therefore international 
organizations and other parties contributed to efforts at peace making. 
As the military conflict was taking place within and being influenced deeply by 
the international environment and the international system, so were the peace efforts. By 
the end of World War I I in 1944 and the establishment of the UN in 1945, a new 
international system was being created and developed. Two main features characterized 
that system. The first was the bipolar superpower competition already mentioned. The 
second was the existence of the United Nations as an instrument to maintain peace and 
stability in the world. The main organ of this organization was the Security Council, and 
the main feature of that Council was the right of the main five international major 
powers (USSR, UK, France, China and USA) to veto any resolution taken by the 
Security Council. As K.J.Holsti pointed out in his book entitled The State, War, and the 
State of War. 
Post-1945 states were not created solely by armed national liberation movements 
or by the co-opted indigenous elates of the colonial state. The United Nations, 
representing the international community and its norms, was also involved in the 
state-making process. It participated in three ways: (1) by defining the territorial 
extent and political forms of new states; (2) by establishing the philosophical and 
political ground rules for de-colonization; and (3) by granting membership to the 
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organization and providing the new states with a variety of life-support 
assistance.3 
Since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict following the establishment of Israel in 
May 1948, there have been number of peace attempts, individual or collective, regional 
or international. The initiatives differed in their goals and methods, some of them were 
honest efforts and some were designed for public relations purposes to win time or to 
create facts on the ground. Some of these attempts resulted in peace agreements. Some 
of them did not succeed but established the ground and made it possible for the 
following efforts to succeed as it facilitated the mutual understanding between the 
parties, and was necessary for exploring the initial position of all parties. That fact was 
emphasized by Saadia Touval who wrote in his book The Peace Brokers: Mediators in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1948-1979, that: 
It is not for lack of attempts to resolve it that the Arab-Israeli conflict has gone on 
for so long. For over sixty years, repeated efforts have been made to reconcile the 
incompatible claims to Palestine made by Arab and Jewish national movements, 
but to no avail.4 
Indeed many mediators and negotiations by governments, international organizations 
and individuals have been part of the total picture in Middle East conflict resolution 
activities. 
This chapter will be devoted to the discussion of the historical background of the 
peace efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. I wi l l assess these efforts at peace 
making during the Cold War and examine how they were shaped by; first, bipolar 
3 Holsti, K., The State, War, and the State of War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996). 
4 Touval, S., The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1919, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. xi. 
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competition between the superpowers, and second, the response of the international 
community and regional actors to that competition and the prevailing international 
system. In this context I will discuss many peace plans which varied in their importance. 
Also I wi l l discuss many mediation efforts, which have been conducted either by 
individuals or by groups or organizations. I wil l start by these mediation efforts as an 
attempt to understand the mediator background, their proposals to resolve the conflict 
and the results of those mediations and their effect on the conflict. 
These peace efforts intensified following every war because of the danger that 
deteriorating situation in the region could threaten the world peace and the interests of 
not only the parties to the conflict but the interests of the major and superpowers. 
The patron-client relationship played an important role in preventing peace 
moves during the Cold War period. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov pointed out that: 
"Patron-client relations, together with the interlocking of local and superpower 
conflict, have generated a multitude of bargaining relationships in the Middle 
East."5 
The failure or success of the peace initiatives that I am going to discuss 
throughout this chapter is linked to the patron-client relationship. The USA's patronage 
of Israel and Soviet patronage of Arab states contributed to the failure of many peace 
efforts because of the rivalry between the two superpowers. 
The best way to deal with peace efforts during the Cold War period in my view 
is to divide the period into five short periods and try to assess those efforts, their 
motives and results and their relations with the wider international politics. In other 
words to see how these efforts were affected by the Cold War world order. 
The first period will be from the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 to the 1967 war. 
The second wil l be from 1967 war to 1973 war. The third wil l be from 1973 war to the 
5 Bar-Siman-Tov, Y., Israel, the Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East, (New 
York: Praeger, 1987), p. xii. 
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signing of Egypt-Israel peace treaty in 1979. The fourth wi l l be from 1979 to 1985 and 
finally the fifth wil l be from 1988 to the start of Madrid peace conference in 1991.6 
Peace Efforts Between 1948-1967 
For Israelis the 1948 war was a war of independence. For the Arabs and the Palestinians 
in particular it was a catastrophe. The Six-Day war of 1967 was a victory for the Israelis 
but was another catastrophe for the Arab countries. However, the period in between 
witnessed many efforts to find a political solution to the conflict. In this section I wil l 
examine some of these efforts and try to find out how they were affected by the Cold 
War Order. Among these efforts I wi l l focus on the United Nations Partition Plan, the 
Folke Bernadotte mission, the Ralph Bunche mission, the Conciliation Commission for 
Palestine and Robert Anderson's mission.7 
The UN Partition Plan 
In response to Britain's inability to manage its own mandate in Palestine successfully 
the United Nations formed in February 1947, a Special Committee on Palestine 
(UNSCOP) to recommend on how to deal with the Palestine problem. After 
investigating conditions in the country, the committee submitted its report to the United 
Nations at the end of August 1947. On 29 November the General Assembly voted with 
thirty-three votes to thirteen, and ten abstentions, to approve the partition of Palestine 
into a Jewish and an Arab state.8 Although the Partition Plan was presented as a solution 
6 Abdul Hadi, M , Documents on Palestine (I), (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997). 
7 Sela, A., The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest 
for Regional Order, (New York: State University of New York, 1998), pp. 57-75. 
8 Smith, C , Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
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to the conflicting claims of the two communities they did not see it as such. The plan to 
partition Palestine into two states, one for the Jews and one for the Arabs, was seen by 
the Arabs as a plot by the Western powers to create an imperialist base in their midst. 
Such a creation would effectively divide the Arab world in the middle, in addition to 
establishing a foreign and hostile entity, which would drive the Palestinians from their 
homeland. In Walid Khalidi's words, "The UN 1947 partition was not the legal, moral, 
fair, balanced, pragmatic, practicable 'compromise' formula that it is made out to be. 
That it was legal at all is moot."9 Nevertheless, "the countries of the Arab League 
pinned all their hopes during this period on diplomacy. None of them was even on 
speaking terms with the Soviet Union. None had made preparations for war. A l l were 
friendly to the United States."10 
For the Israelis, "The right of the Jews to an independent state in part of 
Palestine had been recognized by the international community, giving legitimacy to 
Jewish claims for self-rule."11 However, while they accepted the principle of partition, 
they would not commit themselves to the proposed geography of the plan. 
The importance of the Cold War atmosphere on the issue was clear from the 
start. The USA's position was taken according to its policy towards its rival the Soviet 
Union. 1 2 The United States understood on the one hand the impossibility of imposing 
the partition without military force. On the other hand any military intervention would 
1992), p. 138. 
9 Khalidi, W., "Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution," Journal of Palestine 
Studies, vol. xxvii, no. 105,1997, p. 9. 
1 0 Ibid., p. 18. 
1 1 Smith, (1992), Op. Cit., p. 140. 
1 2 Ibid. 
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be exploited by the Soviet Union, a matter that the USA could not allow. 1 3 Also the 
USA feared Soviet involvement in any international police force and therefore rejected 
giving the Security Council powers to police partition.1 4 The Soviet Union was equally 
concerned that, in the post-World War Two international environment, the USA should 
not gain the upper hand in the developing world which the USSR considered to fall 
ideologically within its own domain. The Middle East was a particularly sensitive area, 
bordering as it did the south/south western boundary of Soviet territory. Any southern 
access to a warm water port would have to be via the region. Moreover, the Soviet 
Union's own Muslim peripheries lay adjacent to the Arab and Iranian lands and could 
potentially be destabilised by religious or nationalist activities therein. Finally, World 
War Two had illustrated the growing importance of Middle Eastern oil fields for the 
energy supplies, economic and military capabilities of the superpowers. In sum, the 
Soviet Union had a profound strategic interest in establishing a presence in the region, 
whether militarily in the Indian Ocean or diplomatically via regional clients. This was to 
remain the case throughout the Cold War. Therefore, although the United States 
dominated peace efforts in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviet Union always tried to 
find a place and contribute in one way or another in order to advance its interests in the 
region. 
Following World War I I and to compete with the United States in the Cold War 
struggle, the Soviet Union increased its activities and became an effective actor in 
Middle East international relations. Alan Taylor pointed out in his book The 
Superpowers and the Middle East that "like the Americans, the Soviets were so 
1 3 Ibid., p. 141. 
, 4 Ibid., p. 142. 
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preoccupied with the superpower rivalry itself that they concentrated mainly on a global 
as opposed to a regional approach,"15 
To do this, the Soviet Union focused its efforts on developing links with the 
states and peoples of the area around the common element of resisting imperialism. 
Building an "anti-imperialist" front in the Middle East was a primary objective of the 
Soviet Union for decades. However it should be understood that: "The Russian attitude 
toward the Middle East has traditionally been opportunistic rather than benign."1 6 The 
relationship with Egypt during President Nasser's period was an example of the Soviet's 
policy success in the Middle East and illustrated this fact. Soviet support for Egypt was 
conveniently portrayed as idealistic, but Nasser had no particular ideological affinity to 
the Soviet Union, his socialism was not scientific and he was continually nervous of 
Soviet efforts to impose upon his own foreign and domestic policy-making. The Soviet 
Union for its part proved uninterested in trying to force Nasser to adopt a political 
system closer to its own and remained interested solely in Egypt's regional position 
under its own sponsorship. Equally military support to Egypt and Syria, especially 
following the 1967 war, improved its own position in the area and allowed it to develop 
relations with many other revolutionary countries like Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and the two 
Yemens. Soviet interests in the region, like those of the USA, were primarily realist in 
orientation and utilised the notion of patron-client relations from early on. 
Robert Freedman pointed out rightly that: "In their 'zero-sum' view of Middle 
East influence, the Soviets were quite concerned that the sharp rise in American prestige 
1 5 Taylor, A., The Superpowers and the Middle East, (New York: Syracuse University 
Press, 1991), p. 133. 
1 6 Ibid., p. 134. 
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in the region meant a concomitant drop in Soviet influence."1 7 Due to this concern, the 
Soviet Union tried always to participate in any political peace efforts despite the 
American desire to dominate and conduct those efforts in its own way. Its participation 
in Geneva conference in December 1973 was a major success in that direction even i f 
the conference did not produce any positive results. The October 1977 joint statement 
with the United States concerning the peace process was a rare example of co-operation 
and coordination during that troubled era. 
In the case of the Jewish State, the Zionists did not wait for the UN to implement 
the Partition Plan and on 15 May proclaimed a Jewish state on the area granted to them. 
The implementation of the UN Partition Plan was not possible. According to Saadia 
Touval the partition plan, "had run into serious difficulty because of Arab opposition 
and British non-cooperation. The USA temporarily abandoned its support for partition 
and proposed instead that UN trusteeship or some other provisional regime be 
18 
established in Palestine when the British mandate ended." 
Thus the impact of the World Order on the Arab Israeli conflict was evident from 
the start.19 Even in the United Nations and its main organs, the superpowers' rivalry 
reflected itself on the partition issue. In Saadia Touval's words, "The Cold War 
20 
paralyzed the work of the Security Council on the Palestinian issue." 
1 7 Freedman, R., Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970, (New York: 
Praeger, 1982), pp. 14-19 
1 8 Touval, (1982), Op. Ci t , p. 25. 
1 9 Forsythe, D., United Nations Peacemaking: The Conciliation Commission for 
Palestine, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1972). 
2 0 Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 251. 
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The Folke Bernadotte Mission 
In the context of mediation efforts, it is clear that Bemadotte's efforts were very 
important. In the period between May and September 1948, following the eruption of 
the 1948 war between the newly established Israel and the neighbouring Arab states, the 
United Nations sent the Swedish Count, Folke Bernadotte, to try and reach a 
comprehensive agreement to the conflict. 
Bernadotte tried to reach a quick settlement, to end hostilities, and opposed 
Israel's leaders' wish to benefit from the Arab weakness in obtaining more territories. 
He believed that any agreement between Arabs and Israelis must achieve a balance and 
justice in the territorial gains. For example, the Israeli domination on the Galilee meant 
that Israelis should have no rights in the Negev, and vice versa.22 
In addition to the Israeli opposition to Bemadotte's proposals of non-acquisition 
of Galilee and Negev at the same time -which, was accepted by the Americans and the 
British- they opposed the idea of the internationalization of Jerusalem. The Israeli 
opposition to his proposals led a Jewish terrorist group to assassinate him in Jerusalem 
on 18 September 1948. 
The unsuccessful end to Bernadotte's efforts was due, even before his 
assassination to factors such as the lack of resources, which prevented him from 
influencing the parties' positions, and more particularly to the limited authority of his 
role as a U N mediator. His mediation came along at the start of the 1948 war, which 
2 1 Ilan, A., Bernadotte in Palestine, 1948: A Study in Contemporary Humanitarian 
Knight-Errantry, (Oxford: Macmillan, 1989), p. 1. 
2 2 See Beling, W., Middle East Peace Plans, (London: Croom Helm, 1986). 
2 3 See, Tessler, M. , A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), p. 274. 
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coincided with the Berlin blockade. At this point in time, the Soviet Union and the 
USA/ Britain were more concerned with events in Europe. The Cold War was taking 
shape and superpower rivalry was becoming more sharply focused, thus reducing their 
ability and willingness to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict in a co-operative and 
effective way. 2 4 Without committed superpower support and under the auspices of a still 
new and weak United Nations, the mission was destined to fail. 
Ralph Bunche's Mission 
Following the establishment of Israel and the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, a 'new 
phase' of the conflict began. The focus was -according to Charles Smith- on "Arab-
Israeli state and military interactions," and was affected to a much greater degree than 
previously by, "great power rivalries and the continuing confrontation between the 
Soviet bloc and the Western powers."25 
Following Bernadotte's assassination, the UN's new mediator Ralph Bunch 
initiated truce negotiations between Israel and its neighboring Arab countries in Rhodes 
between January and July 1949. These agreements exceeded any previous truce or 
cease-fire, and presented the first official agreements between the parties. His role was 
important in the agreements between Israel on one side and Egypt, Lebanon and Syria 
on the other, but less important in the agreement between Israel and Jordan. 
Ralph Bunche was more successful than Bernadotte. That success might be due to 
personal qualifications, his understanding of superpower interests, American support 
2 4 See Buheiry, M. , "The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East in the Early 1950's and 
Today: Retrospect and Prospect," in R. Khalidi, and C. Mansour, Palestine and the 
Gulf, (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1982), pp. 120-160. 
2 5 Smith, (1992), Op. Cit., p. 147. 
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and the diplomatic assistants provided by it in the Capitals concerned.26 The other 
reason is that the states dealt with him as an American more than as a representative of 
the UN and the regional balance of power in that time enabled him to succeed. 
The Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP) 
On the basis of recommendations by Bernadotte and Bunch, the UN General Assembly 
established the Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP) through its resolution no. 
194 of 11 December 1948. 
The period 1949-51 was the only time in the life of the commission when it 
operated as a three-government organ pursuant to a general settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. 2 8 
The commission persuaded Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria to attend a 
conference in Lusanne, Switzerland, in April 1949. On 12 May 1949, the commission 
succeeded in obtaining the signature of both the Arabs and the Israelis to two protocols. 
However, further progress by the commission was impeded by the growing inclination 
of the superpowers to view the United Nations as an instrument for their own ends. The 
Soviet Union, in particular, saw the commission as an instrument of the west, being 
used to limit its own influence in the Middle East.29 
America, meanwhile, was unwilling to put sufficient pressure on either Israel or 
the Arabs to make significant concessions, as it was more interested in winning their 
2 6 Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 73. 
27 • 
See Finger, S., The New World Balance and Peace in the Middle East, (New York: 
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support in its broader strategic struggle with the Soviet Union. With neither superpower 
prepared to support the further work of the commission, it too inevitably failed. 
Robert Anderson's Mission 
The mission of Robert B. Anderson, the personal envoy of President Eisenhower, came 
after the end of the mission of Eric Johnson who had been sent to the Middle East in 
1953 for a mission which lasted for two and a half years.31 
Anderson's mission reflected a basic American strategy for dealing with the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The major American preoccupation in that period was the Cold 
War and improving the defensive capability of the non-communist countries bordering 
the communist bloc, to confront the changes, the most important of which the decline of 
the British influence.32 
It was no coincidence that the Anderson mission coincided with the 
establishment of the first Soviet foothold in the region. 3 3 Following the 1952 revolution, 
Egypt had begun to develop relations with the Soviet bloc, causing concern to the 
United States and its western allies.34 However, the USA was unwilling to itself provide 
Egypt with the arms that it needed to counter Israel's own defence procurement 
programme (notably from France). The USA offered only economic aid, forcing Egypt 
3 0 See Finger, (1975), Op. Cit. 
3 1 See Buheiry, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 70. 
3 2 See Beling, (1986), Op. Cit. 
3 3 Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 135. 
3 4 See Laqueur, W., The Road to War J967: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
(London: The Camelot Press, 1968). 
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to look to the Soviet Union for the weapons it sought. Anderson's mission was a highly 
secret mission to see whether Gamal Abdul Nasser and David Ben Gurion would 
consent to negotiate.35 The American awareness of Egypt's negotiations with the Soviet 
block to obtain arms and its own wish to undermine those efforts, pushed the USA to 
undertake this political initiative, before Egypt went too far in its relations with the 
Soviet bloc. 3 6 However, events during and after the Suez convinced Nasser that the 
United States was aligned against him and with Israel, (Washington having blocked 
food and financial assistance in 1956 and 1957), leading him to take a more pro-Soviet 
stance. This perception was reinforced by the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957. With Soviet 
activities in Europe heightening superpower tensions, there was little prospect that the 
Soviet Union would accept any results from secret American mediation of the Arab-
Israeli conflict and Egypt remains sceptical of American objectives. Israel had 
meanwhile become disillusioned by the American pressure on Britain, France and Israel 
itself to withdraw from the Sinai and was determined to resist any attempts to force it 
into a premature peace. 
Peace Efforts Between 1967-1973 
During the 1960s the Cold War between the two international competing camps 
intensified. By 1967, the Arab-Israeli conflict had become thoroughly intertwined with 
the East-West struggle. Indeed, the Soviet-American and the Arab-Israeli conflicts had 
become closely interdependent.37 "From the Soviet perspective, continuing military and 
3 5 Smith, (1992), Op. Cit., p. 168. 
3 6 Ibid., pp. 168-169. 
3 7 Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 135. 
THE COLD WAR AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS 161 
economic assistance to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq provided a wedge for gaining access to 
the Arab world through governments opposed to Western efforts to maintain their 
dominance."38 For the United States, the 1967 war had confirmed its own commitment 
first and foremost to the defense of the Israeli position. During this period from the Six-
Day War of 1967 to the October war of 1973 there were several peace efforts, including 
an Israeli Nine-point Peace Plan (October 1968) presented by Abba Eban to the United 
Nations and a Soviet Plan, also presented in 1968. Neither plan offered more than the 
UNSC Resolution 242 that was issued immediately after the Six-Day War and which 
became the basis for those initiatives to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. The 
Soviet Plan, which did call for a return to pre-1967 borders was rejected by Israel as 
simply reverting to the pre-1967 situation, while the Israeli Plan did not offer to the 
Arabs as much as even a minimalist interpretation of UNSCR 242. 
The appointment of Dr. Gunnar V. Jarring as special representative of the UN 
Secretary-General was also one of those mediation efforts. The Organization of African 
Unity contributed towards the Middle East peace efforts by composing a presidential 
commission. 
In the following section I wil l discuss these efforts and try to find out how they 
were affected by the wider world politics and the Cold War between the two 
39 
superpowers. 
3 8 Smith, (1992), Op. Cit., p. 194. 
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UNSC Resolution 242 
Following the 1967 war, and the Israeli occupation of what remained of Palestine, the 
Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights and territories in Lebanon and Jordan, the UN 
Security Council issued its well known resolution in November 1967.40 The UNSCR 
242 called in one of its paragraphs for Israel's withdrawal from territories occupied by 
force in the 1967 war. Although this paragraph attracted the Arab parties to the 
resolution, its vagueness made it acceptable to Israel which interpreted it as requiring 
her to withdraw only from some and not all territories occupied in 1967 4 1 
The resolution also called for establishing a just and permanent peace in the 
Middle East, recognizing the reciprocal sovereignty and the territorial integration of 
states and the political independence of all states in the region. This paragraph, which 
was accepted completely by Israel at a time when Israel was trying to legitimize its 
existence in the region, was not fully accepted by the Arab states. They saw it as an 
attempt to legitimize Israel's existence.42 Also the Palestinians, who did not have a state 
of their own and were out of the picture, saw it in the same way, as ignoring their 
legitimate rights. 4 3 The importance of UNSCR 242 stems from its calling for 
exchanging land for peace, and that it was generally acceptable to all parties including 
the Palestinians, who acceptedlhe resolution at a later stage 4 4 
4 0 Bering, (1986), Op. Cit , p. 83. 
4 1 Lall, A., The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1968). 
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It was also important because it constituted a base for other initiatives and plans for 
peace that followed. Its "land for peace" formula worked as a base and term of reference 
for the Camp David agreements, the Madrid peace process, the Oslo agreements and the 
Israel-Jordan peace agreement.45 However, the vagueness of the document was 
exploited by both Arabs and Israel, with each seeking their patron's support in 
interpreting its terms within the UN Security Council. The resolution itself therefore 
became a victim of Cold War realities, showing once again how the clients were able to 
exploit their patrons' own hostilities to advance their causes and in the process 
obstructing advances in the peace process. 
Gunnar Jarring's Mission 
Following the 1967 war, and the issuing of the UNSC Resolution 242, which demanded 
that the UN Secretary General send a special representative to the Middle East, UThant 
appointed Dr. Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish Ambassador to Moscow, for the mission. 
"Jarring's mission originated from a familiar procedure of the international community 
and the UN Secretariat General which responded to the Arab-Israeli conflict by sending 
some one to the region to improve the situation."46 
The UNSC Resolution which demanded the Secretary General to send a special 
representative aimed at two things. First, providing the UN representative with terms of 
reference. Second, reaching an international consensus on the principles, which might 
help reach a settlement of the conflict. 4 7 
4 5 See Appendices, p. 410. 
4 6 See Kerr, M. , The Elusive Peace in the Middle East, (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1975). 
4 7 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 3922/i, 23/2/1972. 
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Jarring made a number of proposals, based on an interpretation of UNSCR that 
demanded full Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, a condition 
unacceptable to Israel. The Golda Meir government was further convinced that the 
"independent" Jarring would not work towards their own interests as the American 
National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, would. ). Thus they rejected Jarring's 
intervention in favour of American peace efforts. Their preference for American 
mediation only enhanced the Israeli-USA relationship, since the Americans were not 
ready either for a peace agreement on which the Soviet Union could vote (i.e: 
emanating from the United Nations Security Council. The Egyptians had accepted the 
terms of Jarring's solution but without Israel's agreement the mission was destined to 
fail. 
Gunnar Jarring's mission failed due to the incompatibility of the parties' 
positions, in addition to the weakness of the United Nations, its lack of resources or 
influence to support its representative. Also it might be attributed to the ambiguity 
concerning the terms of reference, but more important was that the conflict structure 
overlapped with the struggle between the West and the East. The intense competition 
between superpowers to advance their interests in the region prevented them from 
seeking quick solutions to the conflict. In fact the conflict became the main excuse to 
their intervention in the region through political, economic and military aid. The major 
power's interests as Touval pointed out, influenced its policies towards the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
Each of the powers was motivated by concerns unrelated to the Middle East. 
France under Charles de Gaul wanted the talks in order to promote its standing as 
See Halliday, F., Cold War, Third World: an Essay on Soviet-US Relations, (London: 
Hutchinson Radius, 1989). 
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a great power that participates alongside the superpowers in shaping the destinies 
of the world. 4 9 
The two superpowers played out their competition in the Middle East using its conflict 
to further their influence. Economic aid and arms supplies were the main tools in the 
superpowers intervention in the Middle East. While the United States and before that 
France were the main suppliers to Israel, the Soviet Union was the main supplier to the 
Arab side of the conflict. 
Despite its failure, the Jarring mission caused some changes.50 Although it did not 
achieve a settlement, it caused some side effects, which affected the evaluation of the 
conflict, and the efforts to reach settlement.51 Also, it provided Egypt and Jordan with a 
diplomatic alternative, and enabled Egypt to make some big concessions. 
The William Rogers' Initiative 
Growing USA support for Israel in 1960s created Soviet opportunities among Arab 
states.53 As pointed out clearly and rightly by Charles Smith, "Growing American 
identification with Israel in the 1960s provided more opportunities for Soviet inroads 
4 y Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 150. 
5 0 B B C Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 3921/1, 22/2/1972. 
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into the region."5 4 Some Arab countries found themselves with no alternative but to seek 
Soviet assistance to balance the emerging western alliance with Israel. 
"The West sought to neutralize the military capabilities of the antagonists and align its 
participants, especially those among the Arab states, against any possible Soviet 
incursion."55 Therefore 1967 and 1968 saw assistance from the superpowers to regional 
allies increasing. 
Elements within the Nixon administration also wanted to make a new start with 
the Soviet Union, while Saadia Touval thinks that: 
Among the Soviet motivations in desiring negotiations on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, obtaining recognition of its legitimate interest and involvement in Middle 
East affairs was highly important.56 
Both sides therefore had an interest in reviving the peace process. The USA 
sought to counter the Soviet tactics with a new initiative of their own. Behind the 
initiative there was an American desire to reduce Soviet influence and increase the 
American influence in Egypt and other Arab countries, through reducing tensions 
between Israel and the Arab countries.57 The Rogers initiative (June 1970-April 1972) 
58 
was therefore an American proposal designed to achieve three objectives. First, a 
cease-fire between Egypt and Israel in order to end the dangerous situation of open war, 
Second, to prevent any development that might bring the American and Soviet forces to 
5 4 Smith, (1992), Op. Cit., p. 194. 
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a military clash, and third, to revive the Jarring mission.59 The cease fire proposal 
included a memorandum of understanding on the acceptance of both parties of UNSCR 
242 as the basis of negotiations, with a clear indication of Israeli withdrawal from 
territories occupied in 1967.60 The Rogers initiative, in addition to its being mediation, 
conducted by the American Secretary of State himself, was considered to be a peace 
plan. Immediately after his appointment by President Richard Nixon, Rogers took the 
initiative to prepare and formulate a peace plan to present to the parties, in order to 
reach a settlement. William Rogers presented his plan in December 1969, and tried to 
sell it in 1970. 
Egypt and Jordan ultimately accepted the initiative, while Israel not suprisingly 
rejected i t . 6 1 Although the initiative failed in reaching an interim agreement on 
disengagement from the Suez Canal, it did reach an agreement on a cease-fire in the war 
of attrition between Egypt and Israel. 
However the incidents in Jordan between the Jordanian army and the PLO 
elements, and the sudden death of President Gamal Abdul Nasser, in addition to the 
unripeness of the conflict for resolution, all contributed to ending the initiative before 
more substantive progress could be made. Additionally, within the American 
administration there was opposition to the plan, primarily from Kissinger who was to 
become the dominant figure in events as Nixon became preoccupied with the Viet Nam 
war and his own domestic problems. The initiative nonetheless without doubt 
contributed in developing a kind of debate and dialogue of some ideas, and investigating 
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other views, which were apart and influenced to a great extent by the general framework 
of the international circumstances and the East-West conflict within the Cold War. 
The Soviet response to Rogers was opportunist. An initial rejection showed how 
the Soviet Union was eager to express its understanding of and support for its Arab 
allies. However, when the Soviets realised the increasing acceptance among the Arab 
parties, they offered their own acceptance and support to the initiative.6 2 
Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov viewed the Rogers plan from a patron-client relationship 
point of view. He thought that "Israel was confronted with USA constraints far earlier 
than it had expected, when the 'Rogers Plan' was presented to the Soviet Union at 
meeting between Sisco and Dobrynin." 6 3 
Although the initiative can be seen as a failure because it did not bring about an 
agreement between the parties, the acceptance by most of the parties of the initiative 
itself can be seen as a major progress.64 
The OAU Presidential Commission 
The Organization of African Unity tried to play a mediation role between Egypt and 
Israel in the second half of 1971. The African Summit of Addis Ababa appointed a 
committee of African presidents for that purpose. The committee (known as the ten wise 
men) was composed of the presidents of Mauritania, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Kenya, 
Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Zaire, and the emperor of Ethiopia.65 
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This attempt to mediate was influenced by the fact that the committee was 
composed of ten countries that had differences between themselves on other issues, 
negatively influencing the atmosphere of the initiative. Also the initiative suffered from 
a lack of resources and coherence. 
The committee apparently made an attempt to enlist the support of the great 
powers for its efforts. However, it met with indifference, i f not with opposition. 
The US was in the midst of its attempt to mediate an interim agreement for 
disengagement and the reopening of the Suez Canal and was not interested in 
supporting a competing diplomatic effort. The Soviet Union had no interest in 
pressing Egypt to modify its stand on the Jarring initiative. And both, concerned 
with protecting their own freedom of action, probably did not view with favour 
the intrusion of additional actors into a conflict in which their own interests were 
deeply involved. 6 6 
The effort is worth noting, however, because it shows how the Arab-Israeli conflict had 
became a focal point of the international system, and one in which a wide variety of 
states found they had an interest. 
Peace Efforts Between 1973-1979 
The 1973 war demonstrated again the "tendency of the Arab-Israeli conflict to draw in 
the superpowers and endanger the peace of the world." The war also had other effect. 
It strengthened opposition to the policy of detente, since Soviet complicity in the 
preparations for the war and its strong support for Egypt and Syria during the 
hostilities were interpreted as violation of the spirit, i f not the letter, of Soviet-
American understandings, and an indication that the Soviet Union would not 
abide by the restraints that detente supposedly imposed.67 
The 1973 war showed how Arab-Israeli conflict drew in the superpowers and disrupted 
moves towards detente. The war made it more important to find a solution. Following 
the war the search for an Arab-Israeli settlement assumed a new urgency, making the 
6 6 Ibid., p. 223. 
Ibid., p. 226. 
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Arab-Israeli conflict one of the American priorities. The USA feared that the USSR 
which a year before had been expelled from Egypt, might be re-invited again to install a 
military presence, and thus endanger the American position in the region.68 
American skilful diplomacy enabled the USA to benefit from the crisis, 
increasing its influence and creating a mediator role for itself alone. Among the peace 
efforts in that period were UNSC Resolution 338, Henry Kissinger's step by step 
diplomacy, the Geneva Conference, Jimmy Carter's efforts, the USSR-USA Joint 
Statement, the Camp David agreement and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. 
Changes in Soviet-American relations carried in their wake changes in the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Neither escalation nor deescalation could take place in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict without the USA and the Soviet Union regarding the process as relevant to their 
mutual relations and vital interests.69 
UNSC Resolution 338 was regarded as another term of reference for peace in 
the Middle East. It worked as a base for more peace initiatives. This resolution came in 
the aftermath of the October war, as it was issued on 22 October 1973. It called for a 
cease-fire and the implementation of UNSCR 242 of 1967 in all its parts. While Egypt 
accepted it immediately and Israel after some hesitation, the Palestinians rejected it 
because it did not make any mention of their problem and rights. 
The importance of the resolution came from its being a term reference for peace 
efforts, and because it was considered by all parties, together with UNSCR 242, as a 
basis for any peaceful solution in the region. 
The Arab-Israeli conflict exacerbated superpower competition,70 not only that 
superpower competition affected the Arab-Israeli peace process. 
6 8 See Bar-Siman-Tov, (1987), Op. Cit. 
6 9 Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 136. 
7 0 Carlton, (1988), Op. Cit., p. 79. 
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Henry Kissinger's Step by Step Diplomacy 
The events of the war obliged Egypt and Israel to think seriously about negotiating a 
disengagement of their forces on the front lines, and a peaceful settlement. Under these 
circumstances the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger was able to bring the 
two countries to arrange new truce lines, disengagement of their military forces, buffer 
zones under U N monitoring, and to negotiate peace. 
Kissinger's mediation led to five agreements, the cease-fire between Egypt and 
Israel, the Geneva Conference, the disengagement between Egypt and Israel, and Syria 
and Israel, and a second agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1975.71 His ability to 
bring about all these unexpected agreements was unbelievable, especially since he was 
seen as biased towards Israel by the Arab parties. 
Kissinger was accepted although he was not regarded as impartial. He was not 
only the secretary of state of a power that was a de facto ally of Israel but he was 
also a Jew, and therefore presumably doubly biased against the Arabs. 
The Cold War atmosphere was always behind the superpowers action. In the 
international context, the success in limiting the Soviet influence in Egypt and 
establishing American domination, was the ultimate goal behind these agreements. 
As Saadia Touval pointed out: 
Kissinger was a successful mediator not only because he brought about the 
conclusion of five agreements, but also because his mediation produced some of 
the political consequences at which his efforts were ultimately aimed. The 
elimination of Soviet influence in Egypt and the establishment of American 
dominance there were one.73 
Kissinger's step by step policy was based on dividing the issues into individual 
elements, each of which would be negotiated individually, as a gradual approach toward 
7 1 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 4996/1, 2/9/1975. 
7 2 Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 226. 
7 3 Ibid., p. 283. 
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reaching peaceful settlement. It was criticized by many,7 4 because its approach towards 
a separate agreement destroyed the opportunity to achieve a comprehensive peace.75 
Kissinger's efforts as Saddam Hussein said, were an attempt to find partial solutions to 
the 1967 aggression; these would not have a radical effect nor contribute to the stability 
of the region.7 6 
The Geneva Conference 
The relationship between the regional conflict and the international conflict is evident 
and important. Changes in the Arab-Israeli conflict altered the Soviet-American 
political and strategic balance in the region, carrying with them global ramifications.77 
Influenced by the atmosphere of October war and UNSCR 338, which called for the 
implementation of UNSCR 242, and the oil crisis which resulted from Arab oil 
embargo, the two superpowers agreed to make a joint initiative in what seemed to be an 
atmosphere of detente between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the course of 
his visit to Moscow in October, Kissinger agreed with the Soviet leaders that a 
conference would be convened in Geneva under joint American-Soviet auspices with 
the participation of Israel and the Arab states.78 They invited all parties concerned to 
attend a peace conference under their auspices in Geneva in December 1973.79 The 
7 4 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 4998/1, 4/9/1975. 
7 5 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/ 4997/1, 3/9/1975. 
76 Ibid. 
7 7 Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 136. 
78 
79 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 4472/1, 10/12/1973. 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 4484/1, 24/12/1973. 
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conference, which lasted for two days, was an important symbolic event but did not 
provide the setting for substantive negotiations.80 
Despite what appeared to be detente in the relations between the USA and the 
USSR, the lack of seriousness on the part of the two superpowers towards resolving the 
conflict was the main reason for failure.8 1 They both regarded the conflict as serving 
their interests, and as allowing them to extend their influence in the strategic Middle 
East region. 
As Alan Taylor pointed out, 
"The Soviets did manage to work themselves into the center of peace diplomacy 
through their participation in the Geneva Conference of December 21, 1973, but 
when the conference ended without any progress having been made, the initiative 
reverted to the United States."82 
According to Kissinger "The Geneva conference [of December 1973] was a way 
to get all parties into harness for one symbolic act, thereby to enable each to pursue a 
separate course, at least for a while. It was as complicated to assemble the great meeting 
as it was to keep it quiescent afterward while diplomacy returned to bilateral 
83 
channels." In reality, then, the USA interest in the conference was limited. The 
preference was for bilateral talks in which the USA could advance its own interests. 
8 UTouval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 241. 
8 1 Evron, Y., "The United States and the Middle East in the Post Cold-War Era, in B. 
Rubin., From War to Peace: Arab-Israeli Relations 1973-1993, (Brighton: Sussex 
Academic Press, 1994), p. 219. 
8 2 Taylor, A., (1991), Op. Cit., p. 140. 
8 3 Primakov, E., "Soviet Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in W. Quandt, The 
Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 
1988), p. 391. 
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The attempt to reconvene the Geneva Conference indicated a change in US 
motives. Kissinger had aimed at replacing Soviet influence in Egypt and lessening 
the likelihood of another oil embargo.84 
The USSR-USA Joint Statement: October 1977 
Because of the centrality of the security of Israel in American foreign policy, and the 
power of the Israeli lobby in the United States, the American administrations presented 
great concern about the Arab-Israeli conflict, and attempted to achieve a solution that 
would guarantee security, recognition and peace for Israel. 
The Carter administration was not an exception from this rule. Carter started his 
administration by launching an active role to revive the Middle East peace process 
through reviving the Geneva conference of 1973.85 
During Jimmy Carter's administration, there was a determination to reach a 
peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially between Egypt and Israel. 
With the visit to Jerusalem by President Anwar Al-Sadat, the door was opened to more 
American efforts. Thus Carter's mediation efforts played an important role in 
facilitating the dialogue between Anwar Al-Sadat and Menahem Begin. But Jimmy 
Carter, like other USA presidents, was still under Zionist pressure to get comprehensive 
peace apeemeht, which ensured Israeli security.86 Carter therefore tried to revive the 
Geneva conference process. He recognised Soviet pressure on Arabs would be needed, 
therefore he had to have a process which included the USSR. The USSR responded 
8 4Touval, (1982), Op. Cit, p. 286. 
8 5 Ibid., p. 286. 
Mansour, C , Beyond Alliance: Israel in U.S. Foreign Policy, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), p. 129. 
8 7 Ibid. 
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positively to the idea because it created the opportunity to cement its relation with its 
allies and advance its interests and allow for direct participation in the international 
efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli issue.88 
The joint Soviet-American statement opened a new, albeit brief, period of 
Soviet-American co-operation in the Middle East. The document indicates concessions 
by both sides from their previous positions on a Middle East peace settlement.89 
The plan was ruined by Israeli opposition. Israel did not want the USSR to be 
involved and preferred an USA mediated bilateral format. 9 0 American mediation under 
President Carter led to two agreements between Egypt and Israel in September 1978. In 
March 1979, in Washington, Al-Sadat and Begin signed a peace agreement between 
their two countries. 
The success of President Carter's mediation efforts to reach the Camp David 
agreements and the Egypt-Israel peace agreement was due partly to the personal 
involvement of the President himself, in addition to the previous agreements that 
achieved direct contacts between Israel and Egypt. 
Because of the deep differences between the parties' position, Carter demanded 
that the USSR enter a process of pressurizing the parties. The two superpowers issued a 
joint statement, calling for an international conference.91 The statement focused on the 
main elements that any statement on the subject would focus on, including the points 
that did not contradict with UNSC Resolutions nos. 242 and 383. The main points of the 
8 8 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 5631/1, 4/10/1977. 
Freedman, R., Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970, (New York: Praeger, 
1982), p. 304. 
9 0 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 5632/1, 5/10/1977. 
9 1 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 5630/1, 3/10/1977. 
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statement were the desire of reaching comprehensive settlement to the conflict through 
the participation of all parties, and the discussion of all issues including the Israeli 
withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, and resolving the Palestine 
problem. 
It was clear and evident that Israel was "highly suspicious of the Soviet Union, 
and had misgivings about the American efforts to bring the Soviets into the peace 
negotiations."92 Israel used its lobby in the USA as usual to advance its policies and 
advocate its positions. In the USA the powerful pro-Israeli lobby took action to oppose 
the USA-Soviet Communique.93 
In spite of the importance of the statement, and its timing, the dramatic visit of 
President Al-Sadat to Jerusalem diverted the attention another way. 
The Camp David Agreements 1978 
The various peace efforts made during the period from 1947 to 1977, especially those of 
Henry Kissinger following the 1973 war and resulting in the disengagement agreements, 
had had a profound effect in breaking the ice and allowing the opportunity at least for 
the parties to meet. However, the mediation efforts of Kissinger, together with the vital 
leadership factor, pushed the peace process in a whole new direction at least on the 
Egyptian-Israeli track.94 
^ Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 287. 
9 3 Quandt, W., The Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David, (Washington: The 
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In this context, President Anwar Al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem was an important 
transformation in the history of the conflict. It broke the psychological barrier as A l -
Sadat himself termed it, and was a fundamental factor in initiating a new peace 
process.95 
On September 17, 1978, and after series of extensive meetings in Camp David, under 
the supervision of President Carter, the Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, and 
Egyptian president Anwar Al-Sadat signed two "Framework agreements," which came 
to be known as the Camp David Agreements.96 
The first was called "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East" while the 
second was called "A Framework for Peace between Egypt and Israel." The first 
agreement suggested granting self-rule to the Palestinian population of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip for a five years transitional period. The second presented a framework 
for peace between Egypt and Israel. 
There was no doubt that what was achieved by President Carter was a success 
for USA foreign policy in the region, at least in that period of time. His success in 
bringing the parties together and applying economic and political pressure to achieve 
this result was not separate from previous efforts made by his predecessors, Nixon and 
F o r i 9 8 
It did not happen in a matter of days, but as a result of a long negotiation process, 
lasting for more than eighteen months. These agreements were a turning point in the 
9 5 Quandt, W., Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, (Washington: Brookings 
Institution, 1986). 
9 6 Quandt, (1988), Op. Cit., p. 359. 
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9 8 Quandt, (1986), Op. Cit., p. 320. 
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history of the region, and were seen by many -with the exception of the Rejection Front 
countries- at the time as laying the ground for more peace treaties between Israel and 
other Arab parties. However, these agreements were criticized heavily as they come 
short of or were unable to achieve a comprehensive settlement including resolution of 
the Palestinian question." One of those critics was Ismael Fahmi, the former Egyptian 
foreign minister who resigned in protest over Anwar Al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. He 
saw the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" as containing contradictions that led 
to different explanations with long-term effects. 1 0 0 
From an American point of view, the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-
Israeli peace treaty were a major achievement. The agreements allowed the USA to 
develop and expand its relations with both Egypt and Israel. Despite critics of the 
agreements pointing out that they failed to achieve a comprehensive peace that included 
all the parties, many thought that the agreements changed the course of events in the 
region, and created a real transfer in the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The Camp David agreements were a success for USA policy because they 
advanced USA influence over Egypt and Israel in the Middle East, effectively cutting 
the USSR out of the peace process and because they made Israel secure on at least one 
front. This "success" was flawed by the fact that the agreements did not represent a 
comprehensive peace. 
The implications of the Camp David agreements were numerous. First, taking 
Egypt out of the Arab-Israeli conflict reduced available choices for the other Arab 
parties of the conflict, especially the armed struggle choice (war). Without Egypt, 
launching a ful l - scale war against Israel would be very difficult i f not impossible. 
9 9 Quandt, W., Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
1967-76, (Berkely: University of California Press, 1977). 
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Second, achieving peace between Egypt and Israel would reduce gradually Israel's 
fears, and gives it the feeling of security and confidence, which encourage her to reach 
peace agreements with the other parties. Third, the agreements proved to many that 
negotiations under American auspices can lead to agreement, based on "the "land for 
peace" formula. 
As to their effect on the other tracks, the Camp David agreements avoided 
mentioning any Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian Occupied Territories (West 
Bank and Gaza Strip), any freeze on Israeli settlement activity, or any final Palestinian 
self-determination. What resulted from the agreements and taking Egypt out of the 
armed confrontation with Israel was the Israel's negotiating position vis-a-vis other 
Arab parties was strengthened. 
Analysing the Camp David agreements and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty leads 
to some important points. First, Israel achieved an important and long dreamed goal, 
that of dealing with the Arabs, not as a bloc, but as different parties. Dealing with every 
Arab country separately keeps Israel in a much stronger position, and allows her to play 
on all tracks. It also increases suspicion between the Arab parties. Second, the 
agreements did not become -as was hoped for- a framework for a comprehensive 
solution for the conflict, because it did not provide a solution for its core, the Palestinian 
issue. Third, the agreements helped in uniting those in the Arab world that opposed 
achieving peace with Israel. The Arab reaction to the agreements was the establishment 
of a rejectionist front. The front was composed of the Palestinians and the revolutionary 
countries such as Syria, Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, Algeria and Sudan. It was supported 
by the eastern bloc countries in what can be seen as a reflection of the superpowers 
relations.101 The USSR supported the rejectionist front because the Camp David 
1 0 1 For more on the Second Cold War, see, Halliday, F., The Making of the Second Cold 
War, (London: Verso, 1983). 
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Agreements had excluded it from playing the role (and influence) which it wished to 
play. This was the America advancing influence over Egypt through the agreements. 
Fourth, the strength Israel achieved as a result of the agreements became clear during 
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, as that would not have been as easy, i f Egypt 
had not been out of the conflict. Fifth, the Camp David agreements were an 
implementation of American strategy, or served that strategy of enhancing the USA role 
and influence in the Middle East region. The returning of Sinai Peninsula was important 
to win Egypt back to the American side, and including her in the strategic alliance as a 
strategic partner, without weakening Israel's position as a strategic ally. 
Thus, it is possible to view Camp David as a successful attempt, not to achieve a 
comprehensive, just and permanent peace but to throw out of the struggle context, the 
most important Arab party. The reason behind this can be seen as to fragment the Arab 
ranks, by weakening them to force them to negotiate peace agreements from a position 
of weakness. In other words, it was a process of preparing the ground for an American-
Israeli solution, and that's exactly what happened, as we will see in the coming 
chapters. 
Therefore, USA policy under Carter towards the peace process continued to be 
based on a desire for increased USA influence and promoting Israeli interests rather 
than a real solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Peace Efforts Between 1979-1988 
The European Declaration of 1980 
On many occasions, the Europeans expressed their views and positions on the resolution 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They expressed their preference for comprehensive 
settlement, instead of the step by step approach. 
At the European Economic Community conference held in Venice in 1980, the 
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nine member countries issued a declaration emphasizing that the UNSC Resolutions 
nos. 242 and 338 should govern any solution.1 0 2 They supported the rights of all 
countries in the region to security. They called also for justice for all peoples, 
recognition of the legitimate rights for the Palestinian people, recognized and secure 
borders for all states in the region; negotiations to include the PLO, no individual 
initiative to change Jerusalem's position and free passage to the holy places for every 
one. The declaration's importance stems from the fact that it expressed a common 
European opinion and that it was clear in its pointing out the legitimate Palestinian 
rights, especially their right for self-determination, and the participation of the PLO in 
any negotiations. Nonetheless, since Europe at this time played a relatively minor role 
in shaping the international system, the impact of the Declaration was muted. It was 
only later, when the USSR withdraw from superpower competition, that Europe's voice 
103 
began to attain real significance as an alternative to that of the USA. 
The Fahd Plan (August 1981) 
The Fahd plan was a set of principles for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict presented 
by the King of Saudi Arabia in August 1981. 1 0 4 It was based on the lowest common 
denominator, which the King believed could be acceptable to all Arab countries as well 
as the PLO. He explained that his country was thinking of an "alternative to Camp 
David" that would not require confrontation with Egypt and at the same time would 
present the Arabs' desire for peace. The proposals, which were published in August 
1 0 2 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 6447/1, 17/6/1980. 
1 0 3 See, Gordon, P., The Transatlantic Allies and the Changing Middle East, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998). 
1 0 4 Lukacs, (1992), Op. Cit., p. 55. 
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1981, presented a willingness to recognize the existence of the state of Israel in return 
for complete Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967, 
including East Jerusalem.105 
The Saudi plan, contained the following provisions: 1- The Israelis should 
withdraw from all Arab territories captured during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, including 
the Arab sector of Jerusalem. 2- A l l Israeli settlements established in the Occupied 
Territories since the 1967 war should be dismantled. 3- Freedom of religious practice 
should be guaranteed to the Moslem, Christian and Jewish faiths with particular 
reference to the Jerusalem holy places. 4- The rights of the Palestinian people should be 
recognized and acted upon, including the right to compensation for those who did not 
wish to return to their homeland. 5- An Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip should be followed by a transitional period not exceeding a few months 
during which these areas would be placed under UN supervision. 6- The transitional 
period should be followed by the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as 
its capital. 7- Affirming the right of all countries of the region to live in peace. 8-
Implementation of the above principles should be guaranteed by the United Nations or 
by some of its member states.106 
The fact that the plan was presented during the Cold War period influenced the 
international response to it. The response however, varied from one party to another. 
For the USA and Israel in particular, it was important and positive to see an Arab peace 
plan that explicitly or implicitly recognize Israel's right to exist in peace and security. 
The PLO saw some positive points in the plan and thus accepted it while Israel under a 
Likud government saw the plan as went so far in its demand of Israeli withdrawal and 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME6797,10/8/1981. 
Keesing's Record of World Events, p. 31912. 
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creating Palestinian State.107 
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The Reagan Plan (September 1982) 
In an article published in the Washington Post on August 15, 1979, during his election 
campaign, Reagan defined the key issue in the Middle East region as "the menacing 
Soviet threat." Only Israel stood as a reliable bulwark in the face of this danger. Inter-
Arab quarrels, it was implied, were more dangerous than the Arab-Israeli conflict. 1 0 8 
Let's not delude ourselves. The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going 
on. I f they were not engaged in this game of dominoes, there would not be any hot 
spots in the world. 1 0 9 
Reagan's conviction that the Soviet Union was an "evil empire" that needed to be 
contained at all costs was that subsequently to shape his policies towards regional 
conflicts as much as direct USA-USSR relations. As William Quandt pointed out, it is 
worth noting that "Reagan's Secretary of State, Alexander Haig shared the President's 
view that the Middle East should be viewed primarily through the prism of the US-
Soviet rivalry." 1 1 0 
Early in the Reagan administration, Haig began to speak of the need to try to 
forge a "strategic consensus" among the pro-westem regimes in the Middle 
East...trying to focus the attention of "our friends" in the region on the Soviet threat, 
while simultaneously attempting to push parochial local conflicts to the back burner.111 
1 0 7 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME6797/A/4, 10/8/1981. 
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On September 1, 1982, Ronald Reagan gave his first and only major speech on the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The core of the initiative was still Camp David, but with important 
substantive additions.1 1 2 The USA President declared new American proposals to 
achieve an overall settlement in the Middle East.113 In his televised speech, in which he 
explained his administration's plan to achieve a "just and lasting peace in the Middle 
East" Reagan affirmed that the story of the search for peace in the Middle East was a 
tragedy of missed opportunities. He thought that following the Lebanese crisis, there 
was a chance to reach a wider settlement. His plan was rather different from Camp 
David framework, however. It emphasized the Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied 
Territories, and proposed that the final status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip should be 
a political entity connected with Jordan. The plan found some acceptance within some 
Arab leaders, especially King Hussien, but was rejected immediately by the Israeli 
Likud government, as a diversion from the Camp David agreements signed on 1978.114 
The Fez Plan (September 1982) 
Within days of the Reagan initiative, the Arab states held a summit meeting on 6 
September 1982 in Fez, Morocco and adopted a Saudi counter proposal that come to be 
known as the Fez plan. 1 1 5 At the end of its discussions, the conference called for 
settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, based on the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state, together with guarantees from the United Nations Security Council to 
all the states of the region. 
1 1 2 Ibid., p. 365. 
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The plan called for an Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied by Israel 
in 1967 including East Jerusalem. It called also for the dismantle of settlements 
established by Israel after 1967, affirmation of the rights of the Palestinian people to self 
determination, the placement of the Occupied Territories under United Nations 
protection for a short period, and the establishment of a Palestinian State. The plan was 
accepted by the Palestinians but rejected by Israel. Although the plan was discussed by 
some Arab leaders with the five permanent states member of the Security Council, the 
plan did not got a sufficient support, thus was abandoned.116 
In July 1984 the USSR proposed an international conference. Israel's objections 
to the Soviet proposal were not only that the USSR had no diplomatic relations with it 
and therefore could not be a mediator, but also that peace was best achieved in direct 
talks. 1 1 7 
The reasoning behind Israel's objection to an international Middle East 
conference was simple. Firstly, Israeli officials said, it is inconceivable that a country, 
which has no diplomatic ties with one of the sides to the conflict, should see itself in the 
role of mediator. Israel's second objection was that peace would best be made in direct 
118 
negotiations between the parties rather than at big international gatherings. 
The Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement (February 1985) 
In response to the Reagan plan, Jordan and the PLO expressed their intention to 
establish a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation after a ful l Israeli withdrawal from the 
1 , 6 Tessler, M. , A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, (Bloomington: Indiana 
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Occupied Territories, and expressed their wish for negotiations through a joint 
delegation to an international peace conference.119 
Israel rejected this plan which called for land for peace and self-determination 
for the Palestinians.120 Also the USA was not willing to meet with a Palestinian 
representative because the PLO did not recognize the Security Council Resolutions nos. 
242 and 338. It is important to notice the following points: First, this was a period 
shaped by the new USA president's (Reagan's) particular understanding of the Cold 
War and the need to prevent the spread of communism at all costs. Second, this meant 
USA policy was prepared to be more flexible in dealing with the Arabs, but ultimately 
not at Israel's expense. Third, it all led to a flurry of new peace initiatives but the basic 
conditions, which prevented resolution of the conflict, remained intact. 
Peace Efforts Between 1988-1991 
The Shultz Plan (March 1988) 
The actions of the USA during the 1980s leave no doubt that the chief goal of its 
military and political domination in the region was the preservation of its position, 
which, on the whole, it saw in terms of USA-Soviet confrontation. The USA attempted 
to minimize the role of the Soviet Union in regional affairs and perhaps even to oust it 
from the Middle East.121 
The Shultz Plan was an important involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace making 
1 1 9 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts ME 7874 / A/ 4, 13/2/1985. See also Fest, 
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process.122 The USA Secretary of State George Shultz explained the general aims of 
comprehensive peace through direct bilateral negotiations based on UNSCR nos. 242 
and 338. The essential difference in his plan was that negotiations on final settlement 
would not depend on agreement on interim status. Some points of his plan were 
achieving comprehensive peace for all states in the region and the legitimate rights for 
the Palestinian people. Also the convening of an international conference as a forum for 
negotiations. The Palestinians rejected the plan, while the Israelis were divided. The 
plan was accepted by Shimon Peres but rejected by Yitzhak Shamir. 
For the Palestinians, despite Arafat's own growing conviction that a negotiated 
peace was now the only route to statehood, the American proposals still emanated from 
an essentially pro-Zionist American administration. They contained no guarantees for 
Palestinian statehood and failed to satisfactorily address critical issues such as the return 
of Palestinian refugees or the status of Jerusalem. With the Intifada now underway in 
the Occupied Territories, Arafat needed any peace negotiations to address at least some 
of the concerns of the rioting youths in Palestine. The Israelis were meanwhile divided 
as the nationalist right-wing elements of the coalition government were being 
increasingly radicalized through pressure from the extreme right settler groups. 
Shamir's own relationship with the USA was always uncomfortable, with successive 
American administrations preferring to do business with the pro-peace Labour party and 
particularly with Peres himself and later Rabin. Clearly the USA-Israeli patron-client 
relationship was not immune to tensions arising from domestic Israeli political debate as 
well as personalities. 
It should be noted, however, that in this instance the Soviet Union was not an 
obstacle to the proposals, principally because the Gorbacev leadership was preoccupied 
with domestic reform within an economy under pressure and as the military was 
1 2 2 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 0111/1, 28/3/1988. 
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suffering reverses in Afghanistan. The Cold War was already winding down with the 
Soviet inability to engage in confrontational behaviour and its readiness to extend 
detente to new dimensions. In this period of transformation in international relations, 
regional players were to be the obstacles to peace initiatives rather than the 
superpowers. In the following plans it becomes clear that the end of the 1980s saw 
problems in the USA-Israeli patron-client relationship (which resulted from right-wing 
radicalisation in Israel and its role in government) dominating the nature of peace 
proposals or Israeli rejection of them. 
The Shamir Plan (May 1989) 
In this context, the Shamir Peace Plan of 1989 was more a tactic to delay real peace than 
a genuine effort towards it. During a meeting with President Bush in Washington on 6 
April 1989, the Israeli Prime Minister clarified his four points plan. His proposals made 
official on May 1989 were based basically on conducting elections in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, to facilitate the formulation of a non-PLO Palestinian delegation to 
participate in the negotiations on "interim settlement" after a "Self-government 
administration" might be established. The "interim period" would be serving as an 
essential test of co-operation and co-existence" and would be followed by negotiations 
on "the final settlement" in which Israel would be prepared to discuss "any options" 
presented. 
The Palestinians rejected the plan. 1 2 3 They saw it as an Israeli manoeuvre without 
substance. Their plan was met with other plans from PLO, Egypt and the United States. 
The PLO presented its plan for elections. Egypt presented what to be known as 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 04601, 18/5/1989. 
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Mubarak plan and the new American formula presented by its Secretary of State James 
Baker. Al l of these plans addressed the issue of elections presented in the Shamir plan. 
The P L O Election Plan (May 1989) 
According to Ziva Flamhaft, an unprecedented development that could have marked a 
new chapter in Middle East diplomacy did occur at the Arab summit in Algiers on June 
7-9, 1988. During the summit a senior PLO official and a personal aide to Yaseer 
Arafat, Bassam Abu Sharif submitted a statement entitled "PLO View: Prospect of a 
Palestinian-Israeli Settlement." The statement called upon the PLO and Israel to attend 
UN-sponsored negotiations for a "two-state solution." The statement represented a 
dramatic shift in PLO politics. It is worth mentioning here that as early as the twelfth 
Palestine National Council in June 1974, the PLO abandoned the goal of creating a 
democratic secular state in all of Palestine, calling instead for the creation of "a 
Palestinian national authority in any Palestinian areas liberated from Israeli control". 1 2 4 
In response to the Shamir plan, the PLO presented through Bassam Abu Sharif, 
Arafat's special advisor, a program composed of six points. The PLO support of the 
election in the occupied territories; the two state solution; the withdrawal of the Israeli 
forces and its replacement with international forces; international observation of the 
election and the protection of the electorate; provisional stage under international 
auspices under which the legislative body wil l select a negotiation team; an international 
conference based on U N Resolutions 242 and 338 to discuss all issues.125 
1 2 4 Flamhaft, (1996), Op. Cit. 
1 2 5 Ibid. 
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The Baker Initiative (May 1989) 
On 22 May 1989, James Baker, the American Secretary of State spoke to the AIPAC, 
the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee in Washington DC. He shed light on the 
main points of the American position on Arab-Israeli conflict and the ways to resolve it. 
This initiative affirmed once again the points that were made by previous American 
administrations. Of these points, that the permanent settlement can be achieved through 
negotiations based on the Security Council resolutions nos. 242 and 338 and land for 
peace formula, recognition and peace for Israel and the political rights for the 
Palestinians. Also an international conference as a start for direct negotiations, self 
government for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and free elections for the 
inhabitants of the Occupied Territories. Israel was to relinquish the idea of Greater 
Israel and the Arabs to remove the boycott imposed on Israel, the Palestinians to 
renounce violence, and amend their covenant and the Soviet Union to restore its 
relations with Israel and help in reaching a peace settlement.126 
The plan was accepted by the Palestinians, but the right wing Israeli government 
rejected it, fearing that its acceptance would challenge its claim of sovereignty over 
Jerusalem and would also led to direct negotiations with PLO. This refusal led to the fall 
of the national unity government. 
The Mubarak Plan (September 1989) 
In an attempt to contribute in advancing the Middle East peace process, and in order to 
play an active role in the politics of the region as a peace mediator, as the only Arab 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 0466 A/8, 22/5/1989. 
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country at the time to have relations with Israel, President Mubarak of Egypt presented 
a ten-points plan, to be known as Mubarak's plan. 1 2 7 
In addition to regional and international reasons, Egypt has had its domestic 
reasons behind presenting the initiative, as the advancement of the peace process 
provide the regime with stability and legitimacy which face pressure from the radical 
groups opposing the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. 
The main points of this plan which, was in someway a response to the Shamir 
plan, were elections in the Palestinian territories to choose a delegation to negotiate with 
Israel, international supervision for the election process and an Israeli commitment to 
recognize its results. Also an Israeli commitment that the elections and negotiations 
would not lead only to self government but to final settlement implying the Security 
Council resolutions nos. 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace. 
The United States announced its willingness to discuss the plan. The PLO 
considered it as good and comprehensive while Shimon Peres said that he saw "nothing 
wrong" in the initiative. "The problem is that Israel can not accept the ten points as they 
The Baker Plan (October 1989) 
An additional peace attempt occurred when details were released on 10 October, 1989 
of a series of unofficial proposals put forward by USA Secretary of State James Baker, 
which became Known as "Baker's Five Points"1 2 9 composed of: 1- The USA 
understands that because Egypt and Israel have been working hard on the peace process 
1 2 7 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 05591,12/9/1989. 
1 2 8 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 0595 i 12/9/1989. 
1 2 9 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 05871,14/10/1989. 
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there is agreement that an Israeli delegation wil l conduct a dialogue with a Palestinian 
delegation in Cairo. 2- The USA understands that Egypt can not substitute itself for the 
Palestinians and Egypt will consult with the Palestinians on all aspects of that dialogue. 
Egypt wil l also consult with Israel and the USA. 3- The USA understands that Israel 
will attend the dialogue only after a satisfactory list of Palestinians has been worked out. 
Israel wi l l also consult with Egypt and the USA. 4- The USA understands that the 
government of Israel will come to the dialogue on the basis of the Israeli government's 
May 14 initiative [The Shamir plan]. The USA further understands that the Palestinians 
will come to the dialogue prepared to discuss elections and negotiations in accordance 
with the Israeli initiative. The USA understands, therefore, that the Palestinians wi l l be 
free to raise issues that relate to their opinion on how to make elections and negotiations 
succeed. 5- In order to facilitate the process, the USA proposed that the Foreign 
Ministers of Israel, Egypt and the USA meet in Washington within two weeks. Unlike 
the Reagan plan, which was motivated by the aftermath of the Lebanon war, or the 
Shultz plan, which was motivated by the Intifada, the Baker plan was the result of 
various diplomatic developments, beginning with the PLO's recognition of Israel and 
ending with Mubarak's peace plan. Thus Baker's peace proposals were introduced 
under international or regional conditions more favourable than the conditions that 
existed when either the Reagan or Shultz initiatives were launched.130 
Shimon Peres said that he believed Israel should respond favourably to Baker's 
proposals, while the PLO rejected the plan which "constitutes U.S. support for the 
Israeli position". 1 3 1 
The Shultz plan, the Shamir plan, the PLO plan, the Baker initiative and the 
Mubarak plan collectively happened at the end of 1980s. The new Soviet openness 
1 3 0Flamhaft, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 73. 
1 3 1 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 0585 i 12/10/1989. 
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policy created an atmosphere of change. The USA and the parties felt that the time was 
suitable for presenting new initiatives. The immigration of the Soviet Jews created a 
crisis atmosphere and combined with the Palestinian Intifada brought the conflict to a 
new stage that needed great attention especially from the USA. 
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I tried to explain the peace efforts within the context of the Cold War Old 
World Order. The peace efforts during that period were constrained by the conditions of 
the superpower rivalry. The rules of the game of the bipolar international system 
allowed both superpowers and their client states to play in a more favourable 
atmosphere. Knowing that they would not be forced to accept any initiative they did not 
see suitable and confident of the ability of their patrons to defend their decisions, the 
parties were able to resist compromise and wait for more suitable circumstances. 
Summarizing the whole argument I think of the importance of mentioning some points: 
1. Since the very beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict, even before the state of Israel 
was established, there have been numerous efforts to find a peaceful/diplomatic 
resolution. The great powers (UK and France) and later the superpowers (USA and 
USSR) have consistently viewed such a resolution to be desirable. 
2. During the Cold War era, the superpowers' own struggle for influence in the Middle 
East prevented them from taking advantage of opportunities to 'make' peace; first, 
because USA support of Israel led the USSR to actually support Arab states. The 
establishment of patron-client relations prevented either superpower from being able 
to act as impartial mediator. Instead the interests of the superpowers became 
complicated by their desire to see their own clients "win"; Second, both 
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superpowers came to view the Arab-Israeli conflict not on the basis of its own 
merits but in terms of how it reflected their own relations vis-a-vis- one another. 
3. Because of the interests of the superpowers, the parties were unable to really deal 
with each other directly, in a way isolated from larger events. Other factors always 
had to be taken into consideration in peace negotiations. Equally the superpowers 
could use their influence to encourage their client states to resist making peace on 
terms which might adversely affect the superpowers' own interests. Soviet support 
for the Arab states rejecting the Camp David agreements was a clear example. 
4. The only peace agreement which was made involved two states which both wanted 
to be USA clients. This did signify a recognition by Egypt of a change in the 
international balance of power in favour of the United States, but even so Egypt 
could only get peace by abandoning the core issue of the conflict - Palestinian 
rights. 
Therefore, the bipolar Cold War Old World Order was not conducive to the 
achievement of a just and lasting peace, as it was characterized by super-power self 
interest and patron-client relations that actually acted to prevent peace, despite a 
common interest in avoiding wars into which they might be drawn. Clearly the status of 
the peace process at any one time was dependent upon the international (superpower) 
balance of power and the resulting balance of power within the region. This balance of 
power determined the way in which regional states sought to advance their own national 
interests. When those interests required peace, as in the case of Egypt in the 1970s, 
action had to be taken to alter the regional balance of power (expelling the Soviet 
advisors and initiating a war to draw the United States back into the negotiations). 
Clearly states were operating from realist perspectives, with the rules of the Cold war 
determining their engagement (or not) in the peace process. By the end of the 1980s, the 
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alteration in the status and capacity of the Soviet Union was already leaving its mark < 
the behaviour of regional states and on the dynamics of the peace process. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE MADRID PEACE PROCESS 
The Madrid conference is set up in such a way as to make substantive progress 
extremely unlikely. Israel wi l l get its way on matters of procedure. After a largely 
ceremonial opening session, separate negotiations between Israel and the 
surrounding states wil l take place. But Shamir has reassured his constituency over 
and over again that there wi l l be no compromise on the Golan Heights - and no 
compromise that would grant sovereignty or national self-determination to the 
Palestinian people . . . [They would get "limited autonomy" which] would allow 
Palestinians control over municipal functions such as fire and police services, 
garbage collection and street repair. Shamir's plan would not allow Palestinians' 
control over land and water resources, would not protect them from the increasing 
expropriations of land on behalf of Israeli settlers ... 
(Michael Lermer) 
Introduction 
The Middle East was to be the first test theatre for the end of the 'Old' Cold War Order 
and the emergence of the American-led New World Order. The 'Desert Shield' and 
'Desert Storm' that resulted in largely destroying Iraq's military capabilities that were 
viewed by USA as a potential challenge to its handling of Arab-Israeli issue contributed 
greatly in changing the situation in the Middle East. 
The unprecedented deep division in the Arab world over the Kuwait crisis, the 
weak position of the Palestinian side, and the United States' hegemonic position in the 
region made it a suitable opportunity for getting the Arabs to accept, recognise and 
integrate Israel in the Middle East. The USA's diplomacy wasted no time in seizing the 
opportunity created by the previously explained international and regional changes to 
advance its plans and designs for the region. Central among those plans and designs was 
1 Quoted from: Said, E., The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian 
Self-determination 1969-1994, (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 172. 
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the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict within a comprehensive settlement through 
direct negotiations. The convening of the Madrid peace conference in October 1991 was 
the starting point for what was to be known as the Madrid peace process. That process 
started in Madrid but continued in Washington and other places elsewhere in the world. 
In this chapter I wi l l discuss the impact of the New World Order on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict embodied in the holding of the Madrid conference and the start of the Madrid 
peace process. 
First, I wil l try to investigate the background to the Madrid conference and the 
circumstances in which the parties to the conflict were willing or rather obliged to 
participate in the conference. In this section I wil l demonstrate how the new realities of 
the New World Order were the real reason behind the acceptance of the parties to attend 
the conference. 
Second, I wil l follow the United States' diplomatic moves and proposals, 
including Secretary of State James Baker's marathon trips to the Middle East capitals, to 
convince the leaders of the parties to attend the conference. 
Third, I wi l l examine in detail the eleven rounds of Washington bilateral 
negotiations. I will also shed some lights on the multilateral negotiations held in other 
places such as Moscow, Tokyo and Ottawa. 
I wil l argue that the implications of the sea changes in the international system 
and the realities of the New World Order on the Middle East were profound; that the 
convening of a peace conference with the participation of Israel and all Arab parties was 
not possible without the new regional and international situation created by the end of 
2 
the Cold War, the second Gulf War and the realities of the New World Order. 
2 See Bickerton, I and Klausner, C , A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
(London: Prentice-Hall, 1998), p. 255. 
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Background to Madrid Conference 
It is my argument that the Madrid peace conference became possible only after the 
dramatic changes on both regional and international levels. The parties to the conflict 
found themselves in a position where there were no alternatives other than accepting the 
invitation made by the United States and the Soviet Union to attend a peace conference. 
The end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf War created as I mentioned in chapter 
two a new atmosphere, in which the old international rules of the game no longer 
existed. In this section I will clarify the background of the situation in the Middle East 
region following the important changes in both regional and international levels and in 
some cases in the local or domestic level as well. 
International Level 
On the international level as I emphasised throughout my previous chapters, there 
were many important changes that made our world different from what was going on a 
few years ago. To begin with, there is no doubt that Gorbachev's reform policies greatly 
weakened the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that those policies were intended to 
improve its economic and political position, the result was to the contrary. The Soviet 
Union's military defeat in Afghanistan and its subsequent total collapse and 
disintegration, the collapse of the communist bloc and East European regimes and the 
end of the Warsaw pact all had a radical and strong impact on different regions of the 
world and on the international system and world politics. On the Middle East in 
particular the impact was bigger and much more crucial, and that was due to the fact 
that the area was highly affected and penetrated throughout the Cold War order and 
competition between the two poles. For example, Gorbacev informed Syrian President 
Assad that the Soviet Union was no longer willing or able to provide military support 
that would give Syria strategic parity with Israel. Instead it would provide sufficient 
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weapons for a defence capability but even those would have to be paid for in hard 
currency. This kind of alteration in the Soviet's perception of their role as patron 
inevitably altered the regional balance of power (in this case in Israel's favour) and 
impelled the regional actors to reassess their own behaviour in the light of effective 
"new rules". Again in this instance, the result was to be seen in the Syrian-American 
alliance during the 1990/91 Gulf War and in Lebanon. 
That these changes at the international level were reflected so directly in the 
Middle East (and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular) was due to the strong link of the 
conflicting parties with the international players and the international game during the 
Cold War. 
The fact that some parties lost their strategic ally in an unexpected way while 
other parties found their strategic ally and protector as the only dominant superpower 
was unprecedented. That had a long-term decisive effect that upset many balances and 
forced the parties to comprehensively review their strategies, tactics and plans to adjust 
themselves to the new changes. It also encouraged the only world superpower to revive 
its effort to achieve peace in the region. Ben D. Mor, for example wrote on that respect 
that: 
The Middle East peace negotiations began in late 1991, against the background of 
changing international and regional realities shaped by the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1989-90 and the Gulf War of early 1991. The latter two events had a 
major impact on the international politics of the Middle East. The Soviet 
withdrawal from the region (a process that had begun before its collapse) removed 
a long-time superpower patron from the scene, producing a realignment of Middle 
East coalitions. The implications of this structural transformation became clearly 
evident during the 1990 Gulf crisis, when the U.S. assumed a leading role in 
organising an unlikely coalition, composed of western powers alongside 
conservative and radical Arab regimes, to thwart Saddam Hussein's attempt at a 
fait accompli in Kuwait. The success of the military campaign, as well as the 
ability of the Bush administration to secure Israel restraint during the Iraqi Scud-
missile attacks, provided further evidence of America's newly acquired and 
uncontested position of influence in the region. Thus, following the war, the U.S. 
capitalised on its hegemonic status and convened the Madrid peace conference in 
October-November 1991.The peace process can be interpreted not as reflecting a 
fundamental change in preferences for mechanisms of conflict management, but 
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as a shift of strategy - the product of constraints imposed by a hegemonic power -
within a structure of coercion. 
The end of the Cold War paved the way for a more co-operative approach between the 
4 
USA, the remaining superpower, and Russia, the heir of the previous Soviet Empire. 
That co-operation became clear during the Kuwait crisis and the Second Gulf War. The 
Soviet Union did not support Iraq despite the friendship agreement signed between the 
two countries in 1979. Also it did not try to veto UNSC Resolutions concerning the 
crisis. In fact the Soviet Union voted with the majority in the United Nations and 
supported the USA-led coalition against Saddam Hussein.5 Bickerton and Klausner 
pointed out in their book entitled, A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, that: 
The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Gulf War 
dramatically altered the dynamics of superpower rivalry in the region. While the 
United States emerged as the one important superpower on the world stage, the 
new Russian State was provided with opportunity to play a different role in the 
post-Gulf War discussions about regional stability in the Middle East and a 
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Russians would achieve recognition of 
their continued importance on the world stage and their interest in the Middle East 
by being a co-sponsor, along with the United States, of the Madrid Peace 
Conference. 
The transformation of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the USA from one 
of competition to one of co-operation and partnership contributed in changing attitudes 
3 Mor, B., "The Middle East Peace Process and Regional Security" in Z. Maoz, 
Regional Security in the Middle East, Past, Present and Future, (London: Frank Cass, 
1997), p. 184. 
4 Hinnebusch, R. and Drysdale, A., Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), p. 215. 
5 Bickerton and Klausner, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 255. 
6 Ibid., p. 240. 
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7 
and strategies of many parties in the region and paved the way to a new thinking. 
During a trip to the Middle East where he visited Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt in 1989, 
the Soviet Foreign Minister, Edward A. Shevardnadze suggested that the superpowers 
abandon their policy of trying to exclude one another from the region "in favour of 
g 
constructive co-operation for the sake of peace and tranquillity." 
The joint sponsorship of the Madrid peace conference later on was evidence of 
this new phenomenon. As Raymond Hinnebusch explained "With the end of the Cold 
War, the United States has no good reason to exclude the Soviet Union from the peace 
9 
process and excellent reasons to give it a stake in its success." 
The USA encouraged the new Soviet approach of co-operation and tried to use it 
to advance its policy in the Middle East. Bringing the Soviet Union in and engaging it 
was better than excluding it from the area. In his opening speech to the Madrid 
conference President Bush said: "Who in the early 1960s would have believed that the 
Cold War would come to a peaceful end, replaced by co-operation - exemplified by the 
fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are here today - not as rivals, but as 
partners." He added "President Gorbachev and his senior associates have demonstrated 
their intent to engage the Soviet Union as a force for positive change in the Middle East. 
10 
This sends a powerful signal to all those who long for peace." 
7 King Hussain of Jordan in his speech to the General National Congress on 12 October 
1991 mentioned some of the factors, events and developments that had brought about 
the renewal of efforts to arrive at a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
8 Hinnebusch and Drysdale, (1991), Op. Ci t , p. 162. 
9 Ibid., p. 215. 
1 0 Abdul Hadi, M., Documents on Palestine, volume II: From the Negotiations in 
Madrid to the Post-Hebron Agreement Period, (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997), pp. 11-12. 
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Gorbachev also pointed to the USA-Soviet co-operation and the change in the 
international system, as the main force behind the progress towards peace in the Middle 
East. In his opening speech to the Madrid conference he pointed out that: 
It was the well of history that, without an improvement and then a radical change 
in Soviet-U.S. relations, we would never have witnessed the profound qualitative 
changes in the world that now make it possible to speak in terms of an entirely 
new age, an age of peace in world history. Movement in that direction has begun, 
and it is only in this context that we can understand the fact that a tangible hope 
has emerged for an Arab-Israeli settlement. 
The reality behind the altered Soviet (and later Russian) position was that the Middle 
East was no longer a principal arena for the development of Soviet interests. Their 
attention had turned to domestic affairs, primarily the deteriorating economic situation 
at home. The key to improving matters as far as Gorbacev was concerned lay in a 
reduction of defence expenditures, a withdrawal from Afghanistan and Western 
financial assistance, none of which would be possible without a more co-operative 
relationship with the United States. A more conciliatory position on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict was a small price to pay, especially since the Arab states, with their own 
economic troubles, were decreasingly inclined to turn to socialist economic alternatives 
or anti-imperialist rhetoric for solutions. However, the Soviet Union did not entirely 
abandon its friends or its own interests in the region. It relocated its own diplomacy into 
the United Nations, where it retained its UN Security Council veto so that America was 
unable to act entirely autonomously within the region. It can be argued that Gorbacev's 
personality and leadership were key factors in this process, but at the end of the day the 
policies pursued advanced the Soviet (and later Russian) national interests in line with 
realist behaviour. The old patron-client relationships of the Cold War no longer served 
Soviet interests and, as the Soviet Union's commitment to them waned, so the regional 
1 1 Ibid., p. 13. 
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clients were forced to readjust their own perceptions of the balance of power and their 
interests within it. 
Regional Level 
The Middle East regional system had witnessed a great deal of change over the 
last three decades. As I have mentioned in the previous chapters, the interaction 
between both the international and the regional systems can not be clearer anywhere 
more than it is in the Middle East. The patron-client relationship was one of the main 
features of Middle Eastern international relations. According to Yaacov Bar-Siman-
Tov, three types of constraints that a local state confronts are: "(1) those of patron, (2) 
those of the rival patron, and (3) those of the rival client. These constraints create 
bargaining dilemmas for a local state."'2 
Patron constraints determine a local state's decisions and actions to a greater 
degree than do rival patron constraints. Although rival patron constraints are more 
threatening militarily, political constraints by the patron are more crucial in 
shaping client behaviour. 
This is true in the cases of Israel, Egypt, PLO, Lebanon and Syria. American 
pressure (loan guarantees as an example) succeeded in bringing Israel to line, while 
Soviet hints to Syria to pursue a peaceful as against a military option were one of the 
reasons behind its policy of seeking a diplomatic solution to its conflict with Israel. 
Important events can explain to what extent the regional system was penetrated 
and affected by changes on the international system. Although the October war brought 
a psychological victory for the Arab side, the Camp David agreements divided the Arab 
12 
Bar-Siman-Tov, Y., Israel, The Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East, (New 
York: Praeger, 1987), p. 25. 
1 3 Ibid., p. 25. 
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world. With Egypt at peace with Israel, the war option for the Arabs became unrealistic. 
Israel was able to invade Lebanon and evacuate the PLO from Beirut. The Iran-Iraq war 
also contributed in deepening the division between Arab countries, at a huge cost in 
lives and resources. The 1991 Gulf crisis of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the 
subsequent Gulf War also played an unprecedented role in shaping the Middle East 
region and reordering its regional system. 
The invasion and occupation by one Arab major country of a smaller sister 
country destroyed much of the meaning of Arab solidarity. The Arab requirement for 
foreign, non-Arab and non-Islamic western help in countering an 'Arab and Islamic 
aggression' broke a long-held belief in an Arab and Islamic united stand against any 
foreign intervention. The Arab failure to resolve the crisis within their institutions (such 
as the Arab League) opened the door for outside intervention. The West, however, was 
14 
blamed -by many Arabs- for blocking any Arab success in finding Arab solution. The 
Iraqi action of firing Scud missiles on Israel and its attempt to link the crisis with the 
Israeli occupation of Palestine moved the Arab streets and gained Saddam Hussein 
15 
popularity among Arab masses without necessarily accepting his invasion of Kuwait. 
The Kuwaiti and Gulf States' reaction towards that popular support for Saddam was 
very negative. Leaders like King Hussein and Yasser Arafat who tried to follow the 
public opinion in their own countries were seen as siding with the Iraqi aggression and 
16 
thus were liable for political and financial punishment. 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 0998 A/6,16/2/1991. 
1 5 Coban, H., "Israel and the Palestinians, from Madrid to Oslo and beyond," in R, 
Freedman., Israel under Rabin, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 258. 
1 6 Ibid. 
THE MADRID PEACE PROCESS 205 
The rejection by Arab countries of the Iraqi demand that the Iraqi withdrawal 
from Kuwait be linked with a similar Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories 
angered the Palestinians and Arab masses in many parts of the Arab and Islamic 
17 
worlds. The crisis created a great confusion among Arab peoples and regimes and 
18 
resulted in unprecedented division. On the other hand the Israeli 'restraint' towards the 
Iraqi Scud missiles, that created a shock in the Israeli society, gave it some leverage 
19 
with the United States and the European Community. It was reminded however that 
only peace and reconciliation with its neighbours and not more controlled land could 
bring it security. 
The shock that resulted from these dramatic developments encouraged the 
United States to revive its efforts regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hanan Ashrawi, 
the Palestinian negotiator and spokeswomen for the Palestinian delegation to Madrid 
observed that: 
President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker decided to take 
advantage of this collective shock to reorder the region in a way that would 
safeguard American interests (particularly the oil) and the security of its allies 
(mainly Israel). The Palestinians, as the major cause of instability in the region, 
had to be brought in, and the Palestinian question -the major Arab grievance- had 
20 
to be resolved somehow. Thus began the Madrid peace process. 
The shock was great, the rif t was deep and the material, financial, economic and 
environmental damage was beyond imagination and unprecedented. Thus the regional 
balance was disrupted in an unprecedented manner, in a way that encouraged a 
1 7 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 0959, A8, 1/1/1991. 
1 8 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 0982, A/7, 29/1/1991. 
1 9 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 1007 i (b), 27/2/1991. 
20 • 
Ashrawi, H., This Side of Peace: A Personal Account, (London: Simon & Schuster, 
1995), p. 11. 
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redrawing of the map of the region, which can be seen through the no-fly zones in 
northern and southern Iraq as one example only. 
The Arab side was the big loser from the changes on the international and 
regional levels, especially the Palestinian side. Both Syria and the PLO had lost out 
from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist block, their major ally and 
source of political, economic and military support. As Pedro Ramet pointed out: 
Soviet-Syrian relations have become ever closer during the period of Asad's rule. 
They were closer in 1975 than they had been in 1970, closer still in 1980, and 
much closer by 1984, with the Soviets by then routinely delivering top-of-the-line 
equipment to Syria before deployment elsewhere outside the USSR. Since Syria 
has no domestic arms industry, it counts heavily on the USSR for arms 
transfusion, which, in the 30-year period, 1954-1984, amounted to a total market 
value of $13.8 billion. By 1978, there were more Soviet and East European 
21 
military advisers in Syria than in any other less developed country. 
That policy became clear when the Soviet leadership informed Syria officially that it 
would not help her to achieve the strategic parity with Israel. According to Hinnebusch 
and Drysdale, Gorbachev has told Syria that "Israel's interests must be taken into 
account" and that "the Soviet Union would not support any attempt to reclaim the Golan 
22 
Heights through military action." It is important to note here that, although Syria did 
lose out because of the collapse of the USSR, it used the Gulf War to recoup some of 
these losses to realign itself with the USA and win financial aid from the Gulf. 
Meanwhile what made the Palestinian position worse was the PLO's solidarity 
with Iraq and its opposition to the international intervention, which angered the USA, 
Western major powers and the European Community. Following a European meeting, 
Douglas Hurd, Britain's foreign secretary said, "The PLO have done themselves very 
2 1 Ramet, P., The Soviet-Syrian Relationship since 1955, (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1990), p. 124. 
2 2 Hinnebusch and Drysdale, (1991), Op. Cit., p. 215. 
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considerable harm under the present leadership in backing the aggression of Saddam 
Hussein." Portugal's foreign minister said that Yasser Arafat had put the PLO in the 
23 
loser's corner. 
Thus the PLO came under great political and financial pressures. The cutting o f f of the 
great financial support from the oil producing countries in the Gulf, and the expulsion of 
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from these countries had a strong effect. The 
GCC countries were an important source of the hard currency in support of the PLO and 
the Palestinians of the Occupied Territories, which from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait alone 
exceeded, according to Cheryl Rubenberg, US $100 million per year. The cuts led to a 
financial crisis, followed by an internal crisis within the PLO. In the aftermath of the 
Gulf war, no actors were -as Cheryl A. Rubenberg pointed out- in a weaker or more 
vulnerable position than the Palestinians. 
They lost the financial support of their major Arab states backers and the political 
support of a significant number of other states, their bargaining power was 
markedly diminished, the Intifada had come to a virtual halt, their leadership was 
in crisis, and a new exodus of Palestinians had begun -this time from Kuwait-
24 
addmg another painful chapter to the Palestinian tragedy. 
By August 1992, Kuwait had expelled all but 20,000 of the 450,000 Palestinians who 
had resided in that country prior to the Gulf war. This resulted in the loss of some US 
Mortimer, J., "Europe and the PLO: Backing the Wrong Horse," The Middle East, 
April, 1991, p. 16. 
2 4 Rubenberg, C , "The Gulf War, the Palestinians, and the New World Order," in T. 
Ismael, (ed.) The Gulf War and the New World Order, (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 1994), p. 317. 
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25 
$100 million dollars in annual contributions to the Occupied Territories. Arafat's 
estimation however was 1.5 billion dollars.2 6 
Arafat thought, however, that the PLO lost from an economic point of view, but gained 
politically from the Kuwait crisis. He noted that: 
From the political viewpoint, we gained. Now, everyone has realised that the 
Palestinian problem must be solved. The link initiated by Saddam Hussein is 
continuing. As it is, Baker is coming to the region with plans. President Bush 
officially announced to Congress that something has to be done for the Palestinian 
27 
people and that otherwise there wil l be double standards. 
Al l this was added to the Arab side's loss of Iraq as an accounted regional military 
power when the military operations, which had been launched against it in the 
beginning of 1991, resulted in the destruction of most of its military power and 
economic infrastructure. That destruction led to its transformation from a regional 
power to a pre-industrial society or as Edward Said wrote: "Iraq was reduced to a 
28 
noncivihzation, a noncountry." 
In the middle of these circumstances of the collapse of the international and 
regional balances, the USA announced the rise of the New World Order based on the 
principles of justice and fair play. As President George Bush declared in his speech to 
2 5 Ibid., p. 325. 
2 6 In an interview with Turkish TV on 6 May 1991 Arafat said that "We incurred the 
greatest damage from the Kuwait crisis., our loss is approximately 10-11 bn dollars... 
our people living in the occupied territories lost the aid they were receiving from their 
relatives. This in itself totals approximately 1.5 bn dollars yearly. (BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, ME 1066, A9, 8 May 1991) 
2 7 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 1066 A/9, 8 May 1991. 
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Said, E., The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-
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the USA Congress on March 6, 1991, the pillars of that order on the regional level were 
regional disarmament, regional security, regional economic development, and the 
29 
revitahzation of the Arab-Israeli peace process. 
To achieve the building of any of these pillars, in order to create a favourable 
regional order, that could serve its interests and fit its own designed and led New World 
Order, the United States had to start with resolving the long-lasting Arab-Israeli conflict 
and thus advancing the peace process. During the war against Iraq, the Middle East 
team in the State Department had stated that they believed -as William Quandt, 
mentioned- that the outcomes of the war would create the atmosphere in which Arab-
Israeli negotiations would be possible because: 
The defeat of Iraq would convince even the most die-hard Arabs militants that a 
military solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was impossible. The fact that the 
Soviet Union had co-operated with the United States during the crisis would 
further demonstrate that the old cold war rules of the game were being rewritten, 
and that the United States, more than ever, occupied the key diplomatic position. 
Palestinians and Jordanians, who had allowed their emotions to draw them to 
Saddam's side, would now realise that they had lost support among Arab regimes 
and that time was working against their interests. Out of weakness, therefore, the 
Palestinians might be expected to respond positively to any serious diplomatic 
overture. American officials also hoped that patterns of co-operation during the 
30 
Gulf War might carry over into the post-war diplomacy. 
The point here is that the situation in the area, that resulted from these international and 
regional changes in addition to some domestic changes -such as the Palestinian Intifada, 
the weakness of the PLO, the deterioration of its financial and political position and its 
increased international isolation as a result of its vague position during the Gulf Crisis, 
Israel's shock from the fall of some Iraqi missiles on its territories together with Iraq's 
Murphy, E., "The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the New World Order" in H. Jawad, The 
Middle East in the New World Order, (New York: St. Martin's press, 1994), p. 81. 
Quandt, W., Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 
1967, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 396. 
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attempts to link Kuwait crisis with the Palestine problem- encouraged the American 
administration to revive its efforts to achieve political settlement for the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
Thus, the Madrid peace conference was made possible not only because the 
parties love peace or because they have desired to solve the long lasted conflict, but 
because of many factors on the three mentioned main levels: international, regional, and 
domestic levels. It can be regarded as an acceptance by the parties to the conflict of the 
new distribution of power and new rules of the game. 
Why Did the Parties go to Madrid? 
The issue, of whether the New World Order was behind the sudden advance of the 
Arab-Israeli peace process and the convening of Madrid peace conference or not, can be 
answered by defining and analysing the parties' reasons for participating in the 
conference. In general, several factors contributed to the breakthrough to Arab-Israeli 
peace in the 1990s. For Donald Neff, these included, 
The long term evolution of Arab politics toward concluding that war was futile, 
compromise was inevitable, Israel was not going to be destroyed, and that 
continuing the conflict damaged both Arab state and Palestinian interests. The 
perception oT these new "conditions permitted a shift in Israeli policies as well. 
Global changes - including the USSR's collapse, the Cold War's end, and the 
United States' emergence as the world's sole superpower - made vital 
31 
contributions to the altered situation. 
The specific reasons to go to Madrid peace conference, although different, were in some 
ways similar for the Middle Eastern leaders. Most leaders of the region understood the 
changes to the international and regional distribution of power and the new rules. King 
Hussein for example spelled out in a clear and frank way the reasons for seeking a 
3 1 Laqueur, W and Rubin, B., The Israeli-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the 
Middle East Conflict, (London: Penguin Books, 1995), p. 479. 
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settlement. First, he thought that the Palestine question was in decline and that every 
opportunity offered less than its predecessor and the failure to deal with events within 
what is reasonable led to one lost opportunity after another, even as Israel confiscated 
32 
65% of the West Bank. Second, the Israeli recent leadership in 1991 clearly felt that it 
could benefit from the status quo of 'no war no peace,' which could be exploited by 
Israel to change facts on the ground. Third, the world was heading towards peace, 
nuclear disarmament, reduction of armies, reduction or elimination of some weapons of 
mass destruction, the settlement of all regional conflicts and the protection of the world 
33 
environment. Fourth, the collapse of the Arab order and the upset in the Middle East 
balance of power resulting from the Gulf crisis had led to new alliances and a clear drift 
towards regionalism. That had a direct impact on the way the Arabs dealt with the 
Palestine question as well as on the security considerations of each Arab country. Fifth, 
Jordanians and Palestinians were surrounded and were the directly affected parties with 
the continuation of the status quo of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Sixth, the USA was 
showing an increased interest in post-Gulf war stability in the Middle East, a stability 
i l BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14/10/1991. 
3 3 Regarding the effect of this state of affairs on the Middle East, the USSR has shifted 
from the position of a rival to that of a partner of the U.S. in the proposed peace process. 
This shift was effected by a shared concept of the two countries of a new world order 
succeeding the cold war era. The USSR has also ceased to be a source of threat to 
Western, and particularly U.S., interests in the region -a fact that has deprived Israel of 
its most significant asset, namely, that of being the U.S.'s strategic ally in confronting 
the USSR. 
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based on the containment and management of crisis as has been the case until quite 
, 3 4 recently. 
For Israel, the right-wing Shamir government was not supportive of the idea of 
convening an international conference. William Quandt pointed out that: "To win Israeli 
support, any such conference would have to be stripped of coercive authority, providing 
little more than a venue for the parties to negotiate directly. Israel would resist any UN 
» 35 
role as well." In contrast, the Arab parties were emphasising the idea of a ful l 
international conference with strong participation of the UN and the European 
community. Under American pressure, Shamir was to accept to attend, but under 
conditions which made the conference a ceremonial event to be followed by bilateral 
negotiations with the Arab parties. Israel obtained with the help of the USA most of its 
36 
demands and conditions. These conditions included, the absence of any UN role, the 
brief period of the conference, the nature of the invited parties and the nature of the 
Palestinian participation. The latter included no separate Palestinian delegation to the 
talks; no participation of Palestinians from Jerusalem; no Palestinians from the diaspora 
37 
and no PLO representation or participation. 
Neill Lochery, in his study of the Israeli Labour Party, pointed out that the 
American pressure was not the only reason for Shamir to attend the conference. He 
observed that although many thought that Shamir went to Madrid under American 
pressure, which has some elements of truth, the fact remained that he was seen as 
someone who succeeded in imposing his own views and achieving what he wanted. 
3 4 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14/10/1991. 
3 5 Quandt, (1993), Op. Cit., p. 401. 
3 6 B B C Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 1206 i , 18/10/1991. 
3 7 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 1206, A/3, 18/10/1991. 
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Shamir was perceived as having successfully neutralised the conference before 
agreeing to attend. Mr. Shamir had removed the East Jerusalem representation 
(one of the reasons for the break up of the National Unity Government in 1990) 
and had effectively sidelined the PLO, only allowing Palestinian participation as 
38 
part of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. 
Not only this but Shamir also described the conference as an historic achievement. 
Lochery made it clear that: 
Crucially, the results of the conference were not binding and it was only to serve 
as a problem to bilateral talks to take place in Washington some five weeks later. 
Mr Shamir unsurprisingly, described the conference as an historic achievement, 
arguing that: It was the first time that Israel met together with representative of all 
its neighbours without any pre-conditions. This was an achievement in itself even 
i f you do not take into account the results of it. It was important for us (Israel); it 
gave us more standing and prestige. It was clear that we would have to get peace 
with negotiations one day, also it was very clear according to the Camp David 
39 
agreements that we would have to find a solution for the unresolved question. 
Washington had been trying to make some progress in the Middle East peace process 
since before the second Gulf War. Shamir's refusal in 1990 to consider peace talks 
proposed by the USA led to the breakdown of a coalition government between Likud 
40 
and Labour as the government failed to win a confidence vote on March 15. Following 
the Gulf War, however Israel was not able to resist Washington's pressure. Since the 
USA president declared "The time has come to put an end to the conflict in the Middle 
East," the Israeli Prime Minister told the USA Secretary of State, James Baker, that he 
wished to talk to the Arabs. He was trying to avoid any compromise while avoiding at 
the same time angering Israel's main protector, the United States. In other words Shamir 
Lochery N . , The Israeli Labour Party in Opposition and in the National Unity 
Government, 1977-1992, (PhD thesis, University of Durham, 1996), p. 235. 
3 9 Ibid., p. 236. 
4 0 Beilin, Y., Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement, (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999), p. 32. 
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was trying to kill two birds with one stone, by attending a conference that would be a 
conference in name only, without any real meaning or authority, while appearing to 
accept the USA' idea. 
The diplomatic observers were divided in explaining the Israeli acceptance of 
talks. The optimistic felt that the Israeli acceptance to enter negotiations was the first 
important step towards real peace talks, and that when talks started, they could lead to 
useful results. 
The pessimistic felt that Shamir would not negotiate with any real desire for 
41 
compromise. Hanan Ashrawi recalled the saying that goes, "you can bring a horse to 
water but you can not make it drink; you can bring the Israelis to the negotiating table, 
42 
but you can not make them negotiate." 
Clearly Shamir felt that the conference could be a chance for winning some 
gains without making any concessions. Of these possible gains a de facto Arab 
recognition, restoration of relations with the Soviet Union and some other countries, 
43 
abolition of the UN resolution equating Zionism with racism, and getting the loan 
guarantees featured highly. The other reason for Israel was that it knew that it could go 
44 
to the conference armed with its own agenda and conditions. 
The Palestinians had many reasons to try to participate in the peace process and 
4 1 Ibid. 
4 2 Hawatmeh, G., "Too Short for Progress," Middle East International, 24 January 1992, 
p. 9. 
4 3 Law, J., "Nonetheless: Zionism is Racism" Middle East International, 20 January 
1992, pp. 19-20. 
4 4 Barhoum, K., "What Price Madrid for the Palestinians?" Middle East International, 
17 April 1992, pp. 15-16. 
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any international conference concerning the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The PLO leadership 
in particular needed the participation to overcome its international isolation and political 
45 
and financial crisis. The PLO awareness of changes in international and regional 
balances following the end of the Cold War and the second Gulf War was the other 
important reason to seek participation in the peace conference. It is worth mentioning 
here that the Palestinians shared some of the reasons mentioned by King Hussein, 
especially the feeling that every opportunity offered less than its predecessor did. They 
also did not want to be excluded from the settlement or to leave others to decide their 
46 
fate. 
Syria decided to participate for three main reasons. First, Syria felt that its 
participation in the international coalition against Iraq and its adjustment to the realities 
of the 'new rules of the game' might give her some advantage and a favoured position 
with the only remaining superpower and the guardian of the Conference, namely the 
United States. Second, the lack of an alternative to the peace option became very clear 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Third, the desire to show the world that it was not 
an anti peace or terrorist country as the international media portrayed it. 
Lebanon was Asad's first priority. Lebanon is the source of both legitimate and 
illicit revenue, the most prominent businessmen in Syria are Lebanese, and the 
country occupies a strategic position of vital importance; any settlement that 
diminish his stature in Lebanon is sure to be rejected. Contact with the USA is 
also vital to him, and he attaches the highest importance to having his country's 
name dropped from the list of states sponsoring terrorism and from the list of 
47 
states dealing in narcotics; only then wil l he be eligible to receive American aid. 
Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 78. 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 1207 i (a), 19/10/1991. 
Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 203. 
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Lebanon was mainly under Syrian influence or co-ordination. In sum, all the parties 
realised that the sea changes had happened in all international, regional and domestic 
levels and tried to respond accordingly. 
United States' Interests in Promoting the Madrid Conference 
In order to win their support in the Gulf War the United States had promised its Arab 
allies that it would -after liberating Kuwait- concentrate its efforts on finding a solution 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The American administration and Arab leaders repeatedly 
confirmed that a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute would be found after the conclusion 
of the Gulf War. President Bush himself promised that following the war he would 
48 
embark on the difficult task of securing a potentially historic peace. 
The evident American domination in the region, and the transformation of the 
Soviet Union, the main rival to the USA, to a co-operative position had altered the rules 
of the game and given America the major role in the region to establish the conditions 
for peace and determine its march. The USA was looking to reviving the peace process, 
feeling that it would achieve stability and serve its interests, presented in protecting oil 
49 
supplies and protecting Israel and legitimising its existence and integration in the area. 
Reviving the peace process would enhance the peace between Israel and Egypt, while 
the continuation of the tension would increase extremism in the area and strengthen the 
position of the radical trends and generate increasing violence. That violence might 
spread not only across the region but also to Western interests elsewhere and around the 
whole world as well. 
Bickerton and Klausner, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 254. 
Hinnebusch and Drysdale, (1991), Op. Cit., p. 174. 
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There was a great belief generated within the American side that the regional 
climate after the second Gulf War and the international climate after the end of the Cold 
War had created a new situation, which made the negotiations to solve the conflict a 
clear possibility. The President, the Secretary of State and members of the Middle East 
team in the State Department emphasised the importance of seizing the moment and 
taking advantage of the new international and regional situation or what they see as a 
50 
New World Order. 
Understanding the United States policies in the Middle East in 1990/91 can not 
be complete without mentioning the Zionist influence. Concerning the influence of the 
Jewish Lobby on the American Middle East policy, a team that was considered to be 
pro-Israeli, enhanced by the strong Zionist lobby was designing the American policy in 
the Middle East at the time.5' Cheryl A. Rubenberg observed that: 
The intimacy of the US-Israeli relationship was further evidenced in the number 
and position of high officials in the Bush administration with strong pro-Israeli 
sentiments. In late October 1991 the composition of the U.S. group consisted of 
the top Middle Eastern advisors, who had surrounded the administration since its 
inception, including Dennis B. Ross, Director of the State Department's policy 
Planning Staff; Aaron David Miller, State Department Policy Planning staff 
member; Daniel C. Kurtzer, deputy assistant secretary of state, Policy Planning 
Staff; William J. Burns, principal deputy director of State Department policy 
The exception, however, is Richard Haass, the special assistant at the national 
security Council to President George Bush for near Eastern and South Asia affairs who 
advised that "The U.S. should reduce its involvement in schemes intended to produce a 
comprehensive settlement in the Middle East, pay greater attention to the Israel-Egypt 
relations, sustain a continued but narrow dialogue with the Soviet Union and increase 
action against terrorism. See, M . Abu Fadil., "Arab-Israeli Conflict; Don't Raise Your 
Hopes," The Middle East, May 1991, p. 10. 
5 1 Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 121. 
THE MADRID PEACE PROCESS 218 
planning Staff; and Richard N . Haass, special assistant to the president for 
52 
national security affairs. 
It is important however to say that the Middle East foreign policy team was much closer 
to the moderate trend in Israel, presented in Labour and leftist parties, than to the radical 
right wing parties. Therefore, while they saw this as an ideal time to advance the peace 
process to Israel's benefit, they were not necessarily on good terms with the government 
of Yitzhak Shamir. 
The USA policy to protect Israel through Arab acceptance and international 
peace agreements stemmed from an increasing awareness that security was no longer 
achievable by keeping control of some land in the age of long range ballistic missiles 
and the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. 
As Ziva Flamhaft pointed out, one of the main ideas behind the international 
conference was to provide an umbrella of international legitimacy to collective peace 
efforts.5 3 It was also to provide the parties who had fought each other for many years, 
with the opportunity to meet within a bigger forum that would allow them later to meet 
face to face and negotiate their disputes. We have already seen that although the idea of 
convening international conferences for the purpose of solving the Arab-Israeli dispute 
was relatively new, it did not start in Madrid. The first Middle East peace conference 
met in Geneva in December 1973, after the October war. It assembled under the 
auspices of the United Nations Secretary General, and the Soviet Union and the United 
States co-chaired. In that instance, however, the United States managed to substitute the 
5 2 Rubenberg, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 332. See also her book, Israel and the American 
National Interest: A Critical Examination, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983). 
5 3 Flamhaft, Z., Israel on the Road to Peace: Accepting the Unacceptable, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996), p. 55. 
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conference with 'step by step diplomacy'. Israeli opposition to a greater UN role in the 
54 
peace process also contributed to the failure of Geneva conference. In 1977 the Carter 
administration proposed another international Middle East peace conference, but Egypt 
55 
and Israel were both opposed to an increased Soviet role in the area. The situation in 
the early 1990s and immediately after the second Gulf War, however, created a situation 
that has been seen by many as suitable for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
through such a conference. The Soviet role was by now less suspect and America would 
be in a stronger position to influence the direction taken by the conference. 
The war in the Persian Gulf held the promise that the defeat of Saddam Hussein 
would not only create a 'New World Order' but would also enhance regional 
security in the area. The Bush administration assumed that the war would provide 
a window of opportunity in which the United States, utilising its new credibility, 
would be in a position to shape events in the Middle East including a peace 
56 
settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
By the beginning of 1990 Baker felt that he had got Egyptian and Palestinian support 
for his basic approach and focused his efforts on convincing Shamir of what he saw as 
the Shamir plan in all but name. Baker had very difficult talks with Shamir, who was 
insisting, on many conditions, which were very difficult for the other parties to accept. 
The elimination of any UN role contradicted Syria's demand. His insistence on 
forbidding PLO members or even Palestinians residents of Jerusalem from participating 
in the Jordanian delegation was a very difficult condition for the Palestinians to accept. 
The Arab parties wanted an international conference, a strong role for the United 
Nations and a full implementation of the Security Council resolutions calling for Israeli 
withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 according to a 'land for peace' 
5 4 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/1060 A/12, 1 May 1991. 
5 5Flamhaft, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 55. 
5 6Bickerton and Klausner, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 254. 
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formula. Shamir was opposed to this Arab position. He said following the Knesset 
Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee meeting on 29 April 1991, that: 
The Arab countries, of course, preferred a continuing international conference, but 
our position was to convene it and then immediately afterwards to hold direct 
negotiations. Israel would oppose any role for the U N . . .With reference to the UN, 
we said from the start that the process should not be tied to it in any way. 
Israel wanted direct negotiations with all parties and wanted the conference to have no 
more than ceremonial role and no coercion role. Israel also has a different understanding 
of the Security Council resolutions. The Shamir government wanted to trade peace for 
peace not for land. It took the security issue as an excuse to keep the territories under its 
control in the Golan heights, South Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Shamir 
himself repeatedly emphasised the 'peace for peace' slogan as against the 'peace for 
land' formula. 5 8 Israel's right-wing government was ideologically committed to settling 
59 
the entire Eretz Yisrael, and rejected the "land for peace" principle. 
The Secretary of State James Baker started a series of visits to states of the 
region following the end of the military operations in the Gulf, until he got the 
acceptance of all parties to the conflict to attend a peace conference in Madrid to start in 
October 1991. Baker made eight trips to the region. He met with the leaders of Israel, 
Syria, Jordan and most importantly with some Palestinians from the Occupied 
Territories, opening the way -although indirectly- for the PLO to participate in the peace 
process. 
5 7 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. ME/1060, A/12, 1 May 1991. 
5 8 Shamir, Y., Summing Up: Un Autobiography, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1994). 
5 9 Sela, A., The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest 
for Regional Order, (Albany: State University of New York, 1998), p. 333. 
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A l l these events and developments, and the regional and international 
interactions they have entailed, subsequently brought about one essential outcome, 
namely the renewal of efforts in an attempt to arrive at a peaceful settlement to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Hence came the USA-Soviet initiative to convene a Middle East 
peace conference.60 
Thus, understanding the situation as it was, the USA was determined to launch a 
serious and immediate attempt to bring the parties together under an acceptable forum 
and according to a suitable formula for the purpose of achieving a peaceful settlement to 
the dispute. 
The nature of the conference that was ultimately convened, represented a 
significant shift in American policy towards the peace process. Previous methods of 
direct engagement in the negotiations (on the lines of either Kissinger's "small steps" or 
61 
Carter's Camp David) were abandoned and a new method of "constructive ambiguity" 
was pursued. This entailed the United States seeking to prevent the talks from becoming 
bogged-down in specific issues by reducing the process to a procedural one. To do this, 
it had to remove itself from the negotiations themselves, allocating to itself the task of 
procedural arbiter. Thus Baker could point out to Israel that its land expropriation and 
settlement building were obstacles to the process of peace-making, just as he could 
persuade the Palestinians to accept a joint-delegation with the Jordanians for the sake of 
getting the negotiations themselves underway. The method was based on Bush's 
personal belief that peace could not be imposed on the region but could only be reached 
through direct negotiations between the parties themselves. He could afford to hold this 
6 0 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14/10/1991, pp .1-6. 
6 1 Massalha, O., Towards the Long-Promised Peace, (London: Saqi Books, 1994), p. 
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view since, without an aggressive Soviet presence in the Middle East, American 
interests were no longer threatened in such a way that would impel America to try to 
shape the specifics of such a peace process. Moreover, Palestinian and Arab weakness 
at the time ensured that it was unlikely that a negotiated peace would be 
disadvantageous to Israel. Indeed, Bush and Baker could afford to put pressure on Israel 
when it suited them to do so, urging it to make a peace which was in America's interests 
and which the American administration believed would also be in Israel's long-term 
interests. 
United States' Diplomacy 
President George Bush's speech to the joint session of Congress on 6 March 1991, was 
followed by the eight famous Baker's trips to the region that ended with the convening 
of the Madrid conference. In June 1991 George Bush sent letters to the presidents and 
kings of Jordan, Syria, Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia presenting the idea of holding an 
international conference. It was only after many visits and meetings with the Arab 
leaders and Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir that the parties accepted the idea. 
In order to understand the Madrid peace conference and process we need to look back a 
little bit and examine the extensive diplomacy conducted by USA Secretary of State 
James Baker that led to the convening of the conference. 
As William Quandt pointed out, Baker's speech at the AIPAC annual conference 
in 1989 indicated Bush administration's desire to redesign Shamir's initiative into 
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something which could be acceptable to the Palestinians. Baker became more involved 
in the Israeli-Arab diplomacy, and tried -indirectly- to convince the PLO to allow the 
Quandt, W., Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 
1967, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 389. 
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negotiations with Israel to start without its direct participation, in other words to accept 
the idea of a delegation of people from the Occupied Territories. The dialogue between 
the PLO and the USA had been suspended in June 1990, because of what was perceived 
by the USA as a terrorist operation by one of the PLO factions. The Palestinian raid on 
an Israeli beach was in fact committed by a non-PLO organisation, but nevertheless 
affected the USA's decision to stop the dialogue, because it did not accept the terms by 
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which Arafat condemned the operation. Egypt and especially President Mubarak, had 
then played an important role as an effective communication channel with Arafat. 
Baker's efforts although intensified following the second Gulf War can thus be traced 
back to 1989. By the end of that year, the Egyptians had confirmed to him that Arafat 
had accepted his five points plan, one of which was that the Palestinians could bring in 
any position towards the peace process to the negotiations table. 
James Baker's diplomacy proved its success in bringing about an agreement on 
convening the conference. Bush was determined in his pressure on Israel to participate 
in the conference despite criticism from democrats and the Israeli lobby concerning the 
loan guarantees, the matter that contributed towards the failure of Republicans to win 
the election. 
James Baker started his first post Gulf war tour of the Middle East on 7 March 
1991, meeting with the Foreign Ministers of the six GCC states, Egypt and Syria, and 
agreeing a USA plan for collective security in the region. 6 4 He followed it by visiting 
Israel on 11 March for the first time since his appointment as Secretary of State. He met 
with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and a 10-member Palestinian delegation led 
Smith, C , Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 
280. 
6 4 Keesing's Record of World Events, May 1991, p. 38210. 
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by Faisal al-Husseini, and proposed a gradual approach to regional peace and called on 
Israelis and Arabs to initiate confidence-building measures. He completed his first post-
Gulf war tour by visiting Syria on 13 March. 
On 8-10 April Baker visited Israel at the start of his second Middle East tour; he 
discussed the concept of a 'regional conference,' and received an Israeli agreement to 
attend a 'limited' conference. Baker again met with a delegation of Palestinians led by 
Husseini, then visited Cairo for talks with president Mubarak and Saudi Arabia Foreign 
Minister Saud al Faisal; and discussed possible Palestinian alternatives to PLO 
representation at a conference. He ended his second tour by visiting Syria, which 
maintained its opposition to a 'regional conference' and pressed for a full international 
conference with a UN presence. 
In his third visit to Israel on 18 April James Baker failed to persuade Shamir to 
alter his position on an international peace conference, and failed also in his attempts to 
persuade the Syrian president Hafiz Al-Assad to moderate his position. USA-Soviet co-
operation and co-ordination towards the Middle East peace, appeared clear by the visit 
made by the Soviet Foreign Minister. After meeting with Baker on 25 April in 
Kislovodsk, Bessmertnykh, the Soviet Foreign Minister, announced that the Soviet 
Union was willing to act as a co-sponsor with the USA for a peace conference. He 
visited Syria on 8 May for talks with president Assad at the start of a regional tour 
aimed at promoting Middle East peace efforts. His arrival in Israel on 10 May marked 
the first visit of a high ranking Soviet official to Israel since the severing of diplomatic 
ties in 1967. Following a meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister David Levi, 
Bessmertnykh said that "The atmosphere was very good" and that "we really have a 
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chance to begin a peace settlement process." 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/1069 i , 11 May 1991. 
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The offer by the six GCC countries to send an observer to a regional peace 
conference in a statement issued in Luxembourg on 11 May was important as it satisfied 
Israeli demands that all Arab states play a role in the peace process. This statement 
came three weeks after the refusal of Saudi Arabia to take part in a regional 
conference.66 Israel saw progress in the concept of observer status for the GCC states at 
a conference a progress, but wanted all the Arab states to play a role in the peace 
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process as this would be a sort of recognition and normalisation. The change of 
position was due to some extent to American pressure. 
The fourth tour to the region by Baker after the Gulf war began on 11 May by 
visiting Syria where President Assad reiterated his demands that the UN play a 
significant role in a peace conference and that the conference should re-convene 
periodically. He met Bessmertnykh and Mubarak in Cairo on 12 May in what the 
Financial Times described as an 'against-the-odds attempt' to 'kick start' the peace 
process. After the talks in Cairo between Bessmertnykh, Mubarak and Baker, the Soviet 
foreign minister said that the peace process "reached a rather large plateau," but added 
that the possibilities for a conference "are growing." Baker pointed to "significant" 
differences between Syria and Israel, especially on the question of U N involvement in a 
conference. 
The meeting between Bessmertnykh and Arafat in Geneva on 14 May was very 
important in that the idea of a peace conference was discussed, followed by Arafat's call 
for a five party meeting of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and the PLO to discuss 
current Middle East developments. On the same day, 15 May, Baker confirmed in a 
statement issued in Israel, after talks with Shamir, that two issues remain unresolved: 
Ibid. 
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the role of the UN in the conference and whether it would hold more than one session. 
On 18 July James Baker embarked on his f i f th tour of the Middle East since 
March visiting Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel. Before leaving Israel, 
Baker told reporters that it was "a moment of historic opportunity." Syria, together with 
Jordan and Lebanon, formally accepted the USA proposals for the convening of the 
conference. 
The sixth trip of Baker to the region was on 1 August. During this visit Shamir 
announced that Israel would participate in the talks, provided that his conditions on the 
composition of the Palestinian delegation to the conference were met. The seventh trip 
to the region happened in September with much more optimism. During his eighth trip 
on October 18, Secretary Baker concluded his effort, and with the Soviet foreign 
minister, Boris Pankin, announced in Jerusalem that having had an extensive 
consultation with the Arab states, Israel and the Palestinians, both the United States and 
Soviet Union stated that they believed that a historic opportunity for a genuine peace in 
the region was available. Their governments had consequently invited Israel, Egypt, 
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Palestinian representatives to attend a Middle East peace 
conference to be held on October 30 in Madrid. 
The end of the second Gulf War with all its regional and international 
implications forced both of them to co-operate to find a solution for the long-standing 
Arab Israeli conflict. They sent invitations to the parties concerned to attend a peace 
conference under their mutual auspices. The invitations made clear that both 
superpowers were ready to assist the parties in reaching a permanent, just and 
Flamhaft, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 79. 
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comprehensive peace, through direct negotiations based on UNSC Resolutions 242 and 
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383, and that the aim of the process would be real peace. 
According to the letters of the invitations, the conference was to be held on 30 
October 1991, in Madrid, and the bilateral talks would start four days after the opening 
of the conference. ° For participation, the invitations were sent to Israel, Syria, Jordan, 
Lebanon, the Palestinians and Egypt. The invitation was also extended to the European 
Community, to be represented by its presidency, and the secretary general of the GCC 
and a representative of the UN Secretary General as observers. The Soviet-American 
co-operation was vital for the peace efforts to succeed. The Soviet influence on Syria 
and the PLO was needed to convince them to respond positively to the invitation. Israel 
as well needed a resumption of its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. On the 
other hand the American influence on Israel was needed to convince her to agree to the 
conference. Syria and the PLO as well needed an American acceptance and political and 
financial support. The co-operation between the two -which is one of the New World 
Order's main features-, was critical to the agreement of the parties to attend the 
conference. 
In addition, both Arabs and Israelis recognised and understood the determination 
of the USA and even the Soviet Union to get some kind of conference. The statements 
made by President Bush and his Secretary of State made it clear for the parties 
concerned that the USA meant business. Neither Israel nor the Arabs wanted to be the 
party which prevented the holding of the conference. 
6 9 Institute for Palestine Studies., The Palestinian Israeli Peace Agreement: A 
Documentary Record, (Washington DC, 1994), pp. 3-7. 
7 0 Abdul Hadi, M. , Documents on Palestine: Volume II: From the Negotiations in 
Madrid to the Post-Hebron Agreement Period, (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997), p. 10. 
THE MADRID PEACE PROCESS 228 
Letters of Assurances 
Understanding the new realities of the post-cold war international system, and 
recognising its position as the only remaining superpower, the parties nonetheless asked 
the United States for letters of assurances. Responding to their demands and to convince 
the parties to attend the conference, the United States sent those letters of assurances to 
all of them. For the Palestinians, these assurances comprised an American 
understanding, consistent with United States policy, which did not contradict UNSCR 
nos. 242 and 338. These assurances expressed the USA' confidence that there must be 
an end to the Israeli occupation, which could only occur through meaningful and serious 
negotiations. Also that the USA believed that the Palestinians should control their 
political, economic and other decisions which affected their lives and fates. The 
American understanding of the importance of the Palestinian attachment to East 
Jerusalem, made it important to assure them that the structure of their delegation would 
not affect their claim to East Jerusalem. The USA also expressed its opposition to the 
settlement activities in the territories occupied in 1967. 
In the letter of assurance sent to Israel, the USA emphasised the nature of "the 
special relations between our two countries" and the continuity of the American 
commitment to Israel's security, the commitment of its qualitative advantage and its 
right to secure and defensible borders. Also it assured Israel of the ceremonial role of 
the conference, and its non-support for the establishment of a Palestinian state. In the 
case of the Golan Heights, the USA emphasised the assurances made by President Ford 
to the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1975, in which the USA would support 
7 1 Ibid., p. 8. 
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the position that a comprehensive settlement with Syria must assure Israel's security 
72 
from any attack from the Heights. 
Syria received assurances that the USA considered Israel's 1981 annexation of 
the Golan Heights to be illegal, and that UNSC Resolution 242 applied to the Golan and 
the West Bank." 
The USA' letters of assurances were contradictory. One example is the firm 
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American position that Jerusalem must never again be a divided city, contradicting its 
non- recognition of Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem. The American main purpose 
and before any thing else was to bring the parties to the negotiations table at any cost 
and with any assurances even when they might not be easy to keep. Since the PLO, 
Syria and Israel accepted assurances which they knew to be contradictory, they were all 
convinced that it was more important to have something on paper from America than 
that an agreement on issues should be reached before they met. This shows how 
important USA recognition of their claims was to them. 
The letters of invitation sent to the parties on 18 October 1991 appointed the day 
of 23 r d of October as the ultimate date to receive the answers. Al l parties accepted the 
American and Soviet invitation for the conference in Madrid to be held on 30 October 
1991. 
"Ibid.,pp. 9-11. 
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The Madrid and Washington Bilateral Negotiations 
On October 1991 the world witnessed an important event in the history of international 
relations and of the Middle East in particular. That event was the opening of the Madrid 
conference on peace in the Middle East, where the main parties of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict together with many other Arab, European, Asian and African countries under 
the auspices of both the USA and USSR, met for the first time. The objective was to 
reach a peaceful settlement for the long lasting Arab-Israeli dispute. 
The Madrid peace conference opened on 30 October 1991 under the joint 
chairmanship of Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, with the participation 
of Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. Also 
present were representatives of the United Nations Secretary General and the European 
Community. The conference lasted only for a few days. It was mainly a ceremonial 
opening, where all parties to the conflict and the two sponsors delivered speeches. The 
official speeches declared the parties' desires to reach a just, comprehensive and 
permanent peace, and also reflected the international desire to bring peace and security 
to the Middle East especially after the 1991 Gulf war. 
In his speech to the conference, the American President, George Bush, emphasised 
that peace could only come as a result of direct negotiations, compromise, give and 
take, and that peace could not be imposed from outside, either by the USA or any other 
party. He emphasised that he saw the peace process as a process of direct negotiations 
on two tracks, the first between Israel and the Arab countries, the second between Israel 
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and the Palestinians, and on the basis of UNSCR nos. 242 and 338. He made it clear 
that: 
The real work will not happen here in the plenary sessions, but in direct bilateral 
negotiations. This conference cannot impose a settlement on the participants or 
Abdul Hadi, (1997), Op. Ci t , pp. 11-13. 
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veto agreements, and just as important, the conference can only be reconvened 
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with the consent of every participant. 
For the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, President Bush said that no one 
could predict the final result, but some thing might develop, acceptable to Israel, Jordan 
and the Palestinians, which would give the Palestinian people meaningful control over 
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their lives and fate and give Israel acceptance and security. 
In his opening speech, Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out that: "The composition of 
the participants, as well as the nature and objectives of the conference, are eloquent 
testimony to the fact that we are participants in an event of major importance in New 
World politics." He continued as saying that: "It is for the delegations directly 
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participating in the conference to sort out the details of this enormous task." 
The Palestinian speech delivered by Haidar Abdelshafi expressed the hope of the 
Palestinian people for peace and their dream for justice and freedom. "To reaffirm a 
wholeness of vision which once brought about a reverse of civilisation and a world 
order based on harmony in diversity... Even in the invitation to this peace conference, 
our narrative was distorted and our truth only partially acknowledged.. .An invitation to 
discuss peace, comes to only a portion of our people.. .We have been denied the right to 
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publicly acknowledge our loyalty to our leadership and system of government." 
The speech of the Israeli Prime Minister was an example of a radical position, 
especially from a right-wing government, which did not recognise the land for peace 
principle, the principle on which the other parties attended the conference with 
7 6 Quandt, (1993), Op. Cit., p. 504. 
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American assurances. He focused on ideological and historical issues instead of using 
the language of reconciliation. He mentioned for example that "We are the only people 
who have lived in the land of Israel without interruption for nearly 4,000 years." 
We know our partners to the negotiations will make territorial demands on Israel 
but, as an examination of the conflict's long history makes clear, its nature is not 
territorial. It raged well before Israel acquired Judea, Samaria, Gaza, and the 
Golan in a defensive war. There was no hint at recognition of Israel before the war 
in 1967, when the territories in question were not under Israel's control. We are a 
nation of 4 million. The Arab nations from the Atlantic to the Gulf number 170 
million. We control only 28,000 square km. The Arabs possess a landmass of 14 
million square km. The issue is not territory, but our existence. It wi l l be 
regrettable i f the talks focus primarily and exclusively on territory. It is the 
. 8 0 
quickest way to an impasse. 
In general, the convening of the conference was a clear breakthrough, and a success in 
bringing all parties to the negotiation table, especially since it was the first time the 
Palestinian side had participated in the negotiation process. The Madrid conference 
differed completely from the Geneva conference because of the totally different 
international and regional circumstances. The end of the Cold War and the realities of 
the New World Order forced the new Soviet leadership to pursue a different policy by 
seeking co-operation with the USA instead of confrontation. Its internal economic and 
political crisis made it vulnerable to the USA's assistance. In this kind of 
circumstances the Soviet Union was keen to co-operate with the USA in its Middle East 
policy, even though it was clearly an American show. The regional circumstances were 
also different. The Gulf War and its consequences convinced the Arabs and Israel that 
accepting the American proposed conference was the only alternative to take. A l l these 
8 0 Institute for Palestine Studies., (1993), Op. Cit., p. 27. 
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international and regional factors were determinant to the likelihood of success. The 
success can be described at this stage as the ability to bring the parties to the negotiation 
table, even i f the conference did not result directly to any agreements. 
The Arabs and Israelis who had met around one table then broke up into separate 
bilateral negotiations. The negotiations rounds were held in December 1991, January, 
February, March, April, August, October and December 1992 followed by meetings in 
Rome, but without important intervention from the United States. That lack of 
intervention was explained by the American administration as a fear of raising the 
expectations of the Arab parties that America will be able to get Israeli concessions. 
From the beginning it had been clear that the Israeli right-wing government was 
ideologically committed to settling the entire 'Eretz YisraeF, and rejected the 'land for 
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peace' principle. Shamir saw the territory of Greater Israel as sacrosanct. 
Nevertheless the Arab parties went to the conference hoping that the USA could use its 
influence on its own protectorate to advance the negotiation process, and America was 
eager to distance itself from any such commitment. The USA determination not to 
mediate and only to facilitate the talks themselves reflected to some extent a new 
American policy in which it felt confident in its status as the only remaining 
superpower. This policy differed greatly from the Kissinger diplomacy of Camp David 
in which the American administration played major role in mediating between Israel 
and Egypt. The USA in the New World Order was no longer worried about dangerous 
Soviet influence in the region and thus was able to play a much more relaxed and 
confident policy. 
" Sela, (1998), Op. Ci t , p. 333. 
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The structure of the talks was complex to some extent. What was going to 
happen was that the plenary would be the only occasion at which all participants would 
discuss the main issues. Following the plenary, Israel and every Arab delegation were to 
negotiate their separate issues. The Israelis would start talking to the Palestinians 
separately from the Jordanian delegation. The multilateral talks, which would negotiate 
five issues of mutual concern, namely water, arms control, economic development, 
environment and refugees would start in different places around the world. 
The second round of the bilateral talks took place in Washington in December 
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and revealed much about the negotiating strategies and aims of the various parties. 
This round opened in the offices of the USA State Department on 10 December and 
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ended on 18 December with no progress having been achieved. At the start of 
negotiations, the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation claimed that Israel had agreed at 
Madrid to enter into (two track) negotiations. They had envisaged that Israel would 
enter into separate talks with the Jordanian and Palestinian sections of the joint 
delegations. Each section would have symbolic representation from the other section, 
but the effective outcome would have been face-to-face Israeli-Palestinian talks. The 
Israeli delegation rejected such an interpretation and insisted that it would only 
negotiate with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. When this round of negotiations 
started, the Israeli fear of being rushed towards undesirable compromises still 
influenced its policy, and it sought to confine the talks to the procedural issues. 
Explaining this trend, the analyst Lawrence Freedman pointed out that: 
Because recognition is the main thing Israel wants from its neighbours, it has tried 
to shape the negotiations to achieve this without major territorial concessions. It is 
8 4 Sayigh, Y., "The Peace Negotiations: Dim Hopes for 1992," Middle East 
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such a small country, and has so little confidence in the trustworthiness of its 
neighbours, that it sees every territorial concession as a high risk to its security. 
But without concessions of land, the Arabs wil l not concede ful l recognition. 
The first procedural problem was the Israeli non-recognition of the Palestinians, and its 
attempt to deal with them through sub-committees within the Jordanian delegation, in 
contrast to Palestinian insistence on negotiating their problems with Israel separately 
from Jordan. 
The third round of the Middle East peace negotiations, held in Washington on 
13-16 January, ended with no agreement having been reached on the date or venue of 
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the next round of bilateral negotiations. The negotiations started positively, with 
agreement on separate Palestinian representation within the joint Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation, the issue, which had caused the collapse of the second round of talks. 
During the Israeli-Palestinian talks both sides put forward proposals for Palestinian self-
rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Under Israel's proposed "interim self-government 
authority," the Palestinians would have some measure of autonomy, but no control over 
security, foreign affairs or settlement. The Palestinian counter- proposal included 
measures to assure participation in self-rule by Arab residents of Jerusalem and the 
election of an organ to assume authority over all people, land and resources in the 
Occupied Territories until the final status was decided. The Israeli delegation refused to 
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discuss the controversial issue of Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories. 
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The Israeli side appeared to be more enthusiastic; the reason behind this might 
have been their desire to win the American congress' sympathy for its requested loan 
guarantees, which had been delayed by President Bush until after Madrid. According to 
Yezid Sayigh's analysis at the time "Israel ... will seek to portray the bilateral talks as 
progressing satisfactorily, in order to persuade Congress that there is no need to link the 
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housing loans offer directly to the peace process.' In this round, a kind of success was 
achieved in solving a procedural problem, enabling both parties to set and talk together, 
Thus from now the Palestinians were to talk to the Israelis separately. The Palestinians 
presented a document dated 14 January 1992, entitled "Outline of Model of the 
Palestinian Interim Self-government Authority (PISGA)." One of the other important 
developments was the convening of the first session of multilateral talks in Moscow 
which was supposed to be attended by Israel, the Palestinians, Jordan, Syria and 
Lebanon, under the auspices of the peace talks and other concerned countries in January 
1992. The Palestinians refused to attend this time in protest against the Israeli refusal to 
meet with a team selected by the Palestinians themselves and its own insistence that the 
members of the delegation must be from the Occupied Territories. The issues under 
consideration were security, arms, economic development and co-operation, water 
sources, environment and refugees. 
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The fourth round of bilateral talks opened in Washington on 24 February. The 
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10-day round of talks had made little progress by the end of February. At the close of 
the round on 4 March no significant progress had been achieved. The Palestinian 
delegation presented a 16-page plan for the election of a Palestinian legislature to 
8 9 King, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 89. 
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govern a demilitarised West Bank and Gaza Strip. The document was entitled 
"Expanded outline: Palestinian Interim Self-government Arrangements: Concepts, 
Preliminary Measures, and Elections Modalities," Predictably, the plan was rejected by 
the chief Israeli negotiator Elyakim Rubinstein, who described it as; "a plan for a 
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Palestinian state in all but name." Israel presented a counter text. The Israeli text 
mentioned an interim arrangement for the Palestinian inhabitants but not the land; the 
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Palestinians considered it as completely inappropriate. 
Another round of negotiation was held on 27 April. This fifth round was more 
positive, as the Israelis presented their proposals concerning elections in the Occupied 
Territories. These proposals were not totally rejected by the Palestinian side but were 
not totally accepted by the PLO in Tunis, as they focused on presenting the inhabitants 
but not the land with autonomy. The authorities in the proposals did not carry any 
sovereign rights. Commenting on the progress of the latest round of negotiations, the 
Middle East Economic Digest of 8 May, said that all sets of talks had finished 
procedural details and "begun to tackle the real issues". In the Israeli-Palestinian talks, 
the Israeli delegation formally tabled a set of proposals for the holding of municipal 
elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and an offer to permit Palestinian control of 
local health services. Although the offer was not completely rejected by the Palestinian 
side, they made it clear that it fell short of Palestinian aspirations for a legislative 
94 
council to take over control of the Occupied Territories from Israel. 
Meanwhile, Israeli talks with Syria made little headway on the major dispute 
9 2 Ibid., p. 38837. 
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between the two countries that centred on Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights. But 
the talks between Israel and Jordan were held after weeks of renewed speculation about 
the possible declaration of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. The talks centred on 
the issue of water rights over the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers, while talks between Israel 
and Lebanon focused on conditions for a possible Israeli withdrawal from southern 
Lebanon. 
On 24 August 1992, following elections in Israel, bilateral negotiations resumed 
in Washington for the first time since the change of government in Israel when detailed 
proposals on Palestinian autonomy in the Occupied Territories were presented by the 
Israeli delegation on 25 August. They defined the role of a Palestinian autonomous 
authority or administrative council in controlling health, education, justice and 
transport. There was no mention in the document of Israeli troop withdrawals, nor of 
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territorial demarcations. When this sixth round of negotiations started, 
Rabin [the new Israeli Prime Minister] seemed to signal a clear break from the 
policy of his predecessor on the Syrian track by replacing Shamir's chief 
negotiator there, Yossi Ben-Aharon, with his own chief negotiator, Itamar 
Rabinovich. On the Palestinian-Jordanian track, no such personnel change was 
forthcoming; Shamir's nominee, Elyakim Rubinstein, was kept on as head of this 
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Israeli delegation until January 1993. 
Israel presented a document entitled "The Administrative Council of the Interim Self-
government Arrangements," and there was optimism that the new Israeli government 
wanted to go forward, (although it was quickly to end, especially when the USA 
allowed the loan guarantees to be made to Israel). 
Although the chairman of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, pointed out that "fourteen 
months of talks after Madrid was zero," many proposed documents were presented. The 
Palestinians presented a "Draft Proposal: Framework Agreement on Arrangements for 
Ibid., p. 39070. 
Freedman, R., Israel Under Rabin, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 95. 
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Palestinian Interim Self-Government" dated on 1 September. The Israelis responded 
with a document dated 14 September, entitled "Informal Concept of the Interim Self-
government Arrangements: Building Blocks for Agreement." 
This sixth round of bilateral negotiations closed in Washington on 24 September 
1992, and was the longest. As pointed out by Mahmoud Abbas, 
With the holding of the sixth round of negotiations on 24 August 1992 an 
atmosphere of optimism reigned in international circles as well as in the Arab 
world. This was due to the victory of the political alliance in Israel, which arrived 
bearing a programme based on the need for direct negotiations with the Arabs in 
accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and also concessions 
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on all fronts. 
Yitzhak Rabin indicated that Israel was ready to accept territorial compromise over the 
Golan Heights in exchange for peace with Syria or as he said: 
In exchange for a peace treaty which promises an end to war and opens the 
borders between Syria and Israel, diplomatic relations and normalisation, Israel is 
ready to implement (UN Resolutions) 242 and 338 . . . this implies, of course, 
some sort of territorial compromise. 
The seventh round of the talks was held in October, but there was no real progress. In 
fact the Israeli deportation of more than 400 Palestinians to Lebanon increased 
pessimism in the possibility of advancing the peace talks. The weeks leading up to the 
. . . 99 
seventh round were busy with the launch of various diplomatic initiatives. 
The eighth round of peace talks opened on December 7 in Washington. It was 
overshadowed by the Israeli expulsion of 415 Palestinians, which seemed to show that 
Rabin's new moderacy was only skin-deep and did not extend to real policy. 
Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit. 
Keesing's Record of World Events, p. 39119. 
Ibid., p. 39167. 
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The ninth round of bilateral talks opened in Washington on 27 April 1993. This 
was the first session to take place since the inauguration of USA President Bil l 
In the course of this ninth round of talks, the two official delegations exchanged 
drafts of a 'Declaration of Principles' between them. One of the main sticking 
points was the issue of the nature and extent of the jurisdiction of the self-
government authority. The Palestinian delegation demanded legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers for the future Palestinian Interim Self-Government 
Authority and full territorial control over the occupied Territories (including East 
102 
Jerusalem). 
The session ended on 13 May in deadlock. No concrete progress was recorded during 
this round on the Israeli-Palestinian track: the two sides failed to reach agreement on a 
so-called "statement of principles" on self rule in the occupied territories. 
The tenth round of negotiations started on 15 June. The Israelis presented a draft 
"Agreed Statement of Principles," while the Palestinians presented a "Draft Proposal for 
a Declaration of Principles." The Americans on their side presented a "Draft of the 
Israeli-Palestinian Joint Statement," on 12 May, and presented a "Draft of Israeli-
Palestinian Joint Declaration of Principles" on 30 June 1993. 
The eleventh round of bilateral talks were held in Washington in July. The status 
of Jerusalem arose as a key obstacle to progress during this round. Despite Palestinian 
efforts to raise the issue, the Israeli delegation remained adamant that it was not 
103 
negotiable. As in previous rounds of talks, Israel and the Palestinians failed to reach 
agreement on a so-called "statement of principles". 
The twelfth round started in September without recording any progress. 
100 
Clinton. 
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According to John King, 
The characteristic atmosphere at the talks had become one of obfuscation, 
complexity, and an almost retrograde movement as issues were defined and 
104 
redefined. 
These rounds of peace negotiations began without doubt against the background of 
changing international and regional realities. The end of the Cold War and the Second 
Gulf War changed the distribution of power both regionally and internationally and new 
rules were developed and understood by the states of the region. Their acceptance of 
attendance and engagement in peace negotiations was in itself a sign to those 
changes. 
Economic Pressure and the Loan Guarantees Issue 
The American administration under President George Bush applied a kind of a rare 
pressure on Israel through the loan guarantees asked by Israel. According to William 
Quandt: 
On September 6, 1991, President Bush asked the congress for a 120-day delay 
before considering the Israeli loan request. After encountering congressional 
resistance, Bush went public on September 12, and spoke out forcefully against 
106 
Israeh settlements and against the Israeli lobby. 
107 
The United States turned out to be tougher than Israel had anticipated. The clash 
between President George Bush and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir over his settlement 
1 0 4 King, (1994), Op. Cit, p. 105. 
1 0 5 Mor, B., "The Middle East Peace Process and Regional Security", in Z. Maoz., 
Regional Security in the Middle East, (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 183. 
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policy led to "the USA President's postponement of $10 billion in loan guarantees to 
108 
Israel to resettle the ex-Soviet Jews who were flooding into Israel." 
The USA used the loan guarantees issue to press Israel on its settlement policy 
because it was seen by Bush administration as a major obstacle for peace, which 
109 
became one of the pillars for its policy in the Middle East in the New World Order. 
Many observers saw Bush's action as a sign of transfer in the American policy towards 
Israel and as a reflection of the New World realities. Although, it is not clear how that 
American policy affected the Israeli decision to attend the conference, the Arab 
governments saw the adoption of the policy itself at least as a new thing, which need to 
be appreciated. The Shamir government insisted that Israel would not be subject to any 
foreign pressure and Israeli decisions on its security and future would remain in Israel's 
hands. Israel, according to him would not allow any intervention in its policies. "The 
pressure that the Bush administration had brought to bear on Israel was something new 
n o 
in Israel's experience and unique in American foreign policy." Shamir's policies were 
criticised by Yitzhak Rabin as a major cause for weakening the USA-Israel relations. In 
order to improve relations with the USA, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin declared 
following his victory in June 1992 elections (which I wi l l discuss in the coming section) 
a partial freeze on establishing new Jewish settlements, and in August 1992 President 
Bush announced support for the loan guarantees. This became a new beginning in the 
American-Israeli relations that affected the peace process. 
1 0 8 Freedman, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 2. 
1 0 9 See Murphy, E., "Settling the Territories: The Cost to Israel," Middle East 
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Impact of the 1992 Israeli Elections 
By the beginning of May 1992 attention was focused on the Israeli general elections. 
The Israeli election brought to power the Labour Party under the leadership of Yitzhak 
Rabin. In his inaugural speech on July 13, 1992, Rabin said that: "This government is 
determined to embrace every possible effort, pave every road, and do every possible and 
impossible thing for the sake of peace and of preventing war. We wil l change the 
national order of priorities." He announced dramatic changes in Israel's approach to 
the peace process and promised to accelerate negotiations and offered the Palestinians 
112 
far-reaching autonomy. 
Palestinian hopes for an improvement in the climate of the talks were raised because of 
the different Labour view from Likud concerning the ideological idea of Greater Israel, 
and also because of its coalition with left-wing parties, such as Meretz, which supported 
peace with Palestinians. In addition there were some indications that the Rabin 
government had realised the impossibility of ultimately preventing established peace 
with the Palestinians. One of these indications was the partial freeze on settlement 
building in Occupied Territories. As Marvin Feuerwerger observed, "Rabin announced 
a reordering of Israel's priorities and quickly began to reverse the decade-long increase 
113 
in Israeli settlement activity." Concerning relations with the United States, Rabin said 
that: 
Laqueur, W., The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East 
Conflict, (London: Penguin Books, 1995), p. 589. 
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In making peace, we will also be joined by the United States, whose friendship 
and special closeness we sincerely appreciate and hold dear. We wil l spare no 
effort to tighten and improve the special relations we have with the only 
114 
superpower m the world. 
Indeed, Rabin won over the Bush administration, which restored the loan guarantees. 
He found no difficulty in dealing with the new American administration of Bil l Clinton. 
He also received strong commitments from him to increase economic and military aid 
115 
as well as diplomatic support. 
Impact of the 1992 American Elections 
The American elections on the fall of 1992 brought a new Democratic administration 
under the presidency of Bil l Clinton, replacing the republican administration of George 
Bush. This, in addition to the election of the new left-wing Israeli government to replace 
the right-wing Likud government had an important effect on the negotiations. During 
his election campaign, Clinton described Israel as "our strongest democratic ally in the 
Middle East."1'6 He was sharply critical of what he termed the Bush-Baker's "one sided 
117 
pressure on our democratic ally Israel". 
The Palestinians felt that they would lose the little understanding they had got 
during Bush administration, which stood firmly on the face of the Likud government. 
As Marvin Feuerwerger pointed out "Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was hardly 
1 1 4 Laqueur, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 593. 
U 5Freedman, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 3. 
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118 
at ease with the Bush-Baker approach." Also the Bush understanding of the changes 
in the international circumstances and its effect on the possibility of resolving the Arab-
Israeli conflict contributed to his tougher position. 
Baker and President Bush had played an important role in unseating extremist 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and ending fifteen years of Likud rule, which was 
violently anti-Palestinian. "Bush and Baker pressured Shamir to end his ambitious 
settlement program, and Baker openly urged Israel to "reach out to the Palestinians as 
119 
neighbours who deserve political rights." 
Examples of Bush's firm policy are important in order to examine in comparison 
way Clinton's policies. One important example can be found in his dealing with the 
Israeli settlements issue. He once said that: "My position is that the foreign policy of the 
United States says we do not believe there should be new settlements in the West Bank 
120 
or in East Jerusalem." He added, that is "our strongly held view." 
The election of President Bill Clinton in November 1992 however, reinforced 
the positive trend in USA-Israeli relations following the election of Rabin. 
Clinton had promised strong support for Israel during his campaign. He pledged 
to support $3 billion in annual assistance to Israel and promised to enhance U.S.-
Israeli military and technological co-operation. Clinton also pledged to create a 
joint American-Israeli high-tech commission to work on research and 
development of the technologies of the twenty-first century. Clinton indicated that 
1 1 8 Feuerwerger, M. , "Israeli-American Relations in the Second Rabin Era," in 
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he would push vigorously to end the Arab economic boycott of Israel and that he 
121 
would strengthen U.S. efforts to preserve Israel's qualitative edge. 
During Rabin's visit to Washington in March 1993, Clinton signalled his intention to 
"raise US-Israeli relations to a new level of strategic partnership -partners in pursuit of 
• » 1 2 2 
peace, partners in pursuit of security. 
According to George Gruen "The team of officials that Clinton appointed to 
advise him on Middle East policy is certainly at least as experienced and probably more 
123 
sympathetic to Israel's concerns than that of any previous administration." 
Clinton retained Dennis Ross, Edward Djerejian, Dan Kurtzer, Aaron Miller and 
added Martin Indyk and Samuel Lewis in his Middle East peace process team. As Yossi 
Beilin pointed out "This was a team decidedly dominated by Jews, proving that Bil l 
Clinton was not afraid of making such appointments, which twenty years earlier would 
124 
have been unthinkable." The fact that the Jewish lobby contributed to his election 
affected his Middle East policy in a way that differed from the previous Bush 
administration. 
Most American Jews do not doubt that Clinton's heart is in the right place when 
it comes to Israel. Clinton was never willing to put pressure on Israel. His Secretary of 
State, Warren Christopher made that clear during his visit to the region in February 
1993, when he declared that: " I am not in the business of pressuring the Israelis to do 
1 2 1 Feuerwerger, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 9. 
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anything. It is a government that takes action in its own interests". 
He expressed strong support for Israel's view that peace with the Arabs must 
mean full peace. He also made pledges of support including the maintenance of Israel's 
,• • , 1 2 6 qualitative edge. 
Comparing Clinton's policies with Bush's is important in understanding how it is 
more pro-Israel. Concerning the Israeli settlements and as Donald Neff observed, 
"Under the Clinton Administration, Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem for the first 
time went ahead with the open, i f tacit, approval of Washington. Edward Djerjian said 
that: There is some allowance for construction activities in existing settlement. And 
that's basically in terms of . . . natural growth and basic, immediate needs in those 
127 
settlements." With the coming of the Clinton Administration in 1993 Washington 
began funding construction of Jewish housing in a vastly expanded area called Greater 
Jerusalem and appears to accept Israel's claim to the city as its "united and eternal 
128 
capital." Under Clinton, the settlements were neither illegal nor obstacles to peace. 
They became a "complicating factor." Clinton's Assistant Secretary of State Robert H. 
Pelletreau described Israel's settlement policy not as illegal as it was described by 
previous American Administrations but as a complicating factor. He said: "I think 
129 
[settlements are] a complicating factor." 
Summarising Clinton's policy, Donald Neff pointed out rightly that: "The 
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ultimate aim of the Clinton Administration strategy was to eradicate the past and turn 
the Israel-Palestinian conflict into a strictly local affair." 3 0 
The Bilateral Talks and the New World Order 
The failure to make significant progress in the bilateral talks was ultimately the 
result of Israeli intransigence and American unwillingness to impose sufficient pressure 
on Israel to make necessary compromises. It is ironic that, when the United States no 
longer needed a strategic ally to counter Soviet influence in the region, it was 
nonetheless unable and unwilling to use its considerable military, economic and 
diplomatic might to force Israel into behaving in a way compatible with America's own 
interests. This was symptomatic of the transformation of relations between international 
and regional powers in general with the decline of the Old World Order. With little to 
fear from Soviet support of its Arab enemies, Israel could afford to be less compliant 
with American preferences. This did not mean that the relationship was necessarily 
damaged (although it undoubtedly was temporarily harmed by Shamir's personality and 
stubborn refusal to compromise). But it did mean that a new basis for that relationship 
had to be established which acknowledged Israel's graduation from "client-hood". This 
had actually been happening for some time, with Israeli economic and technological 
development giving it greater relative strength within the relationship. The equation was 
thus altered from "American diplomatic, military and economic support in return for a 
pro-American Israeli position and Jewish support in Congress" into "American 
diplomatic, military and economic support in return for Israeli economic and technical 
partnership, support against Islamic terrorism, and Jewish support in Congress". It 
became a more equal partnership, and the American Presidency was therefore less able 
Ibid., p. 177. 
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to impose solutions upon Israel. 
President Bush's vision of the New World Order did not anyway consider this a 
useful or necessary thing to do. As long as the American vision of that order prevailed, 
it was considered in the interests of both Israeli and Arab states to make peace 
themselves on terms that they could all live with. Not to do so risked diplomatic and 
economic isolation which none could afford, while working towards peace would bring 
economic and political rewards, as well as moral credibility. This vision proved flawed 
in so far as the right-wing Israeli government of Shamir did not perceive its own 
national interests in the same way as the American government. How the impasse 
between Bush and Shamir would have been resolved had Labour not won the election in 
Israel remains an open question. It is worth noting, however, that American influence 
was partially responsible for facilitating the Rabin victory. America was not above 
interfering in domestic events to ensure that regimes complied with its own vision of the 
New World Order, even if it found it harder to directly pressure Israel to adapt to that 
order. 
Multilateral Talks 
Multilateral negotiations were less important than the bilaterals. Without success in the 
bilateral talks, the multilaterals would be no more than waste of time, at least as some 
parties, namely Syria and Lebanon, saw it. For them, they could even be dangerous 
because they create a kind of normalisation and co-operation before addressing the 
bottom line issues. Their fear that the Arab bargaining power in the bilateral 
negotiations could be reduced was the main reason behind Syria and Lebanon's decision 
to boycott these multilateral talks. According to Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen): 
The Arabs did not view the multilateral negotiations with the same enthusiasm as 
they did the bilaterals. The Syrians and the Lebanese refused to participate in the 
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multilaterals without giving specific reasons and tried to enlist wide Arab support 
131 
for their position. 
For the U S A and Israel however, the multilateral talks had significant importance. The 
USA, in its endeavour to formulate its New World Order, sought to reduce the tension 
and wanted to create a new order in the Middle East, which was peaceful, co-operative 
and conductive to stability. In order to achieve this, it had to get all the states of the 
region talking to each other about the issues that either divided them, or could lead to 
their co-operation. 
It seemed that the United States and Israel did not want the regional 
normalisation and co-operation to be dependent on waiting for an Arab-Israeli peace. 
The multilaterals were designed to address USA-Israeli interests regardless of peace 
agreements. Syria and Lebanon boycotted the multilateral negotiations as their leaders 
wished to emphasis the importance of resolving the bilateral issues and establishing 
peace before any normalisation of relations. 
The multilateral talks did not often receive much attention because the media 
focused on the bilateral negotiations. Nonetheless they had a great importance as they 
consisted of discussion over Five issues: 1- Arms control. 2- Environment. 3- Waters. 4-
132 
Refugees. 5- Economic development. 
The idea behind the multilateral negotiations stem from the fact that in the 
environment of the aftermath of the Cold War, security and economic development 
became new ideas, and were beyond the ability of one state. Security could be enhanced 
by regional co-operation. 
The multilateral talks also served other purposes. According to Joel Peters, they 
were devised with two broad aims in view. 
1 3 1 Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 97. 
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In part the intention was to facilitate progress at the bilateral level by creating a 
separate arena in which Israel, its immediate Arab neighbours and the wider circle 
of Arab states in the Gulf and the Maghreb could discuss what are technically 
considered non-political issues of mutual concern in such a way that 
developments in these areas would serve as confidence building measures 
133 
between the parties. 
The multilateral talks would examine a range of primarily non-political issues, which 
extended across national boundaries. The resolution of these issues was essential for the 
promotion of long-term regional development and security. The multilateral 
negotiations would focus on the future shape of the Middle East. Their idea was 
grounded in a 'functionalist view of international co-operation and peace'. Economic 
interdependencies, from this point of view would force the region's countries to set 
aside their political and ideological rivalries. 
The U S A Secretary of State outlined the thinking behind initiating the 
multilateral talks in his opening remarks to the organisational meeting in Moscow in 
January 1992. He said: 
It is for these reasons that we have come together - to address those issues that are 
common to the region and that do not necessarily respect national boundaries or 
geographic boundaries. These issues can be best addressed by the concerted 
efforts of the regional parties together with the support of the international 
community and the resources and expertise that it can provide ...What we are 
embarking upon here in Moscow is in no way a substitute for what we are trying 
to promote in the bilateral negotiations. Only the bilateral talks can address and 
one day resolve the basic issues of territory, security and peace which the parties 
have identified as the core elements of a lasting and comprehensive peace 
between Israel and its neighbours." But it is true that these bilateral negotiations 
do not take place in a vacuum, and that the condition of the region at large will 
affect them. In short, the multilateral talks are intended as a complement to the 
134 
bilateral negotiations: each can and will buttress the other. 
Peters, J . , Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks, 1996, p. 5. 
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Structure of the Multilateral Talks 
In the coming section I will briefly shed some light on the structure of the multilateral 
talks and the main issues under consideration. When the opening session of the 
multilateral talks was held in Moscow at the end of January 1992, invitation were issued 
by the co-sponsors of the peace process, to Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the Palestinians, 
Israel, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Yemen, the European Community, Turkey, 
Canada, a representative of the E F T A countries, Japan and China. 
The multilateral negotiations were conducted through two groups. The Steering 
Group was the main committee which co-ordinate the work of the other committees. 
The primary role of the Steering Group was to oversee the activities of the working 
groups and to effect any changes in the structure, composition and operating procedures 
of the whole multilateral track. There were five working groups; on water resources, 
environment, refugees, arms control and regional security, and regional economic 
development. Each of the five groups has met for seven rounds of talks since the 
convening of the opening meeting in Moscow.' 3 5 
The multilateral talks have been the hidden dimension of the Arab-Israeli peace 
process. Although the multilateral talks do not carry the same immediacy and 
importance as the questions at the heart of the bilaterals, they have nonetheless and 
contrary to all expectations, 
Performed a valuable role in the peace process and in fostering the conditions for 
- . 136 
future co-operative arrangements in the Middle East. 
According to Joel Peters, they have provided a unique forum for low-risk 
communication and exchanges between Israel and the Arabs. It is important to notice 
1 3 5 Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit.,p. 98. 
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that participation in these talks and the inter-sessional workshops has afforded the 
parties an opportunity to evaluate the feasibility of future co-operative arrangements and 
generate ideas for creative solutions. The talks also allowed Israel and the Arab states to 
acquire new sources of information, which may change positively their perceptions and 
attitudes. They have helped them to rethink their old assumptions, reduce their fear of 
risk and uncertainty. Furthermore to explore possibilities for joint problem-solving. 
They have presented an opportunity for each side to gain an insight into the goals and 
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intentions, the perceptions and anxieties, the flexibility and limits of the other. The 
multilaterals have also provided a mechanism for the development of bilateral relations 
138 
between the Israeli government and its Arab counterparts. It is the multilaterals, 
which have allowed the Gulf States, most notably Bahrain, Qatar and Oman, and the 
North African states of Tunisia and Morocco, to become engaged in the peace process. 
As Joel Peters observed, "the multilateral track has allowed the parties to attend to 
139 
long term issues, which need to be addressed if and when a settlement is reached. 
The Syrian and Lebanese position towards the multilaterals was justified as it put the 
cart before the horse. I f the multilaterals were to continue, creating a process of 
normalisation and co-operation in all fields, Israel would have less interest in making 
territorial concessions and reaching bilateral agreements with Syria and Lebanon. Even 
if the multilateral talks did not produce quick results; they have still achieved an 
important objective of the American-led New World Order that seeks to bring Israel and 
its neighbours together with other countries in a negotiation process that could led 
slowly to a kind of normalisation and integrate Israel in the Middle East. 
1 3 7 Ibid., p. 64. 
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The mixed results of the multilateral can be explained in terms of the New World 
Order. On the one hand, the subjects of discussion, the range of participation and the 
approach taken to collective problem-solving all indicated that the majority of states 
recognised the need and opportunities for a new approach to regional conflicts which 
would include dialogue and co-operation in a wide-range of areas. The fact that the 
U S A and the Soviet Union were co-operating in this instance removed many of the 
ideological and pragmatic obstacles that had prevented states -previously clients of one 
or other superpower- from doing this. On the other hand, the refusal of Syria and 
Lebanon to participate indicated that the process of transformation from Old to New 
World Orders was not yet complete. In their view, Israel's behaviour must first be 
brought in line with the moral and legal principles of the New World Order, before all 
states could collectively benefit from the new order. I f only some states were subject to 
those principles, the order would have no credibility and would simply be a vehicle for 
the subordination of weaker states by stronger states. National interests still dominated 
the policies of all states, and their main concern remained how to advance those 
interests in the face of altered regional and international balances of power. 
Conclusion 
In the New World Order the USA enjoyed a hegemonic position. Following the end of 
the Cold War and the second Gulf War, the U S A used its unique position to advance its 
own interests. The main interest for the USA in the region was a peaceful stable Middle 
East in which Israel could be protected and oil supplies could flow to the Western 
hemisphere with reasonable prices. For the USA, the new international and regional 
circumstances opened a window of opportunity especially in getting peace and 
recognition for the state of Israel. The new American policy in the Middle East to 
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achieve the main objectives took a form of fulfilling promises made to the Arabs during 
the 1991 war against Iraq. 
The United States promised its allied Arab countries to try and find a peaceful 
settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. To fulfil this promise the Bush administration 
chose to convene a peace conference in which all the parties would meet and discuss 
issues of dispute. 
The World's only remaining superpower could rub its hands together in 
satisfaction at the prospect of the ending of a prolonged international conflict, to 
the resolution of which it had contributed so much in terms of money, manpower 
140 
and diplomacy. 
This was facilitated by the new U S A - U S S R relationship. The willingness of the 
USSR to co-operate in pushing towards peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict 
was -to some extent- a new phenomenon that reflected the reality of the New World 
Order. The recognition by the regional actors of the new international circumstances 
contributed to the possibility of convening the peace conference. One of these new 
circumstances was the new role for the USSR. The other was the absence of alternatives 
for the regional actors as a direct result of the American hegemony, particularly in the 
Middle East. 
The United States hegemonic role allowed her to bring about the parties' 
agreement to attend the peace conference in Madrid. It was able to shape the conference 
without being worried about any Soviet role. The USA was also able to shape the 
conference in a way that could met Arab demands that it should be international and 
Israeli demands that it should be simply ceremonial with the presence of all Arab 
countries and the Palestinians. The way in which the conference operated and the venue 
of the negotiations confirmed America's total influence over the peace process. The 
bilateral negotiations were tailored to Israel's demand while the multilateral 
Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 123. 
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negotiations became a de-facto recognition of Israel and another track to advance other 
American interests (regional stability and co-operation). The U S A did not play a role of 
mediator but of facilitator and thus did not exert any significant pressure -especially on 
Israel- to reach an agreement. 
The USA enjoying its new hegemonic role in the self-claimed New World Order 
was able to achieve at least some of its goals. It cemented its role in the region, as the 
U S A was recognised by almost all the regional actors as the main player. The U S A 
succeeded also in getting the Arabs talking to Israel with no real Israeli concession. By 
getting the sides talking directly to each other for the first time, they effectively reduced 
the potential for regional instability, which is an American interest. 
While the Madrid peace conference succeeded in bringing the parties together 
around the negotiation table, it did not succeed in achieving a real peace. This failure to 
produce peace agreements can be attributed to the fact that the U S A would not use its 
hegemonic role to apply pressure on Israel to make concessions needed for the peace 
process and conference to succeed. Israel itself was not prepared to make real 
concessions particularly concerning relinquishing Arab lands occupied in 1967. The 
main reason could be the whole structure of the peace process, as the United States and 
Israel saw their own interests not in creating the conditions for peace. 
The lack of progress within Madrid peace process led Israel and the P L O to 
conclude an agreement through secret channel in Norway. The Oslo peace process that 
started late 1992 and still continue will be the subject of my next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE OSLO PEACE PROCESS 
The Oslo Accords were predicated on an "amnesiac, unthinkable abandonment" of 
the tragedy of Palestinian history, "not a sentiment I can share or easily forgive." 
Oslo is a "skewed and unworkable" agreement, which does not offer adequate 
redress for Palestinian suffering. 
(Edward Said) 
Introduction 
In the New World Order and since the Madrid peace conference of 1991, Arab-Israeli 
relations have seemed for many commentators to be heading towards reconciliation and 
peace. Although the process has faced many setbacks and has at times seemed to have 
faltered, important progress has been made. It can be argued that the Declaration of 
Principles, signed in Washington on September 1993 by the PLO and Israel, (also 
known as the Oslo Agreement) was simply another stage in a process begun in Madrid 
2 
but one which moved to another 'location' for functional reasons. 
The reasons that drove Israel and the P L O to engage in secret talks in Oslo were 
not totally different from those that took them to the Madrid peace conference. The 
changes on both international and regional levels with all their dire consequences were 
the main vehicle behind the need to reach a peaceful settlement between Israel and the 
1 Michael, A. , "A Different Voice," Jerusalem Post, 29/3/1999. 
2 Indeed Madrid and not Oslo seems to be the starting point of the peace process as far 
as the P L O leader Yasser Arafat is concerned. Arafat said in a meeting with Israeli 
Journalists in Ramallah that "while at Wye the Palestinians again accepted and 
approved the principle of reciprocity, "let's not forget - in Madrid we agreed to 
reciprocity: land for peace. Shamir went to Madrid on this principle." 
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Palestinians. Yossi Beilin, the Israeli deputy Foreign Minister at the time stated that: 
"We consider that part of the 'New World Order' proclaimed by president Bush should 
3 
also be a new regional order". 
The Oslo Agreement was seen at the time of its signing to be a real 
breakthrough. Indeed, it paved the way for further progress, as the Cairo agreement in 
February 1994; Taba agreement in September 1995 (Oslo II); the Israeli-Jordanian 
peace agreement in October 1994; the Hebron protocol in January 1997 and the Wye 
River agreement in December 1998 followed it. 
In this chapter I will discuss the Oslo agreement, not as an isolated accord but as 
part of the much wider peace process initiated in Madrid. First, I will explore the 
background to the Oslo secret channel, explaining why this represented a development 
out of Madrid rather than an alternative to it. In this context I will examine the dynamics 
which led the Israeli government and the P L O to explore a new opportunity for dialogue 
presented by the Norwegian government. I shall also discuss how preparatory contacts 
were made, by whom and how. I will assess how this demonstrated the developing New 
World Order. 
Secondly, I will examine the negotiation process itself in Norway from its start 
in January 1993 to the signing of the Declaration of Principles in September 1993. At 
each stage of the negotiations various issues were raised and dealt with by the parties. 
Through an examination of these developments we can identify the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of the parties involved and how their positions were shaped by 
dynamics beyond the process of the talks themselves. 
Third, I will analyse the text of the Declaration of Principles itself to see how it 
reflected the strength or weakness of the respective parties. After summarising the 
3 * * 
Beilm, Y . , Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement, (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999), p. 40. 
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technical contents of the agreement, I will turn to the deficiencies of the agreement, 
demonstrating how it served Israeli interests within a context that both sides knew to be 
acceptable to the United States. Palestinian interests were barely served, although the 
P L O itself was to gain, but with no allies and without the likelihood that the U S A would 
intervene to adjust the agreement in its favour. The Palestinians had little choice but to 
accept what was the lesser of two evils and preferable to a Madrid-based agreement 
signed by a non-PLO delegation. In doing so I will discuss the main reasons behind the 
'success' of the Oslo secret channel in achieving a breakthrough and the justification for 
the two parties (the Israeli Labour government and the P L O leadership) in concluding 
the agreement. Once the first agreement was signed, and indeed even in its signing, the 
United States was to become very heavily involved in the Oslo peace process. 
The fourth section will examine the other subsequent agreements that are seen as 
part of, and a continuation of, the Oslo process including the Cairo, Taba (Oslo II) , 
Hebron and the Wye River agreements. The main task of the chapter will be to examine 
the role and nature of USA involvement in pursuing the Oslo peace process. In the first 
stage of Oslo I negotiations, America's role had been marginal. There is evidence that it 
was consulted and informed of the process but that it was not directly involved itself. 
However, the parties' decisions and positions were continually informed by the 
dynamics of the American-designed and dominated New World Order. During these 
later stages, however, American involvement was very direct. The continuation and 
conclusion of the Oslo peace process fitted neatly into American interests in the Middle 
East, into its vision of how regional conflicts should be resolved, and into its 
understanding of its own role in such resolutions. 
The chapter will conclude by drawing together the evidence that the Oslo 
agreements and the peace process, which has emerged from them, have been shaped by 
the American-led New World Order. At times this has been through direct American 
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involvement and at other times through indirect acknowledgement by regional parties of 
the nature of the New World Order. 
Background to the Secret Channel 
Information about the background to the secret channel can be found in many sources. 
Some of the most important to mention are Shimon Peres's The New Middle East, Jane 
Corbin's Gaza First, the Secret Norway Channel to Peace Between Israel and the PLO, 
John King's Handshake in Washington, The Beginning of Middle East Peace? 
Mahmoud Abbas's Through Secret Channels, The Road to Oslo, Uri Savir's The 
Process: J, 100 Days that Changed the Middle East, David Makovsky's Making Peace 
with the PLO: the Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord and Yossi Beilin's 
4 
Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement. 
All of these sources have agreed that the Oslo process did not start in Oslo but 
before that. It was true that there had been some contacts between Palestinians and 
4 See 1- Peres, S., The New Middle East, (Shaftesbury: Element, 1993) 2- King, J . , 
Handshake in Washington: The Beginning of Middle East Peace, (Reading: Ithaca, 
1994) 3- Corbin, J . , Gaza First: the Secret Norway Channel to Peace Between Israel 
and the PLO, (London: Bloomsbury, 1994) 4- Abbas, M., Through Secret Channels: 
The Road to Oslo: Senior PLO leader Abu Mazen's Revealing Story of the Negotiations 
with Israel, (Reading: Garnet Publishing Ltd, 1995) 5- Savir, U., The Process: 1,100 
Days that Changed the Middle East, (New York: Random House, 1998) 6- Makovsky, 
D. , Making Peace with the PLO, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996) 7- Beilin, Y . , 
Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement, (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1999). 
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5 
Israelis during previous years, especially between scholars and academics. However 
those contacts had not been official and did not have any approval from the decision 
making institutions in Israel, despite the fact that they served a purpose in exploring 
ideas and preparing studies, and probably broke some psychological barriers to allow 
6 
future official contacts. The P L O leader Yasser Arafat said in an interview with Israeli 
Television in Washington on the 13 t h of September 1993: "we must understand that this 
has come after long efforts. Do not forget the 22 months of negotiations, the many 
secret contacts. The Norwegian channel was not the only one. There have been many 
7 
channels." Also the Oslo secret talks channel was not planned only on an academic 
level but on a political level as well. According to some analysts, it was initiated by 
Yossi Beilin, a prominent member of the Israeli Labour Party in the early 1990s who 
was later appointed as Israel's deputy Foreign Minister by Shimon Peres following the 
1992 Israeli elections. For others it began with a Norwegian initiative started by 
Thorvald Stoltenberg, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, and his deputy Jan Egland at 
around the same time to build bridges between Israel and the PLO. They provided the 
material support to a study by a Norwegian academic called Terje Larsen and his wife 
Mona Juul, in the Occupied Territories. This was to be an important factor in helping 
g 
Norway to construct a team designed to bring the conflicting parties together. 
On one of his visits to Israel in order to complete his study, Larsen met Yossi 
Beilin. They agreed on a mutual understanding of the existence of an historical 
opportunity to establish peace in the Middle East, following the international and 
5 Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 18. 
6 Ibid. 
7 B B C Summary of World Broadcasts, MED/10, 15 191 1993. 
8 Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 105. 
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regional changes at the end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties. Beilin and 
Larsen are both academics with specialism in international politics. Both were familiar 
with the changes, which were happening in the international balance of power, and the 
opportunities created by that change (the New World Order) for resolving regional 
conflicts. Yossi Beilin was known for his writings regarding previously missed 
opportunities and was an advocate for not missing any new opportunity to find a 
9 
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Once he wrote, 
I would like to talk about missing opportunities, the subject I love most. I think 
that one of the reasons why opportunities were missed is that people believed that 
time was on their side. You need the process, and the process is long, and time is 
there and you can do something today, something else tomorrow, then something 
10 
else next week, and eventually something will happen." 
For him, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a New World Order had 
opened the door for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East." 
Terje Larsen was a Norwegian social scientist who headed FAFO; a major 
European peace research institute that was conducting a study of Palestinian living 
conditions in the Occupied Territories. Larsen and Juul visited the region frequently and 
had good relations with Palestinian leaders, P L O officials and their own Norwegian 
government. In particular they were friends with Johan Jorgen Hoist, the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister who was later to supervise the Oslo negotiation process. On one of his 
visits to Israel, Larsen had offered, with the approval of his government, to act as a 
9 Beilin, Y . , Israel: A Concise Political History, (London: Weidenfeld, 1992), pp. 109-
127. 
1 0 Beilin, Y . , "The Opportunity that was not Missed," in B. Rubin., From War to Peace: 
Arab-IsraeliRelations, 1973-1993, (Brighton:Sussex Academic Press, 1994, p. 23. 
1 1 Ibid. 
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. . 12 
facilitator in establishing a secret channel between Israelis and Palestinians. 
In his meeting with Larsen in April 1992 Beilin presented his wishes to explore 
ways to advance the peace process, in case the Labour party won the elections in June 
1992. Larsen responded by proposing that Norway might use its good relations with the 
PLO to arrange secret contacts (a second track) which might be a sideshow to the 
Washington talks. Beilin's response was enthusiastic to benefit from this academic who 
had strong links with the Norwegian Foreign Affairs Ministry. As a start, Larsen 
proposed establishing bridges with local Palestinian personalities and he started by 
arranging a meeting between Beilin and Faisal Husseini to discuss the possibility of 
establishing a second track and the Palestinian contribution in supporting the Labour 
party in the elections. The two also agreed, at a later meeting in September 1992, to set 
up informal talks between Israeli professors and PLO officials. On the Israeli side, the 
Israeli academic, Yair Hirschfeld, who had already established relations with Palestinian 
political and business figures, was the one selected to start the process. He was chosen 
because he had close relations with members of the local Palestinian leadership on one 
hand and members of the Israeli Labour party, especially Yossi Beilin, on the other. It 
was made clear that he would be acting as an individual in the talks and would have no 
7 13 
official status in these contacts. 
On the Palestinian side, one of the first to be introduced to the process was 
Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala), the director of Samed (the PLO investment fund). As such, 
Abu Ala was the second one in the PLO after Arafat to know about the deteriorating 
financial situation of the organisation. He had also been a member of the negotiations 
follow-up committee in Madrid and a supervisor for the Palestinian team to the 
1 2 Savir, (1998), Op. Cit, See also Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 105. 
1 3 Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 64. 
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multilateral talks. In February 1992 he was sent to the Norwegian capital, Oslo, to 
discuss the possibility of financial assistance from the Norwegian government. While 
there he met Jan Egeland and Terje Larsen. Larsen told him of his survey research in the 
Occupied Territories, and expressed his wish to develop links between the two parties. 
Abu Ala urged him to persuade the Israelis, and he assured him that he would support 
14 
these efforts and encourage other PLO leaders to also do so. 
The process was given a major boost by the Israeli elections in June 1992, in 
which the Israeli Labour Party was elected to power promising that new and more 
15 
committed efforts would be made to secure peace with the Arabs. Yitzhak Rabin 
became Prime Minister and appointed Shimon Peres as his Foreign Minister. Peres for 
his part appointed Beilin as his own deputy. Rabin, Peres and Beilin believed that Israel 
should respond to the changes both in the world Order and regional order. They were 
convinced that the New World Order would create new realities that could help achieve 
peace i f the parties understand them and act accordingly. 
The Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoltenberg, ordered Jan Egeland and Mona 
Juul to visit Israel. Terje Larsen, still in contact with Beilin, was already in Israel. The 
new Israeli Prime Minister had run his election campaign on the basis of a pledge to get 
16 
the peace process moving forward. Rabin pledged that he would cease all non-strategic 
1 4 PASSIA (Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs)., 
Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution in the Middle East, (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997), 
p.20. 
1 5 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 1417/ AJ 1, 26/9/1992. 
1 6 Nonneman, G., "The Arab-Israeli Dimension: Background Assessment", in G. 
Nonneman (ed.), The Middle East and Europe: The Search for Stability and Integration, 
(London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 1993), pp. 113-118. 
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settlement activity and would move quickly on Palestinian autonomy. In fact, before the 
elections, Rabin had promised a deal with the Palestinians on autonomy within six 
17 
months to a year. 
Rabin made several goodwill gestures. He freed more than 800 political prisoners, 
halted most settlement activity, barred private Israeli building permits in the 
occupied territories, and reiterated the Labour party position of land for peace. 
Rabin accepted Diaspora Palestinians at the multilateral talks and said that he 
18 
would seek repeal of the ban on contacts with the PLO. 
The political changes in Israel in the 1992 elections persuaded one of the most 
important PLO leaders, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to think that there was an 
opportunity to be seized. Abu Mazen had been known for a long time for his 
moderation. His appeal to the Palestinian National Council in 1977, to allow contacts 
with the "enemy" and his success in obtaining that resolution which allowed the 
19 
contacts with the democratic forces in Israel was an example. When the Labour party 
won the elections in June 1992, Abu Mazen observed Rabin's desire to negotiate some 
form of Palestinian autonomy. He noticed that Rabin distinguished between a political 
1 7 Sela, A., The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest 
for Regional Order, (New York: State University of New York, 1998), p. 337 . 
Bickerton I and Klausner, C , A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, (New 
Jersy: Prentice-Hall 1998), p. 259. 
1 9 In its session held in March 1977 the PNC took a decision emphasising the 
importance of establishing relations with democratic and progressive Jewish factions 
which were struggling within and outside Israel against the letter and spirit of Zionism. 
This decision was reaffirmed at the fifteenth session, 9 to 11 April 1981, the Sixteenth, 
14 to 22 November 1983, the eighteenth, 20 to 25 April 1987 and the Nineteenth, 12 to 
15 November 1988, (Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 14). 
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and a security settlement, that he didn't call the West Bank Judea and Samaria as the 
Likud party did, and that any PLO approach would not automatically be refused as in 
the past. For him these were optimistic indications. 
In sum the Israeli elections in the summer of 1992 had provided a unique 
opportunity for advancement in the Arab-Israeli peace process, with both the 
Palestinians and the Israelis seeing the new Israeli government as offering a unique 
opportunity to move the peace process forward. The previous many months of 
negotiations under the Madrid framework and with a Likud Government had brought no 
substantive progress, and now with the election of a new government and the possibility 
of a new framework for negotiations, there were hopes for a genuine breakthrough. 
Following the elections, Shimon Peres, through his new deputy, Yossi Beilin, 
started indirect monitoring of contacts between the Israeli academics and Palestinian 
officials with Norwegian go-betweens. In September 1992 he had met with the 
Norwegian delegation (Egeland, Larsen and Juul) and presented to them Yair 
Hirschfeld. However, he was unable to agree to a Norwegian proposal to meet with a 
PLO official himself since the Israeli law still forbids such official contacts. He did, 
however, meet with Faisal Husseini, whom he considered to be one of the new moderate 
20 
leadership compared to the PLO leadership in Tunis. 
On the Israeli official level, Rabin kept Eliakim Rubinstein as chief of the Israeli 
negotiation team in Washington and continued with the Madrid peace process. 
However, since there seemed no prospect of an imminent breakthrough there, and since 
Rabin had promised in the election an agreement within six months, an alternative 
strategy was pursued. Peres tried to bring the Palestinian negotiating team from 
Washington together with the Israeli academics, Hirschfeld and Pundak. Hirschfeld and 
Pundak met Palestinian local leaders (Faisal Husseini, Hannan Ashrawi, Ziad Abu Ziad 
Savir, (1998), Op. Cit. 
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and Sari Nuseibeh), and prepared for the two direct secret meetings between Peres and 
21 
Husseim m December 1992 and January 1993. The clear message delivered by 
Ashrawi and Husseini in Washington, however, was that they -as the official team in 
Washington- could not deliver a peace agreement without the PLO and that the PLO 
must be part of any negotiations either directly or indirectly. Hannan Ashrawi in her 
book, This Side of Peace wrote that in a conversation with Dennis Ross she told him 
that "you were the first to be asked to set up a back channel. I personally asked Ed and 
you several times on behalf of the chairman to host or participate in serious and discreet 
trilateral talks, but you refused. Without the PLO, nothing can happen. We know it and 
. 22 
you know it ." It seems clear that both the PLO leadership and the local Palestinian 
leadership within the Occupied Territories wanted the United States to be involved in 
their negotiations with the Israelis. This conversation between Ashrawi and Dennis Ross 
shows that the Palestinians recognised how vital the USA was to achieving any deal 
with Israel. Their awareness of their weakness compared to the strength of the Israeli 
position made them feel that only the USA, i f it wanted to, could put some pressure on 
or persuade Israel to take the Palestinians seriously and negotiate with them a peaceful 
and fair deal. As Israel's patron in the patron-client state relationship, the United States, 
especially with its new status as the only remaining superpower trying to establish the 
rules of a New World Order can influence Israel to compromise and reach a deal with 
the Palestinians. 
Although there was no doubt that there were differences between the PLO 
leadership and the personalities of the inside delegation, which confirm the theory of 
2 1 Beilin, (1999), Op.Cit. 
2 2 Ashrawi, H., This Side of Peace: A Personal Account, (London: Simon and Schuster 
ltd, 1996), p. 250. 
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Arafat that an alternative leadership to his was being cultivated, the fact remained that 
23 
the latter were taking their orders from the outside leadership and reporting to it. [This 
became much clearer with the fact that, since the establishment of the Palestinian 
Authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the members of the Washington delegation 
were given high posts in the new administration. Examples for this are Hannan 
Ashrawi, Saeb Erekat and Nabil Shaath]. 
Since the official Israeli position was that the government could have no contact 
or negotiations with the 'terrorist' organisation PLO the Israelis decided to pursue this 
24 
channel through the unofficial academic group. 
According to Abu Mazen, the next stage was when Abu Ala was asked by Faisal 
Husseini, Hannan Ashrawi and A f i f Safieh during a meeting of the multilateral 
negotiations leadership committee held in London on 3 December 1992 to meet Yair 
25 
Hirschfeld. At this point, Hannan Ashrawi and Yossi Beilin were the co-ordinators of 
the strategy. Hannan Ashrawi pointed out that later she was to be blamed and held 
26 
responsible for Oslo. Pundak pointed out that at this meeting that took place in the 
Cavendish hotel, Hirschfeld tried to give the impression that the meeting was unofficial, 
and that he was speaking as an academic who was not committed to anything and had 
2 3 Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 67. 
2 4Savir,(1998), Op. Cit. 
Abbas, M. , Through Secret Channels: The Road to Oslo: Senior PLO Leader Abu 
Mazen's Revealing Story of the Negotiations with Israel, (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 
1995), p. 112. 
Akram Haniyyeh told Hanan Ashrawi "You are the one responsible," "It was the 
channel you had set up between Ya'ir Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik on the one hand and 
Abu Ala on the other."See Ashrawi., (1995), Op. Cit., p. 260. 
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no authority to speak for the Israeli government. He claimed to be exploiting a twilight 
zone in the Israeli law, which left the possibility for journalists and academics to meet 
PLO officials open. 
A second meeting took place later in the same day. Pundak took its result to 
Beilin. Although neither Abu Mazen nor Savir in their respective books explained what 
exactly happened in that meeting, it is clear that it was about exploring the possibility to 
28 
set up a secret channel between Israel and the PLO in Oslo. 
The reason for the subsequent negotiations to be started in Oslo was the role 
played by Terje Larsen. The Israeli academics knew that in order to continue their 
meetings with Abu Ala they needed a facilitator, and the Norwegians were fit for this 
29 
duty while FAFO would be able to assist the secret channel financially. Meanwhile, 
on 20th January 1993, the Israeli Knesset issued a law abolishing the ban on contacts 
with PLO. The timing of this step seemed to facilitate any possible contacts between 
any Israeli officials and the PLO leadership. 
The engine for altering this law was principally Yossi Beilin. He wrote that: 
The decision to open the track and try to reach an understanding with the PLO 
was indeed mine and it wasn't an easy decision, since I had to take on myself the 
responsibility of initiating important processes without authorisation from my 
30 
superiors. 
The fact that Beilin was behind both the altering of the mentioned law and the 
secret channel compounded with his position in the Labour party and strong relation 
2 7 Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit.,p. 115. 
2 8 Ibid., See also Savir, (1998), Op. Cit. 
2 9 Pundak, R., "First and Second Track Diplomacy: From Madrid to Oslo", in PASSIA 
Seminar(1997),Op. Cit., pp.76-80. 
3 0 Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 163. 
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with Shimon Peres made it clear that the Labour government had the existing contacts 
with the PLO in mind when it presented the new law to the Knesset. According to 
David Makovsky, shortly after Rabin's victory in the Israeli election, Peres called upon 
Rabin (at Beilin's behest) to implement the Labour party decision and have the Knesset 
reverse its six-year-old ban on private Israeli contacts with the PLO. Rabin was 
concerned about the timing, given the upcoming USA elections. When Bush lost the 
election in November 1992, Rabin no longer worried about the ramifications of 
repealing the ban, and on December 1 the Knesset gave preliminary approval to do so. It 
is important to point out her that this showed the difference of one party (in this case 
Israel) to American interests and needs. Israel now clearly acknowledging that USA's 
domestic and external interests are leading the whole process. Hirschfeld was following 
the progress of the Knesset bill closely and deliberately asked the Norwegians to 
31 
schedule the first Oslo session for January 20, the day after it was to become law. 
A paper written by Abu Ala on regional development and regional economic co-
operation in the Middle East had impressed Beilin and others in the Ministry of Foreign 
32 
Affairs. Recognising that contacts had already been made at the unofficial level with 
Abu Ala, and given that Rabin had rejected a possible alternative secret channel 
proposed by Abu Mazen which would have gone through Egypt, he made a strong effort 
in the Knesset to get rid of the law which prohibited contact with PLO members.33 
Clearly, expanding the channel of talks between the Israeli academics and the PLO via 
Norwegian assistance was the best option for an alternative to the stalled Washington 
3 1 Makovsky, D., Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the 
Oslo Accord, (London: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 19-20. 
3 2 Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit. 
3 3 PASSIA, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 79. 
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talks. 
In Tunis, Abu Ala informed Abu Mazen of his contact with Hirschfeld and the 
latter's relations with Beilin. He also informed him of the Norwegian connection and 
the fact that the USA did not seem to have any problem in accepting Norway's go-
34 
between role because of its small size and its neutrality. It is important to note that, 
contrary to many perceptions about the Oslo process, the Americans were clearly being 
consulted at this early stage and their preferences were being taken into account in the 
deliberations of both Israelis and Palestinians. 
Two weeks later, Larsen went to Tunis. He met Abu Ala and other Palestinian 
officials. Abu Ala asked about the possibility of a Norwegian role in further facilitating 
the contacts with the Israelis. He was concerned about Hirschfeld, and he wanted to 
know more about him. Larsen told him that Hirschfeld was Beilin's man. After meeting 
Arafat, who reiterated the Palestinian wish that Norway should continue to play the role 
of go-between, Larsen become more convinced that the PLO had the most crucial 
influence on the Palestinian people, and that it would be very difficult, i f not impossible, 
to reach a solution without its participation. He also clearly admired Abu Ala, whom he 
considered to be very moderate, compared to the old-style leaders in the PLO. 
Arafat for his part had been informed by Abu Mazen and consulted regarding 
Abu Ala's meetings in London in December 1992. Abu Mazen had advised Arafat that 
3 4 Ibid., p. 77. 
3 5 Nofel, M. , Qissat Itefaq Oslo. (The Story of Oslo Agreement) (Amman: Al-Ahliah, 
1995). See also, Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., pp. 133, 136 and 185, and Beilin, (1999), Op. 
Cit., pp. 62-88. 
3 6 Corbin, J., Gaza First, The Secret Norway Channel to Peace Between Israel and the 
PLO, (London: Bloomsbury, 1994), p. 35. 
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this opportunity must not be missed. Arafat agreed that Abu Ala should attend more 
37 
talks in Oslo and had thus made his request of Larsen. 
On the Israeli side, Beilin was now making it clear that Hirschfeld was 
authorised by him to negotiate, but he still emphasised the right of total denial in case of 
any leak of news about the secret meetings and a secret channel running parallel to the 
38 
Madrid framework. 
To provide cover for the secret channel, Larsen's institution, the Norwegian 
Institute for Applied Social Science (FAFO), paid the salaries of Hirschfeld and Pundak 
in order that they could distance themselves from any allegations that they were 
working for the Israeli government, and to give the meetings an academic nature, on the 
basis that the participants were academics who participated in the survey research on the 
Palestinian Occupied Territories. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Stoltenberg, 
informed the Prime Minister who agreed. Egeland informed Dan Kurtzer from the 
American State department, that Norway was establishing links between the PLO and 
Israel. Again, it is clear that the American perspective and reaction was being 
considered before the negotiations had even really begun in Oslo and that they were 
39 
kept fully informed of procedures and progress. 
The decision that the actual negotiations should take place in Oslo was the result 
of a Norwegian initiative. According to Abu Mazen "It was not a Palestinian choice nor 
an Israeli choice...It was a Norwegian initiative that was directed initially at the Israeli 
40 
side, which accepted it in principle." Norway was considered to have good relations 
3 7 Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit. 
3 8 Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 68. 
3 9 Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., pp. 133, 136, 185, See also Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 88. 
4 0 Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 103. 
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with both Israel and the PLO, was officially non-alignment with either of the two 
parties, and had expressed its willingness not to intervene in the negotiations but merely 
41 
to facilitate them. Importantly, the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden and 
Denmark) did not arouse American sensibilities, because of their minimal political 
42 
ambitions and their limited political influence. 
Again we can see that American considerations were being worked into the 
equations of the negotiations. In his book entitled 'Qissat Itefaq Oslo' (the Story of the 
Oslo Agreement) Mamdouh Nofel said that Yasser Abed Rabbo confirmed to the author 
that Warren Christopher was aware of preparations for the secret channel and was 
personally following its progress. However, American knowledge was restricted to 
Kurtzer, Christopher and Clinton themselves and other officials of the state department 
were not informed. It was understood that the PLO and Israeli teams had agreed in the 
presence of Terje Larsen that the negotiations should not be an alternative to 
Washington. Rather, any agreement reached in Oslo would be presented as an American 
proposal to the Washington talks after the sides had agreed on the scenario for the 
presentation of such 'proposals'. It was further agreed that the Norwegians would take 
responsibility for keeping the Americans updated on the negotiations at every stage, 
. . 43 
including the atmosphere, any results and any possibilities. 
According to Terje Larsen, Norway is a completely non-biased player in the process. 
While America, being both an 'honest broker' and also having an interest-stake in the 
region and in the process, is per se another player. You need both kinds of third parties, 
they have complementary roles. (Middle East Insight, November 1998, p .32.) 
4 2 Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 113. 
4 3 Nofel, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 56. 
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Implications of Clinton's Election on the Oslo Process 
The background to the Oslo process can not be understood fully without mentioning the 
1992 USA's presidential elections. As I mentioned in Chapter Four, the American 
elections in the fall of that year, brought a new Democratic administration under the 
presidency of the Democrat candidate, Bi l l Clinton, replacing the Republican 
administration of George Bush. The defeat of George Bush and the victory of Bi l l 
Clinton in the election had, as it became evident, great implications on the Middle East 
peace process. The contribution by the Jewish community towards winning the election 
44 
also played a major role in Clinton's support to Israel. Clinton's commitment towards 
Israel was not only a traditional pursuant of normal American policy towards the Jewish 
State but a real commitment that stems from ideological and moral basis. 
Clinton's affection for the Jewish state was perhaps best expressed in an interview 
recorded by the New York Times the day before the Israeli-PLO agreement was 
signed in Washington: "The only time I went to Israel was with my pastor, who 
told me after I got back that he thought one day I would be president. ... And he 
said 'Just remember, God wil l never forgive you i f you turn your back on 
Israel'" 4 5 
As Donald Neff pointed out, "Clinton's problem, as usual for American presidents in 
the past half-century, is the enormous clout of Israel's supporters in USA domestic 
politics." However, the existence of a left-wing government in Israel makes it much 
easier for Clinton to pursue his Middle East policies concerning the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
As we mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Clinton administration was aware of 
Neff, D., "Has Clinton the strength or the will to save Oslo?" Middle East 
International, no. 548, 18 April 1997, p. 3. 
4 5 Flamhaft, Z., Israel on the Road to Peace: Accepting the Unacceptable, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996), p. 98. 
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the Oslo secret negotiations between the PLO and the Israeli government, but being 
informed does not mean that it was involved. It did meant however that the parties were 
negotiating a deal that needed to be acceptable to, and take account of the only 
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superpower and the leader of the New World Order, the USA's interests. The pro-
Israel new administration and its Middle East team took policies that favoured the 
Israeli side and facilitated achieving its strategic aims and tactical approach. The degree 
of USA involvement in the negotiation process during its various stages reflected the 
new administration's willingness to serve the Israeli plans, as I will discuss in the rest of 
this chapter. 
The establishment of the secret channel illustrated two features of the New World 
Order: firstly, the regional actors had recognised that their national interests now lay in 
dealing directly with one another, rather than through any international powers. For 
Israel, America's desire to limit its participation to one of procedure rather than 
substance provided the Jewish State with the opportunity to negotiate unconstrained by 
American requirements that it should seem even-handed. Israel was negotiating from a 
position of strength relative to the other (Palestinian) party even as the secret nature of 
the talks meant that it risked little should they fail. The Palestinians, meanwhile, 
conscious that Jewish pressures oh the American administration meant that it would 
never be truly even-handed, had little to loose by negotiating directly, while the PLO 
had much to gain from Israeli de facto recognition. Clearly national self-interest 
determined that the two parties should participate while the diminishment of old patron-
client relations enabled them to do so directly and without mediation. Secondly, just 
because the USA was not directly involved in the talks did not mean that it played no 
role. The parties all recognised that American support for and approval of the talks was 
vital. America itself saw no reason to get involved as long as the parties were talking -
4 6 Nofe l , (1995), Op. Cit. 
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it did not matter i f Madrid was going nowhere as long as an alternative channel was 
making progress. As we shall see, the USA only intervened directly when such talks 
stalled and America's own interests (peace in the Middle East) were threatened. It is 
important, therefore, to recognise that the indirect nature of the American role did not 
mean that American interests were not ultimately guiding the process. 
Secret Negotiations in Oslo 
In his book entitled The New Middle East Shimon Peres wrote that the Oslo channel 
47 
lasted eight months until the deal was reached on the morning of 18 August 1993. 
Terje Larsen arranged the first meeting for what became known as the Oslo Secret 
Channel. Three teams -an Israeli, a Palestinian and a Norwegian- were invited to attend 
a FAFO Seminar in Oslo. 
On 20 January 1993 the seminar was opened in a villa in Sarpsborg, 80 
kilometres south of Oslo. It was the first time a PLO delegation had been sent by Arafat 
to meet Israelis to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Norwegians however did 
not intervene with mediation efforts or proposals, but played an important role as 
_ . , . 48 
facilitators. 
Participating in this first round, Hirschfeld and Pundak came from the Israeli 
side and Abu Ala, Hassan Asfour and Maher al-Kurd, from the Palestinian side. In their 
first meeting, Abu Ala and Hirschfeld agreed on the importance of focusing on reaching 
agreement on, as many issues as possible while postponing negotiations on those issues 
that were most controversial. When Abu Ala suggested that the peace process start with 
4 ' Peres, S., The New Middle East, (London: Element, 1993), p. 100. 
4 8 For more about Oslo Back-Channel, see S. Peres., Battling for Peace, (London: Orion 
Books, 1995), pp. 380-402. 
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an Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, probably from Gaza first, 
Hirschfeld considered this early proposal as a real intention from Abu Ala to reach an 
49 
agreement. This was an important step. The idea of giving Gaza first had been 
proposed by Shimon Peres in 1980. The Palestinians had refused it then because they 
knew that the Israelis wanted to get rid of it. It represented for them a security 
nightmare and as fraught with social and economic problems, being a crowded portion 
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of land characterised by violence. Also the Palestinians had feared that it would 
become Gaza "first and last." The fact that the Palestinian team was now the side 
proposing this move, suggests that their own perception of their position had changed 
and that what had previously been an unacceptable condition was now considered a 
reasonable starting-point. The weakness of the Palestinian position was thus evident 
from the very start of the talks. Moreover, from the start Abu Ala was working to 
proposals which would have been unacceptable to the Palestinian delegation in 
Washington but which the PLO felt it could deliver on. 
However, according to Abu Mazen, the first round of discussions dealt with 
many issues mostly in a superficial way without concentrating on specific topics. He has 
pointed out that there was no focus on, or any in-depth discussion of, any of the points 
raised and that the first session had become more of an introduction than negotiations. 
Thus at the end of the first round it was not the points raised that had to be analysed, but 
51 
rather the atmosphere of the talks and the Israelis' opinion. 
4 9 Savir, U. , The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East, (New York: 
Random House, 1998), p. 60. 
5 0 For more information see: S. Roy., Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-
development, (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995). 
5 1 Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 119-127. 
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The two delegations returned to Tunis and Israel and informed their leaders of 
the results of the talks. Beilin informed Peres of the (Gaza first) proposal, as it had been 
re-suggested from the Palestinian team. According to Uri Savir, Peres had long been in 
52 
favour of testing Palestinian autonomy in Gaza before extending it to the West Bank. 
David Makovsky pointed out that in the very first round of talks, 
Hirschfeld and Abu Ala agreed on three main ideas: Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, 
gradual devolution of economic power to the Palestinians and a 'Marshall Plan' to 
the Palestinian entity. They also established the ground rules of no dwelling on 
past grievances, total secrecy, and re-tractability of all positions put forward in the 
53 
talks. 
The second round started on 11 t h of February 1993. The Palestinians presented a plan, 
based on terms of references and aims of negotiations which would lead to a final 
settlement, which would include gradual transfer of Palestinian jurisdiction, both 
territorial and in terms of competence over a transitional period, a 'Marshall plan' for 
Gaza, and an indication as to Jerusalem's future. Hirschfeld brought an Israeli counter-
proposal, which included a declaration of principles from the Israeli view, including the 
Gaza first option and ideas about economic co-operation, a gradual transfer of authority, 
and the building of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure. From the Israeli 
perspective, the offer to allow the building of Palestinian infrastructure after decades of 
deliberately undermining Palestinian efforts to do so, was a significant concession and 
one that was designed to indicate a willingness to move towards some form of 
Palestinian autonomy. 
5 2 Savir, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 6. 
t o 
Makovsky, D., Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the 
Oslo Accord, (Boulder: Westview Press. 1996), p. 23. 
5 4 Corbin, J., Gaza First, The Secret Norway Channel to Peace Between Israel and the 
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This round concentrated on basic issues such as a declaration of principles (in 
which reference to UN Resolutions was a controversial point), a Palestinian Council, 
Jerusalem, territorial jurisdiction, withdrawal from Gaza, and economic development. 
Significantly "The features of the main articles of the declaration of principles began to 
emerge, and the way was now open for the drafting of one or more drafts for the 
declaration." 5 
February's meeting ended with a joint paper of principles, written by the Israelis. 
There was a determination from Beilin that only the Israelis should actually put the 
words on paper. This was a pattern that was to be repeated during subsequent 
negotiations and which placed the Palestinians in the position of either accepting or 
rejecting what were essentially Israeli proposals. The Palestinians were denied the 
flexibility that would come from contributing to the formulation of texts. This became 
particularly important in later negotiations when the Israelis brought in legal advisors. 
Pundak therefore typed the paper, and the two teams returned with their copies of the 
document to Tunisia and Israel. Peres felt that the paper, (the so-called Sarpsborg 
Document) was an indication of the PLO's willingness to make concessions to reach an 
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agreement. 
For the Palestinian leadership, the first round of negotiations in Sarpsborg was 
not important because of the points raised but because of the atmosphere of the talks 
and the Israelis' opinions. After careful study of the minutes of the meeting they arrived 
at two important conclusions. The first was that Pundak and Hirschfeld were indeed not 
far removed from the Foreign Ministry and were not just academic researchers. The 
PLO, (London: Bloomsbury, 1994), p. 60. 
5 5 Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 132. 
5 6 Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 74. 
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second was that Knesset member Yossi Beilin was really backing them. According to 
Abu Mazen the analysis of the minutes indicates that Israeli 'red lines' had hardly been 
defined, a fact which would "enable our team in the coming rounds to raise all the 
subjects we considered necessary for a framework of a Declaration of Principles". 
58 
The third round was held on the 20 t h of March 1993. Although the Declaration 
of Principles was redrafted, and both leaderships were consulted, the Palestinian side 
started questioning the extent of the officiality of the Israeli representative, and the 
reason behind the unwillingness of the Israeli government to send officials to be present 
in the negotiations. The explanation for this could only be that the Israelis still wanted 
the negotiations to be secret and unofficial in order to be able to abandon and deny them 
i f they did not achieve what the Israelis wanted them to achieve, or to upgrade and 
recognise them i f they succeeded in reaching a good deal. This strategy increased the 
pressure on the PLO to make significant compromises early on in order to achieve the 
official recognition of the PLO participation in negotiations with Israel that Arafat was 
seeking. 
This round ended with a review of the document that had been prepared as a 
draft Declaration of Principles. Yair Hirschfeld confirmed that he would take the 
document back to Israel. More importantly, it was mentioned that the document had 
already been studied in detail by American Under-secretary of State Dan Kurtzer, who 
was in telephone contact with the American Embassy in Norway over American views 
of the document. It was further agreed that a final draft should be taken by a Norwegian 
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official to Washington the following Tuesday. Clearly, both sides were keen that any 
5 7 Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 118. 
5 8 Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 76. 
5 9 Ibid., p. 134. 
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agreement reached should have the support of the Americans. For the Israelis this 
represented a guarantee that their own interests would be protected, for the Palestinians 
it meant that American weight would be given to enforce implementation of any 
agreement. 
On 30 April and 1 s t of May 1993, the fourth round of the secret negotiations was 
held in Helmenkollen in Oslo. Here it was proposed that Jericho should be added to 
Gaza as an autonomous area in the first stage. This encouraged the Palestinians to 
continue with the Oslo channel, allaying Palestinian fears that 'Gaza first' would end up 
as 'Gaza first and last'. At this meeting of the secret channel, however, Abu Ala insisted 
on the upgrading of the Israeli representation to counter the fears associated with 
Israel's continued insistence on secrecy. At the end of this fourth round Abu Ala 
informed Hirschfeld that the PLO had agreed to "exclude Jerusalem from interim self-
rule" and also to "finesse the issue of whether Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem 
could both stand as candidates and vote in elections." Abu Ala asked for the upgrading 
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of the Israeli presentation or he would end the talks in Oslo. 
Round five was held on 8 May, at the Norwegian government's guesthouse near 
the royal palace.6' This round produced a draft Declaration of Principles based on the 
discussion of the first four rounds. According to Abu Mazen, the language employed by 
the Israelis suggested that they still lacked confidence in this channel, had not yet 
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endorsed it and that it was still under scrutiny. In contrast to Abu Mazen's analysis 
and expectations the Israelis upgraded their representation in the next round. 
Makovsky, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 42. 
Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 140. 
Ibid., p. 143. 
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Round six was held in Holmenkollen Park, Oslo on 21 May. Following the 
previous five rounds, Rabin and Peres had decided to upgrade the level of representation 
in Oslo by sending Uri Savir to meet Abu Ala. That was the first meeting between an 
Israeli official and a member of the PLO (which was still considered by Israel to be a 
terrorist organisation). Nonetheless Rabin insisted on the continuation of secrecy and 
that the Palestinians should not abandon the Washington channel because of the Oslo 
channel. In doing so, Rabin made it clear that he was trying to offer some reassurance to 
the Palestinians in the form of upgraded Israeli representation, but that he was not 
prepared to put all his eggs in one basket or to allow the Palestinians to reap the benefits 
of this representation until substantive progress had been made. 
Savir's impression had been positive when he had read the Sarpsborg document. 
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He subsequently stressed the idea that negotiations should advance in stages. He 
stressed the issue of Israeli security and the secrecy of the negotiation channel. He 
discussed the issues of Jerusalem and Jericho and the arbitration on any dispute after the 
64 
beginning of the first phase. When he returned to Israel and met Rabin and Peres, 
Savir informed them of the seriousness of the Oslo secret channel, and that the 
government should engage in serious negotiations, and that they needed a very good 
lawyer for that task. Yo'el Singer was their choice. After analysing the document he 
recommended its redrafting. Abu Ala on the other hand gave his impression of Savir 
and his seriousness in negotiating a peaceful settlement to Abu Mazen. 
In retrospect it is clear that Arafat, by sending his 'big gun', Abu Ala, from the 
start had little flexibility in how the Palestinians presented their demands. The Israelis, 
in contrast, used the prospect of upgrading their representation gradually to tempt and 
Savir, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 13. 
Corbin, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 84. 
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pressure the Palestinians into making compromises. The continued need to refer back to 
Jerusalem allowed them the possibility of strategic retreats as well as getting the best 
Israeli legal and political minds to assess the implications of any proposal in depth 
65 
before the Israelis accepted it. Abu Ala did not have access to the same professional 
advice, being restricted to telephone calls with Arafat and the PLO hierarchy in Tunis. 
The tactical advantage therefore lay with the Israelis throughout the negotiations, as 
well as the strategic advantage that arose from the fact that they were the Occupiers and 
the Palestinians the Occupied. 
The Israelis also benefited from the fact that they were much better informed 
and had access to good intelligence compared to the Palestinians. Examples for this are 
many. Uri Savir tells a story that can highlight that point. While Savir was in the Inter-
Continental Hotel in Paris, meeting with Abu Ala and Larsen in the latter's suite, a call 
came through from Mona Juul about a meeting of the Joint Liaison Committee, co-
chaired by Peres and Abu Mazen which the Norwegians were planning to host within 
forty-eight hours, and the task was to contact Abu Mazen. Taking the phone, Abu Ala 
tried to locate Abu Mazen in Tunis. "Protocol and a sudden attack of mischievousness" 
said Savir "prevented me from telling Abu Ala that I knew Abu Mazen was in 
Morocco." After a string of fruitless calls, Abu Ala finally gave up. "Let me find him 
for you," said Savir and soon he had Abu Mazen on the line from the Hyatt Hotel in 
Rabat. " I could see from Abu Ala's face," said Savir, "that his esteem for Israel's 
intelligence community had risen even higher and I did nothing to alter his 
• „ 6 6 impression . 
The Palestinians, for their part, did try to play similar tactical games. For 
6 5 Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit. 
6 6 Savir, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 106. 
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example, the Palestinian delegation to Washington continued to insist on Palestinian 
authority being extended over the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories, 
including East Jerusalem during any transitional period, and that a Palestinian state must 
be declared immediately, while in Oslo the PLO was willing to compromise. This can 
be attributed to a desire on the part of the PLO leadership to convince the Israeli 
government that dealing directly with the PLO would be more beneficial and practical 
than dealing with the Washington's delegation that had no authority to conclude any 
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agreement without permission from Arafat. 
Round seven was held on 13 June 1993. In this round, the Israeli negotiation 
team was increased to four. Yo'el Singer, the lawyer who had been a legal adviser to the 
Israeli delegation during the first and second disengagement talks with the Egyptians 
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and the disengagement talks with the Syrians in the 1970s, was now included. With 
the PLO offer of greater flexibility than the Washington delegation in mind, the Israelis, 
especially Singer, focused on the issues of Jerusalem and the settlements to see exactly 
to what extent the position of the PLO could be changed from that held by the team in 
Washington. Singer criticised the Sarpsborg draft DOP. He wanted to get rid of the UN 
trusteeship idea. He wanted also "the part about Jerusalem being outside of the deal in 
69 
writing, and not just a verbal promise." 
Round eight was held on 25-27 June, where according to Pundak, the Israelis 
70 
discussed the new elements of the DOP with the Palestinians. 
Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 67. 
Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 151. 
Makovsky, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 52. 
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On the 4 t h of July, a new meeting between the two teams was held. This ninth 
round was held in Gressheim near Oslo during the period from the 4 t h to the 6 t h of July, 
with Abu Kush replacing Maher al- Kurd in the Palestinian team. The talks covered five 
points: the inclusion of UNSCR nos. 242 and 338 which called for Israeli withdrawal, 
the negotiations of the final settlement for the future, the Gaza-Jericho approach, the 
elections in Jerusalem, and the fate of 1967 war refugees. Both sides criticised the way 
that the Americans were handling the Washington talks, and in addition the bridging 
proposals which they had presented. 
The Israelis presented a new formal written draft of the declaration that was, 
72 
from their perspective, better constructed than the previous one. It posited a three-
stage process in which autonomy would be instituted first in Gaza and Jericho; then an 
interim agreement would be concluded on extending autonomy within the rest of the 
West Bank; and finally negotiations would be held on a permanent settlement of the 
Israeli Palestinian conflict. They expressed a desire to reach a final accord that would be 
signed in two stages: first, between the PLO and the representative of the Government 
of Israel in Oslo; and second, between Shimon Peres and Faisal Husseini at an official 
ceremony m Washington. 
Round ten was held, according to Makovsky, on 10-11 t h July or according to 
Abu Mazen on the 21 s t of July in a hotel in Halvorsbole. Abu Ala, on behalf of the 
Palestinian delegation, read a letter from Arafat in which new demands were made such 
as elections in Jerusalem, the status of the Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem and the 
7 1 Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 104. 
7 2 Savir,(1998),Op. Cit., p. 35. 
7 3 Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 159. 
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importance of international guarantees and outside mediation. The Israelis considered 
this new document to be totally unacceptable and asked him to withdraw it. Abu Ala 
proposed instead to return to the previous document prepared by Hirschfeld. 
Although the two sides had reached agreement on some points, it was clear that 
the negotiations were losing momentum and that direct intervention by the respective 
leaderships was needed to revive progress. Therefore, on the 13 t h of July Jorgen Hoist 
visited Tunis with Terje Larsen and Mona Juul and met Arafat. He then sent Terje 
Larsen and Mona Juul to Israel, with a letter to Peres that contained an assessment of 
Arafat's views, his position towards Abu Ala and his mental status. Larsen and Juul 
explained in details their meeting with Arafat, to Peres, Beilin, Savir, Hirschfeld and 
Pundak. Peres then informed Rabin. Hoist's letter convinced Rabin that there was good 
reason to resume the negotiations, and the Israeli team returned to Oslo. When the 
Israeli team met with the Palestinian team on 25 t h July, in Halvorsbole, they combined 
the two documents, 'Gressheim' and 'Sarpsborg'. There were twenty-five points, 
sixteen of which were not agreed upon. The Israelis divided the sixteen points into two 
groups of eight. The first were about the security issues, such as the military protection 
of the settlers, the army control of borders with Jordan and Egypt, and the free 
movement of Israeli soldiers in the Gaza-Jericho areas; the second about Gaza-Jericho 
first, such as the authority of the Palestinian Council, the place of the Council, and the 
crossing from Gaza to Jericho. The Israelis proposed solutions to all those points and 
insisted on a Palestinian acceptance of the package as a whole, requesting a Yes or No 
answer. The deal was that Israeli concessions on the second set of eight points would be 
met by Palestinian concessions on the first set. 
Savir, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 38. 
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However, additionally and concerning the issue of mutual recognition, the 
Palestinians suggested that it be part of the declaration of principles, but the Israelis 
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refused that link. 
Round eleven was held on 25-26 July 1993. The eleventh round got under way 
in an atmosphere of considerable tension.76 Both delegations exchanged their drafts. The 
Israeli delegation objected to the Palestinian amendment of the document and 
threatened that this could lead to the end of the channel. The Palestinians demanded ten 
thousand Palestinian policemen in Gaza and Jericho, Palestinian control of the border 
crossings, Israel's withdrawal from Gaza within three months, and that the scope of 
77 
every further re-deployment be determined by negotiation. In that round the two 
delegations tried to reconcile the July 6 text with the points in the Palestinian document. 
During these latest rounds, severe crises had developed between the Israeli and 
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Palestinian teams. At one point Abu Ala had left the talks altogether saying that he 
was unable to proceed with the process of the terms set by the Israelis. The Palestinian 
delegation in Washington was insisting on immediate solution of the status of Jerusalem 
as part of the interim agreement, while Arafat was ready to postpone that to the final 
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status negotiations. 
To prevent the crisis from ending the talks, Savir presented seven points and 
asked Abu Ala to persuade Arafat to accept them in order for him to persuade the Israeli 
7 5Corbin, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 144. 
7 6 Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 166. 
7 7 Savir, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 44. 
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leadership to recognise and negotiate openly with the PLO and with Arafat. The seven 
points were: 
1- Recognition of Israel's right to exist in security and peace. 
2- Resolution of the conflict by peaceful means. 
3- Acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 
4- Renunciation of terrorism. 
5- Resolution of differences through negotiation. 
6- A halt to the Intifada. 
7- Rescinding the clauses of the Palestinian Covenant that calls for the destruction of 
80 
Israel or otherwise contradicts the peace process. 
81 
Round twelve was held on 13-15 August 1993. In this meeting, the two parties 
tried to specify the points of disagreement and moved on to the question of mutual 
recognition. The two teams started negotiations in Oslo on mutual recognition and the 
Declaration of Principles. The Palestinians insisted on including the timetable of the 
final status talks in the DOP and that the final status talks should lead to implementation 
of UNSCR nos. 242 and 338. But there still remained some aspects of a Gaza-Jericho 
first approach and the timetable for withdrawal and the Israelis security in those areas. 
However, at the beginning of August, there were important developments in the 
general atmosphere of the Middle East which were to force both parties back to the 
table and which centred on renewed American initiatives to pursue the Syrian option. 
Warren Christopher met Rabin on 3 August. Their talks centred on the Syrian 
track, and it seemed that this move was deliberate in order to disturb and pressure the 
Palestinians. Rabin agreed that the Syrian track was more promising. The PLO was 
8 0 Ibid., p. 50. 
8 1 See Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 175. See also Savir, (1998), Op. Cit, p. 52. 
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known to be sensitive to the prospect of being left behind and knew that other separate 
agreements between Israel and either Jordan or Syria or both would further weaken the 
Palestinian position. The Israelis and the Americans also knew this and knew that 
concentrating on the Syrian negotiations would force Arafat to moderate his position 
and make more concessions in order to get an agreement before any other party could. It 
is reasonable to assume that the United States must have been collaborating with Israel 
at this time, making the talks go in Israel's favour. It can be said then that the USA was 
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indirectly involved in the Oslo process. 
There was still a need for a high level intervention to solve the remaining issues. 
Shimon Peres visited Scandinavia, and met secretly with Hoist in Stockholm, and made 
a telephone contact with Arafat through Hoist to finish the remaining points. 
Seven hours in the lifetime and history of the Palestinian people were recorded; 
Seven hours of dialogue by telephone ended a twentieth-century conflict, outlined 
the first steps along the road to liberty and freedom for the Palestinian people, 
outlined the features of the future of the region and accomplished what twenty 
months of fruitless negotiations in Washington had failed to do. These seven 
hours saw the conclusion of a total agreement on the arrangements for the interim 
autonomy period. 
Initial agreement was reached, and on 19 August, the two teams met again. An initial 
agreement was signed on 20 August by Abu Ala and Uri Savir with, the attendance of 
Peres and the two teams. On 26 August, Foreign Minister Peres declared that Israel had 
the intention of withdrawing from Gaza and Jericho first, and the Palestinian National 
Council started a debate on the draft of the Declaration of Principles reached in Oslo. 
On 30 August the draft of the Declaration of Principles was approved by the Israeli 
8 2 PFLP-GC communique BBC Summury of World Broadcasts ME 1808 MED/2 
1/10/1993, See also Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 185 and Beilin (1999), Op. Cit., pp. 68-
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Knesset, and announced by both parties. On September, Peres declared that Israel might 
recognise the PLO i f it renounced violence and eradicated the points in its Charter 
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concerning the destruction of the state of Israel. 
On 9 September, more negotiations in Paris led to agreement on mutual 
recognition between Israel and the PLO. Then on 13 September the signing of the 
Declaration by Peres and Abu Mazen, and the historic handshake between Rabin and 
Arafat took place in Washington. The fact that the agreement was signed in Washington 
has a significant meaning. It clearly indicates the parties' acknowledgement of USA's 
vital role and again clearly shows the USA's link to and approval of the process. 
From analysing the negotiation process it appears clear that the Israelis entered it 
with a defined and carefully studied strategy. They deliberately divided their 
participation in the negotiations into two stages. The first exploratory one, conducted by 
Israeli academics, continued for the first five rounds and produced what is coming to be 
known as the Sarpsborg Document. The second continued for the other six round or so, 
conducted by officials and a legal expert and produced the so called Greesheim 
Document and the actual final Declaration of Principle. 
Their reason behind this was that in the second stage the Israelis would be able -
after careful examination of the text- to reduce any risk, correct any mistakes, retreat 
from any dangerous concessions and get more concessions from the Palestinian 
delegation. The participation of Uri Savir followed by Yo'el Singer reduced the 
Palestinian gains that had been achieved in the first draft produced in the first five 
rounds of negotiations (Sarpsborg Document). 
By agreeing at the beginning of the talks on the idea that there would be no 
retraction of any offer made at any point, Abu Ala's hands were tightened while the 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 1782 MED/6,1/9/1993. 
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Israeli side benefited from upgrading their representation and their control of drafting 
the text. 
In the first document there was a mention of many important issues that 
disappeared in the final documents; for example, the Israeli complete withdrawal from 
Gaza Strip within two years and the idea of placing it under a sort of trusteeship which 
had the implication of a transition towards a Palestinian State. There was a mention not 
only that Jerusalem and settlements would be discussed in the final status negotiations 
but also that sovereignty and borders would be on the agenda. The first document also 
did not specify the powers to be transferred to the Palestinians in the interim period 
thereby suggesting that it might be total. Above all Israel agreed to binding arbitration i f 
a dispute occurred between the two parties. A l l these Israeli 'concessions' were undone 
or removed from final drafts by the Israeli official team in return, effectively, for their 
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official presence at the negotiations with the PLO. 
The Oslo Agreement (DOP) 
The document reached in Oslo was entitled, Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
government Arrangements (POP). The text consisted of nine pages, with fourteen pages 
of four annexes and the agreed minutes. 
Analysing the document is not an easy task but not an impossible one. The fact 
that the Israelis assumed the duty of writing the document allowed them to choose an 
ambiguous language that would serve them as the stronger party during the 
implementation process. As Edward Said pointed out rightly "The document has been 
Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit. 
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revealed as an interpreter's nightmare, full of deliberate ambiguities and incomplete 
86 
procedural suggestions." 
The tilt of the balance of power in Israel's favour allowed it to impose the terms 
of the negotiations. The fact that Israel held almost all the cards gave it the upper hand 
and allowed it to exchange few of its cards for almost all the Palestinian cards. With its 
total control over the Palestinian land, people and resources together with its political, 
economic and military might it held the status of a giant facing a dwarf. With the 
American unconditional support and strategic alliance -especially under the new 
Clinton administration- Israel was under no pressure to rush itself into an undesirable 
concession. As Ziva Flamhaft pointed out, President Clinton's stand on Israel was 
another reason for the Oslo breakthrough. 
As a candidate, Clinton criticised the Bush administration for linking peace talks 
to humanitarian efforts to settle Soviet immigrants; praised Rabin for the steps he 
had taken as prime minister to revive the peace process and called upon the Arab 
side to reciprocate; repeatedly asked the Arabs to end their boycott against Israel; 
and promised to help Israel maintain its qualitative military balance in the Middle 
East. As president-elect, Clinton publicly disclosed that he would end the policy 
of pressuring Israel to make unilateral concessions to its Arab opponents, adding 
that 'a Clinton Administration wil l treat the Arab-Israeli conflict as one in which 
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the survival of Israel is at stake.' 
The PLO on the other side was facing its most difficult situation on all domestic, 
regional and international levels since its expulsion from Beirut in 1982. Its financial 
and political crisis had been worsened by a carefully planned American-led isolation at 
both regional and international levels. The international media exaggerated the PLO 
stand with Saddam Hussein and the result was an expulsion of the Palestinians from the 
8 6 See Said, E., The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian self-
determination 1969-1994, (London: Vintage Press, 1995), p. 413. See also Corbin, 
(1994), Op. Cit., p. 168. 
8 7 Flamhaft, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 98. 
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Gulf States and the cutting of vital financial assistance. 
The Agreement called for an Israeli Army withdrawal from Gaza and the West 
Bank town of Jericho, which would then fall under the civilian control of a Palestinian 
autonomy government headed by PLO chairman Arafat. A l l Israeli settlements would 
remain intact, and the new Palestinian police would work together with the Israeli Army 
to guarantee internal security and fight terrorism. In nine months, the Israeli Army 
would re-deploy throughout the remainder of the West Bank to prepare for Palestinian 
elections and the extension of autonomy to the entire West Bank. The most contentious 
issues -settlements, refugees, borders, Palestinian statehood, security, and Jerusalem-
would be deferred until another set of talks, scheduled to begin in the third year of 
autonomy. The Declaration of Principles itself was accompanied by mutual recognition 
between Israel and the PLO and by a commitment from Arafat to end terrorism and 
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remove calls for Israel's destruction from the PLO charter. 
In addition to the mutual recognition, the agreement aimed at a final settlement 
based on UNSCR nos. 242 and 338 after five transitional years, during which a degree 
of autonomy would be established, under a "Palestinian Interim Self Government 
Authority." One of the main aspects of the Oslo Accord is its division of the peace 
process into two stages, and the absence of any term of references to the crucial 
transitional stage, in which Israel transforms limited and gradual administrative 
jurisdictions to the Palestinians. As Uri Savir describes it, the Declaration of Principles 
on Interim self-government Arrangements was a "step-by-step approach toward a 
settlement according to certain clear-cut principles. 'Gradual' was the key word 
Perlmutter, A., "The Israel-PLO Accord is Dead." Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 3, 
June 1995, p. 60. 
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describing the transition from occupation to self-rule, from violence to peaceful 
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coexistence, from a political road map to true reconciliation." 
An important point to be mentioned here is that the agreement did not refer to 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip as Occupied Territories, thus dealing with them as a 
disputed areas. The inapplicability of international law and UNSCR no. 242 on the 
transitional stage relegated the status of these territories during the transitional 
negotiations to "disputed" thus giving Israel equal rights in its territorial claims. The 
Oslo agreement provided mainly for the establishment in the first instance by the PLO 
of a self-governing authority in Gaza and Jericho. Palestinian authority would extend to 
the remaining Palestinian population centres of the West Bank in a second phase, 
coinciding with general elections to form a governing council, the nature and powers of 
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which were yet to be negotiated. 
These documents, (the DOP and the accompanying documents on mutual 
91 
recognition) themselves do not yet constitute a full peace agreement. In addition, the 
declaration left many issues without clear definition, and postponed the most important 
issues for the future. For many Palestinian opponents to the agreement, this was reason 
enough for their position. In their opinion the PLO squandered its final card -recognition 
of Israel and the end of the Intifada- for no more than the transfer of some authorities 
and without any hope for establishing a Palestinian state. Israeli opposition to the 
agreement was meanwhile grounded on fears of the establishment of a Palestinian state. 
8 9 Savir, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 59. 
9 0 Sayigh, Y., Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National 
Movement, 1949-1993, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 658. 
9 1 Said, E., Peace and its Discontents: Gaza-Jericho 1993-1995, (London: Vintage, 
1995), p. 19. 
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The Declaration of Principles lays the foundation for a limited, interim 
Palestinian self-rule in those areas of Palestine occupied by Israel since 1967: the West 
Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. This includes about 20 per cent of 
92 
the Palestine that the United Nations decided to separate into two states in 1947. 
Israel's security responsibilities would include defence against external threats, full 
responsibility for Israelis living in the settlements, and full responsibility for Israelis 
travelling in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Palestinians would be responsible for 
carrying out security actions designed to fight terror (such as confiscating illegal arms) 
in areas under their security control. 
Edward Said and George Giacaman have both agreed that the weak PLO 
position was fully exploited by Israel to achieve and implement the Oslo accords. 
According to George Giacaman "The two Israeli-Palestinian agreements (Oslo I and 
Oslo I I as they came to be called) represent the terms of settlement after the defeat, or 
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more specifically, after the acceptance of defeat by the Palestinians." Edward Said on 
his part pointed out that "it is evident that the Israelis brilliantly exploited the 
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weaknesses and inequities in the Declaration of Principles." Edward Said also made it 
clear that, "On all matters having to do with security, sovereignty, water, settlements, 
and Jerusalem, the Palestinians have in effect gained nothing, as the expropriations have 
9 2 Butenschon, N. , The Oslo Agreement: From The White House to Jabal Abu Ghneim, 
in Giacaman, G and Lonning, D., After Oslo, New Realities, Old Problems, (London: 
Pluto Press, 1998), p. 19. 
9 3 Giacaman, G., "In the Throes of Oslo: Palestinian Society, Civil Society and the 
Future," in G. Giacaman, and Lonning, D., After Oslo, New Realities, Old Problems, 
(London: Pluto Press, 1998), p. 1. 
9 4 Said, (1995), Op. Cit.,p. 63. 
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proceeded as before, the settlement have expanded, more of Jerusalem has been 
incorporated by Israel, curfews, killings, closures and imprisonment have continued, 
95 
and no real end to the occupation has ever been forecast." 
Arafat, however, spoke proudly of the declaration as the first step on the road to 
victory and emphasised its real significance for Palestinians by telling them: "It has put 
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us on the geographical and political map." 
According to Uri Savir "Arafat misrepresented the agreement to his associates as 
a guarantee of a Palestinian state according to a fixed timetable. He also ignored its 
. 9 7 
details, whenever possible, and was in no rush to start negotiating its implementation." 
The rise and increasing popularity of the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, 
combined with the Israeli-American attempt to create an alternative Palestinian 
leadership in Madrid, added more pressure on Arafat and the PLO leadership. The Oslo 
agreement was the result of this asymmetry of power. 
In the coming section I wi l l try to point out some points that can clarify the 
nature of the Israeli-Palestinian accord. 
• First of all, the DOP left the Palestinians subordinate, as Israel remains in charge of 
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East Jerusalem, settlements, sovereignty and the economy. "The issues which form 
Ibid., p. 62. 
Savir, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 95. 
Ibid., p. 94. 
Said, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 1. 
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the substance of Palestinian existence, or non-existence, are left out of the 
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agreement, their postponement reflects the regional balance of power." 
• The document was ambiguous. Its ambiguity was deliberate, paving the way for 
different interpretations during the implementation stage, and gave the advantage to 
the strongest party. Between these vague points, as analysed by Laura Drake, was 
for example the use of the term 'interim period', instead of 'transitional'. In her 
opinion "The concept of 'transition' carries the implication of historical change 
through forward, irreversible motion. The word 'interim' however, refers simply to 
an interregnum, which, in the words of a Washington Post editorial, is "dependent 
on Israeli consent for further evolution." 
I f the Palestinians are to enjoy a "transition" they can expect real and 
historic change away from occupation and toward independence. I f the 
upcoming stage is "interim," however, it could indicate nothing more than a 
. , . . . .100 
period of restructuring for an existing occupation. 
• Despite mentioning the UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, which gives the agreement 
some basis in international law, the resolutions in themselves are not clear toward 
the Palestine problem. There was also the possibility of interpreting their clauses in 
favour of one side, namely Israel. In particular the mention of "secure and 
recognised borders" was exploited by Israel to justify its control over territories 
considered by her as important for security; it might use it to control East Jerusalem, 
and along the Jordan valley. 
• The point about preserving the integrity of the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the 
interim period does not make clear whether this integrity wi l l be preserved after the 
9 9 Drake, L., "Between the Lines: A Textual Analysis of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement," 
Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 16 no. 4, 1994, pp. 1-35. 
1 0 0 Ibid., p. 3. 
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interim period or only during it, thus leaving the door open for the Israelis to detach 
East Jerusalem or any other land after the interim period. 
• The Oslo accord talked more about a military redeployment than about withdrawal 
of an occupying force. The Israeli intention seemed mainly concerned with getting 
its soldiers out of the Palestinian cities' streets after six years of Intifada that caused 
them a lot of domestic as well as regional and international trouble, and to charge 
the PLO with security responsibilities in this troubled areas. 
• Although there was a mention of the Palestinians' political rights which was an 
improvement on Camp David, there was no mention in the DOP of freedom or self-
determination, which the Palestinian people had struggled to achieve for many 
decades. 
• By focusing the agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip the Declaration 
effectively divided the Palestinian people into those who lived inside the Occupied 
Territories and those who lived abroad as refugees. This different treatment caused a 
division within the Palestinians and affected the reconciliation process in the long 
term. Also, the agreement did not define what it meant by the West Bank. This 
ambiguity made the stronger party (Israel) effectively decide the definition. The 
agreement did not make it clear i f territorial integrity would be maintained after the 
end of the interim agreement. 
• In its clauses about the relations and co-operation with the neighbouring countries 
the agreement effectively designates the future of the Palestinian entity as an Israeli 
protectorate that acts as an Israeli bridge to the larger Arab and Islamic world. 
• Although the DOP mentioned settlements, it never mentioned settlers. Rabin's 
distinction between political and security settlements imply that some of the 
settlements might be dismantled but the failure to mention the settlers means that 
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Jews will be able to live wherever they chose, not only in the West Bank and Gaza 
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Strip but in any place in the region. 
The placing of Palestinian economic development under Palestinian-Israeli joint 
authority is effectively placing it under indirect Israeli control. The concept of joint 
authority is translated in practice to the authority of the stronger power which under the 
existing asymmetry of power is not the PLO but Israel. When the document mentioned 
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the borders and the neighbours, it did not clarify which borders with whom. Was it 
borders between Israel and a Palestinian state or between Israel and a Jordanian-
Palestinian confederation, or between Jordan on the one hand and Israel with a 
Palestinian entity under its control on the other? A brief look at the map makes one 
wonder how the Israeli insistence on controlling the Jordan valley could allow any 
possibility for a Palestinian mini state or even a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. 
103 
The reference to the "relations and co-operation with other neighbours binds the 
Palestinian entity to Israel, as it is impossible for the Palestinian entity to establish any 
co-operation with Arab countries without consultation and combination with Israel. This 
means, in a sense, that the intention is to create a situation whereby the Israeli and 
Palestinian entities merge their regional policy-making apparatuses to the point of being 
inseparable. In an interview with Israeli journalist Asher Davidi, Dov Lautman, 
President of the Israeli Manufacturers Association was quoted as saying: "It's not 
important whether there wi l l be a Palestinian state, autonomy, or a Palestinian-Jordanian 
, U 1 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED/1-3, 13 September 1993. 
1 0 2 Abdul Hadi, M. , Documents on Palestine: From the Negotiations in Madrid to the 
Post-Hebron Agreement Period, (Jerusalem: PASSIA), p. 145. 
1 0 3 See Article 3 and Annex I I I and IV of the DOP. See Appendices, p. 376. 
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state. The economic borders between Israel and the territories must remain open. It 
can be argued that with its well-developed economic institutions, Israel wil l in effect 
incorporate the territories economically, keeping them in a state of permanent 
dependency. Then Israel will turn to the Arab world, using the political benefits of the 
Palestinian agreement as a springboard into Arab markets, which it wil l also exploit and 
105 
is likely to dominate. 
The primary consideration in the document is Israel's security, with none for the 
Palestinians from Israel's incursions. In his 13 t h September 1993 press conference Rabin 
was straightforward about Israel's continuing control over sovereignty; in addition, he 
said, "Israel would hold the River Jordan, the boundaries with Egypt and Jordan, the 
sea, the land between Gaza and Jericho, Jerusalem, the settlements, and the roads. There 
is nothing in the document to suggest that Israel wi l l give up its violence against 
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Palestinians or compensate the victims of its policies for forty-five years." As ex-
Secretary of State James Baker said in a TV interview "Israel has given up nothing, 
except a bland acceptance of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people." 
The security of Israel was the main concern not only for Israel but for the United States 
as well. " I f autonomy does not improve security for Israel, Secretary of State James 
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Baker said, there wi l l be no Palestinian autonomy.' 
1 0 4 Davidi, A., "Israel's Economic Strategy for Palestinian Independence," Middle East 
Report, no. 184, September/October 1993, p. 24-26. 
1 0 5 Said, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 11. 
1 0 6 Ibid., p. 7. 
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Response to the Oslo Agreement 
Response to the Oslo Accord (the Declaration of Principles) was enormous. It was some 
thing like a political earthquake. The fact that the signing of the agreement happened in 
Washington under the sponsorship of the president of the USA, the only remaining 
superpower, and in the atmosphere of New World Order influenced the response of 
most world leaders. The stand of the USA and even Russia left very little space for 
manoeuvring to those who wished to reject it. 
The news of the breakthrough was widely welcomed in the West and the USA in 
particular. However, in the Middle East itself the reaction was mixed. Although many 
Israelis and Palestinians welcomed the agreement, many on both sides saw it as a 
betrayal of their national rights and existence. 
The PLO itself witnessed a split. Ten of its sub-organisations declared their 
condemnation of the secret channel and its results. George Habash, Nief Hwatmah, 
Ahmed Jebril and many others declared their organisations' rejection of what they 
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called a national treason and a black day for Palestinian history. Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad expressed their rejection of the agreement by increasing what they consider their 
martyrdom operations (suicide bombings). Members of the PLO executive committee 
resigned their positions. Shafeeq Alhut, Taysir Khalid, Abdulraheem Malluh and 
Abdullah Hurani declared their resignations immediately after the White House signing 
ceremony on 13 September 1993. Chief Palestinian negotiator Dr Haydar Abd al-Shafi 
has reiterated his opposition to the agreement and voiced his reservation on many of the 
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provisions enshrined in it. Iraq, Libya, Iran, Syria and Lebanon rejected the accord as 
a break from the Arab united stand. Qaddafi for example described the mutual 
1 0 8 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED/8, 13 September 1993. 
l 0 9 B B C Summary of World Broadcasts, MED/13, 13 September 1993. 
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recognition between Arafat and Israel as one of the "comedies in history." "The 
reciprocal recognition" -he said- "between the so-called PLO and Israel, is one of the 
comedies in history. And should be considered as an object of ridicule and a farce and 
n o 
not a serious matter." Rafsanjani of Iran said the deal with Israel is "the most 
111 
degrading juncture of history. 
On the other hand Jordan, Morocco, GCC countries and Tunisia welcomed the PLO-
Israeli agreement. Tunisia's Foreign Minister spoke of pride in Tunisia's role in the 
agreement, while the Jordanian Crown Prince saw the PLO-Israel agreement as an 
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"historic breakthrough." The Saudi Council of Mimsters hoped for Middle East 
peace; The UAE cabinet welcomed and supported PLO-Israeli agreement and Kuwait 
welcomed "positive developments" in Middle East peace process.1'3 
In Israel, the peace camp welcomed the news of the agreement. The right wing 
parties however did not receive the news with enthusiasm. Likud leader Benjamin 
Netanyahu, for example, said Rabin has "no mandate" for an "event of national 
114 
humiliation." One year after the signing of the DOP in Washington, Jordan and Israel 
signed a peace agreement on October 1994. 
U U B B C Summary of World Broadcasts, MED/17, 13 September 1993. 
1 , 1 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED/22, 15 September 1993. 
1 1 2 B B C Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 17,13 September 1993. 
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The Parties' Reasons behind the Agreement 
A series of crucial questions needs to be asked i f we are to understand why the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation agreed to the opening of a secret channel in Oslo to negotiate 
with the Israeli Labour government under the leadership of Rabin and Peres, in spite of 
the continuation of the official negotiations within the Madrid framework in 
Washington since 30 October 1991. Also why did the Rabin-Peres Labour government 
desire the diversion toward a secret channel to negotiate with the PLO to reach an 
agreement on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, instead of continuing with the official 
channel in Washington with the mediation, and under the auspices of the USA, the main 
ally of Israel. 
The reasons for the Israeli government and the PLO to negotiate a settlement 
through secret channel were numerous. We can summarise them as follow starting by 
the Israeli government reasons. 
First, as Raymond Hinnebusch pointed out: "Asad's insistence, in talks with 
USA Secretary of State Warren Christopher, that Syria would not conclude a separate 
settlement apparently convinced Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin that his initial 
"Syria first" option would not fly. Ironically, this led Rabin to pursue the 1993 Oslo 
agreement with the Palestinians""5 
On the other hand in 1992 the new Israeli Labour government realised that the 
negotiations with the Palestinian delegation to Madrid would not lead to any quick and 
acceptable agreement, especially since the Palestinian delegation was not able to make 
any concessions without permission from the PLO and its leader, Yasser Arafat, in 
Tunis. As Rabin himself said about the Palestinian delegation to Washington, "They 
1 1 5 Hinnebusch, R., "Does Syria Want Peace?" Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 26, no. 
1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 42-57. 
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were unable to make decisions without getting the green light [from the PLO]." Thus 
there was no possibility of avoiding making direct contacts with Arafat and his 
organisation, which needed a new law from the Knesset allowing that kind of contact. 
According to Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, Rabin only changed his mind and agreed to come 
to an agreement with the PLO after the change in global-political reality and when he 
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realised that this was a better way to serve the same strategic interests. 
Second, Israel insisted always on its refusal to recognise the rights of the 
Palestinian people and on considering the organisations under the PLO's umbrella as 
terrorist organisations backed by Arab regimes and International Communism. It 
insisted always on its historical rights in all Palestine from the Jordan River to the 
Mediterranean Sea. Thus it was never going to be easy to recognise the PLO before 
knowing that it would accept Israel's conditions, one of which was recognising Israel's 
right to live in peace and security. So Israel was concerned that any contact must be 
secret, and should not become public before it could satisfy its main desired points, 
most important of which was the PLO's unconditional recognition of Israel's right to 
exist and acceptance of Jerusalem as Israel's eternal capital. Therefore Israel was 
effectively negotiating with two delegations and would go ahead with the one that made 
most concessions and showed most flexibility. In an interview with IBT, TV on 10 
September 1993 Rabin said: 
Efforts were made in various directions. I decided to see which avenue was more 
successful." He added " I was interested in the following points: First under no 
circumstances should Jerusalem's unity or our sovereignty over it come to be 
1 , 6 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 1-3,13 September 1993. 
1 1 7 Raz-Krakotzkin, A., "A Peace without Arabs: The Discourse of Peace and the Limits 
of Israeli Consciousness," in Giacaman, and Lonning., After Oslo, New Realities, Old 
Problems, (London: Pluto Press, 1998), p. 61. 
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affected in any way. Second, no settlement wi l l be uprooted. Third, the IDF's 
deployment must not be impaired. It wil l remain present wherever it is necessary. 
Finally, the options of the permanent arrangement must remain open. 
Third, the secrecy in negotiations and getting a surprise accord with the PLO would 
serve Israel's strategy of fragmenting the Arab parties. Israel's goal was always not to 
deal with Arab parties as a block but rather as individuals and directly rather than with a 
mediator. In other words, reaching an agreement with the PLO would create shock and 
mistrust among the other parties, namely Syria and Jordan. 
Fourth, the secrecy of the negotiations was to limit the PLO's ability to consult 
with many Palestinian experts in negotiations and legal matters. With Israel's insistence 
on secrecy and the threat to abandon the channel in case of any leak, the PLO was 
obliged to involve only a handful of Arafat's most trusted people who were not 
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qualified to conduct such complex and sensitive negotiations. Also the inability of the 
PLO delegation in Oslo to ensure secure contacts with PLO headquarters in Tunis made 
its strategy and tactics open to the Israelis, who benefited from advanced technology in 
maintaining secret and credible contacts during the negotiation process. 
Fifth, open public and media covered negotiations involve the participation of 
the public opinion in one way or another in negotiations. An agreement on the Israeli 
terms would not be easy to reach, and in the dark and in secrecy it was easier to get an 
agreement, which wi l l be a fait accompli regardless of the public opinion acceptance or 
refusal. 
Sixth, Israel was aware that it had to negotiate with the PLO in order to resolve 
the conflict, especially when it found out that the Palestinian delegation in Washington 
1 , 8 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 2, 13 September 1993. 
1 1 9 See Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 185. 
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received its orders from Tunis, in what they described as negotiations by fax and 
telephone. 
Seventh, Israel under the leadership of the leftist Labour party, with Rabin as 
Prime Minister and Shimon Peres as Foreign Minister, was relatively more willing than 
the right-wing Likud government to reach an agreement with the Palestinians. It was 
searching seriously for a way to reach that conclusion, in contrast to the former right-
wing Likud government that preferred and benefited from any Palestinian inflexibility 
to delay any agreement and dragging the negotiations for many years until there was 
nothing left to negotiate as Shamir said before the start of Madrid conference. 
Eighth, the Labour government was fully aware of the changes in the 
international political system, the realities of the New World Order and the new 
opportunities offered by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the PLO main superpower 
ally. They were also aware of the regional changes after the second Gulf War, the deep 
division of the Arab ranks and the weakness of the PLO and its financial crisis. It sought 
to seize the opportunity to get a good agreement from a strong position, which could 
serve Israel's long term interests. According to David Makovsky: "Rabin's willingness 
to explore the Oslo channel derived in part from his analysis of international and 
regional changes resulting from the end of the Cold War and the political shifts caused 
by the Gulf War." 1 2 0 
Understanding the huge change in the international arena, and the emergence of 
a new set of ideas, seemed very clear on the Israeli Labour government's side. In 
Shimon Peres words, 
The world has moved beyond having ideological confrontation, and has thus lost 
one of the principal motivations for military struggle. The world has come to 
realise that economic opportunity is available for all of mankind, black and white, 
Southerner and Northerner. Economic rivalries have begun to take the place of 
military confrontation. The military confrontations required trained armies, 
1 2 0 Makovsky, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 107. 
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fortified borders, constant vigilance and suspicion. Economic advancement 
requires a very different set of circumstances: open borders, markets that straddle 
121 
political demarcations, goodwill, good products and constant competition. 
Ninth, by using its long-range missiles against Israel, Iraq had participated in changing 
Israel's view of security. It became clear that by keeping land Israel could not guarantee 
its security. That security can be achieved by peace, and peace can be achieved by 
reconciliation and mutual recognition. This shock convinced many Israelis of the 
necessity of reaching peace with the Palestinians to secure internal security to be able to 
face external challenges. Uri Savir noted that: "It was the perception of the threat posed 
by Iranian fundamentalism, and the proliferation of non-conventional weapons in the 
hands of fanatic governments such as in Iraq, that encouraged the Oslo decision makers 
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-Rabin and Peres- to start building new coalitions against common enemies.' 
Tenth, the internal struggle for power within Israel, and the deep ideological 
division in the Israeli society between the radical ideological right and the moderate left 
contributed to the Labour government's pursuit of Oslo. Reaching an agreement with 
the PLO would create facts on the ground and end the ideological claims that formed 
the basis for the Israeli right. 
Eleventh, the Israeli leadership presented by Rabin and Peres was aware that 
Israel needs in the long term the acceptance of its neighbours, integration into the region 
and that it can not stay isolated for ever from its immediate environment or dependent 
on the power of the USA to protect it. It was also aware that the road to this acceptance 
and recognition starts with reaching settlement with the Palestinians as this is the core of 
the conflict and agreement with the Palestinians is the key to peace with Jordan, Syria 
and Lebanon and ultimately to comprehensive peace in the Middle East and recognition 
1 2 1 Peres, (1995), Op. Cit, pp. 374. 
1 2 2 Savir, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 312. 
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from and economic integration into a new Middle East. 
Twelfth, the moderate leftist Israelis -the peace camp- believe that Israel's 
control of another people and treating them with brutality under military occupation 
destroys Israel's moral bases and the tradition of the Jewish people which was 
oppressed throughout its history and does not want to oppress another people. Thus to 
improve its image, which had been highly damaged by the Intifada that started in 1987, 
was important to them. 
Thirteenth, there was a strong belief, which was later proved correct, that any 
agreement with the PLO would lead to take Israel out of its international isolation or its 
international wilderness as Uri Savir put it. Thus obtaining recognition from more 
countries and improving its economy by lifting the Arab boycott that was imposed on 
international companies dealing with Israel. 
Fourteenth, Rabin and Peres as historical leaders and veterans who had a very 
long experience with the conflict and its suffering wished to resolve the conflict and 
achieve some thing for their people and to write their names in the history book. 
Fifteenth, Rabin realised that the time was suitable for reaching an agreement 
with the PLO, specially after all changes in its doctrine in the last two decades. 
I f we ever want to give a serious chance to a solution of the Palestinian-Israeli 
problem, now is the time and the partner is the PLO, after it rid itself of all things 
123 
for which I loathed it. 
Sixteenth, The Israeli leadership realised before any thing else that unless they 
recognised the 'new' PLO and sign a deal with it in which it can impose its control on 
the Occupied Territories the increased popularity of the militant groups together with 
the deterioration in the economic and social situation in the territories will make any 
acceptable solution impossible. This has been emphasised by the Israeli president Ezra 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED/1, 13 September 1993. 
THE OSLO P E A C E PROCESS 309 
Wiesman, Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin. Rabin told the Israeli people in an 
interview with IBA TV that " I f we did not provide the Palestinians with a ray of light 
and hope, their despair would have played into the hands of the murderous, extremist 
124 
Islam." 
For the PLO the reasons behind its going to secret negotiations in a back channel 
in Oslo with Norwegian help and under academic cover are also many; international, 
125 
regional, domestic and personal. 
First, on the international level, there is no doubt that the changes to the structure 
of the international system and the conditions of the New World Order were an essential 
reason behind the dramatic change in the PLO position. Arafat pointed out in an 
interview with Shlomo Ganor that: 
Both of us (Rabin and he) realised that there had been international changes. The 
Soviet Union had ended. The Berlin Wall fell. There have been changes in the 
world. Seeing these changes, people can not stand with folded arms amid these 
sweeping currents that are shaking the whole world. Therefore, and given this 
thinking it was necessary for us to find a way to reach an agreement. The 
agreement on principles that we have reached is a step on the road. This means 
that we have both understood the international equation under the New World 
~ , 1 2 6 Order. 
Second, the defeat of Iraq and the changes in the regional balance of power in Israel's 
favour, the unprecedented division of the Arab countries together with its loss of the 
financial and diplomatic support especially from the GCC countries which led to its 
bankruptcy, contributed in pushing the PLO leadership towards making more 
concessions which it might have refused to make had it enjoyed Arab, international and 
superpower support. 
1 2 4 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 1,13 September 1993. 
125Tessler, (1994), Op. Cit , p. 754. 
126 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 10,15 September 1993. 
THE OSLO PEACE PROCESS 310 
Third, the PLO saw in the coming to power in Israel of the Labour party an 
opportunity to be seized.'27 Any initiative should be responded to positively even i f it 
was not good enough, in the hope of improving it gradually and taking the carpet from 
under the feat of the Israeli right-wing which sought to accelerate the creation of facts 
on the ground by expanding settlements and realising the dream of Greater Israel. As 
Yezid Sayigh pointed out: the election of Labour Party leader Yitzhak Rabin at the head 
of a new government in Israel in June 1992 raised PLO hopes of significant progress in 
128 
the peace talks. 
Fourth, the PLO sought to exploit the sympathetic atmosphere created over the 
previous five years by the Intifada, which had changed the world view of the inhabitants 
of the Occupied Territories to a people who were fighting to achieve their independence 
and who wished to reach with this momentum a positive result before the Intifada could 
129 
cool down with time. 
Fifth, the PLO's leaders sought international recognition as the sole 
representative for the Palestinian people. Thus they sought to reach any agreement 
through themselves instead of through the Palestinian delegation in Washington, which 
might give credibility to the leadership of that delegation which was composed of local 
130 
representatives from the Occupied Territories. 
Sixth, some believe that the PLO's acceptance in entering the Oslo process and 
accepting a phased solution did not contradict its plan of liberating Palestine in stages, 
1 2 7 Tessler, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 755. 
1 2 8 Sayigh, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 652. 
1 2 9 Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 26, Also Karsh, E., From Rabin to Netanyahu: Israel's 
Troubled Agenda, (London: Frank Cass, 1977), p. 124. 
1 3 0 Karsh, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 140, See also Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 67. 
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starting with establishing a Palestinian State on any liberated part of historical Palestine. 
The reasons behind the PLO's going to Madrid and Oslo were summarised by Abu 
Mazen in his book Through Secret Channels. He wrote that: 
The peace accord we signed at the White House in Washington DC on 13 
September 1993 did not just happen by chance, nor did it happen as a result of 
negotiations in the United States or Oslo. Rather, it resulted from a cumulative 
build-up to which the media and the political and military activities of the 
Palestinian Revolution had contributed. Moreover, there was the immense 
contribution of the six years of uprising, the Intifada, which had claimed and 
maimed thousands of children, women and men as its victims. The end of the 
Cold War and its consequences, the break-up of the socialist camp and the trauma 
caused by the Gulf war also played their part in the political windmill. The 
extensive networks of contacts which the PLO had set up with local Israeli and 
international Jewish factions, which were (or became) champions of peace, played 
an important role in the transformation and convergence of Israeli public 
131 
opimon. 
Yair Hirschfeld wrote that Abu Mazen explains that the 1982 Lebanon War and the 
subsequent expulsion of the PLO from Beirut were major steps in this process, as they 
enabled the PLO "to see clearly the totality of both the external and internal issues," 
rebuild their "inner structure", and strengthen their "links with the occupied territories 
in order to gain support for the nascent features of political settlement." Abu Mazen also 
portrays the Intifada as a milestone by stating that the uprising induced and forced the 
PLO to accept United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. This in turn, allowed 
the Palestinians to begin discussing the possibility of becoming Israel's negotiating 
partner. 
Seventh, the financial crisis that faced the PLO after the Gulf Crisis not only 
pushed it to agree on Palestinian Participation in Madrid under the Jordanian umbrella 
132 
but also to enter a secret negotiation with Israel to survive its ever worst position. 
1 3 1 Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., pp. 17-18. 
1 3 2 Hassassian, M. , "U.S. National Interests in the Middle East," Palestine-Israel 
Journal, vol. iv, no. 3, 1997, p. 50, See also, Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 87. 
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Eighth, the speedy decline of its popularity in the Occupied Territories played a 
role in the PLO's participation in Madrid and then obliged it to agree on the secret 
channel in order to reach a speedy solution that could rescue her from bankruptcy and 
decline.'3 3 
Ninth, the PLO's attempt to benefit from the political changes inside Israel, 
following the victory of Rabin in the 1992 election forced it to agree on any method that 
134 
could lead to its re-engagement in the peace process. 
These reasons, and others that were less important, played a role in changing the 
PLO's initial position, towards the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For 
all these reasons and others the two parties, the Israeli Labour Government and PLO 
leadership, found themselves in great need of a secret channel to negotiate directly to 
reach a breakthrough and define principals for settlement in the form of a Declaration of 
Principles to clarify the main lines for the solution. There is no doubt that there were 
previous secret contacts between the PLO and a number of Israeli peace activists but 
they never mounted to an official level, and that was mainly due to the Israeli law that 
ban any contacts with the PLO as a terrorist organisation. 
The idea of getting a third party to facilitate contacts and the idea of starting the 
talks secretly under academic cover, were all aimed in Israel's point of view at keeping 
the way open, as not for the contacts to be a kind of recognition of PLO before making 
sure that the PLO will agree on all its main conditions, especially accepting the interim 
transitional solution of five years, recognition of Israel and its right to live in peace and 
security, postponement of all issues perceived by Israel as sensitive and difficult to 
In Netanyahu's view, the PLO was on the verge of collapse, but Israel breathed new 
life into it. (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/ 1782, MED/7, 1/9/1993. 
134Hassassian, (1997), Op. Cit., pp. 50-51. 
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solve because Israel will not be ready to make concessions on it such as Jerusalem, 
settlements, refugee and borders. 
Implementation of Oslo Agreement 
Following the signing of the DOP in Washington, the Israeli government and the PLO 
faced the difficult process of implementing the written document. The difficulties arose 
from different angles, first of which was the ambiguity in the texts themselves. The 
second was the time frame, which delays the full implementation by five years. The 
third was the strong opposition by extremists on both Israeli and Palestinian sides. The 
fourth was the American position towards the process and its failure to persuade Israel 
by any means to implement the signed agreements within the schedule set by the 
agreement and witnessed by the USA president himself. 
The increasing violence within Israel and the Palestinian Occupied Territories 
immediately after the agreement created fears and mistrust among both peoples. The 
Hebron massacre in particular was a great blow to the process as it happened just a few 
weeks before the conclusion of the negotiations of the first detailed agreement on the 
practical implementation of the DOP. The implementation process took different stages 
and required several agreements and difficult and complex negotiations mixed with 
many involving bloodshed incidents. The assassination of Rabin by an extremist Israeli 
Jew and the assassination of Fathi Shaqaqi and Yahya Ayash and other Palestinian 
militants by Israel have also had a negative impact on the whole reconciliation process. 
The subsequent agreements wi l l be discussed in the coming section in an attempt 
to understand not only their content but also the atmosphere in which they were 
negotiated and signed. The Cairo agreement, and Taba agreement (Oslo II) that were 
negotiated and signed during Rabin's period will be discussed, along with the Hebron 
protocol and the Wye River memorandum that were negotiated and signed during 
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Netanyahu's period in office. The negotiation process is continuing and wil l take 
another few years to be completed under the new Barak government but this wil l be 
beyond the scope of this study. 
The Cairo Agreement 
On the 4 t h of May 1994, after seven months of negotiations the Israeli government and 
the PLO agreed on the practical terms of implementing the Gaza-Jericho agreement. 
The Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area was signed in Cairo by Arafat 
135 
and Rabin and consisted of a preamble and 23 articles. It provided for the withdrawal 
of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area and the transfer of civil 
powers in these areas to a Palestinian Authority. 
For Yitzhak Rabin: "The interim agreement consists of two parts: giving the 
Palestinians authority to run their lives; and giving ourselves responsibility for Israel's 
external security and defence of the settlements, including settlers' movements within 
136 
the territories. Gaza-Jericho is the first stage of the interim agreement." The 
atmosphere during that time was dominated by the suicide bombing of Hamas militants 
and Hebron Massacre by a Jewish extremist settler on 25 February 1994. 
The response to the Cairo agreement was similar to the response to the DOP. 
Shimon Peres said of the agreement "A new baby has been born", despite problems at 
. . 137 
signing ceremony. 
1 3 5 See Appendices, p. 380. 
1 3 6 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 4, 6 May 1994. 
1 3 7 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED, 4 May 1994. 
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Those who rejected the previous agreement continued their rejection to the new 
138 
one. Syria declared that it rejects any phased, partial, separate solutions. The 
Lebanese Foreign Minister wished the Palestinians success, but criticised the agreement. 
Libya rejected the Cairo agreement as it rejected the previous one and said there would 
139 
be "no stability or security in the region until Israel is removed." The PFLP and 
DFLP rejected the agreement and PFLP-GC leader Ahmed Jibril denounced it as: 
An actual translation of the capitulatory deal Arafat accepted in Washington .. .the 
agreement completely avoided mentioning Jerusalem, the capital of the 
Palestinian people...it was also void of the right to repatriation and self 
determination and did not mention the large scale settlement in the West Bank and 
140 
Gaza Strip. 
Jordan, the GCC countries and Tunisia welcomed the agreement. Morocco however 
141 
said the agreement was a good start but was not enough in itself. The agreement was 
carried out in the atmosphere of the suicide bombing and the Hebron massacres. In 
other words, it was initially delayed and then ultimately shaped, by the environment in 
Israel and the Palestinian areas. It was also the first instance of Israel abandoning of the 
timetable set by the DOP. The signing of the agreement on May 1994 was effectively a 
delay of six month on the originally agreed upon time schedule. 
The Taba Agreement (Oslo II) 
The Palestinian-Israeli Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, (Oslo II) 
agreement was signed by Arafat and Rabin in Washington on 28 September 19995. The 
1 3 8 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 2, 2 May 1994. 
1 3 9 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 12, 6 May 1994. 
1 4 0 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 11,6 May 1994. 
1 4 1 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 11,6 May 1994. 
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400 page agreement was initialled by Arafat and Peres in Taba on 24 August, and 
142 
detailed the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. 
Not only President Clinton attended the signing ceremony but also King Hussein 
of Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt. As John Roberts observed, that meant that: 
"should any future government in Israel consider formal repudiation of the agreement, 
in political terms it would be tantamount to saying they did not accept the validity of 
Israel's peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, and that they did not accept the necessity 
143 
for close relations with the United States." 
There was to be a staged Israeli withdrawal beginning on 8 October; in the first 
stage, the Israeli Army wil l withdraw from the cities of Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm, 
Qalqilya, Ramallah and Bethlehem; in the second stage, a further 450 Arab towns and 
villages would see an Israeli withdrawal. However, overall security in the region was 
still to be maintained by the Israeli Army. 
The agreement was attacked by Syria and from the Palestinian organisations 
opposed to the Oslo process. The PFLP for example accused Yasser Arafat of 
abandoning Jerusalem and leaving Hebron under the control of the Israeli army and 
Jewish settlers. The atmosphere in which the Taba agreement was negotiated and 
implemented was similar to that of the Cairo agreement. The agreement was seen by 
many Israelis as "fundamental heresy" and contributed to the assassination of Yitzhak 
144 
Rabin on 4 November 1995 and the start of a new stage. 
The assassination of Rabin a few weeks after the signing of the agreement left its 
1 4 2 See Appendices, p. 392. 
1 4 3 Roberts, J., "Oslo I I : The September 1995 Palestinian-Israeli Accord," IBRU 
Boundary and Security Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 3, Autumn 1995, pp. 41-43. 
1 4 4 Abdul Hadi, ( 1997), Op. Cit., p. 328. 
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implementation in jeopardy. Shimon Peres who became Prime Minister promised to 
continue the process but delayed some of its parts (withdrawal from Hebron) hoping 
that this would help him win the general elections. The February and March 1996 
suicide bombings and the Grapes of Wrath military operation in Lebanon contributed to 
his defeat and the coming to power of Benjamin Netanyahu, heading a right wing and 
anti Oslo coalition government. The first test for this government was the 
implementation of the signed agreements, first of which was Hebron agreement. 
The American involvement in negotiating both the Cairo and Taba agreements 
was minimal. This was due to the fact that the USA administration saw the Rabin-Peres 
government as a 'peace' government that should be allowed to conduct the negotiations 
with less intervention or involvement from outside parties. This policy was to change 
slightly when the American interests were to be affected by the right-wing Netanyahu's 
government, as we wil l see when discussing the Hebron and Wye River agreements. It 
should be noted, however, that the United States was determined that its own 
administration should play a leading role in the ceremonies of the agreements, 
indicative of the fact that they took place with American endorsement and conformed to 
America's vision for the Middle East. In other words, Clinton took some credit for the 
agreements and made sure that America's role in the region remained predominant. 
The Hebron Agreement 
The election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel's Prime Minister in May 1996 marked a 
turning point. His victory was due to the nature of Israel's first direct prime ministerial 
elections and his constructing a coalition with a new 'peace with security' agenda. As 
Bickerton and Klausner pointed out "in the 1996 election campaign, Netanyahu played 
145 
the terrorism card and won." His coalition of right wing and religious groups took a 
1 4 5 Bickerton and Klausner, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 300. 
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very different approach towards peace from that of the Labour government under Rabin 
and Peres. Land and security were the main problematic issues in the relations between 
the two sides. While the Oslo process was based on a negotiated transfer of land within 
a five-year period designed to build confidence and bringing them to a compromise 
final solution, Netanyahu began his rule in June 1996 with his widely known 
reservations about the whole 'peace process'. In his campaign speeches he had asserted 
that Jerusalem would remain Israel's undivided capital, and that Israel reserved the right 
146 
to enter the Palestinian self-rule areas i f necessary. He declared his intention to 
renegotiate the agreement in line with his campaign slogan "peace with security", a 
147 
euphemism for sweeping annexation. John Whitbeck wrote that: "Netanyahu pledged 
to his Likud Party's congress in September 1996 that: "You can dream every night and 
you will still wake up every morning and see there is no Palestinian state . . . there is not 
and there will not be a Palestinian state." He insisted that "the most the Palestinians wil l 
get within the frame of the peace process is a limited autonomy" which, logically and 
legally, would require Israeli annexation of the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip. He 
148 
even declared that the West Bank is 'part of Israel proper'." Nonetheless, Netanyahu 
was eventually pressured into starting implementation of the Hebron Agreement against 
his own and his party's wishes. This period saw the United States taking a more 
determined role in events. It was not prepared to see the peace process stall and adjusted 
the nature of its own participation accordingly. The expectation that USA should play a 
1 4 6 Ibid., p. 301. 
1 4 7 Aruri, N., "The US role in the peace process, and Leaving redeployment to Israel," 
Middle East International, no. 551, 21 March 1997, pp. 16-17. 
1 4 8 Whitbeck, J., "The Palestinian state exists," Middle East International, no. 576, 5 
June 1998, p. 21. 
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direct role had stemmed in part from the fact that the original Cairo and Taba 
agreements, of which Hebron was a part, were signed under the USA's auspices. It was 
inconceivable, therefore, that they should be allowed to fail as that would imply 
weakness on the part of the USA. 
The signing of the Hebron agreement on the 17 th of January 1997 did not present 
an essential turning point in the Middle East peace process. The original Hebron 
agreement was in fact signed between the Israeli Labour government and the Palestinian 
National Authority on 28 September 1995. The implementation of the redeployment 
that was suppose to start in March 1996 was postponed until after the Israeli elections so 
as not to affect Peres' chances of winning it. It seemed that Arafat agreed to this 
postponement -in addition to the fact that he could do nothing to force its 
implementation- to prevent the Benjamin Netanyahu-led Likud Party from using this 
sensitive issue in its campaign against the Peres-led Labour Party. The defeat of Shimon 
Peres and the rise of Netanyahu to power affected not only the Hebron agreement but 
also the whole Oslo process, as we wi l l see in the coming discussion. There is no doubt 
that the suicide bombings in January and February 1996 illustrated Peres's weakness 
and affected his position. On the other hand it played into Netanyahu's hands and made 
him preferable to the Israeli electorate. 
It took more than seven months after Netanyahu assumed power and one 
hundred and twenty six days of complex and difficult negotiations that continued from 9 
149 
September 1996 to 15 July 1997 to finally reach and sign the Hebron Agreement. In 
150 
fact a re-negotiation took place of the Cairo agreement. The text of the agreement 
1 4 9 See Appendices, p. 397. 
1 5 0 Middle East Studies Centre., Hebron Agreement: A Likud Model for the Final 
Settlement, (Amman: Dar Al Bashir, 1997), p. 11. 
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showed the expected approach of the Likud party in dealing with the issues of the final 
status, and the domination of security issues on most of its articles and annexes. The 
text is full of exceptional security arrangements for the 400 Jewish settlers. 
The agreement mentioned that "The Palestinian police take the jurisdictions in 
the area H I similar as those in the other West Bank cities" while Israel hold in its hands 
security responsibilities in area H2, in addition to overall security responsibilities for 
Israelis. The Hebron agreement, as Edward Said, wrote did not do any thing to change 
Israel's control on the West Bank and Gaza Strip and showed the Palestinian 
Authority's acquiescence to the continuation of Israeli sovereignty. Its significance -
according to some- lay in the acceptance by Netanyahu of the Oslo formula, the 
acquiescence by Arafat in the presence of Jewish settlers in Hebron, and the critical role 
152 
played by the United States in securing the accord. 
The division of Hebron makes it possible for the Israelis to use it as a precedent 
153 
to maintain their settlements all over the West Bank. Netanyahu told the Knesset that 
154 
"We are not leaving Hebron. We are not re-deploying from Hebron but in Hebron." 
The Hebron agreement is effectively a division of the city that maintains Israeli security 
control and, most significantly, legitimises the existing Israeli settlements in its heart.155 
This might undermine Palestinians' position at the final status talks. 
1 5 1 Ibid., pp. 7-43. 
1 5 2 Bickerton and Klausner, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 305. 
1 5 3 Said, E., "The Real Meaning of Hebron Agreement." Journal of Palestine Studies, 
vol. 26, no 103, p. 31. 
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The Hebron issue showed how ultimately, and despite its willingness to become 
actively involved in the peace process when the prospect of failure loomed, the United 
States was not able or willing to put enough pressure on Israel to fully implement even 
the signed agreements. The intervention of President Mubarak and King Hussein in 
what seemed at the time a very big crisis around renegotiating and implementing a 
previously signed agreement showed the difficulties ahead in negotiating the final status 
issues especially under an Israeli right wing government. As Bickerton observed 
156 
"President Clinton was unable to persuade Netanyahu to moderate his views." 
In the final analysis the Hebron agreement crisis showed more than any thing 
how the Oslo general framework was vague and ambiguous and how the stronger party 
which is in this case uses its ambiguity clearly is Israel. It showed also how the absence 
of the arbitration issue that the Israelis succeeded in removing from the first draft of the 
DOP affected negatively the Palestinian side during the difficult implementation 
process. 
Nasser Aruri pointed out rightly that, 
The single most dangerous aspect of this new agreement (virtually Oslo III) is 
Arafat's acquiescence to the decision to cede to Israel, now in writing, the right to 
determine the extent of territory and number of forces that would be affected by 
the required redeployment in Area B during the interim phase. 
The new negotiation terms and concepts imposed by the Netanyahu government, 
and the American reluctance to face the Israeli breach of signed agreements, all together 
with the new concessions the Palestinians were obliged to make even over the Oslo 
framework itself, gave a clear indication of where the whole process was going. The 
1 5 5 Said, (1997), Op. Cit., pp. 31-36. 
1 5 6 Bickerton and Klausner, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 301. 
1 5 7 Aruri, N . , "The US role in the peace process. 1) From Madrid to Hebron," Middle 
East International, 7 March 1997, p. 17. 
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crisis in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations continued even after the signing of Hebron 
protocol. The unwillingness of the Netanyahu government to implement the further 
withdrawal required by previous agreements, plus its opening of a Hasmonean Tunnel 
exit onto the Via Dolorosa and the expansion of settlements created an explosive 
atmosphere. It forced the USA to play a much more active role in order to calm the 
situation that could, i f it escalated, damage its interests in the region. The USA's 
invitation to the parties to hold extensive negotiations in Wye plantation and President 
Clinton personal involvement marked a different American approach. 
Wye River Memorandum 
Apart from the Hebron agreement which showed the new Israeli Likud government's 
attitude of disrespect towards the Oslo process by its renegotiations of a signed 
agreement, nothing more happened to advance peace and reconciliation between Israelis 
and Palestinians for some time. 
Netanyahu's government decision on March 17, 1997 to begin construction of a 
new Jewish settlement on Gabal Abu Ghneem (Har-Homa in Hebrew) in East Jerusalem 
158 
angered the Palestinians and brought the peace process to a halt. The Palestinian 
extremists responded with more suicide bombings while the Israeli government 
confirmed on 2 April 1997 that it has approved further expansion of Jewish settlements 
in the West Bank. The crisis in the peace process continued through 1997 with 
Netanyahu's government's failure to implement the further withdrawal required by the 
, _ , 159 
signed Oslo agreements. 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19/3/1997 (ME/ 2871 MED1). 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 2893 MED/ 10, 15/4/1997. 
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USA intervention to find a way out continued but Dennis Ross failed on May 6, 
1997 to convince both parties to soften their positions and Netanyahu turned down on 
March 20, 1998, an American proposal that Israel withdraw from 13.1 percent of the 
160 
West Bank. It was only in August 24, 1998 that Netanyahu accepted the USA's 
proposal to turn over 13.1 percent of the West Bank to the Palestinians as long as 3 
percent of it was designated as a nature reserve and USA Secretary of State Madeleine 
161 
Albright announced m Gaza that a peace summit would be held in the Umted States. 
Amid a personal scandal for President Clinton, Arafat and Netanyahu met him at the 
162 
White House on September. The summit restarted on October 15 at the Aspen 
Institute's Wye River Conference Centre and culminated in an agreement known as the 
163 
Wye River memorandum. 
The Wye Plantation memorandum was signed on 23 October 1998 by Arafat and 
Netanyahu under USA auspices, and presented another example of the clear American 
164 
alignment to Israel. As Donald Neff observed, "In a highly unusual admission of the 
administration's dependence on the Israeli lobby, one official admitted, anonymously, 
that Clinton particularly did not want to alienate conservative Jews, many of whom 
support Israel's hard-liners, because the Democratic party is relying on them to help pay 
165 
of f the large debt left over from its costly 1996 election campaign." The agreement 
1 6 0 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 3183 MED/1,24/3/1998. 
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was a package of measures designed to restore the peace process. These measures 
included Israeli withdrawal from 13 % of the West Bank over a period of 90 days, 
transfer of 14.2% of West Bank land from joint Israeli-Palestinian control to Palestinian 
control, setting up a joint Palestinian-Israeli committee to discuss third-phase troop 
withdrawals, the create of safe passage corridor for the free movement of Palestinians 
from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, opening a Palestinian airport and seaport, 
releasing 750 Palestinian political prisoners in three stages, Palestinian action against 
militant groups and arrest of 30 people accused by Israel of terrorism, Palestinian 
submission of detailed plan of action against alleged terrorists to the CIA and 
eliminating anti-Israeli clauses in the Palestinian Covenant calling for the destruction of 
166 
Israel. 
Netanyahu, with American support, managed to swap the land for peace 
principle that is the basic element in Madrid process with land for security. Arafat made 
many concessions and got very little. Under American pressure he committed his 
Authority to crackdown on Hamas and to destroying its civilian and military 
infrastructure and protecting Israel -a duty- that exceeded the Palestinian authority's 
capability. At Wye, as Dilip Hiro mentioned, "Arafat signed another chapter of what (in 
167 
Edward Said's analogy) has become the Palestinian Versailles." 
Although many Palestinians -especially those who opposed the Oslo process-
see this agreement as another betrayal by Arafat and that it stops a lot shorter than their 
expectation of Israeli withdrawal from all the West Bank or even the 30% that the 
International, no. 548, 18 April 1997, p. 3. 
1 6 6 BBC Summary of world Broadcasts, ME 3368 MED/1, 27/10/1998. 
1 6 7 Hiro, D., "The End of Oslo: The Fateful Date of 4 May 1999," Middle East 
International, no. 586, 30 October 1998, p. 15. 
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Palestinian authority was asking for, some Israelis see it from a similar angle. An article 
in the Jerusalem Post predicted that "the Wye Memorandum will come to be known in 
168 
Israel's troubled history as the Great Betrayal." 
It encompasses the betrayal of solemn promises made to the people of Israel, the 
betrayal of the Jewish inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza and the hitherto 
greatest threat to Israel's security... It follows in the footsteps of its predecessors, 
the Oslo I and I I Agreements... I f the Oslo Agreements have set the stage for the 
creation of a Palestinian state, the Wye Memorandum has gone a significant step 
toward solidifying the sovereignty of that state through two important 
concessions. It has granted the Palestinian entity a more coherent geographical 
configuration, encompassing a significantly greater degree of territorial 
contiguity. It has given the Palestinian Authority control of entry and exit of 
people and goods to and from its territory. 
The Wye River Memorandum enabled the United States to extend a protective umbrella 
over the Palestinian entity and its authority. The American presence as an arbiter, 
inspector and guarantor is clear in the agreement. Some Palestinians see that the CIA 
presence is against them while some Israelis think that it serves the Palestinians because 
"the American involvement in virtually every aspect of implementation undermined the 
vital importance of ensuring maximal bilateral reciprocity and mutual responsibility in 
169 
the execution of the undertaking in Israeli-Palestinian accords." 
In addition to the Wye River memorandum President Bil l Clinton gave 
Netanyahu a series of unprecedented assurances in five letters, one from the American 
Secretary of State to Benjamin Netanyahu and four from the American Ambassador to 
170 
Israel Edward Woker to Dam Naveh the secretary of the Israeli government. The 
USA repeats in these letters its "strong commitment to Israel's security" and that the 
USA will not adopt any position or express any views on the extent of the next Israeli 
168 Jerusalem Post, 27/10/1998. 
169 Jerusalem Post, 27/10/1998. 
17ft 
For the letters of assurances addressed to Dani Naveh, see appendices, p. 390. 
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withdrawal from the West Bank. Also the USA agreed that "Israel alone wi l l decide its 
security needs" and that the USA "opposes and will oppose" any unilateral declaration 
of Palestinian State. Clinton's domestic problems and scandals had forced him to seek 
Israeli's lobby support. 
Signed in October, the Wye accords set up a three-phased framework for Israeli 
withdrawal from 13 percent of the West Bank, in return for security assurances and 
other measures from the Palestinians. During the first phase of implementation, which 
was carried out in full , Israel redeployed from 2% of area C (fully controlled Israeli 
territory) to area B (under joint Israeli-Palestinian control) and 7.1% of area B to area A 
(fully Palestinian-controlled territory). The Palestinians, in turn, shared their security 
plan with the USA and began implementing it. They also began confiscating illegal 
weapons and setting the stage for cutting the Palestinian Police. The PNC, meanwhile, 
reaffirmed the nullification of the sections of the Palestinian charter calling for Israel's 
destruction. During the second phase, the Palestinians continued implementing their 
security plan - but not to former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's satisfaction. His 
cabinet, citing the need for reciprocity and pointing out that Israel was scheduled to 
carry out the second part of the redeployment only after it was satisfied that the 
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Palestinians had earned out their part of the deal, postponed the next withdrawal. 
The USA's direct involvement in the negotiation process increased during 
Netanyahu's period comparing to the Rabin-Peres period. The main reason for this is 
that Netanyahu's tough policies inflamed the situation and threatened the whole Middle 
East peace process. The movement on the peace process was an American interest and 
that can explain its more active role in both the Hebron and Wye River negotiations. 
Jerusalem Post, 7/7/1999. 
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United States' Connection 
The matter of the USA's knowledge and its giving the green light to the Oslo channel is 
beyond question for many reasons. The kind of "very special relations" between Israel 
and the United States and America's status as the only international superpower and 
regional hegemon made it impossible for the channel to succeed or even to start without 
the USA' blessing. 
Terje Rod Larsen who played an important role in the Oslo secret channel is the 
one who can be aware more than any one else of any American role in the process. In an 
interview with the Middle East Insight he made it clear that no other party -a country, 
person or organisation- played a role in the peace process which could match the United 
States' role. 
The American administration has played, is playing and must play the leading role 
as a third party in the peace process. There is no nation; there is no multilateral 
172 
institution, which can replace the American role. 
I f it was easy to prove the USA' influence on the parties to attend the Madrid peace 
conference, thus proving the effect of the New World Order on the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
it was much more difficult, but not impossible, to prove the USA' involvement in 
Oslo's secret negotiations. 
It was neither possible or neither important nor desirable to leave the United 
States in the dark. It would be very unlikely that Israel would not have involved the 
USA in negotiations while they were bound by a strategic alliance. The Israelis, 
especially the Rabin government, could not afford to negotiate a deal and then surprise 
its only strategic ally and protector. However, the apparent absence of the USA during 
the first Oslo channel can be understood as part of a strategy. The USA would always 
support Israel and its need and demands concerning its existence, security and 
1 7 2 Larsen, T., "Oslo Plus Five: The Spirit of Oslo, Interview," Middle East Insight, vol. 
xii i , no. 6, November 1998, p. 29. 
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requirement towards the settlement of its conflict with the Palestinians and Arab 
countries. 
Obviously, Israel today would not be the powerful and prosperous nation it is 
without the US. And it would not long remain so i f the US abruptly cut of f its 
support. It is absurd to suggest that the US have no power to influence Israel to 
live up to its commitments and behave as a worthy US ally. Moreover, it is foolish 
to assert that the US, while supposedly not a party, is a ' ful l partner' in the peace 
process. It has never been a full partner, certainly not in the sense of being an 
honest mediator. Instead it has repeatedly deserted its own policies to side with 
173 
Israeli policy against America's own interests and those of the Arab world. 
Indeed, as John King pointed out, the USA was informed of the negotiations mediated 
by Norway and taking place in Oslo. As early as the second round of negotiations Yair 
174 
Hirschfeld told Abu Ala that the United States gave the channel its blessing. 
The American official in charge of the USA delegation at the multilateral 
negotiations, Dan Kurtzer, debriefed Hirschfeld. Like the Israelis, the Norwegians 
informed the USA about the Oslo track before it was completely underway.175 Jan 
Egeland had already told Kurtzer in November 1992 that Norway was contemplating an 
informal link between Israel and the Palestinians. The United States apparently gave its 
176 
blessing to the opening of another informal channel. Even before that and particularly 
in early July, Peres told USA charge d'affair William Brown that Israel was going to 
177 
reach a deal with the PLO. Moreover during Christopher's visit to the region m early 
Neff, D., "The US and the peace process - hiding from reality," Middle East 
International, no. 558,12 September 1997, p. 17. 
1 7 4 Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 138. 
1 7 5Makovsky, (1996), Op, Cit., p. 26. 
1 7 6 King, (1994), Op. Cit., pp. 113-114 
1 7 7Makovsky, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 27. 
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August 1993, two weeks before the Oslo agreement was initialled, Peres updated him 
178 
about Oslo. Peres even often tried to utilise the Americans to introduce proposals that 
he thought would be rejected i f he was recognised publicly (or even by Rabin) as their 
179 
source. 
The Palestinians were concerned about the uncontrolled spread of information 
about the secret channel. Abu Ala told Hirschfeld that, 
We are also anxious to keep it (the channel) secret, but we were surprised to find 
that Steve Cohen was aware of it and speaking about it in a way that embarrassed 
us, especially because he talked to people who have no relation whatsoever with 
matters of this sort. 
Another account affirms that after each of the meetings in Norway, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Egeland made a report to the USA' State Department, while State Department 
official Dan Kurtzer was also monitoring the talks, so that the Americans must have 
181 
known the detail of what was going on. 
Abu Mazen made it clear that from the beginning both the Israelis and the 
Palestinians agreed to inform other parties. 
When the negotiations began in Oslo, the Israeli delegation suggested that the 
American administration and the Egyptian government should be informed. When 
the Palestinian delegation conveyed this suggestion to us in Tunis we agreed on 
condition that the Israelis would inform the American administration and that we 
would inform the Egyptian government. Shimon Peres duly told Warren 
182 
Christopher and Dan Kurtzer. 
8 Ibid., p. 27. 
9 Ibid., p. 26. 
0 Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 138. 
1 King, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 105. 
2 Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 185. 
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The secrecy of Oslo is an exaggerated story. Mahmoud Abbas said clearly that 
protecting the secrecy of the negotiations in the Oslo channel was impossible for 
entirely practical considerations. He disclosed that while Israel informed the USA, the 
183 
PLO informed Egypt, Russia, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Morocco. 
On the international level the co-sponsors could not be kept in the dark, and in any 
event we imagined that even i f we did not tell them, their intelligence services 
would find out. As the Israelis had officially informed the Americans, we felt it 
. 1 8 4 
incumbent on us to inform the Russians. 
Jane Corbin pointed out that Norway informed the United States in early stage: 
After Peres had broken the news that a peace deal had been concluded with the 
PLO, the Norwegian Foreign Minister was anxious to make it clear that Norway 
had kept America informed about the Oslo Channel. He reminded Christopher 
that Thorvald Stoltenberg and Jan Egeland had submitted general reports on the 
secret talks. In January Egeland had invited the Americans to participate, and 
Hoist himself had given Christopher an early draft of the Declaration of 
Principles. 
The fact that Peres tried to persuade the Americans to present the interim self-
government agreement as an USA-brokered document gave the indication that the 
186 
Israelis has done this before. 
My emphasis on clarifying the fact that the USA was informed of the Oslo secret 
channel is due to the widely spread notion that the channel was a highly protected secret 
between Israel and the PLO. The American real involvement however increased 
following the Washington signing on 13 September 1993. The USA's role changed 
during the different stages of the process. From simply being kept informed during the 
183 Ibid., pp. 186-189 
184 Ibid., p. 188. 
185 Corbin, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 175. 
186 Ibid., p. 177. 
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secret channel, the USA became involved in the peace process in different degrees 
during the different phases of the negotiations. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
the American administration found itself obliged to make much intervention during 
Netanyahu government's stage. The American involvement in the Wye River 
negotiations for instance illustrates the USA's increased concern. The gradual 
development of the USA's role reflects its concern about its interests in the region that 
could be affected according to the march of the peace process. The New World Order 
that the USA had worked hard to create and impose, especially in the Middle East, 
required her to take a much more active role concerning the region's main issues, the 
most important of which is the Arab-Israeli peace process. The contradiction between 
its desire to present itself as the only superpower on one hand and its inability to force 
Israel to adopt a much acceptable approach concerning the peace process on the other 
damaged its position in the region. The USA has without a doubt a hegemonic position 
in the area, but was unable or unwilling or both to use this position against Israel for 
domestic reasons that we mentioned them repeatedly throughout this thesis. In sum one 
can argue that America has determined its interests to be the preservation of a friendly 
relationship with Israel and the achievement of peace in the region. The actual and 
specific features of that peace are not of interest to America and it will use its influence 
on Israel only to the extent that the peace process is not allowed to stall. It is unwilling 
to use its influence to force any specific conditions upon Israel. Therefore it ensures that 
one way or another American interests prevail over the regional efforts to make peace. 
THE OSLO P E A C E PROCESS 332 
Conclusion 
From examining the Oslo process in all its stages, it is important to draw some 
conclusions. The important point that has to be made her is that Israel succeeded in 
exploiting the international and regional atmosphere to achieve one of its long time 
goals of getting Palestinian and Arab recognition of its right to exist as a sovereign state 
within secure and recognised borders. As some Israeli leaders made it clear, the signing 
of the Oslo agreement in 1993 was the second biggest achievement for the Zionist 
187 
movement after the establishment of the State m 1948. 
Considering all the background of the Arab-Israeli and in particular the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its history, the signing of such agreements by the PLO 
reflects how international and regional factors affected the PLO decision to accept it. 
The environment of the American dominated New World Order, where the only 
remaining superpower plays a hegemonic role especially in the Middle East, allowed 
the PLO very little space for manoeuvring. The PLO engagement in secret negotiations 
with Israel without any clear guarantees of positive results reflected its desperate need 
to survive the new circumstances of an unfavourable New World Order. 
The USA hegemonic role in the New World Order was recognised not only by 
the PLO and other Arab parties but also by Israel. Ehud Barak the Israeli chief of staff 
and later Peres' Foreign Minister (November 1995-June 1996) and Israel's Prime 
Minister elect, as of May 1999 has also assessed and recognised the American vital role 
in the peace process. 
The United States historically and currently plays a pivotal and vital role in the 
search for peace in the Middle East. By virtue of its recently attained status as the 
only global superpower of political clout, military power and economic strength, 
Shimon Peres referred to Oslo as such in his book The New Middle East, (London: 
Element, 1993) 
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the US plays a critical role as a facilitator, intermediary or broker, depending on 
who makes the definitions. The US is in unique and unparalleled position to 
advance its own interests by assisting the parties to attain or preserve theirs. The 
US has the manoeuvrability and latitude, as well as the capability to exert 
influence and project power in almost any regional conflict, and has historically 
done so -even when it contested the former USSR- in the Middle East since the 
188 
1950s. 
The USA's direct or indirect involvement in the Oslo process was evident and can not 
be denied. Since its success in bringing the Arabs and Israelis together to the negotiation 
table in Madrid, the USA played an undeniable role in the peace process. It is important 
to say here that in contrast to common belief, the Madrid and Oslo are not totally 
different and separate processes. The overlap of personnel between Madrid and Oslo is 
evidence that the second process grew out of the first. Both Israel and the PLO tried to 
use the secret negotiation channel to achieve its own aims. The Israelis got secrecy out 
of it (enabling them to retreat i f it did not work). The PLO got direct negotiations out of 
it (rather than having to go through Palestinians from the Occupied Territories). The 
secrecy aspect worked against the PLO while the recognition of the PLO did not work 
against Israel. In other words, the particular format of Oslo, while benefiting both 
parties, still favoured Israel more than the PLO, but it was not a format which the PLO 
could afford to resist. Both parties used the Oslo agreements to improve their positions 
and get out of their regional and international isolation. The PLO hoped that the 
agreement, despite its entire shortcomings, would be a step towards achieving the 
Palestinian national aspirations. Israel used it as an instrument to dismantle its isolation 
and to fully integrate in the region. 
The several agreements and the whole peace process in its different stages 
reflect developments in the American dominated New World Order. The initial absence 
1 Q Q 
Barak, E., "Israel Opposition Perspective, Interview," Middle East Insight, vol. x i i i , 
no. 6, November 1998, pp. 12. 
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of the American direct participation was partly part of its strategy to help Israel achieve 
its goals. Its commitment towards Israel's existence, survival, security and military 
superiority in the Middle East was the main element behind its entire policy. The United 
States' direct and gradual active role in the process since the signing of the DOP and 
throughout the last six years confirms its commitment to secure Israel's integration into 
the Middle East. The degree of its activity or in another words maximising or 
minimising of its role was dependent on how it sees the process going. When its 
absence serves Israel's tactical interests, it wi l l excuse itself from involvement in the 
negotiation process. I f the situation get worse and it seems that Arab anger wil l transfer 
to violence and create a situation where Israel's security could be threatened, the USA 
wil l rush to calm the situation by all means available on its position and weapons in its 
armoury. The United States is always willing to step-in when things get shaky. The 
Sharm al-Sheikh summit of the 'peacemakers' on March 13, 1996 was an example of 
this policy. Clinton's visit to Israel the following day where he addressed the Israeli 
Knesset in a show of support and promised Israel money and equipment was another 
confirmation. The American intensive involvement in the Wye Plantation meetings, 
with the active participation of the president himself is another example of attempting to 
easethe tension and reduce the risk of the situation getting worse, in addition to the fact 
that the administration tried to use the gathering for its own domestic agenda during that 
period. 
United States' policies in the Middle East were of course designed to serve its 
interests, but the fact that Israel is the most important of these interests turned these 
policies to merely tools to serve Israel's strategy and thus created difficulties for the 
USA to be a honest broker or an unbiased mediator. 
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CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis was to define the World Order and examine its relations with and 
impact on the Arab-Israeli peace process. Although the Old World Order was examined, 
the main focus in this study was on the New World Order. More specifically I tried to 
understand how and where did the Oslo agreements and the peace process that came out of 
them fit into the larger relationship between the New World Order and the Arab-Israeli 
peace process. 
One of the main objectives of this study was to show that the Oslo peace process 
was not a departure from the peace process initiated in Madrid but rather a continuation of 
it. The whole peace process (Madrid and Oslo) was shaped by and a result of the New 
World Order. In other words the Arab-Israeli peace process in the New World Order, just 
as in the Old World Order, has been determined by the character of, and changes at, the 
international system level. The thesis has argued that the Oslo Agreements and the peace 
process that emerged from them have been shaped by a New World Order in which 
America has played the role of a single, hegemonic, superpower. America's interests and 
preferences shaped the process, whether through direct or indirect American involvement, 
or through the indirect or direct acknowledgment by regional actors, of the nature of the 
New World Order. 
For clearer understanding, it was vital to define the nature of the Old World Order 
and examine the impact of the Cold War on the region and its Arab-Israeli peace process. It 
was vital also to look at the New World Order and define its unipolar and hegemonic 
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nature. The United States' hegemony in the Middle East ought to be understood in order to 
assess its impact on the Arab Israeli peace process. 
To examine and understand the impact of that hegemony on the peace process in the 
New World Order I went on to detailed study of both the Madrid and Oslo peace processes 
and subsequent agreements. 
In the Old World Order, the distribution of power globally created a bipolar system 
where the United States and the Soviet Union dominated the world affairs with their 
struggle for power in the international scene. This 'Cold War' was the main feature of the 
international system prior to 1991. The neo-realist understanding of the Old World Order 
interpreted the Cold War period as one of a bipolar balance of power. The USA and the 
USSR exercised their power against one another through intermediary spheres of influence. 
The world lined up in two opposing camps throughout the whole period between the end of 
World War I I in 1945 and the beginning of the New World Order in 1991. The impact of 
that Old Order on the Middle East was undeniable. The state alignment and patron-client 
relationships affected the way regional actors conducted their policies and pursued their 
interests. To advance and protect their interests in the Middle East, the superpowers 
penetrated the Tegion through all means. The international conflict affected regional 
conflicts and vice versa. The Arab-Israeli peace process was almost non-existent. Those 
states that remained un-aligned sought to take advantage of super-power rivalries to 
advance their own interests; therefore, they too recognised a bipolar distribution and 
balance of power. The ability of the regional actors to play the rules of the game by using 
the superpowers competition on the one hand and the superpowers desire to use the conflict 
to advance its interests on the other victimised the peace process and restricted the 
possibilities for peace action. 
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Because the World Order is, by definition a stable distribution of power between 
major states as well as a pattern of behaviour or rules governing the behaviour of states, the 
New World Order is and will be for some time an American unipolar one. As Charles 
Krauthammer observed "the most striking feature of post-cold war is its unipolarity." The 
United States emerged as the center of world power in an unchallenged position as the only 
remaining superpower. Its hegemony represents the new international distribution of power. 
The role of the USA in the New World Order is and wil l be for some time a global 
hegemon that determines the new rules of the game. The United States used the 
opportunities created by the end of the Cold War, to show its international domination and 
its ability to act unilaterally to impose its will , without fear of confronting another 
superpower. 
The United States' proclaimed New World Order was designed to protect its 
interests. The fact that Israel is one of the most important of its interests made the Middle 
East its main foreign policy priority. Israel and the Arabs in general and the PLO in 
particular played the rules of the new international system in the New World Order. 
Recognising the fact that the new distribution of power resulted in an American 
international unipolarity and regional hegemony allowed the parties to adjust their initial 
positions to meet these international and regional changes. 
For the United States, as long as there is no peace between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors, no country will be allowed to be strong enough to pose threat to Israel. Israel, 
according to the strategic imperatives of the United States, must be able to face any 
coalition between Arab countries. 
The end of the Cold War and the second Gulf War allowed the USA to initiate a 
new peace process, which started at Madrid. The Madrid peace process was one of the 
symptoms of the New World Order and one of its implications. The only remaining 
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superpower hegemonic position the USA enjoyed in the New World Order enabled her to 
bring the parties together around the negotiation table. Its reluctance to use its hegemony to 
put pressure on Israel to make some territorial concessions in order to advance the process 
or at least to stick to its commitment contributed to Madrid's inability to achieve immediate 
agreements. As Tim Niblock made clear, 
The parameters within which Arab-Israeli relations have been shaped and developed 
have begun to change. These 'changed parameters' are not incidental. They reflect, at 
least in part, changes in global international relations. The disintegration of the Soviet 
Union deprived Syria of the superpower ally which could have enabled it to pose a 
military challenge to Israel; gave Israel more leeway to experiment with policies it 
might have deemed too risky before; narrowed the range of strategic options open to 
the PLO; created new opportunities for Israel to benefit from cooperation with states 
in the wide region (e.g. the new states of Transcaucasia and central Asia), provided it 
could purvey a less discriminatory and oppressive image; and left the United States 
free to pursue its own preferred strategy on Arab-Israeli matters, uninhibited by fears 
that a superpower rival would exploit any initiative by undermining United States 
influence.1 
The Madrid peace conference however, played an important role in removing psychological 
barriers which, helped reaching other agreements. The long and hard negotiations and 
initial documents were used as basis for other separate negotiations in Oslo as it proved 
later. 
T h e Oslo secret channel seemed for many to be a departure from the Madrid peace 
process. The fact of the matter is that the Oslo peace process was part of the much wider 
peace process initiated in Madrid. It grew out of it and achieved similar objectives even 
though through another format. The Clinton administration was aware of the Oslo secret 
negotiations. The PLO and Israel were negotiating a deal that needed to be acceptable to, 
and take account of the USA's interests. 
1 Niblock, T., "A Frame for Renewal in the Middle East?" in H. Jawad., The Middle East in 
the New World Order, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 4. 
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The Oslo peace process fitted neatly into American interests in the Middle East and 
into its vision of how regional conflicts should be resolved. There was evidence that it was 
consulted and informed of the process. The Oslo agreements and the peace process that has 
emerged from them have been shaped by the American-led New World Order. This 
happened as a result either through direct American involvement or through indirect 
acknowledgment by regional parties of the nature of the New World Order. The Rabin-
Peres government following the 1992 Israeli elections preferred the Norwegian mediation 
and agreed on the Oslo secret channel with the PLO. After difficult secret negotiations 
Israel and the PLO reached an agreement on the principles that wi l l guide the peace 
negotiations. The Declaration of Principles signed in Washington on 13 September 1993 
was seen as a real breakthrough. Negotiations on the interim agreement and its 
implementation process are still continued. The Cairo, Taba (Oslo II), Hebron and Wye 
agreements were needed to settle the many differences between Israel and the Palestinians. 
Sharm al-sheikh and many other agreements seemed to be necessary to settle many other 
difficult issues. It is clear that because of the close links between Israel and the USA, Israel 
acts as the regional power on behalf of its strategic ally the USA. Therefore the peace 
process has been balanced in Israel's favor. This can be seen in the texts of the Oslo 
agreements and the way the USA has not made Israel stick to its commitments under those 
agreements. 
United States' interests and policy shaped the whole peace process. First, in the way 
participants acted and the strategies they adopted and secondly in the way the USA 
participated and acted. This resulted in the direct involvement of the USA in Madrid 
followed by indirect involvement in Oslo, then direct involvement again after Oslo 
agreement. The continuity of the process was further evidence of the American special role 
that it had acquired through its unipolar and hegemonic position. 
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Needless to say that all the peoples of the region need to live in peace, security and 
stability. Peace however can not be durable unless it is comprehensive and based on justice 
and real reconciliation. The future of the Arab-Israeli peace process is uncertain. Although 
a great part depends on the wil l of the peoples and states of the region, the international 
actors within the New World Order wil l have important impact on this future. I f the USA 
hegemony continues, and taking into account the Israeli influence on USA policy, Israel 
wi l l dictate what happens next. Any future settlement wil l be in Israel's favor. Jerusalem 
wil l remain as Israel always insisted its eternal united capital; the Palestinian refugees will 
not be allowed back to their homeland; Israel wi l l not give up the Golan heights or even 
South Lebanon and with American help wil l maintain the regional power position it has 
enjoyed since the end of the Second Gulf War. Even i f the unipolar world order turned 
within a reasonable time to a multipolar world order where a united Europe, China and 
Russia competed again with the USA, it might be too late for the Arab parties to take 
advantage of such changes. 
Studying the impact of the New World Order on the Arab-Israeli peace process 
(1991-1999) can only open the gate to more research of these important issues. That the 
process is still at an early stage after eight years since the convening of Madrid conference 
shows how long the process is. The Oslo peace process concerns only the Israeli-
Palestinian track, leaving open huge gap for studying the Syrian and Lebanese tracks. The 
final status negotiations and the expected progress and agreements will be an important and 
vital area to study. The comparison between the way in which the Arab-Israeli peace 
process takes shape within the different world orders wi l l remain an important field of 
study to understand the interaction between the international and regional levels. 
In a New World Order were Israel enjoys the support of the United States as the 
only remaining superpower, the Arabs and the Palestinians in particular wil l not get a 
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comprehensive, fair and just solution. For them it seems better to wait for another favorable 
New World Order. For Israel, however, while it succeeded in reaching a peace agreement 
with King Hussein of Jordan before he passed away, the failure to reach a peace agreement 
with Assad of Syria and a final settlement with Arafat might entail waiting a long time 
before new leaders acquire enough power and support to allow them to end this century-
long conflict and reach historic reconciliation. The rules and conditions of the unipolar 
American-led New World Order that brought the parties together to negotiate peace might 
be the main obstacle on the road to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting Arab-Israeli 
peace. To conclude it might be safer not to predict and to leave the future in the hands of 
God. But like Dr Ali Errishi, the son of my own beloved city Benghazi, and together with 
Minnie Louis Haskins, I like to say: "and I said to the man who stood at the gate of the 
year: Give me a light that I may tread safely into the unknown. And he replied: 'Go out into 
the darkness and put your hand into the Hand of God; that shall be to you better than light 
and safer than a known way.'" 
2 http://www.Libyanet.com/vl60ct99.htm 
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APPENDIX I 
Excerpts of President George Bush'Address to Joint Session of Congress 
on the Middle East, Washington, D.C., 6 March 1991 
...Tonight I come to this House to speak about the world - the world after war. The 
recent challenge could not have been clearer, saddam Hussein was the villain, Kuwait 
the victim. To the aid of this small country came nations from North America and 
Europe, from Asia and South America, from Africa and the Arab world, all united 
against aggression. 
Our uncommon coalition must now work in common purpose to forge a future 
that should never again be held hostage to the darker side of human nature. 
Tonight In Iraq, Saddam walks amidst ruin. His war machine is crushed. His 
ability to threaten mass destruction is itself destroyed. His people have been lied to, 
denied the truth. And when his defeated legions come home, all Iraqis will see and feel 
the havoc he has wrought. And this I promise you: For all that Saddam has done to his 
own people, to the Kuwaitis, and to the entire world, Saddam and those around him are 
accountable. 
All of us grieve for the victims of war, for the people of Kuwait and the 
suffering that scars the soul of that proud nation. We grieve for all our fallen soldiers 
and their families, for all the innocents caught up in this conflict. And, yes, we grieve 
for the people of Iraq, a people who have never been our enemy. My hope is that, one 
day we will once again welcome them as friends into the community of nations. 
Our commitment to peace in the Middle East does not end with the liberation of 
Kuwait. So tonight let me outline four key challenges to be met. 
First, we must work together to create shared security arrangements in the 
region. Our friends and allies in the Middle East recognize that they will bear the bulk 
of the responsibility for regional seurity. But we want them to know that as we stood 
with them to repel aggression, so now America stand ready to work with them to secure 
the peace. 
This does not mean stationing U.S. ground forces on the Arabian Peninsula, but 
it does mean American participation in joint exercises involving both air and ground 
forces. It means maintaining a capable U.S. naval presence in the region, just as we have 
for over forty years. Let it be clear: our vital national interests depend on a stable and 
secure Gulf. 
Second, we must act to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and the missiles used to deliver them. It would be tragic i f the nations of the Middle 
East and Persian Gulf were now, in the wake of war, to embark on a new arms race. Iraq 
requires special vigilance. Until Iraq convinces the world of its peaceful intentions - that 
its leaders will not use new revenues to rearm and rebuild its menacing war machine -
Iraq must not have access to the instruments of war. 
And third, we must work to create new opportunities for peace and stability in 
the Middle East. On the night I announced operation Desert Storm, I expressed my hope 
that out of the horrors of war might come new momentum for peace. We have learned in 
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the modern age geography cannot guarantee security and security does not come from 
military power alone. 
All of us know the depth of bitterness that has made the dispute between Israel 
and its neighbors so painful and intractable. Yet, in the conflict just concluded, Israel 
and many of the Arab states have for the first time found themselves confronting the 
same aggressor. By now, it should be plain to all parties that peacemaking in the Middle 
East requires compromise. At the same time, peace brings real benefits to everyone. We 
must do all that we can to close the gap between Israel and the Arab states - and 
between Israelis and Palestinians. The tactics of terror lead nowhere. There can be no 
substitute for diplomacy. 
A comprehensive peace must be grounded in United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. This principle must be 
elaborated to provide for Israel's security and recognition, and at the same time for 
legitimate Palestinian political rights. Anything else would fail the twin tests of fairness 
and security. The time has come to put an end to Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The war with Iraq is over. The quest for solution to the problem in Lebanon, in 
the Arab-Israeli dispute, and in the Gulf must go forward with new vigor and 
determination. And I guarantee you: No one will work harder for a stable peace in the 
region than we will. 
Fourth, we must foster economic development for the sake of peace and 
progress. The Persian Gulf and Middle East form a region rich in natural resources with 
a wealth of untapped human potential. Resources once squandered on military might 
must be redirected to more peaceful ends. We are already addressing the immediate 
economic consequences of Iraq's aggression. Now the challenge is to reach higher - to 
foster economic freedom and prosperity for all people of the region. 
By meeting these four challenges, we can build a framework for peace. I've 
asked secretary of State Baker to go to listen, to probe, to offer suggestions, and to 
advance the search for peace and stability. I have also asked him to raise the plight of 
the hostages held in Lebanon. We have not forgotten them, and we will not forget them. 
To all the challenges that confront this region of the world, there is no single 
solution, no solely American answer. But we can make a difference for positive change. 
But we cannot lead a New World abroad if, at home, it's politics as usual on 
American defense and diplomacy. It's time to turn away from the temptation to protect 
unneeded weapons systems and obsolete bases. It's time to put an end to 
micromanagement of foreign and security assistance programs, micromanagement that 
humiliates our friends and allies and hamstring our diplomacy. It's time to rise above 
the parochial and the pork barrel, to do what is necessary, what's right and what will 
enable this nation to play the leadership role required of us. 
The consequences of the conflict in the Gulf reach far beyond the confines of the 
Middle East. Twice before in this century, an entire world was convulsed by war. Twice 
this century, out of the horrors of war hope emerged for enduring peace. Twice before, 
those hopes proved to be a distant dream, beyond the grasp of man. 
Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided - a world of barbed 
wire and concrete block, conflict and cold war. 
Now, we can see a New World coming into view. A world in which there is the 
very real prospect of a New World Order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a "world 
order" in which "the principles of justice and fair play ... protect the weak against the 
strong ..." A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised 
to fulfill the historic vision of its founders, a world in which freedom and respect for 
human rights find a home among all nations. 
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The Gulf war put this New World to its first test, and, my fellow Americans, we 
passed that test. 
For the sake of our principles, for the sake of the Kuwaiti people, we stood our ground. 
Because the world would not look the other way, Ambassador [Saud Nasir] al-Sabah, to 
night, Kuwait is free. 
Tonight as our troops begin to come home, let us recognize that the hard work of 
freedom still calls us forward. We've learned the hard lessons of history. The victory 
over Iraq was not waged as "a war to end all wars." Even the new world order cannot 
guarantee an era of perpetual peace. But enduring peace must be our mission. 
Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 20, no. 4, Summer 1991, issue 80, p. 180. 
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APPENDIX II 
U.S.-Soviet Letter of Invitation to the Madrid Peace Conference 
October 18, 1991 
After extensive consultations with Arab states, Israel, and the Palestinians, the 
United States and the Soviet Union believe that an historic opportunity exists to advance 
the prospects for genuine peace throughout the region. The United States and the Soviet 
Union are prepared to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting, and comprehensive 
peace settlement, through direct negotiations along two tracks, between Israel and the 
Arab states, and between Israel and the Palestinians, based on United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338, The objective of this process is real peace. 
Toward that end, the president of the United States and the president of the 
USSR invite you to a peace conference, which their countries will co-sponsor, followed 
immediatly by direct negotiations. The conference will be convened in Madrid on 30 
October 1991. 
President Bush and President Gorbachev request your acceptance of this 
invitation no later than 6:00 PM Washington time, 23 October 1991, in order to ensure 
proper organization and preparation of the conference. 
Direct bilateral negotiations will begin four days after the opening of the conference. 
Those parties who wish to attend multilateral negotiations will convene two weeks after 
the opening of the conference to organise those negotiations. The co-sponsors believe 
that those negotiations should focus on region -wide issues such as arms control and 
regional security, water, refugee issues, environment, economic development, and other 
subjects of mutual interest. 
The co-sponsors will chair the conference which will be held at ministerial level. 
Governments to be invited include Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. Palestinians will 
be invited to attend as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Egypt will be 
invited to the conference as a participant. The European Community will be a 
participant in the conference, alongside the United States and the Soviet Union and will 
be represented by its presidency. The Gulf Cooperation Council will be invited to send 
its secretary-general to the conference as an observer, and GCC member states will be 
invited to participate in organising the negotiations on multilateral issues. The United 
Nations will be invited to send an observer, representing the secretary-general. 
The conference will have no power to impose solutions on the parties or veto 
agreements reached by them. It will have no authority to make decisions for the parties 
and no ability to vote on issues or results. The conference can reconvene only with the 
consent of all the parties. 
With respect to negotiations between Israel and Palestinians who are part of the 
joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, negotiations will be conducted in phases, 
beginning with talks on interim self-government arrangements. These talks will be 
conducted with the objective of reaching agreement within one year. Once the agreed 
interim self-government arrangements will last for a period of five years. Beginning in 
the third year of the period of interim self-government arrangements, negotiations will 
take place on permanent status. These permanent status negotiations, and the 
negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, will take place on the basis of resolution 
242 and 338. 
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It is understood that the co-sponsors are committed to making this process 
succeed. It is their intention to convene the conference and negotiations with those 
parties that agree to attend. 
The co-sponsors believe that this process offers the promise of ending decades of 
confrontation and conflict and the hope of a lasting peace. Thus, the co-sponsors hope 
that the parties will approach these negotiations in a spirit of good will and mutual 
suspicions and mistrust that perpetuate the conflict and allow the parties to begin to 
resolve their differences. Indeed, only through such a process can real peace and 
reconciliation among the Arab states, Israel, and the Palestinians be achieved. And only 
through this process can the peoples of the Middle East attain the peace and security 
they richly deserve. 
Source: Makovsky, D., Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's 
Road to the Oslo Accord, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 191. 
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APPENDIX 111 
Main Points of the U.S. Letters of Assurance on the Terms of the Madrid 
Peace Conference, October 1991 
• US letter of Assurance to Israel: 
1. The US sees the objective of the Middle East negotiation as the attainment of 
genuine peace and reconciliation between the peoples of the region, accompanied by 
peace treaties and full diplomatic relations. 
2. The opening conference will have no power to make decisions, hold votes, or 
impose positions. 
3. Negotiations will be direct only. 
4. The US will not support linkage between the various bilateral negotiations. 
5. No party need sit with another party against its wishes. 
6. The US has no intention of bringing about a dialogue between Israel and the PLO or 
negotiations between them. 
7. Palestinians taking part in negotiations must be residents of the West Bank or the 
Gaza Strip who accept phased direct negotiations in two tracks and are ready to live at 
peace with Israel. 
8. The US will not support the creation of an independent Palestinian state. 
9. Israel holds its own interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242, alongside 
other interpretations. 
10. Israel is entitled to secure and defensible borders. 
11. The US will take steps to enlarge the circle of peace in the Middle East. 
12. The US will take steps to bring the Arab economic boycott to an end and to have 
UN Resolution 3379 equating Zionism and racism annulled. 
13. The US will consult closely with Israel and show due consideration for Israel's 
positions in the peace process. 
14. The US reconfirms ex-president Gerald Ford's written commitment to ex-premier 
Yitzhak Rabin of September 1975 regarding the importance of the Golan Heights to 
Israel's security. 
15. The US would be ready to give its own guarantees to any border agreed upon 
between Israel and Syria. 
16. Israel is entitled to a secure border with Lebanon and Security Council Resolution 
425 on Lebanon must be implemented in a manner assuring the stability and security of 
the border. 
The US is committed to Israel's security and to the maintenance of Israel's qualitative 
edge. 
» US Letter of Assurance to Syria: 
1. The peace conference and the talks that follow must be based on Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338. 
2. The object of the conference is to prepare for direct bilateral Arab-Israeli talks 
within two days and also for multilateral talks within two weeks. The bilateral talks will 
run on two parallel tracks: direct talks between Israel and the neighboring states, and 
direct talks between Israel and "the Palestinians." 
3. The US intends to work actively towards a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-
Israel conflict and do everything it can to keep the two-track process going in that 
direction. The US is not an advocate of linkage between the the "various forms of 
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negotiations," but believes that speedy action in all negotiations to arrive at an 
agreement is needed and would serve the interest of a comprehensive settlement. 
4. The conference will convene under US-Soviet auspices and can reconvene with the 
approval of all parties. 
5. The role of the UN consists in the dispatch by the UN secretary-general of a 
representative to attend the conference as an observer.The US and the USSR will keep 
the secretary-general informed of the progress of the negotiations. Any agreements 
reached by the parties will be registered at the UN secretariat and communicated to the 
security council, whose endorsement will be sought by the participating parties. The US, 
cognizant of all parties' interests in the success of this process, will not, as long as the 
process is actively under way, support any parallel or conflicting action by Security 
Council. 
6. The final settlement can be reached only on the basis of mutual concessions during 
the negotiations. The US will throughout these negotiations continue to be committed to 
the fact that Security Council Resolution 242 and the land-for-peace principle are 
applicable to all fronts, including the Golan Heights. 
7. The US does not intend to recognize or accept any unilateral action on the part of 
Israel vis-a-vis the extension of its laws, sovereignty or administration on the teritory of 
the Golan Heights. 
8. The US will continue to oppose Israeli settlement activity in the territories occupied 
in 1967, which remains an obstacle to peace. 
9. The US is prepared to serve as guarantor of the security of whatever borders Israel 
and Syria agree on. 
The US will continue to act as a mediator that genuinely seeks a settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict on the basis of recognition of all parties' "needs and requirements." The 
US and USSR will remain the "moving force" in this process to help the parties make 
progress towards a comprehensive peace settlement. 
The US and USSR are ready to remain in constant touch with any of the parties 
at any time, and the US is also ready to participate in the negotiations in any of their 
stages with the approval of the parties involved. 
• US Letter of Assurance to Lebanon: 
An assurance that Security Council Resolution 425, which calls for an Israeli 
withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon, has nothing to do with resolution 242 and 
will be treated as a separate issue. 
As assurance that the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the withdrawal of Syrian troops 
from Lebanon are two separate issues, the former addressed by resolution 425 and the 
latter by the Taef agreement, which also calls for the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese 
forces from Lebanon. 
• US Letter of Assurance to the Palestinians: 
- Palestinians and Israel must respect each other's security, identity, and political rights. 
- Bilateral talks will begin four days after the opening of the conference. 
- Multilateral talks will open two weeks after the opening of the peace conference. 
- We believe that Palestinians should gain control over political, economic, and other 
decisions that affect them and their fate. 
- The US will seek to avoid prolongation and stalling by any party. All negotiations 
should proceed as quickly as possible toward agreement. 
- The US doesn't seek to determine who speaks for Palestinians in this process. We are 
seeking to launch a political negotiating process that directly involves Palestinians and 
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offers a pathway for achieving the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people 
and for participation in the determination of their future. We believe that a joint 
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation offers the most promising pathway toward this end. 
- Palestinians will be free to announce the component of the joint delegation and to 
make a statement during the opening of the conference. They may also raise any issue 
pertaining to the substance of the negotiations during the negotiations. 
- The US understands how much importance Palestinians attach to the question of East 
Jerusalem. Thus we want to assure you that nothing Palestinians do in choosing their 
delegation members in this phase of the process will affect their claim to East Jerusalem 
or be prejudicial or precedential to the outcome of the negotiations. 
- The US is opposed to the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem and extension of Israeli 
law on it and the extension of Jerusalem's municipal boundaries. We encourage all sides 
to avoid unilateral acts that would exasperate local tensions or make negotiations more 
difficult or preempt their final outcome. 
- The US believes that Palestinians of East Jerusalem should be able to participate by 
voting in elections of an interim governing authority. The US further believes that 
Palestinians from East Jerusalem and Palestinians outside the occupied territories who 
meet the three criteria should be able to participate in the negotiations on final status. 
The US supports the right of Palestinians to bring any issue including East Jerusalem to 
the table. 
- The purpose of negotiations on transitional arrangements is to affect the peaceful and 
orderly transfer of authority from Israel to Palestinians. Palestinians need to achieve 
rapid control over political, economic, and other decisions that affect their lives and to 
adjust to a new situation in which Palestinians exercise authority in the West Bank and 
Gaza. For its part the US will strive from the outset and encourage all the parties to 
adopt steps that can create an environment of confidence and mutual trust, including 
respect for human rights. 
- Negotiations between Israel and Palestinians will be conducted in phases beginning 
with talks on interim self-governing arrangements. The talks will be conducted with the 
objective of reaching agreements within one year.Once agreed the interim self-
governing arrangements will last for a period of five years. Beginning the third year of 
the period of self-governing arrangements, negotiations will take place on permanent 
status. It is the aim of the US government that permanent status negotiations will be 
concluded by the end of the transitional period. 
- Palestinians are free to argue whatever outcome they believe best meets their 
requirments. The US will accept any outcome agreed by the parties. In this regard and 
consistent with long-standing US policies, confederation is not excluded as a possible 
outcome of negotiations on final status. 
- The US believe that no party should take unilateral actions that seek to predetermine 
issues that can only be reached through negotiations. In this regard the US has opposed 
and will continue to oppose settlement activity in territories occupied in 1967 which 
remain an obstacle to peace. 
- Any party will have access to the sponsors at any time. 
- We are prepared to work hard with you in the period ahead. 
Source: Flamhaft, Z., Israel on the Road to Peace, Accepting the Unacceptable. 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp .201-205. 
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APPENDIX llll 
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 
The Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the 'Palestinian Delegation'), 
representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of 
confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and 
strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, 
lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the 
agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles: 
Article I 
Aim of the Negotiations 
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle east peace 
process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government 
Authority, the elected Council (the 'Council) for the Palestinian people in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a 
permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 
It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the overall peace 
process and that final status negotiations will lead to the implementation of Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 
Article II 
Framework for the interim period 
The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of 
Principles. 
Article III Elections 
1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern 
themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political 
elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international 
observations, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order. 
2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections 
in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I , with the goal of holding the 
elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of 
Principles. 
3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the 
realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirments. 
Article IV 
Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for 
issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view 
the west Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be 
preserved during the interim period. 
Article V 
Transitional period and permanent status negotiations 
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1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip 
and Jericho area. 
2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than 
the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel 
and the Palestinian people representatives. 
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: 
Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and 
cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest. 
4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should 
not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period. 
Article VI 
Preparatory transfer of powers and responsibilities 
1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from 
the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military 
government and its civil administration to the authorized Palestinians for this task, as 
detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of preparatory nature 
until the inauguration of the Council. 
2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the 
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic 
development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the 
Palestinians in the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, 
direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinians police force, as agreed upon. Pending the 
inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional 
powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon. 
Article VII 
Interim agreement 
1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim 
period (the 'Interim Agreement'). 
2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the 
Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities 
from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The 
Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council's executive authority, legislative 
authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial 
organs. 
3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the 
inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and 
responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above. 
4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, 
the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a 
Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export 
Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority 
and a Palestinian water Administration Authority, and any other authorities agreed 
upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and 
responsiblities. 
5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, 
and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn. 
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Article VIII 
Public Order and Security 
In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel 
will continue to carry the responsiblity for defending against external threats, as well as 
the responsibility for overall security of the Israelis to protect their internal security and 
public order. 
Article IX 
Laws and Military Orders 
1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim 
Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it. 
2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in 
remaining spheres. 
Article X 
Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee 
In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and 
any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of 
this Declaration of principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be 
established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common 
interest, and disputes. 
Article XI 
Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic Fields 
Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the 
West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of 
Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established 
in order to develope and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in 
the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV. 
Article XII 
Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt 
The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in 
establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of 
Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on one hand, and the Governments of Jordan 
and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These 
arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide 
by agreement on the modalities of the admission of persons displaced from the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption 
and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee. 
Article XIII 
Redeployment of Israeli Forces 
1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve 
of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out 
in accordance with Article XTV. 
2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its 
military forces should be redeployed outside the populated areas. 
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3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented 
commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal 
security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above. 
Article XIV 
Israeli Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area 
Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol 
attached as Annex I I . 
Article XV 
Resolution of disputes 
1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of 
Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be 
resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant 
to Article X above. 
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism 
of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties. 
3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, 
which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both 
parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee. 
Article XVI 
Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Programs 
Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for 
promoting a 'Marshall Plan', the regional programs and other programs, including 
special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached 
as Annex IV. 
Article XVII 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
1. This Declaration of principles will enter into force one month after its signing. 
2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes 
pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof. 
DONE at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth of September 1993. 
For the Government of Israel For the P.L.O 
witnessed by: 
The 
United States of America The Russian Federation 
Source: Abbas, M., Through Secret Channels: The Road to Oslo, Senior PLO 
leader Abu Mazen's Revealing Story of the Negotiations with Israel, (Reading: 
Garnet Publishing, 1995), p. 225. 
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APPENDIX V 
GAZA-JERICHO AUTONOMY AGREEMENT 
(CAIRO AGREEMENT) 4 MAY 1994 
The Government of the state of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(hereinafter "the PLO"), the representative of the Palestinian people; 
PRE AMPLE 
WITHIN the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated at Madrid in 
October 1991; 
REAFFIRMING their determination to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and 
security, while recognizing their mutual legitimate and political rights; 
REAFFIRMING their desire to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace 
settlement through the agreed political process; 
REAFFIRMING their adherence to the mutual recognition and commitments expressed 
in the letters dated September 9, 1993, signed by and exchanged between the prime 
Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO; 
REAFFIRMING their understanding that the interim self government arrangements, 
including the arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area contained in 
this Agreement, are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations 
on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security council Resolutions 
242 and 338; 
DESIROUS of putting into effect the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements signed at Washington, D.C. on September 13, 1993, and the 
Agreed Minutes thereto ( hereinafter "the Declaration of principles"), and in particular 
the Protocol on withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area; 
HEREBY AGREE to the following arrengements regarding the Gaza Strip and the 
Jericho Area: 
Article I 
Definitions 
For the purpose of this Agreement: 
a. the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area are delineated on map Nos. 1 and 2 attached 
to this Agreement; 
b. "the Settlements" means the Gush Katif and Erez settlement areas, as well as the 
other settlements in the Gaza Strip, as shown on attached map No. 1; 
c. "the Military Installation Area" means the Israeli military installation area along 
the Egyptian border in the Gaza Strip, as shown on map No. 1; and 
d. the term " Israelis" shall also include Israeli statutory agencies and corporations 
registered in Israel. 
Article II 
Scheduled withdrawal of Israeli Military forces 
1. Israel shall implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli 
military forces from the Gaza Strip and from the Jericho Area to begin immediately 
with the signing of this Agreement. 
2. Subject to the arrangements included in the Protocol concerning withdrawal of 
Israeli Military forces and Security Arrangements attached as Annex I , the Israeli 
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withdrawal shall include evacuating all military bases and other fixed installations to be 
handed over to the Palestinian police, to be established pursuant to Article IX below ( 
hereinafter " the Palestinian Police"). 
3. In order to carry out Israel's responsibility for external security and for internal 
security and public order of settlements and Israelis, Israel shall, concurrently with the 
withdrawal, redeploy its remaining military forces to the settlements and the military 
Installation Area, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, this 
redeployment shall constitute full implementation of Article XIII of the Declaration of 
Principles with regard to the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area only. 
4. For the purpose of this Agreement, " Israeli military forces" may include Israel 
police and other Israeli security forces. 
5. Israelis, including Israeli military forces, may continue to use roads freely within 
the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. Palestinians may use public roads crossing the 
settlements freely, as provided for in Annex I . 
6. The Palestinian Police shall be deployed and shall assume responsibility for 
public order and internal security of Palestinians in accordance with this Agreement and 
Annex I . 
Article III 
Transfer of Authority 
1. Israel shall transfer authority as specified in this Agreement from the Israeli 
military government and its civil Administration to the Palestinian Aythority, hereby 
established, in accordance with Article V of this Agreement, except for the authority 
that Israel shall continue to exercise as specified in this Agreement. 
2. As regards the transfer and assumption of authority in civil spheres, powers and 
responsibilities shall be transferred and assumed as set out in the protocol concerning 
Civil Affairs attached as Annex I I . 
3. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of the agreed powers and 
responsibilities are set out in Annex II . 
4. Upon the completion of the Israeli withdrawal and the transfer of powers and 
responsibilities as detailed in paragraphs 1 and 2 above and in Annex n, the Civil 
Administration in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area will be dissolved and the Israeli 
military government shall not prevent it from continuing to exercise the powers and 
responsibilities specified in this Agreement. 
5. A Joint Civil Affairs coordination and cooperation committee ( hereinafter "the 
CAC") and two Joint Regional Civil Affairs subcommittees for the Gaza Strip and the 
Jericho Area respectively shall be established in order to provide for coordination and 
cooperation in civil affairs between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, as detailed in 
Annex I I . 
6. The offices of the Palestinian Authority shall be located in the Gaza Strip and 
the Jericho Area pending the inauguration of the council to be elected pursuant to the 
Declaration of Principles. 
Article IV 
Structure and composition of the Palestinian Authority 
1. The Palestinian Authority will consist of one body of 24 members which shall 
carry out and be responsible for all the legislative and executive powers and 
responsibilities transferred to it under this Agreement, in accordance with this Article, 
and shall be responsible for the exercise of Judicial functions in accordance with Article 
VI, subparagraph 1 .b. of this Agreement. 
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2. The Palestinian Authority shall administer the departments transferred to it and 
may establish, within its Jurisdiction, other departments and subordinate administrative 
units as necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities. It shall determine its own 
internal procedures. 
3. The PLO shall inform the Government of Israel of the names of the members of 
the Palestinian Authority and any change of members. Changes in the membership of 
the Palestinian Authority will take effect upon an exchange of letters between the PLO 
and the Government of Israel. 
4. Each member of the Palestinian Authority shall enter into office upon 
undertaking to act in accordance with this Agreement. 
Artcle V 
Jurisdiction 
1. The authority of the Palestinian Authority encompasses all matters that fall 
within its territorial, functional and personal Jurisdiction, as follows: 
a. The territorial Jurisdiction covers the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area 
territory, as defined in Article I , except for Settlements and the Military Installation 
Area. 
Territorial Jurisdiction shall include land, subsoil and territorial waters, in accordance 
with the provisions of this Agreement. 
b. The functional Jurisdiction encompasses all powers and responsibilities 
as specified in this Agreement. This Jurisdictions does not include foreign relations, 
internal security and public order of Settlements and the Military Installation Area and 
Israelis, and external security. 
c. The personal jurisdiction extends to all persons within the territorial 
jurisdiction referred to above, except for Israelis, unless otherwise provided in this 
Agreement. 
2. The Palestinian Authority has, within its authority, legislative, executive and 
judicial powers and responsibilities, as provided for in this Agreement. 
3. a. Israel has authority over the settlements, the Military Installation Area, 
Israelis, external security, internal security and public order of Settlements, the Military 
Installation Area and Israelis, and those agreed powers and responsibilities specified in 
this Agreement. 
b. Israel shall exercise its authority through its military government, which, for 
that end, shall continue to have the necessary 
Article VI , subparagraph 1.1. of this Agreement. 
2. The Palestinian Authority shall administer the departments transferred 
to it and may establish, within its jurisdiction, other departments and 
subordinate administrative units as necessary for the fulfillment of its 
responsibilities. It shall determine its own internal procedures. 
3. The PLO shall inform the Government of Israel of the names of the 
members of the Palestinian Authority and any change of members. 
Change in the membership of the Palestinian Authority will take effect 
upon an exchange of letters between the PLO and the Government of 
Israel. 
4. Each member of the Palestinian Authority shall enter into office upon 
undertaking to act in accordance with this Agreement. 
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Article V 
Jurisdiction 
1. The authority of the Palestinian Authority encompasses all matters that fall 
within its territorial, functional and personal jurisdiction, as follows: 
a. The territorial jurisdiction covers the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area 
territory, as defined in Article I , except for settlements and the Military 
Installation Area. 
Territorial jurisdiction shall include land, subsoil and territorial waters, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. 
b. The functional jurisdiction, encompasses all powers and responsibilities 
as specified in this Agreement. This jurisdiction does not include foreign 
relations, internal security and public order of settlements and the Military 
Installation Area and Israelis, and external security. 
c. The personal jurisdiction extends to all persons within the territorial 
jurisdiction referred to above, except for Israelis, unless otherwise provided in 
this Agreement. 
2. The Palestinian Authority has, within its authority, legislative, executive and 
judicial powers and responsibilities, as provided for in this Agreement. 
3. a. Israel has authority over the Settlements, the Military Installation Area, 
Israelis, external security, internal security and public order of settlements, the 
Military Installation Area and Israelis, and those agreed powers and 
responsibilities specified in this Agreement. 
b. Israel shall exercise its authority through its military government, 
which, for that end, shall continue to have the necessary legislative, judicial and 
executive powers and responsibilities, in accordance with international law. This 
provision shall not derogate from Israel's applicable legislation over Israelis in 
personam. 
4. The exercise of authority with regard to the electromagnetic sphere and airspace 
shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. 
5. The provisions of this Article are subject to the specific legal arrangements 
detailed in the protocol concerning legal Matters attached as Annex III. Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority may negotiate further legal arrangements. 
6. Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall cooperate on matters of legal assistance 
in criminal and civil matters through the legal subcommittee of the CAC. 
Article VI 
Powers and Responsibilities of the Palestinian Authority 
1. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Palestinian Authority, within 
its jurisdiction: 
a. has legislative powers as set out in Article VII of this Agreement, as 
well as executive powers; 
b. will administer justice through an independent judiciary; 
c. will have, inter alia, power to formulate policies, supervise their 
implementation, employ staff, establish departments, authorities and 
institutions, sue and be sued and conclude contracts;and 
d. will have, inter alia, the power to keep and administer registers and 
records of the population, and issue certificates, licenses and 
documents. 
2. a. In accordance with the Declaration of Principles, the Palestinian 
Authority will not have powers and responsibilities in the sphere of 
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foreign relations, which sphere includes the establishment abroad of 
embassies, consulates or other types of foreign missions and posts or 
permitting their establishment in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area, the 
appointment of or admission of diplomatic and consular staff, and the 
exercise of diplomatic functions, 
b. Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, the PLO may 
conduct negotiations and sign agreements with states or international 
organizations for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority in the 
following cases only: 
1. economic agreements, as specifically provided in Annex IV of this 
Agreement; 
2. agreements with donor countries for the purpose of implementing arrangements 
for the provision of assistance to the Palestinian Authority; 
3. agreements for the purpose of impleminting the regional development plans 
detailed in Annex IV of the Declaration of principles or in agreements entered into in 
the framework of the multilateral negotiations; and 
4. cultural, scientific and educational agreements. 
c. Dealings between the Palestinian Authority and representatives of foreign states 
and international organisations, as well as the establishment in the Gaza Strip and the 
Jericho Area of representative offices other than those described in subparagraph 2.b. 
above, shall not be considered foreign relations. 
ArticleVII 
Legislative Powers of the Palestinian Authority 
1. The Palestinian Authority will have the power, within its jurisdiction, to 
promulgate legislation, including basic laws, laws, regulations and other legislative acts. 
2. legislation promulgated by the Palestinian Authority shall be consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement. 
3. legislation promulgated by the Palestinian Authority shall be communicated to a 
legislation subcommittee to be established by the CAC ( hereinafter "the legislation 
subcommittee"). During a period of 30 days from the communication of the legislation, 
Israel may request that the legislation subcommittee decide whether such legislation 
exceeds the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority or is otherwise inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement. 
4. Upon receipt of the Israeli request, the legislation subcommittee shall decide, as 
an initial matter, on the entry into force of the legislation pending its decision on the 
merits of the matter. 
5. I f the legislation subcommittee is unable to reach a decision with regard to the 
entry into force of the legislation within 15 days, this issue will be referred to a board of 
review. This board of review shall be comprised of two judges, retired judges or senior 
jurists ( hereinafter "Judges"), one from each side, to be appointed from a compiled list 
of three Judges proposed by each. In order to expedite the proceeding before this board 
of review, the two most senior judges, one from each side, shall develope written 
informal rules of procedure. 
6. legislation referred to the board of review shall enter into force only if the board 
of review decides that it does not deal with a security issue which falls under Israel's 
responsibility, that it does not seriously threaten other significant Israeli interests 
protected by this Agreement and that the entry into force of the legislation could not 
cause irreparable damage or harm. 
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7. The legislation subcommittee shall attempt to reach a decision on the merits of 
the matter within 30 days from the date of the Israeli request. I f this subcommittee is 
unable to reach such a decision within this period of 30 days, the matter shall be referred 
to in Article XV below ( hereinafter " the Liaison committee"). This liaison committee 
will deal with the matter immediately and will attempt to settle it within 30 days. 
8. Where the legislation has not entered into force pursuant to paragraphs 5 or 7 
above, this situation shall be maintained pending the decision of the liaison committee 
on the merits of the matter, unless it has decided otherwise. 
9. Laws and military orders in effect in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area prior to 
the signing of this Agreement shall remain in force, unless amended or abrogated in 
accordance with this Agreement. 
Article VIII 
Arrangements for Security and Public Order 
1. In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the 
Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, the Palestinian Authority shall establish a strong police 
force, as set out in Article IX below. Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for 
defense against external threats, including the responsibility for protecting the Egyptian 
border and the Jordanian line, and for defense against external threats from the sea and 
from the air, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis and settlements, 
for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order, and will have all 
the powers to take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility. 
2. Agreed security arrangements and coordination mechanism are specified in 
Annex I . 
3. A joint coordination and cooperation committee for mutual security purposes 
(hereinafter "the JSC"), cooperation offices for the Gaza district, the Khan Younis 
district and the Jericho district respectively ( hereinafter " the DCOs") are hereby 
established as provided for in Annex I . 
4. The security arrangements provided for in this Agreement and in Annex I may 
be reviewed at the request of either party and may be amended by mutual agreement of 
the parties. Specific review arrangements are included in Annex I . 
Article IX 
The Palestinian Directorate of police force 
1. The Palestinian Authority shall establish a strong police force, the Palestinian 
Directorate of police force ( hereinafter " the Palestinian police"). The duties, functions, 
structure, deployment and composition of the Palestinian police, together with 
provisions regarding its equipment and operation, are set out in Annex I , Article III. 
Rules of conduct governing the activities of the Palestinian police are set out in Annex I , 
Article VIII. 
2. Except for the Palestinian police referred to in this Article and the Israeli 
military forces, no other armed forces shall be established or operate in the Gaza Strip or 
the Jericho Area. 
3. Except for the arms, ammunition and equipment of the Palestinian police 
described in Annex I , Article II I , and those of the Israeli military forces, no organization 
or individual in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area shall manufacture, sell, acquire, 
possess, import or otherwise introduce into the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area any 
firearms, ammunition, weapons, explosives, gunpowder or any related equipment, 
unless otherwise provided for in Annex I . 
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Article X 
Passages 
Arrangements for coordination between Israel and the Palestinian Authority regarding 
the Gaza-Egypt and Jericho-Jordan passages, as well as any other agreed international 
crossings, are set out in Annex I , Article x. 
ArticleXI 
Safe Passage between the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area 
Arrangements for safe passage of persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and 
the Jericho Area set out in Annex I , Article IX. 
Article XII 
Relations Between Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
1. Israel and Palestinian Authority shall seek to foster mutual understanding and 
tolerance and shall accordingly abstain from incitment, including hostile propaganda, 
against each other and, without derogating from the principle of freedom of expression, 
shall take legal measures to prevent such incitement by any organisations, groups or 
individuals within their jurisdiction. 
2. Without derogating from the other provisions of this Agreement, Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority shall cooperate in combatting criminal activity which may affect 
both sides, including offenses related to trafficking in illigal drugs and psychotropic 
substances, smuggling, and offenses against property, including offenses related to 
vehicles. 
Article XIII 
Economic Relations 
The economic relations between the two sides are set out in the protocol on Economic 
Relations signed in Paris on April 29, 1994 and the Appendices thereto, certified copies 
of which are attached as Annex IV, and will be governed by the relevant provisions of 
this Agreement and its Annexes. 
Article XIV 
Human Rights and the Rule of law 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall exercise their powers and responsibilities 
pursuant to this Agreement with due regard to internationally-accepted norms and 
principles of human rights and the rule of law. 
Article XV 
The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee 
1. The liaison committee established pursuant to Article x of the Declaration of 
principles shall ensure the smooth implementation of this Agreement. It shall deal with 
issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest and disputes. 
2. The liaison committee shall be composed of an equal number of member from 
each party. It may add other technicians and experts as necessary 
3. The liaison committee shall adopt its rules of procedure, including the frequency 
and place or places of its meetings. 
4. The liaison committee shall reach its decisions by Agreement. 
Article XVI 
Liaison and cooperation with Jordan and Egypt 
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1. Pursuant to Article XII of the Declaration of Principles, the parties shall invite 
the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to paticipate in establishing further liaison and 
cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian 
representatives on the one hand, and the Government of Jordan and Egypt on the other 
hand, to promote cooperation between them. 
These arrangements shall include the constitution of a continuing committee. 
2. The continuing committee shall decide by agreement on the modalities of 
admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, 
together with necessary measures to prevent disruption 
and disorder. 
3. The continuing committee shall deal with other matters of common concern. 
Article XVII 
Settlement of Differences and Disputes 
Any difference relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred to the 
appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism established under this Agreement. 
The provisions of Article xv of the Declaration of Principles shall apply to any such 
difference which is not settled through the appropriate coordination and cooperation 
mechanism, namely: 
1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Agreement or any 
subsequent agreement pertaining to the interim period shall be settled by negotiations 
through the liaison committee. 
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be settled by a mechanism 
of conciliation to be agreed between the Parties. 
3. The Parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim 
period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of 
both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration committee. 
Article XVIII 
Prevention of Hostile Acts 
Both sides shall take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime 
and hostilities directed against each other, against individuals falling under the other's 
authority and against their property, and shall take legal measures against offenders. In 
addition, the Palestinian side shall take all measures necessary to prevent such hostile 
acts directed against the settlements, the infrastructure serving them and the military 
Installation Area, and the Israeli side shall take all measures necessary to prevent such 
hostile acts emanating from the Settlements and directed against Palestinians. 
Article XIX 
Missing Persons 
The Palestinian Authority shall cooperate with Israel by providing all necessary 
assistance in the conduct of searches by Israel within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho 
Area for missing Israelis, as well as by providing information about missing Israelis. 
Israel shall cooperate with the Palestinian Authority in searching for, and providing 
necssary information about, missing Palestinians. 
Article XX 
Confidence Building Measures 
With a viewe to creating a positive and supportive public atmospher to accompany the 
implementation of this Agreement, and to establish a solid basis of mutual trust and 
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good faith, both parties agree to carry out confidence building measures as detailed 
herewith: 
1. Upon the signing of this Agreement, Israel will release, or turn over, to the 
Palestinian Authority within a period of 5 weeks, about 5,000 Palestinian detainees and 
prisoners, residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Those released will be free to 
return to their homes anywhere in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. Prisoners turned 
over to the Palestinian Authority shall be obliged to remain in the Gaza Strip or the 
Jericho Area for the remainder of their sentence. 
2. After the signing of this Agreement, the two parties shall continue to negotiate 
the release of additional Palestinian prisoners and detainees, building on agreed 
principles. 
3. The implementation of the above measures will be subject to the fulfilment of 
the procedures determined by Israeli law for the release and transfer of detainees and 
prisoners. 
4. With the assumption of Palestinian authority, the Palestinian side commits itself 
to solving the problem of those Palestinians who were in contact with the Israeli 
authorities, until an agreed solution is found, the Palestinian side undertakes not to 
prosecute these Palestinians or to harm them in any way. 
5. Palestinians from abroad whose entry into the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area is 
approved pursuant to this Agreement, and to whom the provisions of this Article are 
applicable , will not be prosecuted for offenses committed prior to September 13, 1993. 
Article XXI 
Temporary International Presence 
1. The parties agree to a temporary international or foreign presence in the Gaza 
Strip and the Jericho Area ( hereinafter"the TIP"), in accordance with the provisions of 
this Article. 
2. The TIP shall consist of 400 qualified personnel, including observers, instructors 
and other experts, from 5 to 6 of the donor countries. 
3. The two parties shall request the donor countries to establish a special fund to 
provide finance for the TIP. 
4. The TIP will function for a period of 6 months, the TIP may extend this period, 
or change the scope of its operation, with the agreement of the two parties. 
5. The TIP shall be stationed and operate within the following cities and illages: 
Gaza, Khan Yunis, Rafah, Deir El Ballah, Jabaliya, Absan, Beit Hanun and Jericho. 
6. Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall agree on a special protocol to 
implement this Article, with the goal of concluding negotiations with the donor 
countries contributing personnel within two months. 
Article XXII 
Rights, Liabilities and Obligations 
1. a. The transfer of all powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian 
Authority, as detailed in annex 11, includes all related rights, liabilities and obligations 
arising with regard to acts or omissions which occurred prior to the transfer. Israel will 
cease to bear any financial responsibility regarding such acts or omissions and the 
Palestinian Authority will bear all financial responsibilities for these and for its own 
functioning. 
b. Any financial claim made in this regard against Israel will be referred to the 
Palestinian Authority. 
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c. Israel shall provide the Palestinian Authority with the information it has 
regarding pending and anticipated claims brought before any court or tribunal against 
Israel in this regard. 
d. Where legal proceedings are brought in respect of such a claim, Israel will notify 
the Palestinian Authority and enable it to participate in defending the claim and raise 
any arguments on its behalf. 
e. In the event that an award is made against Israel by any court or tribunal in 
respect of such a claim, the Palestinian Authority shall reimburse Israel the full amount 
of the award. 
f. Without prejudice to the above, where a court or tribunal hearing such a claim 
finds that liability rests solely with an employee or agent who acted beyond the scope of 
the powers assigned to him or her, unlawfully or with willful malfeasance, the 
Palestinian Authority shall not bear financial responsibility. 
2. The transfer of authority in itself shall not affect rights, liabilities and obligations 
of any person or legal entity, in existence at the date of signing of this Agreement. 
Article XXIII 
Final Clauses 
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signing. 
2. The arrangements established by this Agreement shall remain in force until and 
to the extent superseded by the interim Agreement referred to in the Declaration of 
Principles or any other agreement between the parties. 
3. The five-year interim period referred to in the Declaration of Principles 
commences on the date of the signing of this Agreement. 
4. The parties agree that, as long as this Agreement is in force, the security fence 
erected by Israel around the Gaza Strip shall remain in place and that the line 
demarcated by the fence, as shown on attached map No. 1, shall be authoritative only 
for the purpose of this Agreement. 
5. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice or preempt the outcome of the 
negotiations on the interim agreement or on the permanent status to be conducted 
pursuant to the Declaration of Principles. Neither party shall be deemed, by virtue of 
having entered into this Agreement, to have renounced or waived any of its existing 
rights, claims or positions. 
6. The two parties view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial 
unit, the integrity of which will be preserved during the interim period 
7. The Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area shall continue to be an integral part of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and their status shall not be changed for the period of 
this Agreement. Nothing in this Agreement shall be considered to change this status. 
8. The preamble to this Agreement, and all Annexes, Appendices and maps 
attached hereto, shall constitute an integral part hereof. 
Done in Cairo this fourth day of May, 1994. 
For the Government of the State of Israel For the PLO 
Yitzhak Rabin Yasser Arafat 
Witnessed by: 
The United States of America / The Russian federation / The Arab Republic of Egypt 
Source: Abdul Hadi, M., Documents on Palestine. Vol. II From the Negotiations in 
Madrid to the Post-Hebron Agreement Period, (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997), pp. 
175- 180. 
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APPENDIX V! 
Letters of Assurance to Israel 
November 4, 1998 
Dear Dani: 
I wanted to confirm our policy on the issues of Reciprocity/Parallelism, Permanent 
Status Negotiations, and Prisoner Releases. In this regard, the statements issued publicly 
by the State Department on October 29, 1998, are accurate and represent our policies. 
On Reciprocity/Parallelism, the statement said: "Resolving the crisis of 
confidence between Israelis and Palestinians requires each side to fulfill a set of 
responsibilities based on the concept of reciprocity, i.e., both sides must carry out their 
respective obligations in accordance with the Wye River Memorandum. These 
obligations will be implemented or carried out in a parallel phased approach in 
accordance with the mutually agreed Time Line." 
As for Permanent Status Negotiations, the statement said: "The US is highly sensitive to 
the vital importance of the permanent status issues to Israel's future. We recognize that 
the security of the State of Israel and the Israeli public is at stake, and the US 
commitment to Israel's security remains ironclad. 
"We appreciate that i f the US is invited by both parties to participate in the permanent 
status talks, which are to be conducted between Israel and the Palestinians on a bilateral 
basis, we will do so for the purpose of facilitating the negotiations. 
"Only Israel can determine its own security needs and decide what solutions will be 
satisfactory. 
"We also understand that any decision to convene or seek to convene a summit to 
resolve permanent status issues will need the agreement of both parties." 
With regard to the issue of Prisoner Releases and the question of a "revolving door," the 
statement said: "We have had discussions with the Palestinians and they have given us a 
firm commitment that there will be no 'revolving door.'" 
These public statements by the State Department represent our policies. 
We will not change them and they will remain our policies in the future. 
Sincerely, Edward S. Walker Jr. 
Ambassador. 
Dear Mr. Naveh: 
I wanted to provide further clarification of the understanding of the United States 
regarding one of the issues addressed in the Wye River Memorandum. With respect to 
the Palestinian side's provision of its list of policemen to Israel (II (C)(1)(a)), the US has 
been assured that it will receive all appropriate information concerning current and 
former policemen as part of our assistance program. It is also our understanding that it 
was agreed by the two sides that the total number of Palestinian policemen would not 
exceed 30,000. 
Sincerely, Dennis B. Ross. 
Special Middle East Coordinator 
Dear Dani: 
I wanted to confirm our policy on the issue of the 3rd phase of further 
redeployment. In this regard, the statement issued publicly by the State 
Department on October 27,1998, is accurate and represents our policy. 
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Regarding the third further redeployment, the statement said: "During the 
discussions leading to this agreement, the US made clear to both parties that it wil l not 
adopt any position or express any view about the size or the content of the third phase of 
Israel's further redeployment, which is an Israeli responsibility to implement rather than 
negotiate. 
"Under the terms of the memorandum, an Israeli-Palestinian committee is 
being established. Nonetheless we urge the parties not to be distracted from the urgent 
task of negotiating permanent status arrangements, which are at the heart of the matter 
and which will determine the future of the area. 
"Our own efforts have been and wil l continue to be dedicated to that vital 
task." 
This public statement by the State Department represents our policy. We wil l not 
change it and it will remain our policy in the future. 
Sincerely, Edward S. Walker Jr. 
Ambassador. 
Dear Dani: 
I wanted to confirm our policy on the issues of unilateral actions and the 
Charter of the PLO. In this regard, the statements issued publicly by the State 
Department on October 27, 1998, are accurate and represent our policies. 
With regard to unilateral declarations or other unilateral actions, the statement said: "As 
regards to the possibility of a unilateral decision of statehood or other unilateral actions 
by either party outside the negotiating process that prejudge or predetermine the 
outcome of those negotiations, the US opposes and wil l oppose any such unilateral 
actions. 
"Indeed, the US has maintained for many years that an acceptable solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict can only be found through negotiations, not through unilateral 
actions. And as we look to the future, that wi l l remain our policy. 
"For the present, we are doing all we can to promote permanent status negotiations on 
an accelerated basis. And we are stressing that those who believe that they can declare 
unilateral positions or take unilateral acts, when the interim period ends, are courting 
disaster." 
With regard to the PNC, the statement said: "The Wye River Agreement specifies that 
the members of the PNC (as well as the members of the PLO Central Council, the 
Palestinian Council, and the Heads of Palestinian Ministries) wil l be invited to a 
meeting which President Clinton wil l attend. 
"The purpose of this meeting of the PNC and other PLO organizations is to reaffirm 
Chairman Arafat's January 22 letter to President Clinton nullifying each of the Charter's 
provisions that are inconsistent with the PLO's commitments to renounce terror, and to 
recognize and live in peace with Israel. 
"This process of reaffirmation wil l make clear, once and for all, that the provisions of 
the PLO Charter that call for the destruction of Israel are null and void." 
These public statements by the State Department represent our policies. 
We wi l l not change them and they wil l remain our policies in the future. 
Sincerely, Edward S. Walker, Jr. 
Ambassador 
Source: The Internet: Http:\\ 
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APPENDIX VII 
Palestinian-Israeli Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
(Taba agreement) (Oslo II) Washington, 28 September 1995 
MAIN POINTS 
The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
(hereinafter "the PLO"), the representative of the Palestinian people; 
PREAMBLE 
Within the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated at Madrid in October 
1991; 
Reaffirming their determination to put an end to decades of confrontation and to live in 
peaceful co-existence, mutual dignity and security, while recognizing their mutual 
legitimate and political rights; 
Reaffirming their desire to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement 
and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process; 
Recognizing that the peace process and the new era that it has created, as well as the 
new relationship established between the two parties as described above, are 
irreversible, and the determination of the two parties to maintain, sustain and continue 
the peace process; 
Background 
.. .To date, preliminary agreements implemented pursuant to the Declaration of 
Principles include the Gaza-Jericho Agreement of May 4, 1994 which provided for the 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area and the transfer of 
civil powers in these areas to a Palestinian Authority, and subsequent agreements giving 
the Palestinian Authority limited responsibilities for additional civil spheres throughout 
the West Bank. Al l these agreements are superseded by the provisions of the Interim 
Agreement. 
The main object of the Interim Agreement is to broaden Palestinian self-
government in the West Bank by means of an elected self-government authority (the 
Palestinian Council). This wi l l allow the Palestinians to conduct their own internal 
affairs, reduce points of friction between Israelis and Palestinians, and open a new era of 
cooperation and co-existence based on common interest, dignity and mutual respect. At 
the same time it protects Israel" vital interests, and in particular its security interests, 
both with regard to external security as well as the personal security of its citizens in the 
West Bank. 
General 
The Interim Agreement between Israel and the PLO, including its annexes, 
comprises some 400 pages, setting forth the future relations between Israel and the 
Palestinians. To the main body of the agreement are appended six annexes dealing with: 
security arrangements, elections, civil affairs (transfer of powers), legal matters, 
economic relations, and Israeli-Palestinian cooperation. 
The agreement states that a Palestinian Council will be elected for an interim 
period not to exceed five years from the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement (i.e. no 
later than May 1999). The permanent status negotiations will deal with the remaining 
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issues, including Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, 
relations and cooperation with neighboring countries, etc. 
Elections 
The Council is an elected body and, accordingly, the agreement sets out 
arrangements for democratic elections to the Council by all Palestinians of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip aged 18 or over, who are registered in the population register. 
The elections wi l l take place 22 days after the conclusion of an IDF redeployment from 
populated areas in the West Bank... 
The Palestinian Council 
The Palestinian Council to be established following the elections will assume 
various powers and responsibilities in security and civil spheres in the West Bank and 
Gaza, as detailed below. 
With the establishment of the Council, the Israeli military government wi l l be 
withdrawn and the Civil Administration dissolved. The Council wi l l assume 
responsibility for all rights, liabilities, and obligations in the spheres transferred to it. At 
the time Israel will retain those powers and responsibilities not transferred to the 
Council... 
Security and redeployment 
The IDF will redeploy in the West Bank according to the timetables set in the 
agreement. In the first stage, designed to facilitate the holding of elections, the IDF wil l 
withdraw from the populated areas of the West Bank: the six cities -Jenin, Nablus, 
Tulkarm, Kalkilya, Ramallah and Bethlehem (in the city of Hebron special security 
arrangements wi l l apply as provided in the agreement) -and 450 towns and villages. At 
the end of this redeployment, there wi l l be almost no IDF presence in Palestinian 
population centers. 
In general, throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel wi l l have overall 
responsibility for external security and the security of Israelis and settlements. 
With regard to internal security and public order, the agreement established 
different arrangements for three typs of area: 
-Area " A " comprises the six cities listed above. In these areas, the Palestinian 
Council wi l l have full responsibility for internal security and public order, as well as full 
civil responsibilities. 
-"B" comprises the Palestinian towns and villages of the West Bank. In these 
areas, which contain some 68 percent of the Palestinian population, the council wi l l be 
granted ful l civil authority, as in Area "A". The Council will be charged with 
maintaining public order, while Israel wi l l have overall security authority to safeguard 
its citizens and to combat terrorism. This responsibility shall take precedence over the 
Palestinian responsibility for public order. 
25 Palestinian police stations wi l l be established in specified towns and villages 
to enable the Palestinian police to exercise its responsibility for public order. The 
agreement contains provisions requiring that the movement of Palestinian police be 
coordinated and confirmed with Israel. 
-In Area "C", which comprises the unpopulated areas of strategic importance to 
Israel and the Jewish settlements, Israel wi l l retain fu l l responsibility for security and 
public order. The council will assume all those civil responsibilities not related to 
territory, such as economics, health, education, etc. 
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Further Redeployments 
In addition to the redeployment of Israeli military forces described above, the 
agreement provides that a series of further redeployments are to take place at six-month 
intervals following the inauguration of the Council. In the course of these 
redeployments, additional parts of Area C will be transferred to the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Council, so that by the completion of the redeployment phases, 
Palestinian territorial jurisdiction will cover West Bank territory except for the areas 
where jurisdiction is to be determined under the final status negotiations (settlements, 
military locations, etc.). 
The Revocation of the PLO Covenant 
The agreement contain an undertaking to revoke those articles of the Palestinian 
Covenant calling for the destruction of Israel, within two months of the inauguration of 
the Council. 
The Security Policy for the Prevention of Terrorism and Violence 
The agreement provides for the establishment of a strong force, 12,000 in 
number, that wi l l constitute the only Palestinian security force. The Security Annex 
specifies the deployment of the police force, the approved equipment and its modes of 
action. 
The Security Annex specifies the commitment of Israel and the Palestinian 
Council to cooperate in the fight against terrorism and the prevention of terrorist attaks, 
according to the following framework: 
A. The Palestinian Police is the only Palestinian Security Authority. 
B. The Palestinian Police wi l l act systematically against all expression of 
violence and terror. 
C. The Council will issue permits in order to legalize the possession and 
carrying of arms by civilians; any illegal arms wil l be confiscated by the 
Palestinian Police. 
D. The Palestinian Police wi l l arrest and prosecute individuals suspected of 
perpetrating acts of violence and terror. 
Both sides, in accordance with this agreement, wil l act to insure the immediate, efficient 
and effective handling of any incident involving the threat, or acts of terrorism, violence 
or incitrnent, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis. To this end they wil l 
cooperate in the exchange of information and coordinate policies and activities. 
Joint security committees wil l be established to coordinate between the IDF and 
the Palestinian police. Regional offices wi l l operate 24 hours a day. Joint patrols wi l l 
ensure free and secure movement on designated roads in Area "A". Joint Mobile Units 
wil l serve as rapid response units in case of incidents and emergencies. 
Transfer of Civil powers and Responsibilities 
The agreement sets out the arrangements for the transfer of agreed upon civil 
powers and responsibilities from the Civil Administration to the Council. In Area "C", 
power and responsibilities not relating to territory wil l be transferred to the Council; 
powers and responsibilities relating to territory wil l be gradually transferred along with 
the redeployments in these areas. The transfer of further civil powers and 
responsibilities is subject to detailed provisions insuring, among other things, the land 
rights of Israelis and the continued provision of services (electricity, water, 
telecommunications, etc.) to the settlements. 
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Freedom of Movement for Israelis 
The IDF and Israeli will continue to move freely on the roads of the West Bank 
and Gaza. In area "A" Israeli vehicles will be escorted by joint patrols, Israelis may not 
in any circumstances be arrested or placed in custody bt the Palestinian police, and may 
only be required to present identity and vehicle documentation. On roads that are jointly 
patrolled, any request for identification shall only be made by the Israeli side of a joint 
patrol... 
Religious Sites 
Responsibility over sites of religious significance in the West Bank and Gaza 
wil l be transferred to the Palestinian side. In Area "C" this wi l l be transferred gradually 
during the "further redeployment phase", except for the issues which wi l l be negotiated 
during the permanent status negotitions. Both sides shall respect and protect religious 
rights of Jews, Christians, Muslims and Samaritans to wit: 
A. Protecting the holy sites. 
B. Allowing freedom of worship and practice. 
Jewish holy sites are listed in the agreement. 
And defines access arrangements for the holy places located in Area " A " and "B". With 
regard to Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem and Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, special 
arrangements are set out in the agreement which wil l also also guarantee freedom of 
access and freedom of worship. 
Hebron 
In view of the Jewish presence in the heart of Hebron and the sensitive historical 
and religious aspects involved, special arrangements wil l apply in this city. These 
arrangements wil l enable Palestinian police to exercise responsibilities vis-a-vis 
Palestinian residents while at the same time israel wi l l retain the powers and 
responsibilities necessary to protect Israeli residents living in Hebron and visiting the 
holy places. 
There wil l be a redeployment of Israeli military forces in Hebron, except for 
places and roads where arrangements are necessary for the security and protection of 
Israelis and their movements. This redeployment wi l l be completed no later than six (6) 
months after the signing of this agreement. Israel wi l l continue to carry the 
responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their 
internal security and public order. 
The status quo at the Tomb of the Patriarchs wi l l remain unchanged, for the time 
being. 
There wil l be a temporary international presence in hebron... 
Water 
The agreement contains an undertaking on the part of Israel to increase the 
amount of water allocated to the Palestinians by 28 million cu.m. Any further addition 
to either side wil l be based on an increase in the available water resources to be 
developed through international funding and channels, among them the tripartite 
American-Palestinian-Israeli forum which will hold its first meeting after the signing of 
the interim Agreement. The agreement provides for the establishment of a joint water 
committee that will manage water resources and enforce water policies, protecting the 
interests of both parties by the prevention of uncontrolled drilling and enforcing 
standards, etc. 
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Release of Prisoners 
In order to foster a positive atmosphere as this agreement is being implemented, 
and to engender mutual confidence and a basis for cooperation between the two peoples, 
Israel wi l l release Palestinian prisoners who are in Israeli custody in three (3) stages 
according to the following format: 
Stage 1-Upon the signing of the agreement. 
Stage 2-On the eve of elections for the Council. 
Stage 3-At a later unspecified date. 
Annex VI I of the Agreement establishes the criteria which Israel wil l take into 
consideration when deciding upon the release... 
Source: Bickerton I and Klausner, C , ( New Jersy: Printice-Hall, 1998), pp. JOT-
SI 0. 
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APPENDIX VIII 
Hebron Agreement 
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, January 1997 
In accordance with the provision of the Interim Agreement and in particular of Article 
V I I of Annex I to the Interim Agreement, both parties have agreed on this Protocol for 
the implementation of the redeployment in Hebron. 
Security Arrangements Regarding Redeployment in Hebron 
1. Redeployment in Hebron 
The redeployment of Israeli Military Forces in Hebron wil l be carried out in accordance 
with the Interim Agreement and this Protocol. This redeployment wil l be completed not 
later than ten days from the signing of this Protocol. During these ten days both sides 
will exert every possible effort to prevent friction and any action that would prevent the 
redeployment. This redeployment shall constitute full implementation of the provisions 
of the Interim Agreement with regard to the City of Hebron unless otherwise provided 
for in Article VI I of Annex I to the Interim Agreement. 
2. Security Powers and Responsibilities 
a. (1) The Palestinian Police wi l l assume responsibilities in Area H - l similar to 
those in other cities in the West Bank; and 
(2) Israel wi l l retain all powers and responsibilities for internal security and 
public order in Area H-2. In addition, Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for 
overall security of Israelis. 
b. In the context - both sides reaffirm their commitment to honor the relevant 
security provisions of the Interim Agreement, including the provisions regarding 
- Arrangements for Security and Public Order (Article XI I of the Interin 
Agreement); Prevention of Hostile Acts (Article XV of the Interim Agreement); 
Security Policy for the Prevention of Terrorism and Violence (Article I I of 
Annex I to the Interim Agreement); Guidelines for Hebron (Article V I I o f Annex 
I to the Interim Agreement); and Rules of Conduct in Mutual Security Matters 
(Article X I of Annex I to the Interim Agreement). 
3. Agreed Security Arrangements 
a. With a view to ensuring mutual security and stability in the City of Hebron, 
special security arrangements wil l apply adjacent to the areas under the security 
responsibility of Israel, in Area H - l , in the area between the Palestinian Police 
checkpoints delineated on the map attached to this Protocol as Appendix I 
(hereinafter referred to as "the attached map") and the areas under the security 
responsibility of Israel. 
b. The purpose of the above mentioned checkpoints wi l be to enable the Palestinian 
Police, exercising their responsibilities under the Interim Agreement, to prevent 
entry of armed persons and demonstrators or other people threatining security 
and public order, into the above mentioned area. 
4. Joint Security Measures 
a. The DCO wil l establish a sub-office in the City of Hebron as indicated on the 
attached map. 
b. JMU will operate in Area H-2 to handle incidents that involve Palestinians only. 
The JMU movement wi l l be detailed on the attached map. The DCO will 
coordinate the JMU movement and activity. 
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c. As part of the security arrangements in the area adjacent to the areas under the 
security responsibility of Israel, as defined above, Joint Mobile Units wil l be 
operating in this area, with special focus on the folloing places: 
(1) Abu Sneinah 
(2) Harat A-Sheikh 
(3) Sha'ab 
(4) The high ground overlooking new Route No. 35. 
d. Two Joint Patrols wil l function in Area H - l . 
(1) a Joint patrol which wil l operate on the road from Ras e-Jura to the 
north of the Dura junction via E-Salaam Road, as indicated on the 
attached map; and 
(2) a Joint Patrol which wil l operate on existing Route No. 35, including 
the eastern part of existing Route No. 35, as indicated on the attached 
map. 
E. The Palestinian and Israeli side of the JMUs in the City of Hebron wil l be 
armed with equivalent types of weapons (Mini-Ingraham sub machine-guns 
for the Palestinian side and short MI6s for the Israeli side). 
F. With a view to dealing with the special security situation in the City of 
Hebron, a Joint Coordination Centre (hereinafter the "JCC"), headed by 
senior officers of both sides, will be established in the DCO at Har 
Manoah/Jabel Manoah. The purpose of the JCC wil l be to coordinate the 
joint security measures in the City of Hebron. The JCC will be guided by all 
the relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement, including Annex I and this 
Protocol. In this context, each side will notify the JCC of demonstrations and 
actions taken in respect of such demonstrations, and of any security activity, 
close to the areas under the responsibility of the other side, including in the 
area defined in Article 3(a) above. The JCC shall be informed of activities in 
accordance with Article 5(d)(3) of this Protocol. 
5. The Palestinian Police 
a. Palestinian police stations or posts will be established in Area H - l , manned by a 
total up to 400 policemen, equipped with 20 vehicle and armed with 200 pistols, 
and 100 rifles for the protection of the police stations. 
b. Four designated Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) wi l l be established and 
stationed in Area H-T, one in each of the police stations, as delineated on the 
attached map. The main task of the RRTs will be to handle special security 
cases. Each RRT shall be comprised of up to 16 members. 
c. The above mentioned rifles wi l l be designated for the exclusive use of the RRTs, 
to handle special cases. 
d. The Palestinian Police shall operate freely in Area H - l . 
(1) Ativities of the RRTs armed with rifles in the Agreed Adjacent Area, as 
defined in Appendix 2, shall require the agreement of the JCC. 
(2) The RRTs wil l use the rifles in the rest of Area H - l to fulf i l l their above 
mentioned tasks. 
e. The Palestinian Police wi l l ensure that all Palestinian policemen, prior to their 
deployment in the City of Hebron, will pass a security check in order to verify 
their suitability for service, taking into account the sensitivity of the area. 
6. Holy Sites 
a. Paragraphs 2 and 3(a) of Article 32 of Appendix 1 to Annex I I I of the Agreement 
will be applicable to the following Holy Sites in Area H - l : 
(1) The Cave of Othniel Ben Knaz / El-Khalil; 
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(2) Elonei Mamre / Haram Er-Rameh; 
(3) Eshel Avraham / Balotat Ibrahim; and 
(4) Maayan Sarah / Ein Sarah 
b. The Palestinian Police will be responsible for the protection of the above Jewish 
Holy Sites. Without derogation from the above responsibility of the Palestinian 
Police, visits to the above Holy Sites by worshippers or other visitors shall be 
accompanied by a Joint Mobile Unit, which will ensure free, unimpeded and secure 
access to the Holy Sites, as well as their peaceful use. 
7. Normalization of life in the Old City 
a. Both sides reiterate their commitment to maintain normal life the throughout the 
City of Hebron and to prevent any provocation or friction that may affect the 
normal life in the city. 
b. In this context, both sides are committed to take all steps and measures 
necessary for the normalization of life in Hebron, including: 
(1) The wholesale market - Hasbah - wil l be opened as a retail market in which 
goods wi l l be sold directly to consumers from within the existing shops. 
(2) The movement of vehicles on the Shuhada Road wi l l be gradually returned, 
within 4 months, to the same situation which existed prior to February 1994. 
8. The Imara 
The Imara wil l be turned over to the Palestinian side upon the completion of the 
redeployment and wil l become the headquarters of the Palestinian Police in the City of 
Hebron. 
9. City of Hebron 
Both sides reiterate their commitment to the unity of the City of Hebron, and their 
understanding that the division of security responsibility wil l not divide the city. In this 
context, and without derogation from the security powers and responsibilities of either 
side, both sides share the mutual goal that movement of people, goods and vehicles 
within and in and out of the city wi l l be smooth and normal, without obstacles or 
barriers. 
Civil Arrangements Regarding the Redeployment in Hebron 
10. Transfer of Civil Powers and Responsibilities 
a. The transfer of civil powers and responsibilities that have yet to be transferred to 
the Palestinian side in the city of Hebron (12 spheres) in accordance with Article^ 
-VII of-Amex"I -to -tlre~M^ be conducted concurrently with 
the beginning of the redeployment of Israeli military forces in Hebron. 
b. In Area H-2, the civil powers and responsibilities wi l l be transferred to the 
Palestinian side, except for those relating to Israelis and their property, which 
shall continue to be exercised by the Israeli Military Government. 
11. Planning, Zoning and Building 
a. The two parties are equally committed to preserve and protect the historic 
character of the city in a way which does not harm or change that character in 
any part of the city. 
b. The Palestinian side has informed the Israeli side that in exercising its powers 
and responsibilities, taking into account the existing municipal regulations, it has 
undertaken to implement the following provisions: 
(1) proposed construction of building above two floors (6meters) within 50 
meters of the external boundaries of the locations specified in the list 
attached to this Protocol as Appendix 3 (hereinafter referred to as "the 
attached list") will be coordinated through the DCL. 
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(2) Proposed construction of buildings above three floors (9 meters) between 50 
and 100 meters of the external boundaries of the locations specified in the 
attached list wi l l be coordinated through the DCL. 
(3) Proposed construction of non-residental, non-commercial buildings within 
100 meters of the external boundaries of the locations specified in the 
attached list that are designed for uses that may adversely affect the 
environment (such as industrial factories) or buildings and institutions in 
which more than 50 persons are expected to gather together will be 
coordinated through the DCL. 
(4) Proposed construction of buildings above two floors (6 meters) within 50 
meters from each side of the road specified in the attached list will be 
coordinated through the DCL. 
(5) The necessary enforcement measures wi l l be taken to ensure compliance on 
the ground with the preceding provisions. 
(6) This necessary enforcement measures wi l l be taken to ensure compliance on 
the ground with the preceding provisions. 
12. Infrastructure 
a. The Palestinian side shall inform the Israeli side, through the DCL, 48 hours in 
advance of any anticipated activity regarding infrastructure which may disturb 
the regular flow of traffic on roads in Area H-2 or which may affect 
infrastructure (such as water, sewage, electricity and communications) serving 
Area H-2. 
b. The Israeli side may request, through the DCL, that the Municipality carry out 
works regarding the roads or other infrastructure required for the well being of 
the Israelis in Area H-2. I f the Israeli side offers to cover the costs of these 
works, the Palestinian side wil l ensure that these works are carried out as a top 
priority. 
c. The above does not prejudice the provisions of the Interim Agreement regarding 
the access to infrastructure, facilities and installations located in the city of 
Hebron, such as the electricity grid. 
13. Transportation 
The Palestinian side shall have the power to determine bus stops, traffic arrangements 
and traffic signalization in the city of Hebron. Traffic signalization, traffic arrangements 
and the location of bus stops in Area H-2 wi l l remain as they are on the date of the 
redeployment in Hebron. Any subsequent change in these arrangements in Area H-2 
wil l be done in cooperation between the two sides in the transportation sub-committee. 
14. Municipal inspectors 
a. In accordance with paragraph 4.c of Article V I I of Annex I of the Interim 
Agreement, plainclothes unarmed municipal inspectors wil l operate in Area H-2. 
The number of these inspectors shall not exceed 50. 
b. The inspectors shall carry official identification cards with a photograph issued 
by the Municipality. 
c. The Palestinian side may request the assistance of the Israel Police, through the 
DCL of Hebron, in order to carry out its enforcement activities in Area H-2. 
15. Location of Offices of the Palestinian Council 
The Palestinian side, when operating new offices in Area H-2 wil l take into 
consideration the need to avoid provocation and friction. Where establishing such 
offices might affect public order or security the two sides wil l cooperate to find a 
suitable solution. 
16. Municipal Services 
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In accordance with paragraph. 5 of Article V I I of Annex 1 of the Interim Agreement, 
municipal services shall be provided regularly and continuously to all parts of the city of 
Hebron, at the same quality and cost. The cost shall be determined by the Palestinian 
side with respect to work done and material consumed, without discrimination. 
Miscellaneous 
17. Temporary International Presence 
There wil l be a Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH). Both sides will 
agree on the modalities of the TEPH, including the number of its members and its area of 
operation. 
18. Annexl 
Nothing in this Protocol wi l l derogate form the security powers and responsibilities of 
either side in accordance with Annex 1 to the Interim Agreement. 
19. Attached Appendices 
20. The appendices attached to this Protocol shall constitute an integral part hereof. 
21. Done at this 15th day of January 1997. 
For the Government of Israel For the PLO 
Source: Abdul Hadi, M., Documents on Palestine, vol. I I From the Negotiations in 
Madrid to the Post-Hebron Agreement Period, (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997), pp. 
317-320. 
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APPENDIX IX 
MULTILATERAL TALKS 
Dates of Meetings 
Madrid Peace Conference 
30 October - 1 November 1991 
Multilateral Organizational Meeting 
28-29 January 1992, Moscow 
Multilateral Steering Group (co-chairs: United States and Russia) 
Round 1 27 May 1992, Lisbon 
Round 2 3-4 December 1992, London 
Round 3 7 July 1993, Moscow 
Round 4 15-16 December 1993, Tokyo 
Round 5 12-13 July 1994, Tabarka, Tunisia 
Round 6 17-18 May 1995, Montreux, Switzerland 
Inter-sessional meetings 
9-10 February 1994, Canada 
22-23 January 1995, Cairo 
Multilateral working groups 
Water Resources ( gavel-holder: United States; co-orgaizer: Japan and EU) 
Round 1 14-15 May 1992, Vienna 
Round 2 16-17 September 1992, Washington, DC 
Round 3 27-29 April 1993, Geneva 
Round 4 26-28 October 1993, Beijing 
Round 5 17-19 April, 1994, Muscat, Oman 
Round 6 7-9 November 1994, Athens 
Round 7 18-22 June 1995, Amman 
Refugees (gavel-holder: Canada; co-organizers: United States, EU and Japan) 
Round 1 13-15 May 1992, Ottawa 
Round 2 11-12 November 1992, Ottawa 
Round 3 11-13 May 1993, Oslo 
Round 4 12-14 October 1993, Tunis 
Round 5 10-12 May 1994, Cairo 
Round 6 13-14 Decmber 1994, Antalya, Turkey 
Round 7 11-14 December 1995, Geneva 
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Arms Control and Regional Security ( gavel-holder: United States and Russia) 
Round 1 11 -14 May 1992, Washington, DC 
Round 2 15-17 September 1992, Moscow 
Round 3 18-20 May 1993, Washington, DC 
Round 4 2-4 November 1993, Moscow 
Round 5 3-5 May, 1994, Doha, Qatar 
Round 6 12-15 December 1994, Tunis 
Conceptual basket 
Meeting 1 30 January-3 February 1994, Cairo 
Meeting 2 12-14 October 1994, Paris 
Meeting 3 29 May-1 June 1995, Helsinki 
Operational basket 
Meeting 1 20-24 March 1994, Antalya, Turkey 
Meeting 2 7-9 November 1994, Dead Sea, Jordan 
Meeting 3 4-6 April 1995, Antalya, Turkey 
Environment ( gavel-holder: Japan: co-organizers: United States and EU) 
Round 1 18-19 May 1992, Tokyo 
Round2 26-27 September 1992, The Hague 
Round 3 24-25 May 1993, Tokyo 
Round 4 15-16 November 1993, Cairo 
Round 5 6-7 April 1994, The Hague 
Round 6 25-26 October 1994, Manama, Bahrain 
Round 7 18-22June 1995, Amman 
Regional Economic Development ( gavel-holder: co-organizers: United States and 
Japan) 
Round 1 11-12 May 1992, Brussels 
Round 2 29-30 October 1992, Paris 
Round 3 4-5 May 1993, Rome 
Round 4 8-9 November 1993, Copenhagen 
Round 5 15-16 June 19947Rabat 
Round 6 18-19 January 1995, Bonn 
Round 7 12 March 1996, Amman 
REDWG Monitoring Committee 
Meeting 1 17 January 1995, Bonn 
Meeting 2 26 June 1995, Cairo 
Meeting 3 15 December 1995, Brussels 
Finance committee 
Meeting 1 5 December 1994, Cairo 
Meeting 2 17 January 1995, Bonn 
Meeting 3 1-2 April 1995, Amman 
Meeting 4 16-17 May 1995, Cairo 
Meeting 5 7 August 1995, Amman 
Trade committee 
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Meeting 1 5 December 1994, Cairo 
Meeting 2 17 January 1995, Bonn 
Meeting 3 18 April 1995, Cairo 
Meeting 4 25 June 1995, Cairo 
Meeting 5 14-15 December 1995, Geneva 
Tourism committee 
Meeting 1 5 December 1994, Cairo 
Meeting 2 17 January 1995, Bonn 
Meeting 3 14-15 March 1995, Cairo 
Meeting 4 11-12 July 1995, Haifa 
Infrastructure committee 
Meeting 1 5 December 1994, Cairo 
Meeting 2 17 January 1995, Bonn 
Meeting 3 6-7 June 1995, Amman 
Source: Peters, J . , Pathways to Peace: the Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks. 
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Appendix X 
Clinton Statement at Signing of Israel-PLO Agreement 
Prime Minister Rabin, Chairman Arafat, Foreign Minister Peres, Mr Abbas, President 
Carter, President Bush, distinguished guests, on behalf of the United States and Russia, 
co-sponsors of the Middle East peace process, welcome to this great occasion of history 
and hope. Today we bear witness to an extraordinary act in one of history's defining 
dramas, a drama that began in a time of our ancestors when the world went forth from a 
sliver of land between the River Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea. That hallowed piece 
of earth, and land of life and revelation, is the home to the memories and dreams of 
Jews, Muslims, and Christians throughout the world. 
As we all knoe, devotion to that land has also been the source of conflict and 
bloodshed for too long. Throughout this century, bitterness between the Palestinian and 
Jewish people has robbed the entire region of its resources, its potential, and too many 
of its sons and daughters. The land has been so drenched in warfare and hatred that 
conflicting claims of history etched so deeply in the souls of the combatants there that 
many believe the past would always have the upper hand. 
Then, 14 years ago, the past began to give way when at this place and upon this 
desk three men of great vision signed their names to the Camp David Accord. Today we 
honor the memories of Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat, and we salute the wise 
leadership of President Jimmy Carter. 
Then, as now, we heard from those who said that conflict would come again 
soon. But the peace between Egypt and Israel has enddured. Just so, this bold new 
venture today, this brave gamble that the future can be better than the past, must endure. 
Two years ago in Madrid, another president took a major step on the road to 
peace by bringing israel and all her neighbors together to launch direct negotiations. 
Today we also express our deep thanks for the skillful leadership of President George 
Bush. 
Ever since Harry Truman first recognized Israel, every American president, 
Democrat and Republican, has worked for peace between israel and her neighbors. Now 
the efforts of all who have labored before us bring us to this moment, a moment when 
we dare to bledge what for so long seemed difficult even to imagine: that the security of 
the Israeli people wi l l be reconciled with the hopes of the Palestinian people, and there 
wi l l be more security and more hope for all. 
Today, the leadership of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization will 
sign a Declaration of Principles on Interim Palestinian Self-Government. It charts a 
course toward reconciliation between two peoples who have both known the bitterness 
of exile. Now both pledge to put old sorrows and antagonisms behind them and to work 
for a shared future, shaped by the values of the Torah, the Koran and the Bible. 
Let us salute also today the government of Norway for its remarkable role in 
nurturing this agreement. 
But above all, let us today pay tribute to the leaders who had the courage to lead 
their people toward peace, away from the scars of battle, the wounds and the losses of 
the past, toward a brighter tomorrow. The world today thanks Prime Minister Rabin, 
Foreign Minister peres and Chairman Arafat. Their tenancy and vision has given us the 
promise of a new beginning. 
What these leaders have done now must be done by others. Their achievement 
must be a catalyst for progress in all aspects of the peace process, and those of us who 
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support them must be there to help in all aspects, for the peace must render the people 
who make it more secure. 
A peace of the brave is within our reach. Throughout the Middle East, there is a 
great yearning for the quiet miracle of a normal life. We know a difficult road lies 
ahead. Every peace has its enemies, those who still prefer the easy habits of hatred to the 
hard labors of reconciliation. 
But prime Minister Rabin has reminded us that you do not have to make peace 
with your friends. And the Koran teaches that i f the enemy inclines toward peace, do 
thou also incline toward peace. 
Therefore, let us resolve that this new mutual recognition wil l be a continuing 
process in which the parties transform the very way they see and understand each other. 
Let the skeptics of this peace recall what once existed among these people. There was a 
time when the traffic of ideas and commerce and pilgrim flowed uninterrupted among 
the cities of the fertile crescent. In Spain, in the Middle East, Muslims and jews once 
worked together to write brilliant chapters in the history of literature and science. Al l 
this can come to pass again. 
Mr. Prime Minister, Mr Chairman, I pledge the active support of the United 
States of America to the difficult work that lies ahead. The United States is committed 
to ensuring that the world in marshalling the resources necessary to implement the 
difficult details that wil l make real the principles to which you commit yourselves 
today. 
Together, let us imagine what can be accomplished i f all the energy and ability 
the Israelis and the Palestinians have invested into your struggle can now be channeled 
into cultivating the land and freshening the waters, into ending the boycotts and creating 
new industry, into building a land as bountiful and peaceful as it is holy. Above all, let 
us dedicate ourselves today to your region's next generation. In this entire assembly, no 
one is more important than the group of Arab and israeli children who are seated here 
with us today. 
Mr. Prime Minister, Mr Chairman, this day belongs to you. And because of what you 
have done, tomorrow belongs to them. We must not leave them prey to the politics of 
extremism and despair, to those who would derail this process because they cannot 
overcome the fears and hatred of the past. We must not betray their future. For too long, 
the young of the Middle East have been caught in a web of hatred not of their own 
making: For too long, they have been taught from the chronicles of war. Now, we can 
give them the chance to know the season of peace. 
For them, we must realize the prophecy of Isaiah, that the cry of violence shall 
no more be heard in your land, nor rack ruin within your borders. The children of 
Abraham, the descendants of Isaac and Ishmael, have embarked together on a bold 
journy. Together, today, with all our hearts and all our souls, we bid them shalom, 
salaam, peace. 
Source: Bickerton, I and Klausner C , A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict, (New Jersy: Prentic Hall, 1998), p. 274. 
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APPENDIX XB 
The Washington Declaration between Jordan and Israel, July 25,1994, 
Washington, D.C. 
A. After generations of hostility, blood and tears and in the wake of years of pain 
and wars, his Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin are determined 
to bring an end to bloodshed and sorrow. It is in this spirit that His Majesty King 
Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defense, Mr. Yitzhak Rabin of Israel, met in Washington today at the invitation of 
President William J. Clinton of the United States of America. This initiative of 
President William J. Clinton constitutes an historic landmark in the United States' 
untiring efforts in promoting peace and stability in the Middle East. The personal 
involvement of the President has made it possible to realise agreement on the content of 
his historic declaration. 
The signing of this declaration bears testimony to the President's vision and devotion to 
the cause of peace. 
B. In their meeting, His Majesty king Hussien and prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
have jointly reaffirmed the five underlying principles of their understanding on an 
agreed common Agenda designed to reach the goal of a just, lasting and comprehensive 
peace between the Arab States and the Palestinians, with Israel. 
1. Jordan and Israel aim at the achievement of just, lasting and comprehensive peace 
between Israel and its neighbours and at the conclusion of a treaty of peace between 
both countries. 
2. The two countries wi l l vigorously continue their negotiations to arrive at a state of 
peace, based on Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 in all their aspects, and 
founded on freedom, equality and justice. 
3. Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 
Muslim Holy shrins in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status wi l l take 
place, Israel wi l l give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines. In 
addition the two sides have agreed to act together to promote interfaith relations among 
the three monotheistic religions. 
4. The two countries recognise their right and obligation to live in peace with other as 
well as with all states within secure and recognised boundaries. The two states affirmed 
their respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence of every state in the area. 
5. The two countries desire to develop good neighbourly relations of cooperation 
between them to ensure lasting security and to avoid threats and the use of force 
between them. 
C. The long conflict between the two states is now coming to an end. In this spirit 
the state of belligerency between Jordan and Israel has been terminated. 
D. Following this declaration and in keeping with the agreed Common Agenda, 
both countries wi l l refrain from actions or activities by either side that may 
adversely affect the security of the other or may prejudice the final outcome of 
negotiations. Niether side wil l threaten the other by use of force, weapons, or 
any other means, against each other and both sides will thwart threats to security 
resulting from all kinds of terrorism. 
E. His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin took note of the 
progress made in the bilateral negotiations within the Jordan-Israel track last 
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week on the steps decided to implement the sub-agendas on borders, territorial 
matters, security, water, energy, environment and the Jordan Rift Valley. 
In this framework, mindful of items of the Agreed Common Agenda (borders and 
territorial matters) they noted that the boundary sub-commission has reached agreement 
in July 1994 in fulfilment of part of the role entrusted to it in the sub-agenda. They also 
noted that the sub-commission for water, environment and energy agreed to mutually 
recognise, as the role of their negotiations, the rightful allocations of the two sides in 
Jordan River and Yarmouk River waters and to fully respect and comply with the 
negotiated rightful allocations, in accordance with agreed acceptable principles with 
mutually acceptable quality. Similarly, His Majesty King Hussein and prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin expressed their deep satisfaction and pride in the work of the trilateral 
commission in its meeting held in Jordan on Wednesday, July 20 th 1994, hosted by the 
Jordanian prime Minister, Dr. Abdessalam al-Majali, and attended by Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. They voiced their pleasure at 
the association and commitment of the United States in this endeavour. 
F. His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin believe that steps 
must be taken both to overcome psychological barriers and to break with the 
legacy of war. By working with optimism towards the dividends of peace for all 
the people in the region, Jordan and Israel are determined to shoulder their 
responsibilities towards the human dimension of peace making. They recognise 
imbalances and disparities are a root cause of extremism which thrives on 
poverty and unemployment and the degradation of human dignity. In this spirit 
His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin have today 
approved a series of steps to symbolise the new era which is now at hand: 
1. Direct telephone links wil l be opened between Jordan and Israel. 
2. The electricity grids of Jordan and Israel will be linked as part of a regional 
concept. 
3. Two new border crossings wi l l be opened between jordan and Israel - one at the 
southern tip of Aqaba-Eilat and other at a mutually agreed point in the orth. 
4. In principle free access wil l be given to third country tourists traveling between 
Jordan and Israel. 
5. Negotiations wil l be accelerated on opening an international air corridor between 
both vountries. 
6. The police forces of Jordan and Israel will cooperate in combating crime with 
emphasis on smuggling and particularly drug smuggling. The United states wil l 
be invited to participate in this joint endeavour. 
7. Negotiations on economic matters will continue in order to prepare for future 
bilateral cooperation including the abolition of all economic boycotts. 
Al l these steps are being implemented within the framework of regional infrastructural 
development plans and in conjunction with the Jordan-Israel bilaterals on boundaries, 
security, water and related issues and without prejudice to the final outcome of the 
negotiations on the items included in the Agreed Common Agenda between Jordan and 
Israel. 
G. His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin have agreed to 
meet periodically or whenever they fell necessary to review the progress of the 
negotiations and express their firm intention to shepherd and direct the process 
in its entity. 
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H. In conclusion, His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
wish to express once again their profound thanks and appreciation to President 
Wlliaim J. Clinton and his Administration for their untiring efforts in urthering 
the cause of peace, justice and prosperity for all the peoples of the region. They 
wish to thank the President personally for his warm welcome and hospitality. In 
recognition of their appreciation to the President, His Majesty King Hussein and 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin have asked President William J. Clinton to sign 
this document as a witness and as a host to their meeting. 
His Majesty King Hussein Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
President William J . Clinton 
Source: Flamhaft, Z., Israel on the Road to peace: Accepting the Unacceptable, 
(Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), p. 221. 
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Appendix XII 
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, October 1994 [Excerpts] 
P R E A M B L E 
The government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the government of Israel: 
Bearing in mind the Washington Declaration, signed by them on 25 july 1994 
and which they are both committed to honor. 
Aiming at the achievement of a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the 
middle East based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 318 in all their aspects; 
Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening peace based 
on freedom, equality, justice, and respect for fundamental and human rights: thereby 
overcoming psychological barriers and promoting human dignity; 
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations and recognizing their right and obligation to live in peace with each 
other as well as with all states, within secure and recognized boundaries; 
Desiring to develop friendly relations and cooperation between them in 
accordance with the principles of international law governing international relations in 
times of peace; 
Desiring as well to ensure lasting security for both their states and, in particular, 
to avoid threats and the use of force between them; 
Bearing in mind that in their Washington declaration of 25 july 1994, they 
declared the termination of the state of belligerency between them; 
Deciding to establish peace between them in accordance with this treaty of 
peace; 
Have agreed as follow: 
Article 1 - Establishment of Peace 
Peace is hereby established between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of 
Israel (the parties) effective from the exchange of the instruments of ratifications of this 
treaty... 
Article 3-International Boundary 
a. The international boundary between Israel and Jordan is delimited with reference to 
the boundary definition under the Mandate... 
b. The boundary is the permanent, secure, and recognized international boundary 
between Israel and Jordan without prejudice to the status of any territories that came 
under Israeli military government control in 1967... 
e. It is agreed that where the boundary follows a river, in the event of mitral change in 
the course of the flow of the river...the boundary shall follow the new course of 
theflow. In the event of any other changes, the boundary shall not be affected unless 
otherwise agreed... 
h. Taking into account the special circumstances of the Bakura / Naharayim area, which 
is under Jordanian sovereignty, with Israeli private ownership rights , the parties agreed 
to apply the provisions set out in Annex I (b)... 
Article 5 -Diplomatic and other Bilateral Relations 
1. The parties agree to establish full diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange 
resident ambassadors within one month of the exchange of the instruments of 
ratification of this treaty. 
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2. The parties agree that the normal relationship between them wil l further include 
economic and cultural relations. 
Article 6 Water 
With the view to achieving a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all water 
problems between them: 
1. The parties agree mutually to recognize the rightful allocations of both of 
them in Jordan River, Yarmuk River waters, and Arab/Arava ground water 
in accordance with the agreed acceptable principles, quantities, and quality 
as set out in Annex I I , which shall be fully respected and complied with; 
2. The parties, recognizing the necessity to find a practical, just, and agreed 
solution to their water problems and with the view that the subject of water 
can form the basis for the advancement of cooperation between them, jointly 
undertake to ensure that the management and development of their water 
resources do not, in any way, harm the water resources of the other party; 
3. The parties recognize that their water resources are not sufficient to meet 
their needs. More water should be supplied for their use through various 
methods, including projects of regional and international cooperation; 
4. In light of paragraph 2A, with the understanding that the cooperation in 
water-related subject would be to the benefit of both parties, and wil l help 
alleviate their water shortages, and that water issues along their entire 
boundary must be dealt with in their totality, including the possibility of 
trans-boundary water transfers, the parties agreed to search for ways to 
alleviate water shortage and cooperate in the following fields: 
a. Development of existing and new water resources increasing the water 
availability, including on a regional basis, as appropriate, and minimizing 
wastage of water resources through the chain of their uses; 
b. Prevention of contamination of water resources; 
c. Mutual assistance in the alleviation of water shortages; 
d. Transfer of information and joint research and development in water-related 
subjects, and review of the potentials for enhancement of water resources 
development and use; 
5. The implementation of both countries' undertaking under this article is 
detailed in Annex I I . . . 
Article 9 -Places of Historical and Religious Significance 
1. Each party will provide freedom of access to places of religious and 
historical significance. 
2. In this regard, in accordance with the Washington Declaration Israel respects 
the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Moslem holy 
shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status wil l take 
place, Israel wil l give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in the 
shrines. 
3. The parties wi l l act together to promote interfaith relations among the 
monotheistic religions, with the aim of working towards religious 
understanding, moral commitment, freedom of religious tolerance and 
peace... 
Source: Bickerton I and Klausner C , A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict, (New Jersy: Prentic Hall, 1998), p. 305-307. 
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